(EST PUB DATE THE IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM: PROGRESS DESPITE SETBACKS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000875771
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2009
• Case Number: F-2002-01391
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983

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Intelligence
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83- 100,1 lOc x
The Iraqi Nuclear
Program: Progress
Despite Setbacks
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APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
14-May-2009
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June I va
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 Directorate of
Intelligence
The Iraqi Nuclear
Program: Progress
Despite Setbacks
S1f' $J-IWlg4W
 The Iraqi Nuclear
Program; Progress
Despite SetbacksF
Key Judgments The damaging Israeli airstrike on 7 June 1981 against the Osirak reactor
A1lorma6un available at Iraq's Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center dealt a significant setback to
as ,J' 1 alar lA'L the Iraqi nuclear program but probably did not change Iraq's long-range
in hi, rvmvr
rilq s short
range options or acquiring sst ee materia -either by producing plutonium
in the Osirak reactor or by diverting its highly enriched fuel-have been
eliminated until rebuilding gets done. But Iraq's longer range program to
build a significant and broad-based domestic nuclear capability----and
probably an eventual nuclear weapon capability--is still moving forward
stcadilyF_~
SJ$ 83-10040(.V
 We still see no identifiable nuclear weapon program in Iraq. But Iraq has
made a few moves that could take it in that direction, in addition to serving
its broad purpose of eventual nuclear independence. If foreign assistance in
vital areas such as the manufacturing and testing of high explosives and the
design, fabrication, and testing of nuclear weapons could be obtained, Iraq
possibly could have a viable design completed on paper within a few years.
Unless they receive significant added foreign help, however, the Iraqis will
not be able to produce the material for a nuclear weapon before the 1990s.
Attaining that capability, even then, depends critically on the foreign
supply of a nuclear reactor-preferably a power reactor-of substantial
size fairly soon.F__~
~-~'~ iv
~ I
 Introduction
Status of the Iraqi Nuclear Program Before the Iran-Iraq War
Direction of the Iraqi Nuclear Program After the Iranian Attack
Effects of the Israeli Attack (7 June 1981)
Status of the Iraqi Nuclear Program Beforehand
Physical Effects of the Attack
Effects on the Iraqi Program
Iraqi Reaction
Prospects for Continued Foreign Assistance
Other Countries
Prospects for Iraqi-Developed Nuclear Weapons
Reactors for Plutonium Production
Plutonium Fuel Cycle
Other Possible Acquisition of Fissile Material
Nuclear Weapon Development
 ow
 The Iraqi Nuclear
Program: Progress
Iraq's nuclear R&D program was started with the
establishment of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commis.
sion (IAECI in January 1959. In August of that )ear,
the Soviets agreed to provide Iraq with a thermal
research reactor (IRT) rated at 2 megawatts thermal
(MWt), a radioisotope production laboratory, and
other supporting facilities. (The reactor was upgraded
in 1978 to 5 MWt, and subsequently to 10 MWt.)
Subsequently, the IAEC established the Nuclear Re-
search Institute (NRI)' near the village of Tuwaitha
as the location for the Soviet-built facilities (figure I).
NRI came to be recognized as the most important
Iraqi scientific research facility. By way of recogni-
tion, Iraq apparently decided that projects and facili-
ties built at the institute would be designated "Tam-
muz. The Soviet equipment and assistance came
earlier than any other foreign aid to NRI and were
called simply the Tammuz projectF--]
nuclear research reactors, hot cells, and supporting
facilities.' The French assistance has been referred to
as the 17 Tammuz project.' The 40-to-70-MWt
French-supplied Osirak reactor has been designated
by the Iraqis as the Tammuz-1: the smaller, 300-
kilowatt-thermal (kWt) French-supplied Isis reactor
has been designated Tammuz-2. Each of these reac-
tors was to be fueled with about 12 kilograms (kg) of
The NRI has been referred to successively as the Baghdad
Nuclear Research Center. the Iraqi Nuclear Research Center, and
now the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center
Tammuz: the month (July) of the Iraqi revs utr 1968. Itt
'Supporting facilities: radioactive-waste treatment and storage:
postirradiation examination facility: " Batimenis. Ateliers, Labora-
toires- (buildings, workshops, laboratoriest: and experimental de-
,ices---IRENE, HASE, MARINA.
' The French established a consortium-- RBAG--us the general
contractor for the 17 Tammuz project. CERBAG is controlled bv
the following companies: Technicatome (TA). Societe Generaie
pour Ics Techniques Nouvellcs (Jljht (formerly Saint Gobain
Techniques Nouvellesi, Comsip Entreprise (CEi, Constructions
Na,ales ci lndustrtcllcs de la Mediterranee(CNIM(, and Bouygucs
Offshores IBY).I
93-percent-enriched uranium. Such material is nor-
mally referred to as highly enriched uranium (l1LU)
and could be used in nuclear weapons.F_~
On 5 April 1976
signed a contract with Italy for a radiochemistry
laboratory, which was completed in April 1978. On 8
February 1978, Iraq signed a contract with the
Italians for four additional facilities (now completed!:
a radioisotope production laboratory IRPL), a materi-
als testing laboratory, a chemical engineering labora-
tory. and a fuel fabrication laboratory (FFL). The
FFL has been referred to as the 30 Tammuz project.
We do not know whether the other Italian-built
facilities` are also part of this project, or are designal-
0 by their own specific project name and number.
The Italian organizations involved with constructing the laborato-
ries at Tuwaitha arc SNIA-Techim, CNEN IComiiato Nazionalc
per l'Energia Nuclearct. AMN (Ansaldo Mcccanica Nuclearel. and
 T ecret
Status of the Iraqi Nuclear Program
Before the Iran-Iran War
We do not know how many of these Italian and French workers
acaualh received threats, but we believe that the main targets Were
the Italian firth SNIA-Tcchint and the French firm Technicatomc.
One Israeli concern during this time was the potential
for storage and accumulation of highly enriched
uranium fuel in Iraq. The French, too, exhibited
concern early on about the possible diversion of
Osirak fuel
the French tried to convince Baghdad to accept a new.
low-enriched (7-percent) fuel called "caramel" for
future shipments in place of 93-percent-enriched fuel.
But the Iraqis refused to accept the change. There-
fore, in June 1980 the French shipped a load of highly
 enriched uranium (rnrnpricing the first Core load
destined for Osirak). There have been no additional
shipments. The French claim that caramel fuel is
proliferation resistant, because the process for ex-
tracting plutonium from spent caramel fuel is more
difficult than extraction from standard reactor fuel.
 requested price quotations at this
time from a wise trm for two 500-gram containers
of 99.5-percent purity calcium metal. Calcium metal
is an excellent reducing agent and would most likely
be used to reduce uranium, zirconium, or plutonium
halides to uranium, zirconium, or plutonium metal.
Calcium metal in such a high-purity form has no
other uses than as a reducing agent- Iraq has been
interested in obtaining a facility to convert uranium,
at least, to the metallic form. Both metallic uranium
and metallic plutonium can be used as reactor fuel or
in nuclear explosives. Zirconium alloys are used as a
cladding for reactor fuel clements.l
The IAEC has been trying to upgrade its computer
capabilities since 1975. Iraq's National Computer
Center has recently expressed interest in acquiring the
Japanese ACOS-900 or ACOS-1000 computers for
Baghdad University. We suspect that, if the comput-
ers are acquired. they will be used by the IAEC. The
Japanese computers are comparable to the IBM 3081
and 3033 computers in performance and price, and
they could be useful in nuclear weapon research.
is the acquisition of
lasers and associated equipment. Because of the type
of equipment being sought and because of an earlier
approach to the Italians for assistance in LIS. we
suspect that Iraq is interested in developing an enrich-
ment capability by this means. Even with some
Effects of the Israeli Attack
;7 June 1981)
Status of the Iraqi Nuclear Program Beforehand
A few months before the Israeli airstrike, the Iraqi
nuclear program was still at a rudimentary stage, as
indicated by extensive purchases of instruments and
other equipment abroad. Pakistan. by way of compar-
ison. was much more advancedi
 In addition to the earthen berms and camouflage
netting to protect against air attack, there was an
intense effort to acquire other security equipment to
protect the facility from a possible ground attack. The
equipment sought,
included equipme to UMM an illegal intrusion,
blastproof and airtight doors, metal and explosive
detectors, and a perimeter security system. Such
activities may have been partially in response to a
but we have not been able to confirm ansy such attack
MW
Effects on the Iraqi Program
Iraqi Reaction. The Israeli attack clearly dealt a
severe blow to the Iraqi nuclear program. but does not
appear to have altered Iraq's long-term plans for
nuclear independence. Iraq has probably gotten over
the initial disarray and morale problems caused by
the destruction of the Osirak reactor. It noa appears
resolved to get on with its nuclear program, but with
more attention to covertness and physical security.
Iraq's initial response to the Israeli attack was un-
characteristically restrained. Baghdad, negotiating di-
rectly with the United States, accepted a compromise
UN Security Council resolution that simply con-
demned Israel and called on Tel Aviv to place its
nuclear facilities under international safeguards.
Credit for this moderate performance, however, was
dissipated soon thereafter when Iraqi President Sad-
dam Husayn appealed for international assistance to
help the Arabs acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent
to Israel. Saddam's clumsy attempt to focus world
attention on Israel's nuclear capability brought un-
wanted publicity to iraq and made its Western collab-
orators more aware of the proliferation risks of sup-
plying Iraq with nuclear materials and tcchnolog~.
 et
 France and Italy are unlikely either to default on
current commitments to Iraq or to cut off all future
nuclear contacts. Neither country wants to take ac-
tion that would damage good relations with Iraq, a
long-term source of oil and a lucrative market for
civilian and military goods. Both countries, however,
will probably be more sensitive in the future to
proliferation problems and insist on tougher safe-
guards
Iraq's oil leverage with its key nuclear suppliers has
been reduced in two ways. The stalemated war with
Iran has resulted in sharply reduced oil exports and
has undermined Iraq's ability to use the oil weapon
against France and/or Italy. A second factor is that
world oil surpluses have made other supplier countries
more approachable than formerlyF_~
 and the Iraqis had met to firm up final details of a
feasibility study for Italian provision to Iraq of a
power reactor rated at about 300 megawatts electric
(M We), equivalent to about 900 M Wt. The reactor
involved-the Italian CIRENE, which exists only in
prototype form-is designed to operate on natural-
uranium fuel, although the prototype uses slightly
enriched uranium.` Because the Iraqis are developing
the capability to produce the necessary fuel (depend-
ent upon their obtaining the three "nonsensitive"
laboratories), this reactor could give them access to
significant quantities of plutonium, starting in nine or
10 years. The Iraqis startled the Italians by asking for
a commitment to build the reactor-something the
CIRENE: CISE reattore a nebbia IC ISE steam reactor). CISE is
a research institute in Italy
 Finally{ SNIA-
Tcchin: as su mute a i an recently has been
selected as one of two final candidates for a power
reactor site feasibility study. This would be a rather
innocuous and unprovocative contract. Nevertheless,
it means that the company continues to pursue nucle-
ar contracts with Iraq (if only selectively). These
contracts could lead to a progressively deeper involve-
In summary. Italy will remain the major supplier of
the Iraqi nuclear program. Despite the proliferation
risks, Italy probably will continue helping Iraq in
numerous areas of nuclear technology, possibly even
including reprocessing and plutonium chemistry. Be-
cause Italy is a major Iraqi arms supplier, it probably
could impose additional safeguards without endanger-
ing relations with lraq.F_~
Other Countries
In addition to continuing its relationships with indus-
trialized Western supplier countries. Iraq probably
will put greater emphasis on strengthening nuclear
cooperation with other industrialized countries, and
with Third World countries in those situations where
Western ability to influence nuclear transfers to Iraq
is even more limited. Iraq might also make greater
efforts to acquire nuclear materials covertly, but we
would not expect such efforts to be successful. No
other country, we believe, has been successful in
acquiring nuclear materials covertlyF_~
Iraq has had nuclear contacts with both Pakistan ano
Brazil. Iraqi-Pakistani nuclear contacts have taken
place from time to time over the past few years,
possibly including limited collaboration since the Is-
raeli attack. We do not know the exact nature of the
recent contacts, but they appear to have been related
to purchases of uranium and nuclear equipment.
Iraqi-Brazilian nuclear contacts have increased since
the two countries signed a cooperation agreement in
Reactors for Plutonium Production
Iraqi options for acquiring fissile material-HEU or
plutonium--for weapons are very much restricted.
The only routes that appear to offer any chance of
success in the late 1980s to early 1990s are: rebuilding
Osirak, building another research reactor, or building
a production reactor or a power reactor: all of them
sources of plutonium. The clandestine acquisition of
HEU or plutonium would be a very uncertain option,
at best.F__~
As to an Osirak replacement, Iraq has several options:
it may abandon the Osirak project, rebuild Osirak
with French assistance, or build an indigenous reac-
tor. As noted earlier, it would probably take from one
MW
 to three vcarc for the French to rebuild O ir: k: !.^_?^g,?r
if there were additional Israeli interference. Even if
the reactor were rebuilt, the French probably would
insist on substituting a lower enriched fuel. This step
would eliminate the problem of Iraq's diverting fresh
HEC fuel for bombmaking. Iraq still could produce
plutonium in the reactor either by using the vacant
positions in the reactor core or by building a blanket
around the core. Loading natural uranium into the
vacant core positions would produce only about I kg
of plutonium per year, even with the reactor operating
constantly at full power. Therefore, Iraq would have
to operate the reactor for several years to acquire
enough plutonium for a single device. Putting a
blanket around the core. however, possibly could
produce as much as 10 kg of plutonium per year.
In either case, Iraq would have to fabricate a large
number of natural-uranium fuel assemblies, irradiate
them, and reprocess them. We strongly believe that
building a blanket around the core would be very
difficult for Iraq to do without being detected by the
IAEA or the French. (in addition to IAEA inspection,
there would be a French presence at the reactor for
many years.) Furthermore, the Iraqis would need an
abnormally large amount of French fuel (probably six
core loads instead of three or four) to keep the reactor
operating steadily at maximum power. The French
could not fail to note such abnormally large demands
for fresh fuel supplyr----]
Iraq cannot currently construct a reactor itself, but
Brazil or Spain might provide assistance. Brazil could
probably assist Iraq in building a research reactor, but
only in the range of 2 to 5 MWt-and Iraq already
has its 5-MWt Soviet-built reactor. The Spanish
could help Iraq build a power reactor with a consider-
ably higher power level (300-to-500-MWc, or 900-to-
1,500-MWt, range), if that were what Iraq wanted.
This reactor probably would be a pressurized water
reactor (PWR). Even though it could produce a few
hundred kilograms of plutonium per year, it is almost
impossible to divert plutonium clandestinely from this
type of reactor. An overt diversion would be possible if
Iraq were to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and deny safeguards on the reactor.
H?-?'ever lrnlq would still be dependent n foreign
enrichment services and hence could not go into overt
diversion unless it intended to sacrifice further opera-
tion of the reactor.)
Iraq might attempt to avoid safeguards by construct-
ing a reactor clandestinely. However, the project
would be difficult to carry out clandestinely. especial-
ly since Iraq would be dependent on Brazil or Spain to
conceal their own participation. With a facility of this
size. and large numbers of personnel and materials, it
is unlikely that it could be kept secret for long. In any
case, it would be very difficult to obtain enriched
uranium fuel clandestinelyF I
It is unlikely that Iraq could complete construction of
either a natural-uranium, heavy-water power reactor
type (such as the CIRENE) or a PWR before the
early 1990s. although one or the other probably would
afford the best chance that Iraq has of acquiring
enough plutonium for a nuclear device. We do not
know the current status of negotiations between Italy
and Iraq on the purchase of the CIRENE. It ap-
peared, shortly after the Israeli attack, that Iraq was
preparing to purchase a PWR: since then, negotia-
tions for this reactor appear to have stalled. After the
attack, Iraq may have reasoned that there was no
better time than the present to purchase a power
reactor, that a power reactor could provide access to
some plutonium, and that Israel would receive much
stronger censure if it were to bomb a civilian power
reactor, F_~
Plutonium Fuel Cycle
Iraq has been working hard to acquire-primarily
from Italy-the necessary fuel cycle (uranium supply.
fuel fabrication, reprocessing, and waste treatment) to
support a reactor and to extract plutonium. The
IAEA confirmed a recent Iraqi request to place the
Italian-provided facilities at Tuwaitha under safe-
guards. Already
Iraq has produced boiling water reactor (BWR) and
PWR nuclear fuel pellets at the fuel fabrication
laboratory. Iraq also plans to fabricate PWR and
BWR fuel rods and test its ability to assemble one
 P%VR and one RWR fuel clement. Iran rn"Id a c the
uranium that it has clandestinely acquired to fabri-
cate reactor fuel. Iraq still would have to acquire the
fuel clement fabrication facility that it has discussed
Other Possible Acquisition of Fissile Material
Iraq continues to show a great interest in obtaining
fissile material clandestinely-- on the black market or
elsewhere. For example. in 1979 high-grade uranium
was offered to Iraq by swindlers. Whether it was
natural, depleted, or highly enriched is not known to
us; the proposed price, which is known. suggests
highly enriched uranium. It is possible that Iraq has
:1rnuired some nrnnin.m h.., ,. a do ..n. 1...1:....,, ,1,..,
any of it has been weapon-usable material. Dissatis-
faction with what have probably been hoaxes so far
will not be likely to deter Iraq from further attempts.
Although Iraq continues to show a great interest in
what we believe to be laser isotope separation re-
search, it is unlikely that Iraq could use this emerging
technology as a source of weapon-grade material in
the foreseeable future.)
Nuclear Weapon Development
No active effort to develop nuclear weapons in Iraq is
evident, but Iraq has shown an interest in several
areas relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.
As noted earlier. Iraq has shown a great interest in
upgrading its computer capability and acquiring a
Japanese computer that is more than adequate for
nuclear weapons design. However, it is unclear wheth-
er Iraq is acquiring a computer specifically for this
purpose. Iraq has also shown interest in another area
that is more directly relevant to nuclear weapons-
converting uranium to the metallic form. Iraq also has
shown an interest in acquiring plutonium. In addition,
as noted earlier, Iraq has made attempts to acquire a
medium-range ballistic missile, possibly for a nuclear-
warhead delivery system. The project now appears to
be dormant mainly because of the inability of the
prospective suppliers to provide the missileF___-]
Even if Iraq acquired enough fissile material for an
explosive device, it still would need to design and
fabricate a nuclear explosive. We know of no indige-
nous program in this area, nor of the existence of any
Iraqi nuclear weapon design group. If foreign assist-
ance in vital areas such as the manufacturing and
testing of high explosives and the design, fabrication.
and testing of nuclear weapons could be obtained.
Iraq possibly could have a viable design completed on
paper within a few years. There is no indication that a
foreign supplier is willing to assist Iraq in these areas.
Considering Iraq's past successes with foreign suppli-
ers and its potential oil leverage, however, we would
not totally dismiss the possibility of such foreign
assistance.)