MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAM (W/ATTACHMENTS)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001420861
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00095
• Publication Date: February 20, 1973

'- U CLASSIciED
DD/P
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
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CONCURRENCE I f INFORMATION
Remarks:
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
05-Nov-2008 -
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F'&LD H=-,',E TO ?E-TURY TO SENDER
I.
W. E. Colby
4,
DATE
DLO Feb 73'
r C_'iFIDE_iTJAL 1 SEC-,JET
i0 z1 N9. 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67 L
 15 1 ebruary 19 ( 3
.MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Mail Intercept Program
1. The attached memorandum from Chief, CI was orally briefed
to the Director (and the DDCI), he was shown the activity reflected on
page" 12, and he read the entire attachment giving random examples of
production. I used the attached Talking Paper as a basis of. presentation
to the Director. The Director expressed his agreement with the desir-
ability that this project be passed to the FBI and his lack of conviction
that the product to CIA is worth the risk of CIA. involvement. He directed..
the DDCI to discuss the activity with the Acting Director, FBI, with. a.
view to offering the FBI the opportunity to take over the project, including
the offer of detailing the CIA personnel involved to the FBI to implement
it under. FBI direction and responsibility.
2. Since had indicated that he was unwilling to
continue to collaborate on the project beyond 15 February unless it were
cleared with appropriate superior authority, the Director agreed that the
actin would be suspended unless
prosecu at a very high level.
3. Mr. Osborn advised of this conclusion, and
requested that the project be suspended until appropriate resolution.
of the problems involved. This has been done.
W. E. Colby . ' .
would accept its continu-
ance for the time being under our assurances that the matter is beig
 TALKVG PAPER
SUBJECT: Mail Intercept Program
14 February 1973
1. A program of intercepting mail between the United States and
the USSR has been in ex?stence in New Yor?csince 1952. This procrra-~z
has provided information of interest as we understated it
dea with Soviet activities vis-a-vis the united States and -Nvrith respect
to Americans who maintain acii`vveecontacts with Soviet and r Co -
munist areas. The program was most recently briefed to then Attorney
General Mitchell and Postmaster General Blount in June 1971.
2. Considerable efforts are made to conduct this operation on a
totally secure basis, but it is of course possible that it leak. While the
recording of the addresses and return addresses is totally. legal,. the
opening of first-class mail is in conflict with 39 U. S. Code, Section 4057.
A contention can be made that the operations is nonetheless within the - .
constitutional powers of the President to obtain foreign intelligence in-
formation or to protect against foreign intelligence activities (powers
statutorily recognized in 1S U. S. C., Section 119, with respect to bugging
and wiretapping.
project is in any case substantial. In my view, this political risk is not
justified by the operation's contribution to foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence collection. It may well be justified by the r-9ntribu_
3. The political risk of revelation of CIA's involvement in this
best judged b e zs.is v?ewe as sufficient, I recomrnend -
strongly that the prof ect be assumed by the FBI rather than running the
extra risk *o1 possible public revelation of its association with CIA. CIA
would naturally provide any support desired by the FBI and would .hope to
receive such material as might be of value to CL4 frori'the FBI. I
4. Pending resolution of the above, the project is suspended.
 The Project
I ? :S . The mail intercept Project is a basic eounterintelli.^.e:~ce
asset designed to give US intelligence agencies adsitional
insight into Soviet intelligence. activities and interests.
It provides information about Sovict-American contacts. and
insight into Soviet realities and the scope of Soviet inter
ests in the academic, economic, scientific and govern=.;e;,tal.
fields unavailable from any other source. The Project adds 'a
'
-- t tat 4e 1 es Ls sand acti
vj-
ties t::iich cannot be' obtained from the limited resources
available to this A
gency
B. The Project is particularly Productive in Supporting both
the Agency
c
jvc an
o;~cr '- _._
ti.onal leads to visiting Soviet students
ch
e
'
;
t
.
an^e scie ntist s
,
academicians and intellectuals,' trade specialists and experts
from or7ani7ntjnnc cT tr-':,+ !3 c +T,- TTCCTI T_
Thc basis. for exploitirt- the Project for -1-1
15 Ptlr?toSe i5.. ..~?C-... ...-_
knowledge we have from every Soviet BI
i
oc
r.telligcnec. service
defector that each visitor to the t;'est is approved by the
respective Security Service. The Project,.lir-ited to rail to
and from the USSR and the USA, is basically concernec' it:t
individuals the KGB approves because it controls them, h
" ~T_ eir
T)assnorts _ their. forei nn nom-..h
ang
c:- ???? ~~ uu~ a t tuft, i LC.
Based on KGB and GRU defector in-Fnr"n-f--;,,,
n Pursuing inves ti
at
d
I,---- ...~...i.~.j.r- 1t~ V--1Li.l
i.e. , a "cooptee:T' It is also known that no Soviet
can m i
tain correspondence to the United States t:ithout KGB approval.
C. In many instances the Project r !
roti ide
tl
n
p
s
~e o
ly ,.,c; ns Of detecting continuing contact between KGB controlled exc,-artge
students and Americans. The concern is the spotting
as-
sessing and ideological missionary work these Soviet sa:id tu,
Co while in the ITS. The Soviet student not only maintains
correspondence t?:Iicn he goes back to the UUSS~,11 but -often returns
to serve in the US in an official cainacity as a
i
sc
ent ~st~
trrtc?e representative or diplomat and reneti:s hi
s contacts. T.;
internal security concern is ? illustrated by the fact t t"- t
of the academically active 32 Soviet exchange sti.:deats in th_e
during the academic year 1971-1972 reliable collateral
sources have identified 11 as coopted KGB agents and 10 as
 coop ted GR' agents. To date 10 o l' the 35 Soviet exch an e
students here for tile' academic year 1972-1073 have been
ic.cntifi cd as :G1 caoptccs. .
B. the Project provides inforn.iation. otherr:ise unavailable
about. the Soviet contacts and travel O F Americans to the
USSP. which is often innortant i;?hcn chcci:3.ng applicants for
Agency or other Government employrent and in con Lirm ins; re-
ports from Clandestine Service, Domestic Contact Service
and FBI agents, contacts and informants.
i. Project material recorded. for 18 years gives basic in
formation about Soviet individuals and institutions useful
to the analyst looking for specific leads and in gauging
trends in Soviet interests and policies.
F In addition to the obvious value of the Project to the
CS, recently advised us then we were reviewing its
currcn requirements that the Project information is ex-
trendy valuable with respect *to information
Project information helps
develop sources and assess Soviet students. The an..i.CI
-
pites t'.:e Project will provide insight into the devclor.ing
t_r_ace relations where no coverage -is passible. The
has benefi t ted from leads to Arerican students. who have
deep in the USSR and, in particular, from the knowledge that
the sons and daughters 'of CPU SA and Front Groun officials
who they expect will be the left leaders in S to-10 years
have studied in the USSR. Often there arc no other leads to
this information. The also notes that quite often the
Project information permits it to correlate lead information
t:hich,has been outstanding. for several years.
II A. The Project originated in the Spring of 1952 when the
t en Si: Division* of the CS (now SB) began' to examine the
positive, operational and counterintelligence information
potential which night be obtained from a systematic monitor-
ing of postal communications between the-United-States and
the Soviet Union.
In November 1952
 arced 1:itil ;jc_: Fort iostalInsnector AS
n ,^ir~.tinn of r.::13-1 covers by C
Off- Tel person-Sntt~,elc?ccE.tr!~^,',':tr'~: as
oSt Office flepartnen t of i iclals was beS`ilil on i7 Pebr u,
1053.
C. Occasions exnlorator,%, CIA Installation nearby proved So re?,wnrdinr-that COnt'_?.ntIa.
tion oil a '1ic;hly selective basis l as dce::'cd aeccssarv in the
national security intere
D. Tn .':ay I954
'tr. 110 n T
r
D'JLi
CS
.
,
ICI , and
r. j'ic ia u
the Chic F. of Operations, DDP, tool: the first 'initi
five in the series of bricfinr.,S t0 i:1, Ca
ure flat c:! '?i; lnz_
stration has known the Project existed. They advised Post
master General Arthur E. SU,;ti1?n
I'IELP that an exar.;inLticn.
was bcins; nade of the "covers" of nail to and fro... the
Soviet Union (such examination is legal) .
I:.lilc .:r. - Si.;:::TE r.
FILL. did not comment specifically, it was clear that he Was.
in favor of the activity. .
r. s:r.len the yield iron the activity transcenCCC'_ the ir_te.r-
Csts of the Soviet fiiri c- -
l.ran?sferred in 1955 to the --' -,or it Sus
Counter IntelljSenec Staff of t:te
jDDI` , here it has regained to the present_
''.- Ln. January 195 s
,
Service's permission -.o exanine
Union . CIA u as advised of - cs
t e Postal Ins')cctior
to ant F-rn- the SolriC
in February 19 t.o re Tular1y provide
tale
n
-
---- ..he 1-Lt IS - ae
a ency which receives conies of the material
i
and a ran^ed
j t:itll i tcrs
only r_aa-CI.1
n its ray. -for.
0. ..In February 1961 '.r DULLES and =r, I ?':',S c:isct:ssec? the
mail surveillance" activity 1: i. t.1 Post;.aster yen eral rc?:::rd
and C lie f Postal Inspector NO;rTAGUE:. ?'
that the act; it;r should r. DAY nRrcecl
continue and ,-,,de the ca Meat th1,
c Post Office Department need not knothte _extent of
nail examination. t:l~.
~:? :e first ;.S postal official to be fully a=, .:are of tle
clandestine aspect of the -^-til surveillance ~:as e.,-Cs
Ci::;7lo'rCC r
uon his t
rolcct bccali I ,1zS tle5 1~,.1 C t;It;i CIA. `1000 t e_.
 T. In early' June 1971 PCI brie red Atta r-n 1-
?rrr r,. , - e
selected smm ies of infer.:. ation obtained '. This t: as
11r_,t tine officials at this level were briefed about talc
c Ct ils Of the operation. 130 th Cabinet ier;bers concurred
ir. the continuation of the activity. Hr. :?i,1
J S tv1J c li
BLOC'Ni that knew about the operation as a
result of his C : service.
J. The present Postmaster General has not been briefer by
any CIA official.
II. ~. Frbm its initiation the security risk associates
this undertaking I1as been fully recognized. The security
ec.lznics of this Project Which were carefully laic' ini-
tially are continuously reexamined ancl
w
ritI
h
,
a
r t
e possible
exccpticns noted below, it is believed that security is as
tic "t as it possibly can be.
B. ail is examined only in a -vault area. t lie a restr? e-
t.ed secure area of Federal Builciinr ?Jo. 111 at -Al a inter-
national Airport.
L. Control over copies of the examined letters' in the
Project office at Headquarters is strinf-cnt.
Each item is
1o:-ved. Each Person, translator, analyst, and cleared
recipient directly involved in the Projector with . 'r c-:
::aerial is thorour;Iily briefed and continually ;r w 1 L J S nressecct
.. d-
the sensitivity Of -t!-Le Project. Routincc of naterial
is via scaled envelope, by hand, to nanccl recipients only.
 ' ?`rCri~
a 1s *~f'?-r~i? ncn -jv StOyo ?;1 a vaulted ea
i? 0L C ~ c
r
TIC camn, rt:iented unit within the r" I 's .^, ores ti c Tr,
ili?eriCC Division j, which receives con].: s O F the Pro i oc-
m aerials observes rigid security T)TOce;tL.res , ros i :`1` -L^,?
tilt materials to a limited number or Snccia.
l ilC'Gn
c. Salt):; r-
visors in th t Di Vision who regularly handle cez I?~;- or
more sensitive information and are a;'raro of the sen,,.. rt
of this material. FBI Field Offices receive only disguised
:.
Project information and even tnen a cautionary st tc- ent
is included and highlli Ilted. The fact that CI is the source
of the. information is Protected by sourcing the information
to a coded identification. Th
e raw P
roj ect. Materials ials are
never placed in case files, arc never reproduced anal never
seat to FBI rie'ld offices.
C. The "flap" potentials. in this Project arc essenztia
the sane hypothetical problems this Agency and the 1-1-11. f
T
ace
-every day in our operations. however, to wive a persp
tine to problems are have considered, the follocr%n areas of
Concern Lc-
~ - ?
are not
e
I. A disgruntled 1?ost Office department crnlovec at
the Jamaica Airmail Facility, near JI'I` Intern a ~I
tia Z ~-
Airport, New York, where the screenincr of the mai.l
takes place, could ?allege that sacks of m
iI
a
are re
-
-1, . to a locked roo?-, tic could only speculate as to
the reasons for the removal, h oi:weve r. . (In t'-2c cvcn t of
surprise forced entry into the exarininr; room. at the
I:. hours, the
only observable- activity would be the copying of selcc-
te d exteriors
2 ? Over the years, teats o i examin
d
il
r
e
ma
.ccn
't: Y
c h
made. available on a restricted) and- necc1-to-?:nnc:- bas' J. s
to individuals within the Clandestine Service_ ecause
of short-tern rotational assignment tenure, it -tas been.
necessary to hake a fairly large number of persons ;.;i t_
tins of the Project material but not to the CC 1 1,1n1cs
of acquisition. An individunl who becomes discru:: tied?
or loses all appreciation for security Could dis-
close that nail was being examined. ';it
r" I:i irery yea
exceptions, however,. no one could pinpoint here t e
examination is done and verify that it is dole by CIA.
5 4 ,
 -l to is l~ n;lcnc are trans-
--- . e O i 4 :: C C l~ C) r`
CIA
from the Airmail Facility to the : ederal ,.1:ilr'.irtc a
Jr -11 International Airport. Conceivably the nc: s:on.s
transnortinn these letters could becor.!e involved i
an accident or be attacked by th:tcs, disclasi