TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENTS (WITH ALL ATTACHMENTS)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: CUBA
• Keywords: BAY OF PIGS
• Keywords: CASTRO FIDEL
• Keywords: PFEIFFER
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000252273
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2009
• Case Number: F-2009-00497
• Publication Date: April 26, 1961

CIA. HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1997
26 April 1961
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^DATE:
24-Jun-2009
MEMORANDUM-FOR: Lt. Colonel B. W. Tarwater, USAF
J-5, OJCS
1. Enclosed are the following documents: /
Attachment A - A brief aa.rrative of the air activity (TS-155685-.A) ~ ~W
Attachment B - A chronological sequence of events (TS-155685-B) ~~~~~
Attachment C - A report returned from Tide on aircraft,
crew, target and departure time (TS-155685-C)
Attachment D - Training received by the pilots
Attachment E -Support drop missions flown from D-Day
through Dt2
~.ttachment F - A list of personnel involved in .the .training
of the pilots and their background (TS-155685-D)
Attachment G - Composition of base unit at Tide. This
does not include .the air unit, which consisted of twenty people, the
majority of which were the Operations Staff. (TS-155685-E)
STANLEY W. BEERLI
Colonel, ~ USAF
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 Narrative of Air Activity
1, Qn 6 April 1961 a briefing was conducted for the Deputy Director
(Pleas). Acting Chief, WH-4, and Acting Chief, DFD, which outlined the
proposed plea of air operations for Project JMATE and Sub-Project JMFURY.
Targets were as cited in DPD Air t}peraNoas Play 240-1 with the exception
that Targets 1. Z, and 3 were to be strack oa D-3 as a portion of Project
JMFURY. Project JMFtTRY involved target 1, San Antoaio'de Los Banos, two
aircraft; target 2, Campo Libertad, two aircraft] target 3, Santiago de Cuba,
two aircraft.
Z, On 9 ~-pril the briefing team departed Washington for JMTIDE. The
parpos~ of this. trip was .to brief the combat elexaeats. of the proposed :plan of
activities. ,After two days target stadq at JM'TIDE, a rec~lmaaeadatioa eras
submitted to Headquarteae which recommended assignuaaeat of three aircraft
each to Targets 1' and 2. This change was effected.
3. On 15 April Project Jl-dFtTRY was implemented with strikes occurring
at dawn. A Z4 hour d?lay received 13 April ehsnged air strikes from D>3 to
~. ~_2, Results of that strike were believed ttA have been destruction of TO to 80
percent of r,,QG~s_co~anbat ais_~bilitjr, l~snages sustained by attacking air-
craft were as follows: ~e aircraft and a:ew destroyed by anti aircraft fire
eventually crashing into the sea appre~cimately 30 miles north of the Cuban
coast attempting to reach Baca Chien l~taval Air ~atien. 4ae aircraft loaded
at Grand Gaysnaa short of feel, Cln,~ aircraft leaded st Boca Chico Naval Air
Station, ao battle damage had been incurred. The reason for leading at the .
Boca Chien Naval Air Station was dae to this aircraft attempting to escort a
crippled-B-26 to Boca Chico which later crashed intt~ the sea. The aircraft
which landed at Boca Chico and Graced Cayaoan were eventually returned to the
launch base.
4. On D-1 eleven targets were assigned the B-26 strike force designed
to deatrop the remainder of COC o~ieraNon l _ai.r.c~pability. Be~reen-..the hours
of 2100 local'and x100 iocah:dnriaa the night,36-1T Ap~dl the target assig~~ut
was changed prohibiting air strike of nay airfields the trsorning of D day. All
aircraft were committed to sustain air support over the beachhead area.
~. On D day 5 C-46~s and one C-54 snceessfnlly dropped_the..airbornc
battaifon at`~e s~ppoiated DZ's withtn~Tit a objective area, These aircraft
returned to the launch base. 8-26 aircraft were rotated over the beachhead
throughout the day. The 8-26 aircraft reporting the sinking of one gun boat,
the destruction of one Sea Fury and one B-26, numerous strikes on ground ,
 Y jv ~; ~ L.l7 ~
targets and one C-4b aircraft by evasive attack caused an attacking Sea Fury
aircraft to crash into the sea. Four B-26 were lost late oa D day to enemy
T-33 aircraft. One aircraft landed at Grand Cayman with one engine shot out.
One aircraft landed at Boca Chien dne to pilot fatigue. It should be'pointed
out that all Cuban air crews had at this paint been up 36 to 48 hours without
sleep. Thirteen (13y actual combat ~[orHes were flown on D day, All sorties
were in support of the amphibious lgnding on the beachhead. At this point it
became clear that enemy air activity utilizing T-33 aircraft could destroy the
more obsolete B-2b type aircraft with relative ease cad a decision was made
to attempt to destroy the remaining GOC aircraft at night oa the ground
thrangh successful bombing raids. Six aircraft were scheduled to strike the
m:in base of operations in two waves of three each during the night of 17.18
April. The aircraft aborted on talcs off. Heavy haze and low clouds prevented
three aircraft froaa finding target cad one aircraft attacked Sea ,Antonio de Los
Banos.
6. On D plus 1 it became necessary to utilize Ameriea.a civilian pilau
to protect the beachhead area dne to the fact the Cubans were either too tf~s d
or refused to fly. .Sox sorties were flown during the afternoon of D pins 1.
Reported damage by GOC sources iadieated 1800 casnalities and destruction of
seven tanks.
7. C)n the morning of D plus 2 American pilots again were pressed into
service for protection of the beachhead area for two reasmns ~l~ the reluctance
of the Cnbaa pilots to fly more combat sorties without air to air cover and (2j
the AaAericans were attempting to build morale and develop a will to win, Two
American crews were shot down with no survivors in the morning of D plus ~.
Both aircraft were lost to T-33 aircraft. All sorties IIown oa We morning of
D plus 2 were scheduled during the one hoar period Navy air cover was supposed
to have been provided the beachhead area.
8. In the afternoon of D plus Z a radio message was received from the
ground Brigade Commander stating that he was destroying his equipment and
"heading for the hills', IIpon receipt of this massage ail air activities .in support
of the beachhead area ware termiaatad,
 Cl-?~~~~rGL~.r~ICAL ~~~4.,, vF~'CF QF EVFiVTS
Tire e
- Santi.a~o de Cuk,a
- ;i~ecial Projec4:
'. ~s>~i. (~~71f.; `, ;'c ~ u} 11 ta,?;:.;ets scheduled (Deletes.
1 C~ aircraft con~r~itte~:' fct? _~~-:i~a;~
6. :~-1 (GL.::~~i.`` ~>913} a, ta:?~ets scheduled (1-2.-~,-".A)
5 aircraft corr:.r-,itted far .i:+- i:~a}r
7. D- Day (1'l Ara::=.~i1) No day targets (strateF;ic)
..~ ~~+ All aircraft car:~x-rlitted aura part
(~:~,^T,; X923) .I
beachhead fox D- Day
z?. D-.Day (~~T,t,~~'. ~f66t:~) i~.sax effort ni~~it attacl