(EST PUB DATE) MEETINGS WITH MICHAEL LEDEEN/MANUCHEHR GHORBANIFA.

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: IRAN-CONTRA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001296206
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2009
• Case Number: F-1992-00896
• Publication Date: January 1, 1987

APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 12-22-2008
Executive Re.: `-'ry
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Chief, Near as and South Asia Division
SUBJECT: Meetings with Michael Ledeen/Manuchehr Ghorbanifa.
1. On the afternoon of 21 December, Chief, NE/Iran
contacted Mike Ledeen to lay-on arrangements to meet
an -nenz urru~rbanifar (Subject). Ledeen advised that Subject ,would
be arriving a day later than anticipated. He suggested we get
together at 1100 hours 22 December to discuss our coming meeting
with Subject.
Meeting with Michael Ledeen
- During the 22 December meeting, Ledeen reviewed his
relationship with subject. He said about a year ago, he (Ledeen)
had gone to the former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane to
discuss the need for an Iran policy. Ledeen suggested to McFarlane
that he be authorized to contact the Israeli Government to see what
could be done in conjunction with them. McFarlane authorized this
contact and shortly thereafter Ledeen met Prime Minister Peres.
Ledeen added that Peres was very e-nthusi-astic about working with
Ledeen and the U.S. Government on the Iranian problem and told him
about their contact with Subject. Two Israeli officials, David
Kimche and Jacob Nimradi, introduced Ledeen to Subject. Since then,
he has seen Subject 20-30 times, often in conjunction with Kimche
and Nimradi. It was from this contact that the operation developed
to have the Israelis at our behest deliver to Iran 500 Tow missiles
and, more recently, 18 Hawk missiles in exchange for the release of
all the hostages held in Lebanon. Ledeen is convinced that the
release of Reverend Weir was tied directly to the first shipment of
missiles. Ledeen went on to say, however, that he never really
expected the Iranians to deliver all the hostages given the
'Iranian's merchant mentality.'
- The delivery of the Hawk missiles has been an operational
nightmare. There was a misunderstanding about the type of missiles
the Iranians were seeking. They wanted a missile that could hit a
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS I NVMED
 target at seventy-thousand feet and already had Hawk missiles in
their arsenal. What they thought they were going to get was a
modified and advanced version of the Hawk. They are quite angry
about the delivery of the missiles and have asked that they be
removed from Iran as soon as possible. Their presence in Iran is
politically troublesome to the Iranian hierarchy. They are now
asking for Hercules or Phoenix missiles.
- Ledeen stated that at a recent high-level meeting which
included the President, Secretary of State Schultz and Defense
Secretary Weinberger a decision was made not to proceed with
Ghorbanifar in an effort to release the hostages. Schultz and
Weinberger reportedly were quite unhappy about this operation.
- As an aside, Ledeen noted they had purposely overcharged the
Iranians and had used around $200,000 of these funds to support
Subject's political contacts inside Iran. Later that same eveninc_,
Subject stated he was holding $40 million which the Iranians want
returned.
- Ledeen is a fan of Subject and describes him as a 'wonderful
man .... almost too good to be true.' He had asked Subject to come
to the U.S. to meet with us in order to straighten out his
credibility and to find a way to keep the relationship going with
hin. The number one item in this latter area is his proposed Libyan
operation. Ledeen said that when he learned of our Burn Notice on
Subject, he contacted him in an effort to have him explain the
situation (see Attachment A). He commented that Subject admitted
lying to us, saying he could not reveal his source nor explain his
relationship with senior Iranian officials. He felt we would not
understand his relationship with the Iranian government. We
suggested* that perhaps a new polygraph would be useful given these
latest revelations. He agreed to a polygraph to be conducted in the
Hqs area on 6 January.
In closing out this session, Ledeen made the point that any
serious covert action operations directed against Iran using
Ghorbanifar should be run out of the White House not CIA because it
will leak from Congress."
Meeting with Ledeen and Ghorbanifar
D, Ju9310
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 sF/Lr JJ9,Q
 - Subject said that because of the negotiations concerning tne
exchange of the hostages for missiles, there has not been a
terrorist act directed against the USG since July. He implied that
this might change now that the negotiations have broken off.
 laits to travel to London on 24 December to be witli
t
p
- Subjec
his family for 2-3 days. He has agreed to return on 5 January to
undergo a polygraph scheduled for 6 January.
- Around 2330 hours NSC staffer, Ollie North, dropped by to sad
hello to Subject and to talk-with him about the problem of
retrieving the missiles from Iran. We departed at 2400 hours and it
was arranged to get together on the afternoon of 23 December to
discuss further some of his ideas. (Comments: This latter meeting
took place as scheduled and the new information obtained during this
session is folded into this
arran in the _qnPrifically or a polygraph and the