DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS ON VIETNAM

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0001403425
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
June 22, 2015
Document Release Date: 
June 19, 2009
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Case Number: 
F-2007-00466
Publication Date: 
September 23, 1964
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~:~ SEP 19f4 MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DCI SUBJECT? DCT Congressional Briefings On Vietnam Attached is a brief statement of the thrust of Mr. McCone's remarks before congressional committees and Senators Russell and Saltonstall on the dates indicated. If there is further that Y can do on this9 would you please advise. APPROVED FOR RELEASE^DATE: 03-25-2009 DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS ON VIETNAM CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services 23 September 1963 The Director said there did not appear to be any cohesive military group capable of ousting the D~ the then current regime hat there appeared to be no replacement which was capable of rurnniConsequently, the .Agency wa surging a bably would be no Bette cautious, slow approach to the problem. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 10 October 1963 "We have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively would be an impr ~ em c tedvcautiously, Tother- fore, it has been our counsel that we mus p wise a situation might flare uP would olme out the victor erely by civil war, and the communists. w sitting on the sidelines . " Far East Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs 23 October 1963 A successful coup may or may not be an improvement, and discouragement was indicated ?~ etee confidence of the p Dille. rOnme reforming its ways and regami g the other hand, there seemed to be no replacement government waiting in the wings and the generals fo someemr t acted per'od of politicaleconnce. Hence it might be assumed that and the effect that this might have on fusion would result from a coup, the future of the war could not be determined. CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations Committees 29 October 1963 No statement regarding future prospects of the war in Vietnam noted in the Memorandum for the Record. Briefings of Senators Russell and Saltonstall 1 November 1963 In reporting on the coup then in progress and its effect on the war, the Director indicated that a structure had been built to prosecute the war and political events in the city had not yet signifi- cantly affected the war. It was not expected that the war would collapse because of the coup, noting it had not been the CIA view that the war would fail if Diem stayed in power. CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations 6 November 1963 Regarding the specific circumstances of the coup, the Director noted that the political situation would have to be watched most care- fully and inevitably there would be considerable confusion for a time. No specific remarks were noted with regard to the general future situation. At that time it was not known what kind of new government would come forth. CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services ? November 1963 Same as 6 November 1963. CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations 6 December 1963 The Director stated he was extremely worried about the situation in Vietnam pointing out that the government of Vietnam could not get congealed and there was some dissension within the ruling forces. He commented there was not full rapport between the leaders and indicated that civilians were not fully brought into the government at that time. Those who had been brought in had unclear authority. The war effort had not been improved by the new government and Viet-Gong activities had increased. The DCI noted that his concern with the situation did not mean that it was in danger of going down the drain or that it was desperate. On the other hand, he indicated he saw little forward thrust. The DCI indicated that the U. S. should not go in with its own forces and fight this war, U. S. strategy to train South Vietnamese to do their own fighting is sound. On the other hand,. the U. S. could not simply pull out of South Vietnam and should "play the hand out. " With respect to the then current Vietnam leaders, it was indicated that many of them are responsible and with considerable abilities but reiterated there is evidence of developing tensions and rivalries. 2T September 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE R ECORD: On 16 April 1964 the DGI briefed the CIA. Subcommittee of the House Appropxiations Committee. The Director- indicated that the situation. in South. Vietnam was not good and that there are more reasons to be pessimistic than optimistic. On the favoxable side he pointed out-that Khanh has shown potential sagacity and has a substantial governxnent. But on the unfavorable side he pointed out that over the last six months the Viet Cong have stepped up their attacks and inereas ed their military effectiveness. In addition, the Viet Cong are taking actions i.n the political and civic action. fields and today control larger areas. Consequently, the people are getting discouraged and more apathetic. 21 September 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: On 19 May 1964 the DCI briefed the CIA Subcommittees of the Senate Armed Services and Sanhtt~okp verrthe gove-rnmenttin Saigon Director stated that since Kh he has shown considerable leadership and political sagacity. However, he has a number of problems involving a number of leaders in the government; leaders of the military and the provisional chiefs and the heads of the four Corps areas. The Director noted there were beaurocratic rivalries and some of the civilian mud ment,f there are do not have sufficient authority. Hence, in my j g rmre reasons to doubt the future of the East under present programs and moderate extensions to existing progr ems; `than ~~h.ere arenreasons. sabotage against NV N, border crossings, ) to be opti.rnistic about the future of our Corps in South. Vietnam. 21 September 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: On 18 June 1964 the DCI bx?iefed the CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services. The Director noted that the Viet Cong still hold the initiative throughout most of the cotultry. DCI said the governments position is mc3st serious and that densely populated areas around Saigon and that the Government's large and small scale operations against the Viet Cong has been showing some lag in the past few weeks. ~L September 19~~ MEMOR.ANDUNI FOR THE RECORD: On 12 August 196 the DCI briefed .Defense Subcommittee of the H_~use Appropriations Committee. The Director commented on the He indicated that there had been many disappointments with these operatiuns,~ The DCI pointed out that he was not offering this criticism but that it is disturbing