NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005301300
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00571
• Publication Date: July 19, 1990

APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^DATE:
01-Sep-2009. , F .
(b)(1)
~b)~3)
C!'AS NID 90?IG7JA
 u'I~n erec_
USSR: Congress Decisions Push Party Reform
[raq: T'hrcatcning OPEC O~~crproducers
Spadn-Cuba: Tension iti4ountirg Ovcr Refugees
holes USSR: Republics Form Militan~ Units
:Putting Best Face on Spring Draft
Housing Crunch Fueling Central Asian Unrest 9
Crime Rate Continues To Rise
"1'ugoslavla: Heading Toward State of Emergency. lG
Cyprus: Tension Escalating ~ ~ ~ x,:40
Cuba: Harsh Moves To Counter Dissent
Venezuela-Nicaragua: Oil Trade :'2eestablished
 Toa ~~tc!-
 K~h!'s terms--now that external roadblocks hstve for the most part been
G1ERM.~~IY~S. Moring ToM?Ard Unity Treaty
The two Germanys will move rapi ~;ly toward r~n!}tcation--on Chancellor
chief Rudolf Seiters has said Bonn is opemninded.
to West t:Jerm:~ny t~ia Article 23 of its Basic Law one day before
planned a21-German electie:ts on 2 December. Prime Minister
de Maiziere has publicly objected, but West German Chancellery
An East German Chri.tian Democratic Union (CDU) legislative
leader says some members of his group avant to vote Sunday to accede
August, and ratification in September.
formal talks this month and next, agreement nn a text by the end of
A first draft of the German Unification Treat}~ may be ready by
tomorrow ajor issues included whether
to specif}? Berlin as the capital and what ground rules should be used
to elect an all-German legislature. The negotiation. schedule calls for
the final decision on the capital, but to satisfy the East Germans he
may endorse references in the treaty to moving flee capital eventually
Comment: The unification treaty is likely to be ushered through
largely on schedule, and an early vote for accession is also possible.
The treaty will create a new Germany that retains the political and
economic structure of West Germany. With flee recent elimination of
external obstacles to unification and a strong CDU position in both
,.Germanys, Kohl maybe willing tr- make small compromises to ensure
smooth sailing. He has favored letting anal]-Germa~t legislature make
of electoral procedures.
Kohl Wray also shift on his desire to held separate elections under
different rules for an aq-German Bundestag. A lower threshold for
legislative representation in the East would help the Christian
Democrats by splittittg the left, weakeitit~g the Social Democratic
-]'arty (SPD), and bolstering allies of the CDU-East. Kohl's Free
Democratic partners share the Sl'D's apposition to different rules,
a?d he could decide that insisting on ditiererc rules might slow the
unification treaty. The Seiters statement indicates Kohl may now
believe Ire will be elected chancellor of a united Germany regardless
 Tu
 --='- on ,
own ~Cre~
 i o-~eerxi
USSR; ,.., ,. ,,.Congress Decisions Push Party Reform
New bylaN~s adopted ley this month's Soviet party congress retain
ambiguous and compromise language but could bt tht basislor a radical
democrar(zatian ojt/re Comrrtrrnlst Party.
According to texts published this week, the rules and program make
no mention of the party's vanguard rote, calling only on its members
to struggle for "political leadership." Democratic centralism, long
used to impose tight discipline, has bcett eliminated, although party
members are still obligated to carry out decisions once adopted.
White party rules continue to outlaw factionalism, they permit
members "to unite around platforms in the course of debates." The
rules also accept the formation of party grouas in democratically
elected legislatures, rectuiriny, them cnly to "consider" the decisions
of party committees
The bylaws further decentralize power by transferring much
decisionmaking authority to republic and grassroots-level
organizations. In the military, for example, the Main Political
Administration, abastion of traditionalists, has been downgraded,
replaced in part by the all-army party conference; the change should
permit company- and field-grade officers a greater say in policy. The
- rules indicate the party organizations in the KGB and police will be
reformed to reduce their ability :o dictate policy. The party program
. .. ?, , .,,published Sunday spurned the rtvr:~enk(atura system, by which the
center selected candidates for party, state, military, and media posts.
~ C:omment; The program and rules go far to meet the demands of the
~~csternizing reformers in the pa~1y's Democratic Platform and may
reduce wholesale desertions by supporters of Boris Yel'tsin. Although
vague and contradictory, they are sufficiently flexible to allow the
party to evolve at the grassroots into a genuine political party and to
abandon its Leninist heritage of tight discipline.
Nevertheless, the reforms may come too-late. Recent opinion polls
suggest the party is at an alltime low. In a survey of public opinion
shortly before the congress opened, only 18 percent believed the party
could ease the current crisis; 46 percent supported the immediate
resigNation of the administration. Other polls show th.e party is held
in lower regard than the Supreme, Soviet, the armed forces, the KGB,
 o''~rreet_
1RAQ: Threatening OPEC Overproducers
Baghdad is threatenJng "e,~'ectiva action" against Kuwait artd the
Urtittd Arab Emirates to roerce them rota rtductrtg ol! prodWCtiort to
" ~ support bigber prices.
President Saddam Husayn on Tuesday severely criticized unnamed
Arab states for helping what he called a US effort to keep oil prices
low; he threatened to take action against oi! ovcrproducrrs. Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz has written the Secretary of the Arab League
specifically accusing Kuwait and the UAE, UPEC's largest
overproduccrs, of colluding to keep oil prices law. He also charged
Kuwatt with stealing oif from Iraqi oilfields and encroaching on Iraqi
territory, according to press reports
There is no evidence of Iraqi military preFarations. Kuwait, however,
has put its military on full alert, dispatched its foreign minister and
ether envoys to Arab capitals, and appealed to the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council for support. An emergency
session of Kuwait's National Assembly condemned the Iraqi threats
yesterday.
Comment: The threatening rhetoric, strong even by Iraqi standards, is
alt+led at increasing pressure on Kuwait and the UAE to reduce
proc',uction before the semiannual t?;'EC ministerial meeting in
Geneva next week. Oil futures prices firmed at around $I.iG a barrel
after oil ministers from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the U.4E met
in Jiddah last week, but Saddarrt's speech so far has had tittle impact
on the market. Baghdad, desperate for increased revenu:s to fund
.major reconstruction and military projects, probably also hopes to
extort financial assistance from Kuwait. If it believed its threats are
not working, it probably will make threatening gestures along the
long-disputed Iraq-Kuwait border.
Kuwait and the UAE announced cuts in oil production last week
and are not likely to reduce production further solely because of
Aaghdad's threats. Kuwait has steadfastly resisted past Iraqi
intimidation and probably put its military on alert to signal resolve.
The Amir probably hopes to evoke an international reaction,
particularly among Arab countries that will be strop enou h to
make Baghdad step back
 To
Too
 'West European Vievrs oa Cuba
' West Europeans agree that Castro wilt ultimately suffer the same fate
as Eastern Europe's Communist leaders, but they differ on the means
to encourage reform. Italy has taken the toughest line; Foreign
Minister De iVlicheli.s has suggested making ending support foi Castro
'`a condition for aid to the USSR. West Germany apposes such
``~iinkage, but has decided to discontinue East German trade
cornmitcnents next year--sharply reducing bilateral trade--?and has
-been noncommittal on Havana's requests for new cooperation
...agreements after German unification. France, however, reportedly
argues that increased engagement witl- Havana wil! weaken Ca~tro's
" "grip can power. Most West Europeans do not place z high priority on
` `relations with Havana and are unlikely to take strong action to speed
? a restoration of democracy.
 TensIun 1?iounting O~?er Refugees
Madrid's decision to recall its Ambassador in Navarta adds to the
tension aver tht rejagees in the Spanish Embassy, and the decline of the
jormerlJ~ good relationship will reinforce Castro's Sro~ing isolation.
The strain began last N ?ck when Cuban police dragged awould-bc
refugee from the Spanish Embassy compound. Havana apologized,
but Spanish Foreign Minister Fernandez-Ordoncz's insistence on a
negotiated settlement on three othcc? refugees in the Embassy and his
promise to keep the doors open to asylum seekers have prompted
Cuban protests. Havana has charged that Fernandez-Ordoncz is
acting like a colonial administrator, and Madrid has suspended a
meeting of a Spanish?Cuban cooperation commission set for this
month. A press report sa s another Cuban refu ec made his wa to
the Emboss ~ esterda .
tougher policy. In recent months Spain has ~ oted in the UN to
,.~~ ondemn Cuban human rights violations, and Prime Minister
Cionzaiez reportedly urged Castro to reform his regime. Castro
Comment: The Cuban moves will further weaken Spanish sympathy
for the Castro regime. Although Spain has long urged other West
Europeans to give Castro the benefit of the doubt, political changes
in Eastern Europe and Nicaragua are impelling Madrid to adopt a
rebutted publicl~~, criticizing Spain's political system and King.
Regardless of how the refugee problem is resolved, Spain's policy
toward Latin America will become more pragmatic and its relations
with Cuba are unlikely to recover completely. Castro believes he must
respond to diplomatic challenges to maintain credibility at home, b.,t
he realizes Havana could lose much by alienating Madrid and
.jeopardizing extensive Spanish investment in Cuba's tourist industry.
l9 July 1990
 oA .
USSR: Republics Form hlilltstry? Units
The Lithuanian legislature }~cstcrday passed a provisional law,
effective this fall, creating an armed force for the transition to
independence. Draftees will serve six to 18 months with the border
guards, the interior troops, or the fire~ighting units unless they choose
alternative service. A Lithuania:, paper yesterday published a letter
from Soviet Defense Minister Yazov protesting efforts against the
national draft 6y Vilnius. Rc~d Star reports that only 33.6 percent of
Lithuanian draftees responded to this year's Gallup. Another press
report indicates Georgia, which had only a 27.5-percent draft
turnout, has formed a national guard.
Comment: Moscow, frustrated by the refusal of local governments
to prosecute draft resisters, may choose to involve itself dire~.~;~; ? o
;:~:~Pvent the creation of republic military forces. If Lithuania and
:,e,~rPi:, arc successfill in establishing ntilitary units, other non-Slavic
?publics probably will follow their lead.
USSR: Putting Best Face on Spring Draft
The Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Col. Gen. hrivosheyev, has
claimed 9S-percent fulfillment of the spring nationwide draft Gallup
plan. The Soviets say this number viii increase as those given
'"deferments to take final examinations report for induction. A table
published last week indicates 10 of the 15 Soviet republics I~~~
fulfillment rates of 87 percent or higher. The exceptions--the three
Baltic republics, Georgia, and Armenia-had rates ranging from
54 percent to as little as 7.5 percent.
Comment: Yazov recently co~;dained of a shortfall in the armed
forces of'400,OOG men, in marked contrast to the new claim the
overall draft was a success. The new figures r~~;~ understate the
number of men evading the draft. So~'iet offieiaus may have a11~=::~-~~d
for some evasion in their planned conscription numbers or even
adjusted the numbers out of fear that reparting a low turnout would
fuel resistance to military service. In any case, the Gallup in the Baltic
republics, Georgia. ai-d Armenia ?a~r?early a failure, and Soviet
leaders must decide 11ow to react. They could either tl'y to press
republic leaders to enforce the conscription laws or take unilateral
action to enforce them; either step probably would harden resistance
by republic leaders and people. The Soviets may decide to accept
their shortfalls in this Gallup, even though doing so would set a
precedent of tolerating regional dissent on military service.
I9 Jule 1490
 n~n . w~roi
 USS12: Housing Crunch F uel-ng Central ~islstn Unrest
t zgcn m t c . trg ~z ous~ng
construction by the republic government on land previously farmed
by Uzbeks has resulted in a monthlong state of emergency and
repeated violence. indigenous groups, hoping to acquire v~:ated
Comment: Republic authw~ities in Central Asia have given high
priority to allocating land for prefabricated, frequently selfbuilt
housing--a program first begun in the Brezhnev years. The region's
rapid population growth, increased migration to urban areas, and
:influx of refugees have far outstripped the pace of new cons~ruction.
Unauthorized shantytowns inhabited largely by the destitute have
sprung up around major cities, becoming breeding Grounds for social
9nternal Affairs Minister Bakatin recently an~iounced that crime
in the USSR incr~ascd by 14.b percent in the first half of this year,
"" ~~"continuing a rapid climb countrywide; he predicted that the increase
:would be even greater d~lring the transition to elements of a market
economy. He expressed particular alarm over the escalation of si~~ent
crimes suci- as murder, rape, and assault, As part of a new anionwide
;crime-fighting program, the police have been given a larger budget,
'more automobi;es and communications a ui meet a raises and
expanded training and personnel services.
Comment: Although Soviet data indicate the crime rate is rising more
slowly than in the first six months last year, its continued upward
trend and forecasts of furt:,er increases have the ieadet?ship worried.
Opinion polls show Soviet citizens share that concern. Lawlessness _,
is likely to increase as central control over society weakens and as
criminal elements exploit the early consequences of the move toward
markets-more shortages, highe-? prices, and longer lines. Increasing
public pressure on the Gorbachev leadership will force it to divert
even more scarce resources to combat crime,
,~ ~.
L9Juty 1990
 1.1 ?Zgr~l
J 1 ,~ - - "' Vojvodina
'~ ~ CROATIA ,~ ~,~, ~~,.,M~ri S~~
'~ y~,:,ti Z HERCEGOVINA ti
~ `. Su~J+rYOa '~ ~ Serbia proper
~,
..'
e,
~~ - -?.._Z i ..._..._..--??-
c' ~ ~s~a~. L
.. :a-S~r.~4bifk! ~~~; '.~ `~ ~ KOSOYO'I '''~
n~ i~ulonomous
.r?. ~;+: Cr
Ttt
~
...
g
' /// .1
V - r' ?sk~~j~
-'-~~ R~puOlic Oound~n
--- Au;onomovt ue~ boundary
? R~puolic or nrtonomou~
u~a apit~'
 YUGOS]:.AYiA: Heading 1'o~?ard State of Emergency
A frustrated Prime Minister Markovic is considering calling a
national refcrcndunt on secession to preempt moves by the republics
d Croatia it that dircctio
The referendum would be part o a state o emergency
ar ov~c would announce later this month. He reportedly believes
he has the backing of Defense Minister Kadijevic, the federal arm}~.
and a majority of the federal presidency. The republics arc
increasingly implementing their own reform programs and ignoring
lire Prime Minister's efforts to jumpstart his reform program;
Slovenia, for example, unilaterally raised gas prices and abolished its
relation?:hip with the republic headquarters of the Territorial Defense
Force, a reserve force, according t~ press reports.
Comment; The federal leadership is desperate to curb the republics'
centrifugal tendencies but, short of military intervention, has few
options. The repu~~lies may. accept a referendum on secession, but
"the declaration of a state of emergency might provoke Croatia and
Slovenia to declare independence and bolt the federation. Slo?renia's
effort t.o disma~ttle the Territorial T)efense Farce is a move toward
forming its own armv. a measure that ntiRht lead to federal militat~+
CYPRUS: Tension Escalating
The imminent transfer of control over the disputed, town of Varosha
from Turkey to the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash's threat to resettle the area have raised tensio?s on the
island. Further Greek Cyprio~ posturing in response is likely
Greek Cypriot President Vassiliou prefers a
Comment: Although Vassiliou almost certainly will continue to resist
calls for military action, Turkish Cypriot resettlement would put him
under considerable pressure to reconsider. Greek Cypriot civilian
demonstrations planned for tomorrow, the anniversary of Turkey's
invasion in 1474, might lead to confrontations along the Green Line.
 'f'u~o .'~,~~
~1'aD'Seexet
 The Ct~baa HeimAn .Rights 10~1ore?ent
Cuba's human rights movement consists of about a dozen small groups that pursue causes
ranging from freedom of expression and religion to environmental protection. The activists,
who are nonviolent and generally ineffective, have been targets of periodic government
crackdowns. The latest was in March, when the UN.Human Rights Commission passed a
resolution critical of tuba. Thr Cuban Human Rights Party, one of the more confrontational
groups, staged occasional demonstrations and pushed for a plebiscite on the Castro regime
before its leaders were arrested earlier this year. The gove*nment may be trying to smear the
Human Rights Party by linking it to accusations of sabotage. It a~pean certain the party's
imprisoned leaders will face serious charges when they are tried.
 The Havana press yesterday reported the sentencing of : i young,
unemployed Cubans for planning acts of sabotage, a tart admission
that the Castro regime faces potentially violent domestic opposition.
'I'hc dissidents. who were given prison terms of up to I S years, belong
to a group associated with the illegal Human Rights PBetty, which
Havana believes is linked to the US Interests Section. The regime
alleges that the activists planned to destroy government buildings in
Comment: Although Havana probably has exaggerated the dissidents'
activities, by playing up the threat of antiregime violence Castro can
portray any new repressive measure as necessary to preserve public
order. The harsh treatment of the dissidents refle ^ts Castro's
determination to squelch opposition as he tries -u deter asylum
seekers from seeking refuge in embassies and to minimize the effects
oftolitical change in Eastern Europe. Although the regime routinely
claims dissidents are manipulated by the US; it may use this case to
rally nationalistic sup ort b accusin Washin ton of actuail
promoting instability.
Venezuela recently rescheduted Nicaragua's $143 million oil debt,
paving the way for a resumption of oil shipments, suspended in 1985,
under the concessionary terms of the San Jose Accords. The
settlement shows the commitment of President Perez to support the
Chamorro government and help it avert a possible oit shortage.
Managua will repay $18 million over afive-year period at market
rates and the remaining $125 million over 40 years at 3-percent
interest. Nicaragua is touting the aureement as a maior diplomatic
victory.
Comment: The easy terms extended to Nicaragua reflect the
determination of Perez to play a leading political and economic role
in the region. They set an expensive precedent for Venezuela's
negotiations with other countries in the region, such as the
Dominican Republic, at a time when the Venezuelan economy is
recovering from a severe recession. Resumption of Venezuelan oi!
deliveries under the San Jose Accords will ease Managua's financial
 o~3eu etet_
 - US, UK, aT~d UAE companies awarded Yemen oil concessions in
former Sar?Iet contract area for $45 million up front ... Sanaa
frustrated with poor results of Soviet develot?ntent ...Soviets
pressing for debt repayment.
comments "cannot but cause questions aid perplexity.'
~n US contact with emerging democratic opposition groups in
USSR .. ,presidential press spokesman Maslennikov said such
USS$ --Initial Soviet reaction appears mild to Secretary Baker's comments
. ~.-,Soviet othcials say they would accept CSCE summit document
based on NATO's London declaration ...likely to focus in
postsummit negotiations on responsibilities of conflict resolution
center, Soviet proposals not in London declaration
artxied, confrontations likely.
wake of recent strike ...pro- and anti-Sandinista groups well-
-France's Jacques Uelors in Moscow today to explore Sor?iet
economic needs in anticipation of EC aid ...first official visit to
USSR by an EC Commission president.
Americas -Sandinistas organizing large rally today to celebrate 11th
anniversary of Nicaraguan revolution ...tensions remain high in
 0
 'I'on
 Ob
 0
l9 July 1990