IRAQ: IMPLICATIONS OF INSURRECTION AND PROSPECTS FOR SADDAM'S SURVIVAL

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: IRAQ
• Keywords: OPPOSITION FORCES
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001441917
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-01284
• Publication Date: March 16, 1991

Directorate of Intelligence
16 March 1991
Iraq: Implications of I urrection and
Prospects for Saddam sSurvival
Summary
Saddam Husayn faces his most serious political challenge in more
than twenty years of power. He and his regime are confronted by
economic chaos, armed insurrection, the prospect of widespread
civil war, and foreign intervention. His immediate plight may ease
somewhat with suppression of the insurrection in the south and a
relaxation of the UN-imposed embargo, but the Kurdish rebellion
and the threat of foreign intervention pose a serious threat to
Saddam's continued hold on power. (S NF)
Forces loyal to him have been able to contain much of the fighting
in the Shia Muslim areas of southern Iraq, but Kurdish gains in the
north are probably compelling him to prematurely transfer troops
north, which could reverse recent progress in restoring government
control in the south. Efforts by external powers, especially Iran, to
assist the rebels have aggravated the danger to Saddam but are not
yet sufficient to decide the issue. (S NF)
Saddam's speech Saturday in which he promised political and
economic reforms while warning of the dangers of external
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 meddling suggests he is looking for ways to rally Iraqi patriotism
around him. Other references in his speech suggest Saddam may
have given advisors on the Revolutionary Command Council a
wider role in shaping policy to save his regime. Should these
efforts be unsuccessful and large-scale unrest break out in Baghdad,
Saddam could be in mortal danger. He must act quickly and
decisively to quell the Shia and Kurdish unrest and create a sense of
stability if he is to stave off a potential coup and Iraq is to remain
united. (S NF)
Political change, if and when it does come to Iraq, will probably be
sudden and without warning. Saddam is most likely to be removed
by a lone assassin or a small group of individuals--probably from
the military or security services--who have access to him or find an
opportunity to strike him. Because of the need for a successful
operation to be conducted in absolute secrecy, we probably will not
have advance warning of a coup that removes Saddam. (S NF)
Saddam's in Control For Now
In the past week, Iraqi forces tightened their grip on the holy cities of An
Najaf and Karbala in southern Iraq but resistance forces have shown surprising
resiliency. Baghdad is struggling, however, to eliminate insurgents from the
smaller cities along the Tigris and Euphrates River valleys. Iran's press and
Shia exile sources claim that fighting has erupted in several of Baghdad's
suburbs. At the same time, Kurdish insurgents in the north are making
considerable gains despite the arrival of regime reinforcements from southern
Iraq. The main road from Karkuk to Baghdad has been cut, and Kurdish
sources claim in the press to have taken a significant amount of territory in the
oil-rich province. The regime's hold on Dahuk Province, adjoining the border
with Turkey, is collapsing. (S NF)
The regime appears to be getting on top of the situation in the south but it has
not yet stamped out the'rebellion there.' The Shia insurgents are driven by
religious fervor and, like the Kurds, a strong taste for revenge after years of
oppression. They are also probably getting some logistic and financial support
from Iran and Syria, and more may be on the way. If Saddam does not soon
 quell the rebellions, the chances for a serious outbreak in Baghdad will grow
and his position will be more precarious. Time is not on his side. (S NF)
Saddam has dominated Iraq longer than any other figure in its modern history.
Since the revolution which brought the Ba'th Party to power in 1968 he has
shaped its political and economic character, defined its foreign policies, and
fashioned a national identity for one of the most ethnically and religiously
diverse countries in the Middle East. He has also created one of the most
authoritarian and brutal regimes in the region. (S NF)
Since the end of the war, Saddam has taken steps to ensure military support
and ease domestic economic stress. He has lauded the military for its heroic
role in the war and made no public search for scapegoats. He has also
declared an amnesty for deserters, released some prisoners held in Iraqi jails,
and eased rationing on gas. On Saturday, he offered unspecified political
reforms, probably elections for a new National Assembly with broader ethnic
sectarian representation. He also said he was appointing a new Minister for
Reconstruction to oversee the rebuilding of a new Iraq. His "reforms" are
probably intended to offer increased "popular" participation in government,
but meaningful involvement by the people is unlikely. Similarly, his
economic proposals are probably aimed at securing domestic and foreign
sympathy by stressing civilian reconstruction needs. Few Iraqis will be
convinced by these gestures, but they may sway some who are afraid or
unwilling to commit themselves to rebellion. Iraqis may not miss Saddam if
and when he goes, but it is probably difficult for most Iraqis--even given the
death and devastation of two major wars-to imagine life without him. Most
Iraqis alive today have never known another leader. (S NF)
There are several possible outcomes for the worst domestic crisis Iraq has
faced since independence in 1932.
Saddam wins and revitalizes his control over Iraq. Saddam will use
whatever means necessary, including draconian security measures and forced
deportations, to ensure pacification. He probably has deployed military and
intelligence units with orders to determine responsibility and exact maximum
punishment. In his speech Saturday, Saddam described the rebellions as
"proof" external forces threaten Iraq. He is likely to use this threat to rally
Iraqis, particularly Sunnis, around him, warn off potential backers of the
insurrections, and, in the longer-term, justify rebuilding his war machine.
(S NF)
If Saddam is able to contain the insurrections he now faces, the next few years
promise to be uncertain ones in Iraq. His forces will exact a heavy toll for
participating or sympathizing with rebels. In previous rebellions, punishment
 has included executions, mass arrests, and forced deportations and resettlement
of large segments of the population to distant parts of the country. He will
probably offer further cosmetic political reforms, such as presidential
elections, and promise more economic relief when the coalition lifts the
embargo. He will depend increasingly on an even narrower circle of family
and Ba'thist loyalists, as suggested in his promotion of cousin Ali Hassan al-
Majid to Interior Minister. (S NF)
Saddam loses, and a pro-Iranian Shia state emerges in Baghdad. Saddam
is unlikely to survive if the rebellion takes hold in Baghdad and a large
proportion of the army defects. The fighting in the southern Shia cities
probably began with local anti-regime Shias who saw an opportunity in the
apparent breakdown of law and order to rise against Saddam. It spread
quickly, probably fanned by the arrival of Iranian-based Iraqi dissidents and
Iraqi Shia certainly sought additional help from their brothers in Iran. The
Shia community in Iraq is not controlled by Tehran and has indigenous
historical traditions and religious institutions older than Iran's. Most Iraqi
Shia probably would oppose Iraq becoming a satrapy of Iran, but many do
support the political program of the Iraqi clerics in Iran, namely an Iranian-
style Islamic republic, democratic elections, and majority rule. They would
want to follow pro-Iranian policies, but a Shia government in Baghdad would
have to allow for a broader and possibly secular base if it wanted to rule a
united Iraq. (S NF)
Iraq's Shias, led by their pre-eminent cleric Grand Ayatollah Khu'i, rejected
Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of velayat-e fay (political rule by a
supreme religious leader) and remained loyal to Baghdad during the eight-year
war with Iran. More pragmatic Iraqi Shia leaders may view Tehran's style of
government as appropriate for Iran, which is more than 95 percent Shia
Muslim, but would probably not accept its complete application in Iraq, where
the Shia are only 55 percent of the population and need support from other
ethnic and religious factions to overthrow Saddam. (S NF)
A Shia takeover in Iraq, however, would revive Islamic revolutionary fervor
in Iran and cause increased threats of Shia subversion and terrorism to the
Sunni monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. It would also increase the risk of
religious fundamentalist unrest in Syria and Turkey. (S NF)
No one wins, and full-scale civil war breaks out. The central government--
with or without Saddam--could be too weak to defeat its enemies and rule
effectively. The Kurds have seized on the Shia revolt to stage their own
rebellion, but they are too few in number (only 20 percent of the population)
to take power in Baghdad. If the army and security services collapsed, then a
Lebanon-style power vacuum would exist, and a general civil war involving
Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds might develop. The Lebanonization of Iraq could
 follow. As in Lebanon, the biggest danger would be foreign intervention.
Iran, Syria, and Turkey would see their national interests threatened and could
be tempted to intervene. Even if Saddam defeats the Shia, he may face a
prolonged Kurdish uprising in the mountainous north which would be a source
of instability for the region. (S NF)
Removing Saddam: Scenarios for a Coup
The prospect of a Shia victory, or just prolonged internal strife, could also
encourage disparate Sunni elements in Iraq, including anti-Ba'thist nationalists,
pro-Syrian Ba'thists, and military elites to rally around Saddam as the only
recourse to an Iranian-influenced Shia regime. It also could force political
change on Saddam, including his overthrow. (S NF)
Saddam Survives but is Forced to Share Power in a Palace Coup. A few
family members, senior Party officials, or senior military officers could force
Saddam to share power. They would see a need to keep Saddam probably
because he retained the loyalty of the security and intelligence forces and the
Party. They might also fear that to remove him precipitously would trigger
wider-scale revolt. Iraq has no "retirement plan" for its rulers and Saddam
certainly assumes that, if he cannot flee-and we believe it uncharacteristic for
him to run from a fight-then he must compromise or be killed. Saddam could
offer to share power with senior military leaders who may command popular
respect and who he believes are closely identified with him and will, therefore,
protect him. Most are likely to accept such an offer in order to protect
themselves from more sweeping and dangerous change. There would be no
fundamental change in Iraqi policies or intentions. (S NF)
Cooperative military leaders would probably hope to control Saddam and
would probably remain loyal to him as long as an external military threat
exists. Saddam would probably view an arrangement with the military as a
marriage of convenience to be dissolved when order had been restored and his
position was secure again. Military and Party officers in this arrangement
would probably have a similar view of the relationship and hope to remove
Saddam at 'a later date. (S NF)
Saddam is Removed By Insiders. Saddam could be removed by a member
of his inner circle or senior military figures who believe that his continued rule
threatens their lives, families, and fortunes. If he were killed and his security
apparatus remained cohesive, power would probably be seized by a senior
military leader or by a committee of surviving influential Tikritis, Ba'th Party
officials, and senior military officers assisted by the intelligence and security
services. These political elites would probably jockey for position among
themselves, but a power struggle in this context would not necessarily involve
foreign backers. (S NF)
 A successor government probably would make significant concessions to
reduce regional tensions in order to consolidate its own position, but not.
because it disagreed with Saddam's claim that Kuwait belonged to Iraq, his
vision of Iraq's regional hegemony, his tactics of brutality, or his style of
strong-man rule. The new leaders would probably look to the United States
for assurances of tacit acceptance, for example, that no war crimes trials
would be held, no reparations levied, no limits placed on Iraq's military, and
that all sanctions be lifted. No successor regime, however-pro-Western its
orientation or professed sympathies, is likely to agree voluntarily to further
reduce Iraq's military strength. A military regime is especially unlikely to
make concessions. And no successor regime, however desirous it might be for
harmonious relations with the West or with neighboring regimes, will want to
be perceived as acting on behalf of an outside power. (S NF)
In these scenarios, Syria, Iran, and Turkey would probably reaffirm their
support for Iraq's territorial integrity, and probably would not make a grab for
Iraqi territory. But they would continue to encourage the Iraqi dissidents they
host and eye the borders with Iraq more closely. (S NF)
Revolution by Outsiders: Saddam and the Regime are Destroyed.
Individuals involved in the insurrection or a group of military and political
officials who hold mid-level positions and blame Saddam and his generals for
Iraq's destruction could trigger the overthrow the entire regime. Members of
Saddam's family, the Party, government leaders, and even senior military
leaders closely aligned with Saddam would be swept away. Military officers
would still probably provide the bare bones of leadership, but it could very
well be difficult to find someone to oversee a provisional government. A
weak national front government would probably be formed. (S NF)
Rivals inside Iraq and outside the country would compete for power. The
fragile 17-party coalition formed in Damascus last December would probably
collapse, and competing factions would try to consolidate their hold on
sections of the country and Baghdad. The Kurds would probably set up an
autonomous government in the northern provinces and might even declare
independence. Shia clerics in southern Iraq would demand an influential voice
for Iraq's majority Shia population in the new government. (S NF)
Under this scenario, Iraq's Arab neighbors would signal support for
continuation of Sunni Arab government. Turkey would more openly covet
land ceded decades ago to Iraq but would probably not cross the border unless
Kurdish unrest threatened Turkish internal security. Iran would probably seize
key border posts and oil fields in border areas. (S NF)
Power Centers
The military and th e Ba'th Party will play a role in determining Iraq's political
future with or without Saddam. Other factors such as ambitions among
influential extended families, age-old rivalries between Arab and Kurd, Sunni
 and Shia also clearly will persist, but ethnic tensions may be muted initially if
the anti-Saddam rebellion succeeds. (S NF)
Military. Iraq's military traditionally has played a key role in determining the
country's political leadership. From 1932 when Iraq became independent to
1968 when the Ba'th Party seized power through a military coup, Iraqi
military officers conducted six successful coups and countless failed attempts.
No Iraqi regime has been able to ignore the military's political influence,
particularly its penchant for corrective coups, and it will likely play a decisive
role in determining any successor to Saddam. (S NF)
The military's independence has been restricted by the Ba'th regime. Saddam
has used natural attrition--including death in the Iran-Iraq war--purges, arrests,
and executions to eliminate an older, less politically reliable generation of
military officers and create in their place a new cadre of military loyalists. He
has also appointed family and clan members from Tikrit and other loyalists to
key positions and frequently transferred or forced into retirement popular
senior officers to prevent them from building independent power bases.
Saddam also secured military loyalty by providing the lion's share of the
budget for huge inventories of some of the best military equipment available
and showering lavish rewards among the officer corps. Finally, Saddam built
up the Republican Guards as a loyalist Sunni praetorian guard to ensure the
loyalty of the military to himself and the Sunni-Tikriti establishment.. (S NF)
The wars with Iran and over Kuwait have almost certainly cost Saddam
military support. We believe many officers and enlisted men must harbor
considerable resentment against him for giving away the gains acquired in the
costly war with Iran and for nearly destroying Iraq's military capability in the
Kuwait war. Military leaders probably see a need to protect the institution
against greater competition for fewer resources in a post-war Iraq. Some
senior officers may view power-sharing with Saddam as the only way to
protect the military so that it can rebuild after the war. These officers may
also want a voice in domestic politics to avoid the stigma of responsibility for
losing the war. They are most likely to act to restore stability if they believe
Iraq is-about to disintegrate. They could move against Saddam if they
believed that would lead to more harmonious relations with the Arab states and
other regional neighbors and access to military purchases necessary for
rebuilding the armed forces. Disaffected Republican Guard commanders
would have the best chance of successfully ousting Saddam or reducing his
power. (S NF)
The Party. Less is known about the status of the Ba'th Party, its willingness
to challenge Saddam for power, or its ability to survive in a regime without
him. Over the years, Saddam managed to eliminate Party theoreticians and
popular figures who he believed were capable of building a power base within
the Party. The Party ruled Iraq through its control of the Revolutionary
Command Council and government posts. Saddam gradually stripped the
RCC and hence the Party of its ability to elect leaders, including the President,
or debate policy. In many cases he made competence or personal loyalty the
primary criteria for advancement over Party membership. (S NF)
 The more extensive the coup in Baghdad, the less likely the Ba'th Party is to
play a role in the new government. Ba'thist leaders who survived the coup
would probably be irrelevant in determining policy. The Party's older
generation has probably been effectively purged of any capable actors or
thinkers, and its younger generation probably lacks the initiative necessary to
shape an effective political force. Loyalty to family and sectarian ties would
probably outweigh loyalty to an outmoded political machine. (S NF)
There are no clear front runners for succession in the military or the Party. If
they survived the war and if they are not made scapegoats for the defeat and
executed soon, Defense Minister Sa'di Abbas al-Jabburi, Chief of the Armed
Forces General Staff Husayn Rashid al-Muhammad, Deputy Chief of Staff
General Nu'mah Faris, or Commander of the Republican Guard Iyad al-Rawi
would be likely candidates, especially if they were in Baghdad. A former
military officer not associated with the defeat in Kuwait, such as Lieutenant
General Mahir Abd al-Rashid, could also be a candidate for power. Military
commanders in control of the capital would probably try to prevent the return
to Baghdad of potential rival military leaders stranded outside the city.
Moreover, disgruntled military officers and party bureaucrats who had
suffered at the hands of the Old Regime could carry out blood vendettas which
would seriously weaken the Party's infrastructure. (S NF)
The Army and the Party might decide to work together to ease the transition to
a post-Saddam government and win acceptance by Iraqis and foreign
governments. They might agree on a non-controversial military figure, like
former Defense Minister Shanshal, to head the new regime with a Party man
as number two--a similar configuration brought the Bath Party to power in
1968. A few Ba'thist leaders could survive and even be incorporated into a
transition regime because they had technical expertise or foreign recognition.
Examples would be Deputy Prime Minister Sa'dun Hammadi, a Western-
educated technocrat who functions as Iraq's de facto economic czar, or Deputy
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, who serves as Foreign Minister and is well-known
in Western and Arab capitals and Moscow. Eventually, traditional
conspiratorial Iraqi political styles--in particular the bloody coup--would assert
themselves, and one strong man would seek to control Baghdad. According to
the Iraqi Constitution,. the Revolutionary Command Council has the authority
to elect a new president should the post become vacant, but no "candidate" is
likely to use this mechanism for transferring power unless he is sure of his
"election." (S NF)
 Succession Without Destruction: The Legal Mechanisms
Iraq has not had a succession crisis since the 1968 revolution which brought
the Ba'th Party, General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and his "deputy" Saddam
Husayn to power. Baler was eased out of office in 1979, but there was no
serious opposition to Saddam. The interim constitution of 1968 gave the
RCC the power to elect the president and select a new one if he resigned.
Later revisions of the Constitution shifted power away from the RCC to the
Presidency but shied away from the succession issue. In 1980 Saddam
proposed the Constitution be amended to allow the election of the President
by a popular referendum. As with most political "reforms" in Iraq, these
were paper exercises intended to allay ethnic unrest and convince the West
of Baghdad's liberal tendencies. Saddam never had any intention of
widening the electoral franchise or moving Iraq to a more democratic
political society. His vice president, Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma'ruf, a Kurd,
has never been part of the decisionmaking process and has no power-base.
He certainly would not succeed Saddam. (S NF)
Prospects
We believe Saddam will do whatever is necessary to keep himself and his
regime in power and preserve his military capability. His position is probably
secure as long as his intelligence and security services remain intact, the
military backs him, he is seen to be wielding authority, and his potential
opponents believe he may make a deal which will ensure his survival.
References by Saddam in his recent speech to his "leadership comrades"
suggests he may already be allowing Revolutionary Command Council
members like Sa'dun Hammadi, Izzat Ibrahim, Tariq Aziz, and perhaps some
senior military figures to play a more active role in policy formation. (S NF)
Even these circumstances may not be enough to save him. Saddam may be
forced to make further concessions to senior civilian officials and the military
to ensure their cooperation in the brutal suppression of the insurrection and
support for his continued rule. If so, his powers will be limited and Iraq could
witness a prolonged period of instability after the end of the insurrection as
military and political leaders around Saddam jockey for power. (S NF)
The economy will be a key factor. If UN sanctions continue and Saddam is
unable to sell oil, his position internally will be at increasingly greater risk.
Even if the embargo is lifted, the enormous reconstruction challenge facing
Iraq will require Saddam to deal more energetically and efficiently with
economic problems than he has ever done in the past. (S NF)