THE CIA AND ACADEME
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0000619196
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F-2013-02322
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December 1, 1983
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Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196TITLE: The CIA and AcademeAUTHOR: Rallph E. CookVOLUME: 27 ISSUE: Winter YEAR: 1983Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196roved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196STUDIES ININTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, opera.tional, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.?All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196SymbiosisApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196THE CIA AND ACADEMERalph E. CookClose ties between the Central Intelligence Agency and American collegesand universities have existed since the birth of the Agency in 1947. The bondsbetween national intelligence and the academic world actually predate theAgency, for William J. Donovan, President Roosevelt's Coordinator of Infor-mation, established a research team of distinguished academicians to assist himin 1941. Donovan proposed a novel idea: have the information that helecting, mostly from the military services and the Department of State,1analyzed not only by the intelligence components within the War and NavyDepartments but by his team of -scholars, economists, psychologists, techni-cians, and students of finance.- To head his research group, Donovan choseJames Phinney Baxter, president of Williams College and a noted specialist inAmerican diplomatic history.Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Research and Analysis Branchof what became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) rapidly expanded. AfterBaxter's departure in 1942, William L. Langer, the distinguished historianfrom Harvard, took over direction of the branch and remained in that postuntil disestablishment of OSS in late 1945.While many of the scholars who had participated in the analytic part ofOSS returned to their campuses after the war, some remained with thegovernment. Those who had been in the Research and Analysis Branch weretransferred to the State Department. Then, as the Central Intelligence Groupand, after 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency grew in size and responsibil-ity, a number of academicians who had served with OSS returned as analystsin the new Office of Research and Evaluation.During the great expansion of CIA following the outbreak of the KoreanWar in 1950, Agency recruiters appeared in significant numbers on academiccampuses across the nation. Also in 1950, the Director of Central Intelligence,General Walter Bedell Smith, called upon William Langer to return toWashington to organize the new Office of National Estimates (ONE). Thisoffice had seven board members, including four historians and an economistdrawn from the ranks of academe,* a combat commander, and a lawyer. Oneof the historians, Sherman Kent, succeeded Langer as Director of ONE in1952 when Langer again returned to Harvard. At roughly the same time, thenoted economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Max Millikan,was brought to Washington to organize the economic intelligence effort in thenewly created Office of Research and Reports.? The four historians were Sherman Kent, Ludwell Montague, De Forrest Van Slyck, andRaymond Sontag; the economist was Calvin Hoover.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196__S_QttiELDEN-Ttgr? AcademeMeanwhile, as the Agency expanded, its recruiters turned to establishedfigures in the academic world for leads and referrals to the best among theirstudents. ? Many of the personnel already on board similarly informed theircolleagues still on the university campuses of the need for and opportunitiesawaiting those who had the requisite background for work in the Agency.As a large number of the members of OSS and the early recruits to CIAcame from prestigious private schools in the Northeast and the Far West, withsome representation from the large Midwestern universities, it is not surprisingthat a disproportiate number of the new recruits came from the same schools.Similarly, professors who had joined the Agency often turned to their formercolleagues still on the campuses for consultation and assistance. This -old boy"system was quite productive in providing new employees in the professionalranks. Thus, there was an early linkage between the Agency and the IvyLeague, or similar schools.A Souring in the SixtiesRelations between academe and the CIA were cordial throughout the1950s. During much of that period the Cold War was at its height and the na-tion's need for the Agency and its activities were seldom questioned by facultyor students. There was no criticism worthy of note following the Agency'salleged involvement in Iran in 1953 or Guatemala the following year. The1960s were to be different.There was some criticism on campuses over CIA involvement in the Bayof Pigs expedition in 1961 and the barrage of denunciation increased as theAgency, along with the rest of the government and the -establishment,- founditself under intensified attack as the war in Vietnam continued. In part to miti-gate this opposition, the Office of Personnel in 1962 established the HundredUniversities Program in which recruiters and senior officials of CIA madepresentations before selected faculty members and placement officers in aneffort to publicize CIA's role in national security and to emphasize theAgency's recurrent personnel needs.Meanwhile, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, aware that theclose ties that had bound Agency officials and analysts with their colleagues onthe campuses were loosening, and concerned about developments in China(explosion of an atomic device in 1964 and the subsequent beginning of theCultural Revolution), asked the Deputy Director for Intelligence in 1966 totake action to improve the Agency's expertise on China. The DDI created theoffice of Coordinator for Academic Relations (CAR), a part-time job for JohnKerry King, a former' professor at the University of Virginia who had beenwith the analytic part of the Agency for several years.? Beginning in 1951 and continuing for several years thereafter, the Agency tried, withoutmuch success, to establish a -University Associates Program--a program of using professors ata selected list of 50 colleges and universities as consultant-contacts who would receive a nominalfee for spotting promising students, steering them into studies and activities of interest to theAgency, and eventually nominating them for recruitment.34 ,cref.trtryApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196.44ccideme CONFI The DDI specifically charged the CAR with, inter alia, responsibility forexploiting the capabilities of the various China studies centers in the universi-ties, devising means for attracting China specialists to work for the Agency,and developing and managing relations with academic consultants on China.One of the nation's best China centers was at Harvard. It was logical thatthe Agency would seek help from that institution. Subsequently, several DDIanalysts were enrolled in the graduate program at the Harvard East AsianResearch Center. Unfortunately, by 1967 the local chapter of Students for aDemocratic Society was aware of the participation of these analysts and acampaign against their presence on campus was launched. Attempts byProfessor John K. Fairbank, director of the Center, to explain the differencebetween operations officers and analysts at CIA fell on deaf ears.King also set about organizing a number of "China seminars" in Boston,New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, in which a few noted China scllarsengaged Agency experts in low-profile and informal discussions. King, duringhis four-year tenure as CAR, also initiated a program of passing unclassifiedreports prepared by the Agency to a select group of academicians in anattempt to gain comment on the reports and good will for the CIA.Despite individual examples of continuing cooperation with the Agency,relations with academia as a whole continued to sour. The deterioration wasgiven impetus in February 1967 by the disclosure in Ramparts magazine thatthe CIA had been funding the National Student Association for a number ofyears. Additional disclosures of Agency involvement with private voluntaryorganizations and foundations resulted in President Johnson's appointment ofa three-person committee, chaired by Undersecretary of State NicholasKatzenbach, to review government activities that might "endanger theintegrity and independence of the educational community." Following itsinvestigations, the Katzenbach Committee recommended that federal agencieshalt covert financial relationships with "any of the nation's educational orprivate voluntary organizations." While the recommendation was never issuedas an executive order or enacted as a statute, it was accepted by the Presidentand led to major adjustments within the Agency.Recruiters for the Agency, meanwhile, were experiencing increasingproblems on college campuses. Many of the schools that had provided superiorcandidates in the past were now home for the most militant of students.Picketing of recruiters began in 1966, rapidly spread across the nation, andpeaked in 1968 when 77 incidents or demonstrations occurred. Procedureswere changed with interviews held off campus and, whenever it appeared thata visit might precipitate incidents, the visit was canceled. The HundredUniversities Program was suspended in 1968.The Academic Coordinator, working on behalf of the analytic offices,continued to expand contacts with academicians wherever possible. By 1970,seminars on Soviet matters were added to those on China. By 1974, scholars on' The other two members were Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare JohnGardiner and DCI Richard Helms.NTIAApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 00061919635Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196AcademeCuba and most of the rest of the world had been added to the list ofacademicians with whom the CAR kept in touch. The CAR was promotingvisits by academicians to CIA Headquarters to confer with those in the DDIhaving similar interests and he was assisting analysts and administrators insecuring the participation of outside experts in Agency-sponsored conferencesand seminars.'Sensational allegations of wrong doing by CIA and other components ofthe intelligence community, which erupted in the media in the early 1970s,led to congressional demands for investigations and the creation in 1974 of se-lect committees in the House, under Representative Pike, and in the Senate,under Senator Church. (Two other groups also were formed to investigateintelligence activities?a Commission on the Organization of the Governmentfor the Conduct of Foreign Policy, known as the Murphy Commission, and acommission appointed by President Ford and led by the Vice President, theRockefeller Commission.) The various investigating bodies, focused mutr oftheir attention on CIA's covert action, most of which had little to do with the _Agency's relations with academia. There was some discussion, particularly inthe Church Committee final report, which tended to lump relations withschools along with Agency relations with the media and religiousorganizations.The final report of the Church Committee (the Pike Committee reportwas never formally released) interpreted -academic community" far morebroadly than had the Katzenbach Committee. In particular, the formerfocused more heavily on individuals whereas the latter had concentrated oninstitutions. The Church Committee found that hundreds of academicians inover 100 colleges, universities, and related institutions had a covert relation-ship with the Agency providing leads and -making introductions for intelli-gence purposes." Others engaged in intelligence collection abroad, assisted inthe writing of books and other propaganda materials, or collaborated inresearch and analysis. .While the Church Committee recognized that the CIA -must haveunfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities canproduce," it recommended that that advice and judgment be openly sought.The committee concluded by placing the principal responsibility for alteringthe existing relationship between CIA and academe on the backs of the collegeadministrators and other academic officials. "The Committee believes that it isthe responsibility of . . . the American academic community to set theprofessional and ethical standards of its members. This report on the natureand extent of covert individual relationships with the CIA is intended to alert(the academic community) that there is a problem."? Harold Ford succeeded John Kerry King as CAR in 1970 and was followed in 1974 byGary Foster. In late 1976, with the reorganization of the DDI as the National ForeignAssessment Center (NFAC), relations with aca emics w ? ? ki-e rdinat ed by two professional staffemployees working full time (b)(3)(c) ere the original incumbents andwere followed by James King and In January 1981, the author became CAR asthe post reverted to one-person status. In 1982, the CAR was transferred from the Office of theDDI to the Office of External Affairs under the DCI and in mid-1983 to the newly created Pub-lic Affairs Office.36Approved for for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006191964cademe ,CONMENTIVI:The report set off a flurry of activity within academic ranks and led to nu-merous articles in newspapers and periodicals. Among several letters addressedto DCI George Bush was one from William Van Alstyne, president of theAmerican Association of University Professors, demanding that Bush give thesame assurance against covert use of academics that he had earlier given tomissionaries and journalists. The DCI replied that the Agency sought only -thevoluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreignpolicy processes of the United States." Where relationships are confidential,noted Bush, they are usually so at the request of the scholars rather than of theAgency. He refused to isolate the Agency from the -good counsel of the bestscholars in our country."Bush's argument was to be adopted and enlarged upon by his successor,Stansfield Turner, who engaged in a long and eventually unsuccessful effort toreach agreement with Derek Bok, president of Harvard University. onrelations between that university and the Agency. Bok, acting on the ChiirchCommittee suggestion, appointed a committee to prepare guidelines to assistmembers of the Harvard community in dealing with the CIA. The guidelineswere accepted by Bok and published in May 1977. It was immediatelyapparent that some of Harvard's concerns (unwitting employment of aca-demics and use of scholars in preparing propaganda materials) were no longerat issue due to changes in Agency policy and issuance of Executive Order11905 by President Ford. There were still two issues on which no meeting ofthe minds was possible. One of these had to do with what the guidelinestermed -operational use" of faculty and staff by the CIA. The other concernedcovert Agency recruitment of foreign students for intelligence purposes.Additionally, the guidelines specified that all faculty and staff -should" reportany and all relations with the Agency to their deans, who should report themin turn to President Bok.Attempts by the DCI to point out that these were exceptional cases of aca-demics who might be employed by the Agency on a strictly confidentialmission abroad because of their unique access to foreign individuals orinformation failed to change Bok's mind as did Turner's contention that theconfidentiality of a relationship with an academic was frequently at theprofessor's, rather than the Agency's, request. Finally, Turner pointed out thatthe CIA's responsibility to provide secret foreign intelligence left the Agencywith no alternative to engaging in the activities which Bok deplored, but Bokwas assured that "the rein" would remain tight in such cases.Publicity regarding the dispute over the Harvard guidelines allowedMorton Halperin and John Marks of the Center for National Security Studiesto launch a campaign to have other colleges and universities adopt similar ormore stringent restrictions on intelligence activities on campuses. While someten academic institutions took action toward adoption of similar guidelines, inmost cases modifications were included which limited the impact of anyrestriction on Agency operations. For the great majority of schools where theissue arose, the faculty and the administration rejected any guidelines, usuallyon the ground that existing regulations and practices were adequate to protectboth the institution and the individual from corruption.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196AcademeScope of Current CooperationRelations between the Agency and the academic world have slowlyimproved since 1977, more or less in inverse correlation to the state of East-West relations. ? The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, in ,particular, opened new doors to cooperation with CIA on many campuses. Thedepressed state of the economy in recent years has also been cited as a catalystfor greater interest in Agency employment on the part of recent graduates aswell as the cause of increased willingness to cooperate with CIA by those whosell their services as consultants or external research contractors.A number of recognized authorities who could be of value to the Agency'sresearch effort decline all attempts to gain their assistance. Most are political -scientists, or in an allied social science, and many have expertise in the ThirdWorld. Many scholars on the developing nations of the world, aware thatreports that they have collaborated with American intelligence could atiu--dice their research activities (including their sources), are reluctant even to _come to Langley. Interestingly, some of these scholars are prepared to discusssubstantive issues if an Agency analyst is willing to visit them in their homes orat their offices.Specialists on the Soviet Union or other communist countries havetraditionally been less reluctant to work with the intelligence community,presumably because they are believed to be in touch with the Agency anyway.Experts on Western Europe and other developed nations, in their willingnessto cooperate with the Agency, fall somewhere between the general coopera-tiveness of the Sino-Soviet specialists and the reluctance of the Third Worldexperts.At present the Agency enjoys reasonably good relations with academe andgains much from its contacts with faculty and students. The Office of Trainingand Education uses a large number of academics in its courses. Other officeswithin the Directorate of Administration, specifically Logistics and MedicalServices, have contracts with educational institutions or with individualacademicians. This fall, 27 professors spent two and one-half days atHeadquarters in the Conference on US Intelligence: the Organization and theProfession, conducted by the Center for the Study of Intelligence.(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)The Foreign Resources Division has relationships with scores of individ-uals in US academic institutions. In all cases these links are voluntary and? Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University has written extensively on the CIA. Hemaintains that congressional attempts to restrict Agency activities are strongest and most likelyto be implemented during periods of detente in East-West relations; conversely they are mostunlikely to succeed in periods of increased tension. The charting of relations between the CIAand academe would appear likely to show a similar pattern of close ties during periods ofheightened tension between the US and USSR and strained relations during periods of detente.38Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196ii%ccidemeApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196witting. Many of the individuals also are contacts of the DCD. TheseAmerican scholars do not "recruit" foreign students or researchers for theAgency, but assist by providing background information and occasionally bybrokering introductions.Many academicians are willing 4- --ovide expert assistance to Agencyanalysts and the research componeni(b)(1)(b)(3)(n) Additionally, scores ofother academicians were willing to consult on an ad hoc basis, some withoutreimbursement. Components within the National Intelligence Council and theDirectorates of Intelligence and of Science and Technology sponsored nearly50 conferences during 1982 at which specialists from colleges, universities, or"think tanks" were present.The DDI, the DDS&T, and the NIC also sought help from the academicworld through contracts for ev*----1 research, with the results tipaally _presented as written rehorts. (b)(1)(b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)Since 1977, the Intelligence Directorate has also brought in(b)(3)(c)scholars, usually on sabbatical, to the Agency as contract employees to assistanalysts through an exchange of ideas, a review of written reports, and theproduction of finished intelligence for dissemination to policy makers. Inexchange, these "Scholars-in-Residence" are, for one or two years, privy toinformation that would never be available to them on campus. ?The Supreme Court decision in the Snepp case in early 1980 had somedampening effect on the willingness of professors to work with the Agency.Some of them feared that if they signed the requisite secrecy agreement, theirfuture independence to publish would be severely restricted. Another poten-tial Scholar-in-Residence declined to take the polygraph test, describing it as"demeaning."The Agency also provides numerous services for the academic commu-nity. Since 1972, unclassified CIA reports have been available to the publicand have been widely sought by colleges, universities, and individual scholars.The FBIS ?Daily Reports have long been standard items on the shelves ofmany university libraries.Requests for unclassified briefings of students or faculty members at CIAHeadquarters or on campuses normally receive a positive response. During1982, 31 groups containing over 1,100 individuals were given briefings onintelligence or on some substantive topic at Headquarters. In the same year, atleast 60 Agency officials spoke at various schools throughout the nation.Fourteen college presidents were brought to Langley in 1982 to meet theDirector and other senior officials and to be briefed on Agency activities. Thisprogram, which has generated considerable good will and understanding forthe Agency, was begun in 1977 and has involved a total of 58 presidents fromlarge and small schools throughout the nation, all of the schools important tothe Agency as sources for recruitment of staff employees or consultants, or forother operational requirements.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196AcademeThe Office of Personnel presently is active at approximately 300 schools.Several offices in the DDI and DDS&T also recruit directly from colleges anduniversities. Recently there has been a program, originating in the Directorateof Operations, sending special representatives onto campuses in an attempt toattract high-caliber career trainees.The Graduate Studies Program, which began in 1967, provides summerinternships for students who will be attending graduate school in the fall. Mostof the 57 graduate students from 42 schools accepted in 1983 were attached tothe Intelligence Directorate. A number of -alumni- of earlier GraduateStudies programs subsequently became staff employees.For undergraduates, the Agency maintains a cooperative Student TraineeProgram. The goal of this program today, as it was when it began in 1961, is toprovide a long-range method of recruiting occupational skills which kre inshort supply. The program allows the student, who must be registered inlege with an established coop program, to gain practical wotk experience by-alternating periods of study at school and work at the Agency. Originally, theprogram sought engineers exclusively but in recent years has added those whomajor in computer science, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and accounting.The Office of Equal Employment Opportunity since 1969 has beenrecruiting at, and negotiating contracts with, minority schools. Facultymembers and placement officers from traditionally black schools have beenbrought to Headquarters for briefing sessions.Finally, the Agency has long sought to gain recognition for itself as acenter for intellectual activity comparable to the best institutions in theacademic world. The claim has often been made that CIA could staff a majoruniversity because of the diversity of disciplines represented among itsemployees. Graduate degrees earned by staff employees give some indicationof the training acquired?over 600 Ph.Ds and more than 2,300 Masters'degrees.To gain recognition for the Agency's employees among their counterpartsin academe, overt employees have been encouraged to participate in meetingsof academic and professional societies. Of the over 700 attendees in 1982, asignificant number joined in panel discussions or presented unclassifiedresearch papers.Work for the FutureThe wide ranging program described above puts the Agency on generallygood terms with the academic community. There is, however, considerablework for the future if CIA is to continue to count on securing the best possiblerecruits for its staff employees and the participation of faculty members in im-proving its analytic product. One of the problems, a long-term trend inacademic institutions toward ever decreasing numbers of students in areastudies programs, is currently being examined by a joint committee made upof representatives from the universities, business, and the federal government,including CIA.40Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196AcademeApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196There is also a continuing need to improve the Agency's image at manycolleges and universities. While the number of demonstrations against CIA hasdrastically diminished over the past decade, there are still occasional minorincidents, as happened when CIA and NSA recruitment was protested atMiddlebury College last winter.Some recent Agency activities, including expanded recruitment efforts bysubstantive intelligence officers on the campuses, increased numbers of CIAparticipants at academic conventions and conferences, and a growing use ofexternal research contracts with non-annuitants, are all valuable tools inbreaking down barriers and increasing confidence betweeen the Agency andthe academics.One promising recent activity involves visits to selected college campusesby intelligence officers who are seeking to locate, or create, a body of fapiitymembers favorably disposed toward the Agency. This is accomplished pnnci-pally through conversations with faculty members and by-briefings, whenrequested, to classes or to faculty groups. These friendly contacts in the ranksof academe can be of inestimable value. The goals are to have professorsremind their best students that CIA is a potential employer, to correcterroneous accusations on campus against the Agency, and, perhaps, to identifyother faculty members who might be willing to attend conferences orparticipate in substantive consultations at Langley.There is some danger from an uncoordinated rapid expansion of recruit-ment trips by the many Agency components now engaged in the effort. Unlessoversight of the campaign is centralized, it could result in several Agencyrepresentatives appearing on a campus in rapid succession or even concur-rently. This -overexposure- could have negative repercussions; specifically,irritation on the part of Agency friends and consternation among others?bothfaculty and students. All recruitment visits to academic institutions should becleared in advance at some point within the Agency?possibly within theOffice of Personnel, possibly at the Academic Coordinator's office.The opportunity exists, of course, for any overt employee attending anacademic convention or symposium to assist in furthering good relations forthe Agency. Understandably, many academicians are most impressed by theparticipation of Agency employees on panels. Beyond that, any Agency officerattending a professional meeting can gain good will for CIA by being friendlyand, within the limitations of security, informative about the Agency. Mostacademicians are curious about CIA and grateful for any clarification of itsmission and its activities.The occasional vigorous criticism of the Agency from faculty members orstudents tends to focus on covert action. While some critics will not be satisfiedby any argument, others can be reconciled to the need for covert actionthrough a dispassionate explanation of its synergistic role with other moreconventional means of conducting international relations and a reminder ofthe oversight function of the Congress.CONFIDENTIAL 41Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196to' 'AcademeFrom the author's own experience with a number of college groupsbriefed at Headquarters over the last few years, it is obvious that there is avital need to correct misconceptions held by a large percentage of students andalso by some faculty members. Illustrative of this point were the comments ona short written quiz given by an Agency briefing officer prior to herpresentation before a student group. To the question, what is your reactionand that of your classmates on campus to the words "Central IntelligenceAgency?" the recurring response was "fear."Yet, when the briefings are over there are often voluntary expressions ofsupport for the Agency, inquiries regarding careers, and, from the faculty,offers to meet with DCD or to serve as Agency consultants. If the students andtheir teachers are made aware of the truly symbiotic relationship between theacademic and intelligence worlds, there is little question but that the greatmajority will support the continuing efforts of what Ray Cline terms-.this"peculiarly American combination of spies and scholars, working in tandem."This article is classified.42 --C-ertlinDENTTATApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619196J