HU'S A REFORMIST, HU'S A CONSERVATIVE

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000620553
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987

Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553TITLE:AUTHOR:Hu'sa Reformist,Hu'saConservative(b)(3)(c)VOLUME:31ISSUE: WinterYEAR: 1987pproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553T U.D..I S ININTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence...  All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553The HaosApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553--See'RET(b)(3)(n)--i-- and Huais i": of Chinese political analysis?HU'S A REFORMIST, HU'S A CONSERVATIVE(b)(3)(c)If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth ofthings. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairscannot be carried on to success.?Confucius, Analects, Book XIII: Chapter IIIThe use of a -reformist" vs. -conservative" dichotomy has becomecommon in the analysis of Chinese politics but is ultimately unsuccessful inexplaining what is actually happening in China. The labels themselves areincorrect; moreover, grouping key players into two categories obscures a muchmore complex political landscape. So long as analysis continues in this manner,future intelligence -surprises" will become more likely.The purpose of this article is to suggest a better approach: to focus onseveral factors which affect group formation and the process by which issuesare resolved. Such an approach reveals several groupings of political actors, anda pattern of shifting coalitions in Chinese politics. This approach offers a bettergrasp of what is actually happening in China and could result in better forecastsof Chinese political developments.ExamplesAnalysis of China has long been troubled by the proclivity of non-Confucian observers to impose too simple labels upon an extremely complexpolitical landscape. As Confucius foresaw, the wrong naming of things has ledto false understanding and frequently to flawed analysis.The most serious continuing such problem is the tendency to lump Chineseofficials into two categories?the -reformists" and the -conservatives." Suchanalytical bifurcation is not new. Mao's contribution to Marxist-Leninistideology distinguished between "rightist" and -leftist" deviations from thecorrect line. During the Cultural Revolution officials were deemed to be eitherrevolutionaries"?those who supported the current ideological line no matterhow often it changed?or -counterrevolutionaries"?those who fell afoul ofthat line.1 Much political analysis accepted the Chinese categories, but used theterms -radical" instead of revolutionary" and pragmatic- instead of -counter-revolutionary." Over time the categories evolved into the present conservative-ref ormer dichotomy.(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)? The Chinese ideograph liao4+means -good-; huai ii.rneans -bad-.' The mislabeling of people during the Cultural Revolution has been a key political issue inChina throughout the 1980s. Thousands, if not millions, of persons have sought reversals andcompensation for unjust verdicts.(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062055349--erECTIETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553(b)(3)(n)Chinese(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)Wrong LabelsWhile I do not object to the term -reformer" per se, its use in the Chinesepolitical context has become almost meaningless. It would be hard to find anyleader in China today who is not a reformer, who does not want fundamentalchanges in the Maoist prescriptions for political, economic, and social devel-opment. Consequently, to suggest that there is somehow a group of -reformers"pitted against some other group?as most analysis now does?obscures the basictruth of Chinese politics for the past decade, which is that groups of reformersare competing with each other. A major improvement in how we think aboutthings could begin with the assumption that just about everyone who counts inChina is a reformer; this would allow us to begin to find other more useful waysto distinguish between individuals and their policy preferences.50Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553N+AChineseApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553___sE-eRrf(b)(3)(n)Also objectionable is the use of the term -conservative.- I once heard ananalyst characterize recent developments in China as a resurgence of the-conservatives- which meant there would be a -shift to the left in Chinesepolicy.- The linking of leftism and conservatism?which appears altogether toooften in analysis of China?must be received with a mixture of confusion andindignation by some consumers. Such links may make sense to the analysts whoinvoke them, but to outsiders they are vacuous.The term -conservative- has a rich and distinguished heritage in thelanguage of Western political philosophy and political discourse which bears noresemblance to the misguided applications to the Chinese situation today. Inthe Anglo-American political tradition, conservatism, like liberalism, refers topolitical beliefs in which the individual is considered to be historically andmorally superior to any collection of people. The individual is possessed ofcertain natural or inalienable rights -which can never be fully abridged andwhich can only be compromised by voluntary contracts.- 2 Conservatives differfrom liberals in to what extent the social contract may be employed to securevarious desirable outcomes, but both are in agreement that governments are acondition of individual consent.By way of contrast, Marxism-Leninism, and its Maoist derivative, restupon a concept of man that is fundamentally different from that of theAnglo-American tradition. The underlying sociopolitical philosophy of Maoismis collectivist?that is, the individual is not the sole and ultimate source ofvalue, but, rather, the individual is a derivative product of his membership insome collectivity. For Marxists, this collectivity is the social class. Chinesecommunists accept such values or normative concepts as freedom, fulfillment,and so on, but understand and define them entirely differently than would atrue conservative. The individual becomes -free- only insofar as he is willingto submit to the will or rule of the collective. Clearly, those Chinese communistswho value strongly Maoist ideological concepts are not -conservatives- in anytrue sense, but are radical collectivists. Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reaganare appropriately characterized as -conservative-, but it is hardly conceivablethat Peng Zhen or Chen Yun should be so identified.(b)(1(b)(3)(n)a See A. James Gregor, Contemporary Radical Ideologies: Totalitarian Thought in theTwentieth Century. (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 10-14.--grEeRET (b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062055351Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553(b)(3)(n)Chinese(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)Rethinking Analytical AssumptionsChinese politics involves competition for scarce resources and there aredivisions among China's leadership and challenges to authority. 3 However,instead of being sharply divided into two groups, the Chinese leadership has foryears been a more fluid system of shifting coalitions. The main variables whichaffect the composition of the coalitions apparently are:guanxi. Probably the most pervasive characteristic of Chinese politicsis the system of guanxi, that is, informal loyalty networks. Anunderstanding of patron-client ties is crucial to any analysis of how thesystem works. The relationship between Deng and Hu is illustrativehere; Deng promoted Hu because of personal loyalty even though Hu'sviews were often divergent from Deng's.? personality. Often missing from assessments of Chinese politics is aconsideration of how various leaders get along with each other on apersonal basis. While some of this information is difficult to get, thereoften is reporting which provides interesting insights. For example, Ibelieve that one of the principal reasons for Hu's downfall was that hewas not well liked by many other leaders because of personal traitssuch as his bluntness.? position. Our understanding would be enhanced, I believe, by a morecareful consideration of the bureaucratic interests that some leadersare inclined to defend. If a leader has spent considerable time onagricultural work, for example, he may be more inclined to supportagriculture during key decisions on budget allocations. Similarly, keymilitary officers naturally want to have a person with a strong militarybackground succeed Deng as Chairman of the Military Commission.? worldview. The ideological predispositions of key players are impor-tant. All leaders are committed to a Marxist-Leninist vision, but withinthis civil religion are divergent faiths which prompt differingapproaches to problems. The -fundamentalist- mindset of playerssuch as Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, for example, have apparentlyplayed an important role in their approach to reform.3 Some scholars, notably Lucian Pye, use the term -faction- to characterize the groupingswhich develop in Chinese politics (see Pye, The Dynamics of Factions and Consensus inChinese Politics: A Mode and Some Propositions, Project AIR FORCE report by RAND,R-2566-AF, July 1980). I believe the term -faction- is too strong. It is appropriate for Japanwhere factions are clearly identifiable in the LDP and other parties, but less appropriate fordescribing Chinese groupings.52 (b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553Chinese ,SE-GRET(b)(3)(n)1These variables come together as various leaders take stands on policyissues. A fresh, revitalized analytical approach should try to examine morethoroughly than is now attempted how these four variables interact in thepolicy process, rather than trying to categorize the chief players. Initially, everyeffort should be made to avoid locking people into various categories. Onlyuntil there is conclusive evidence that certain individuals belong in certaincategories should a label be applied, and even then analysis should continue toconsider, implicitly or explicitly, why the groups have formed, what theirdurability is, and the derivative consequences.Toward Potential New CategoriesAll this is not to say that we should avoid categorization altogether.Categories are useful as shorthand descriptions of political actors and processesso long as they are accurate. In past years, several students of Chinese politicshave gone beyond the oversimplified dichotomous analytical mode by offeringmore diverse categorizations of Chinese leaders. In 1974, for example, Oksen-berg and Goldstein presented a four-category typology. 4 Robinson, Lieberthal,and others ha'Ve also explored various typologies which break free of thetwo-group bifurcation. These efforts have been criticized, but their exampleoffers an approach we should consider in freeing ourselves from the presentanalytical snare.In a preliminary manner, and as a basis for future discussion amonganalysts, I propose that some potential categories which reflect the variablespresented above could be:? Marxist-Leninist Fundamentalists. During the policy process someleaders seem to be most interested in the ideological implications andtend to base their stands on these issues. Such leaders usually seem tointerject traditional ideological interpretations into the policy debate.Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu would probably fall into this category.? Challengers. Some leaders seem primarily concerned with promotingchange in the system, but also with maintaining their personal power.Deng, for example, wants to press forward with change even at risk toideological or bureaucratic imperatives. He is anxious to transform thebasis of party authority from charisma to performance. Peng Zhen isalso determined to change the basis of authority in the party (probablybecause he has great influence in the legal mechanisms), but alsoapparently wants to challenge Deng for power.? Turf Defenders. Some party bureaucrats seem primarily interested inprotecting their positions and proteges by avoiding retirement. Theyare supportive of reform, but not at the cost of their power andprestige, and are not as enthusiastic as the challengers. Li Xiannianprobably fits in this category."The Chinese Political Spectrum," Problems of Communism 23 (March-April 1974), pp.1-13. Their proposed categories were: Militant Fundamentalists, Radical Conservatives, EclecticModernizers, and Westernized Chinese. (b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062055353Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553(b)(3)(n)Chinese? Bureaucratic Compromisers. These are people who are primarilyinterested in securing particular bureaucratic interests, irrespective ofideological concerns or of progress in reform momentum. They differfrom the Turf Defenders in that their principal interests are organi-zational, not personal (though the two can often become intermeshed).Zhao Ziyang and Chen Yun probably belong in this category. Hu Qili,Li Peng, and Tian Jiyun might wind up here too, at least, for the timebeing until one or more of them is likely to join the challenger ranks.? Westernizers. While there are probably few of .these among theleadership, evidence suggests that some prominent persons like FangLizhi may belong in this unique category. These Chinese essentiallywant a fundamental restructuring of the political system and itsunderlying ideology. While these figures do not have much powernow, Chinese intellectual history over the past century indicates thatthey could have great influence over time.If such categories were employed, events such as the removal of HuYaobang could be more appropriately understood as a convergence of variousinterests rather than as merely a struggle between reformers and conservatives.Hu was opposed early on by fundamentalists because of his efforts to easestrictures on artistic and cultural expression. He increasingly alienated key turfdefenders by trying to get his own clients placed in important leadershippositions, and he alienated bureaucratic compromisers because of his headline-making and often off-the-cuff statements on questions of Party reform, militaryreductions, and relations with Japan. He may also have antagonized Western-izers because of his seeming pro-Soviet stance. Central Committee documentscirculated in conjunction with Hu's removal and hint of most of these factors;his alleged failure to manage effectively the December student demonstrationsseems to have been the final straw.The categories listed above, however, are intended to be only exploratory.Moreover, as previously noted no categorization should be firmly establisheduntil more research has been done. Categories must remain flexible, taking intoaccount the practical reality that some individuals will have strong stands onsome issues but be unaffected by or indifferent to others. Nevertheless, thesecategories are suggestive of where rethinking our analytical framework mightlead. By redirecting our attention to the issues and processes and more carefullyexamining how different personalities come down on these issues we should beable to gain greater insights into Chinese politics. These insights, in my view,will reveal not a battle between two factions, but a fluid process of shiftingcoalitions.Fortunately, there are signs that some analysts are seeking to avoid thebifurcation trap by concentrating on process.  (b)(1)(b)(3)(n)54 aEGRET (b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553ChineseApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620553?SECA:ET(b)(3)(c)(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)Nevertheless, much remains to be done. Reexamining our assumptions willnot be easy. The -conservative-reformist- mode of analysis has become socomfortably ensconced that perhaps only few will be willing to depart from it.But unless we do, we will continue to advance obfuscation rather than clarity,settle for darkness rather than light, and ultimately, abandon truth in favor oferror.This article is classified>aftrf__SEGRET(b)(3)(n)(b)(3)(nApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062055355