U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND SOVIET ARMOR

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000624298
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: June 1, 1980

Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298TITLE: U.S. Intelligence and Soviet ArmorAUTHOR: Paul F. Gorman, Major General, USAVOLUME: 24 ISSUE: Summer YEAR: 1980Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298pproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298STUDIES ININTELLIGENCE ?A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)acearrA case study in conventional military force assessment(with exhortations) for intelligence managers, collectorsand analysts.U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND SOVIET ARMORPaul F. GormanMajor General, USAThis thinkpiece aims at I) identifying a central, unresolved issue inconventional force assessment, and 2) conducting a tutorial for senior intelligence,officers in associated problems of collection and analysis. It begins with a review ofthe centrality of maneuver armor to the Soviets, and a refutation of the commonly-held belief that NATO antitank guided missiles (ATGM) offset the Warsaw Pact'sadvantage in armor. There follows a retrospect us of recent trends and a laying outof the options open to designers of armor protection and armor penetrants, with aspecific forecast of Soviet interests. Finally, there is an exegesis an intelligenceimplications, culminating in a broadly sketched plan of action.SUMMARYSoviet strategy in Central Europe is buttressed by armored vehicles?some 9,400Soviet tanks are the most visible element of Soviet power there. Since 1968 the USSRhas built over 65,000 armored vehicles for maneuver: nearly four times as many tanksas the United States, some three times as many armored infantry carriers. The bestSoviet armored vehicles are clearly superior to U.S. counterparts, less because oftechnological breakthrough than the resolute, relentless Soviet materiel acquisitionprocess. Soviet industry, supported by procurement funds for land force arms whichtriple U.S. outlays, grinds out new models which outstrip ours in quality and Quantity.The near-term outlook is for more of the same: through 1984, the Warsaw Pact willoutproduce NATO in large-gun, advanced-armor tanks more than 4:1. NATO'sprecision guided missiles (PGM) are unlikely to give the Soviets doubts about thecontinued efficacy of their armor, since their counters are both impressively numerousand redundant.Nor are longer term prospects more promising. While U.S. innovations since 1974promise two effective new tanks for the 1980s (the M60A3 and XM-1), plus a range ofpotent new tank penetrants and incapacitants, Soviet measures against U.S. anti-armorweapons, which we now know have been quite effective in the 1970s, could keepthem well out in front of American developments throughout the 1980s. In the armslikely to dominate the outcome of a future battle for Central Europe?armoredfighting vehicles and counterweapons?the U.S. Army, then, probably will remainqualitatively and quantitatively inferior. The domestic and international implicationsof this inferiority?were it generally appreciated?are grave indeed.SECRET 1Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet ArmorWhat could change this bleak prognosis is better intelligence on the nature ofSoviet armor and projectiles for tank guns, and on Soviet countermeasures againstU.S. precision guided missiles (PGMs). Intelligence community leaders mustappreciate that:? It is true neither that antitank missiles have outmoded the tank nor that armorand penetrants have reached their respective technological performance limits.? In the 1980s, fielded tanks could be uparmored to counter new threats, andupgunned via new ammunition to defeat unforeseen forms of adversary armor.? An armor can be designed to fend off any known penetrant; a penetrant can bedesigned to defeat any known armor.More than in any other field of armaments, the development of tanks andprecision guided missiles is sensitive to and can benefit enormously from timelyacquisition and interpretation of intelligence. The men and women of the U.S.intelligence community can thus exert powerful and immediate leverage on thecrucial balance of conventional military forces arrayed in Europe.Given perceived nuclear parity, apprehension over the balance of conventionalarmaments could bear decisively on the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance in peace, orits armies in war. Moreover, there are large sums of U.S. defense funds involved indecisions which turn on intelligence estimates of Soviet development of penetrants andprotection. Most U.S. intelligence gaps pertaining to strategic weapons would, werethey closed, scarcely affect on-going programs. But the intelligence shortfall re Sovietarmor has already influenced billion-dollar decisions on the XM-1, TOW, and tankammunition programs. Further clearing of uncertainty could have immediate impact.Here is a case where modest improvements in intelligence could cause multiplereallocations of defense funds, and conceivably, become the linchpin in NATO'sconfidence and credibility.I. OVERVIEWArmor in Soviet StrategyA nation's outlays for war materiel telltale its anticipated style of combat. Overthe past 15 years, armor for land force maneuver has stood second highest among thetop 20 Soviet separate weapon systems procurement programs, and well up amonggeneral categories of weapons (see table, page 3). This investment has provided theUSSR with an active inventory of about 50,000 main battle tanks?five times the U.S.fleet?and more than 30,000 modern infantry combat vehicles?three times the U.S.fleet.(b)(1)This emphasis leaves little doubt that the Soviet Union sees armor as its principalmeans of controlling land and people. This is so notwithstanding NATO's deploymentof large numbers of precision-guided missiles and other antiarmor ordnance, anddespite the strains armor procurement imposes on Warsaw Pact economiesbeleaguered by growing shortages of energy, manpower, and raw materials. TheSoviets perceive armor as the makeweight in the conventional arms balance in CentralEurope, now and for the foreseeable future.--Stetrr?Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Table I.Major Weapon Procurement ProgramsTop 20 Individual Systems(Ranked by Cost)1965-79FloggerArmored fighting vehicles*D-class submarine (with missiles)Y-class submarine (with missiles)Hip/HazeFoxbatFencerSS-11BackfireFitterSS-18FishbedFlagon ACandidV-class submarineSS-19SS-20SA-5SS-9Hind1980-85FloggerArmored fighting vehicles*Modified FoxbatNew SLBMBackfireSS-20FencerSS-19Advanced fighterFollow-on to V-class submarineSS-18Hip/HazeNew long range bomberNew large ICBMSA-X-10AA-X-9MCandidHindSS-20New class general purpose submarineSoviet Weapon Procurement CategoriesTop 101965-79Fighter/interceptorsICBMsBallistic missile submarinesHelicoptersArmored fighting vehicles*SAMsGeneral purpose submarinesBombersSurface combatant shipsTransports1980-85Fighter/interceptorsICBMsGeneral purpose submarinesBombersSAMsHelicoptersArmored fighting vehicles*MR/IRBMsTransportsSurface combatant ships*Weapon systems, equipment, and initial spare parts (exports excluded); includes main battle tanks(T-62, T-72) and four types of armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles (BMP, BMD,BTR-60, and BRDM). N.B.: 1979 expenditures for these were up 500 percent from 1965.SECRETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006242983Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298EC-itt-r?(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Ground Force Divisions in Central EuropeSoviet ArmortY NATO garrison areaWarsaw Pact garrison area1 Number of active divisionsGround Force Strengths in Central EuropeNATOWarsaw PactUS Only Total Soviet Only TotalActive divisions"4272758Personnel204,000797,000482,000970,000Tanks"'1,4756,4609,40016,480*Divisions vary in size and type from country to country.? ? In active units.?Secret?(b)(3)(c)4Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298SECRETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor(b)(3)(c)  -SfeRE-T--(b)(3)(n)Soviet Medium Tanks10.4Soviet Combat Infantry Vehicles(b)(3)(c)-"SreRE-TApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006242985Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet ArmorBACKGROUNDIn the 1920s and 1930s, the tank proving grounds of Russia were thewomb of the Nazi panzer armies.? Marshal Tukhachevsky was practicing -blitzkrieg" with actual tanksand close air support when Guderian et al were still experimenting withplywood mock-ups.? Only the USSR exploited the genius of the American tank designer,Walter Christie, whose inventions underwrote World War II's best tank,the Soviet T-34.But Stalin's purges of Tukhachevsky and other Red Army leadersvitiated the effectiveness of Soviet armor, and Hitler's armor leadersnearly defeated a Soviet tank fleet outnumbering theirs by more thanfour to one, teaching the Soviets a powerful lesson in how many tanksare enough.? The Soviets' military history of World War II depicts the Red Army'sarmor as the spearhead of victory. Yet in 1945, tanks comprised lessthan 6 percent of USSR ground forces; today, tanks are more than 25percent. The current Soviet motorized rifle division has 16 times thetanks of its World War II counterpart, 37 times the number of armoredinfantry carriers.? Since 1945 armor has been used frequently to underwrite Soviet politicsin East Europe.? Armor is fundamental to contemporary Soviet strategy in Europe, theMiddle East (exports to client states), and Asia (forces opposite PRC,Afghanistan)."The Soviets have been first in space, first in tanks, far behind in computers, andlast in ladies' lingerie" . . . Robert Kaiser, RUSSIA.The USSR builds and fields large numbers of armored vehicles because:? That has been its practice ever since the nascent Communist state seized worldleadership in armor development after the Rapallo Treaty in 1922.? The Soviet armored vehicle industry is one of its largest enterprises, employingmillions of workers, and consuming huge quantities of steel, other rawmaterials, and energy.? Tanks and accompanying armored vehicles are sine qua non for the high-tempo, offensive operations prescribed in Soviet military doctrine for eithernuclear or conventional warfare.Even if, after Brezhnev leaves the scene, the new Soviet leadership wanted todivert resources from armor programs, it might well be stymied by sheer societalinertia: the USSR seems irrevocably committed to producing armor, in huge quantity,and of high quality.6 SECRETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet ArmorSoviet Armor Armor Production(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)In recent years, Soviet tank and APC production has dwarfed that of the UnitedStates. Since 1968, Soviet factories have turned out over 65,000 armored fightingvehicles: about four times as many tanks, and about three times as many APCs as theUnited States. In 1979, production of outmoded models ceased, and at least one largeplant at Omsk was refurbished. Assuming past production trends continue, totalannual production of tanks could increase 30-40 percent over the next few years.Deliveries of Armored Personnel CarriersUSSRUSAPC's5.0004,0003.0 )2,01,0 I1968 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78(b)(3)(c)Tank DeliveriesTanks4,000USSRUS3,000 ?-2,0001,000I I1968 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78The Soviets have systematically modernized their armor inventories. Since theearly 1960s, when the United States began to issue the M-60 series tank and M-113series armored personnel carrier (vehicles which remain in 1979 our only armorproduction items), the Soviets have fielded no less than three types of main battletanks and three new armored personnel carriers. Some 13,000-15,000 T-64 and T-72tanks have been manufactured?more than the whole U.S. fleet of the M-60 series.Moreover, while U.S. forces are still dependent (with the M-60 series) uponhomogeneous steel armor and rifled, manually served guns, Soviet T-64 and T-72tanks are protected by more advanced armor and mount large-caliber, high-velocity,smoothbore, automatically loaded cannon. Soviet armored infantry vehicles have bothsmoothbore antitank cannons and on-vehicle antitank guided missiles as well as firingports, while the U.S. M-113 mounts only a World War II vintage machine gun, andhas no firing ports. Soviet tank crews have been reduced from four soldiers to three bythe addition of automatic loaders, and the newer Soviet tanks incorporate bothstabilization and electro-optical fire control instruments further to automate gunnery,and to increase first-round hit probability with less training.It is not that Soviet armor designers have access to technologies beyond the reachof their U.S. counterparts. The United States could have built and fielded superior, orat least comparable, armored vehicles. To the degree that the Soviets today enjoy atechnological advantage in their deployed, high-quality armor systems, that edgeproceeds from compressed development cycles in close sequence, plus theirwillingness to put a partially developed vehicle into production and into operationalApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006242987-S-ECRET-Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)units, allowing the vehicle to mature in use via product improvement.* Thus, the gapbetween U.S. and Soviet armor forces is less a function of advanced Soviet technologythan of a resolute, relentless materiel-acquisition process:Soviet ArmorARMOR MATERIEL ACQUISITION PROCESS?United StatesDiscontinuous and lengthy system development,product improvement, follow-on development.Turbulence in design, production and test teamsresulting from discontinuous development.Requirement for cost-effectiveness analyses basedon operational tests stretches time prior toproduction decision.Design for mission versatility, even at risk ofcomplexity in manufacture and maintenanceafield.Search for significant advances beyond currentsystem capability, to limit of technology; "state ofthe art": a better system.SovietTelescoped development, product improvement,follow-on development.Continuously operating design bureaus workingon successive models.Tests in operational units, production and im-provement via retrofit in units.Designs for narrow missions, at low technologicalrisk to insure better manufacturability, reliability,and maintainability.Acceptance of modest improvement over prede-cessor system, using "off-the-shelf" technologyand design ingenuity: an adequate system.*For example, although their T-64 tank, the mainstay of their forces in Germany, has been trouble-prone since its fielding, it has been improved over time via extensive and expensive modifications, includinga whole new power plant. While such defects in a U.S. tank would have caused a major scandal, we coulddetect almost no perturbations in the Soviet defense establishment over their issue. During the 6 months(April-October 1979), improved T-64s were replacing older T-62s and T-55s among Soviet forces inGermany at the rate of about 100 per month.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)crt-RFTThe Soviet materiel-acquisiton process for land forces is supported lavishly byU.S. standards. In fact, the estimated dollar cost of Soviet outlays for land force armsover the past decade has been three times the comparable U.S. outlays.US and Soviet Land Forces ProcurementR Comporlsan 0r us Out1o9s With EstimatedDoaar Caste or Soviet Activatesso4.177USSRC70 71Cumulative, 1970-79US  1 30 balionUSSRassJIM ,11190 batten72 73'A 75 78 77 78 79Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006242989Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)rr  Soviet ArmorThe Question of QualityThe U.S. Army rates the best current Soviet tank Clearly superior to its mainbattle tank:1979,2-L-?.....Co44isgS ?.&?,..' R.4. A,iiMA.4GUN.1/44..'.04"er2/NIGHTVISION'AMMOLOAD_2/NBCLOADERAUTO, .sWOSo?1.,'''10?'- 1-12I/V+V +V+V'?VVNOTES.1. 1-72 possesses automatic electronic rangefinder, pssibly laser rangefinder.2. 1-72 has "snorkel."3. M60A1 has 60 rounds vs 40 rounds in T-72.4. 1-72 possesses antiradiation liner.5. M60A1 does not have automatic loader.By 1984 or 1985, when an upgraded version (designated XMl-El) becomesavailable with both additional armor protection and a 120-mm gun, the U.S. Armyexpects the United States to be producing a tank as good as the Soviet follow-on to theT-72.101984_r64,o,..042'Q.c?, oq- q-,?.. ..' 20C.J(.7....ZR.--t. ji, .,--..,ctiN.?-c- ji.,1- -e-(o:2: ?:'..0.' 0'vi.' 6r....,_ycjQ7.'.:oTCT, ,sXM-1V+8/'VV +VL/V180V_ v_ VVV-.IvVvNOTES1. Assumes 120-mm gun for XMl.2. XMl will have advanced torsion bar suspension, superior horsepower/weight ratio.3. Assumes 120-mm gun for XMl.4 XMl will not have automatic loader.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Similarly, the U.S. Army rates its current APC clearly inferior to its Sovietcounterpart, the BMP:1984k'iVP"1,4)_yNIGHTVISION__VNBC_yIFV_yAT_sjM1131,-v-BMPp?i+v' l-vo'1.-.0'1.0NOTES:1. Judgment based on size, weight consideration.2. BMP has passive IR sight.3. BMP possesses collective protection, filter, chemical alarm.4. BMP mounts 73-mm gun, has firing ports.5. BMP mounts Sagger ATGM.By 1984, as the United States Infantry Fighting Vehicle becomes available, theArmy figures it may close the gap in quality, if not in quantity, compared with theBMP follow-on:1979MOBILITYNIGHTVISIONNBCATCANNONRATEOfFIRE2 J,_2/,-V_,JJIFVv1-v+VVV +VBMP FO1,1VVNOTES:1. IFV will possess superior suspension.2. IFV will have thermal night sight.3. Judgment based on WV Bushmaster.4. Judgment based on WV Bushmaster.horsepower/weight ratio.automatic cannonautomatic cannon15VCRET 11Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet ArmorConfronted with the foregoing data, or comparable presentations, NATOsupporters usually adduce two arguments which they feel offset putative Sovietstrength in armor:? In assessing armor, all of NATO's tanks, not just those of the United States,should be counted.? NATO relies not just on tanks, but on antitank guided missiles (ATGM) andother advanced weapons to counter Soviet armor.NATO vs. Warsaw Pact TanksWarsaw Pact tanks now outnumber NATO's (2:1 in peace, better than 2.5:1postmobilization) and NATO is unlikely to improve its position by 1985.Quantitatively, the Warsaw Pact is likely to maintain about the same edge.The first argument has merit, but proffers little comfort. Over the past five years(1975-1979) NATO's procurement of tanks has averaged less than half that of theWarsaw Pact.While NATO is expected to add some 3,000 tanks to its inventory between 1980and 1985, these increases will be mainly from new British procurement (about 100120-mm gun Chieftain Challenger tanks) and U.S. POMCUS (prepositioned overseas4asnor r(b)(3)(n)Main Battle Tank Mobilization in Central Europe1980-1985: M Day & M+15Men. a(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n).4,99ftrr-r(b)(3)(n)NATO and Warsaw Pact Main Battle Tank Procurement.1975 to 19792500 -2250 -2030 -1/501500 -12501000-,750 -500 -250 -0  5 Year Average;US : 779non-US NATO : 367- TOTAL 1158USSR:2070NSWP :318TOTAL2388LegendA US _X USSR  0 non-US NATO  NSWP1975 1946 1977-528112T1978(b)(3)(n)materiel configured in unit sets)?all M-60 series. Qualitatively, NATO will remaindependent on tank types with 105-mm or smaller main guns, and old-style,homogeneous armor, while the Warsaw Pact will be turning out larger numbers oftanks with guns of 120-mm or larger bore, and advanced armor. If only such large-gun, advanced-armor tanks be counted, the Warsaw Pact will probably outproduceNATO by more than 4:1.This difference in quality is significant. Presented below is a U.S. Armycomparison of the effectiveness of key tanks of the recent past and near future. TheU.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency* has used for this purpose a dynamicmodel of combat between two tanks (one-versus-one duel). The mathematical model isinformed as feasible by data from battles (for example, the October 1973 War), andactual firings and other tests. It aggregates outcomes of duels at various combat ranges,in which each protagonist is 50 percent of the time fully exposed in the attack, and 50percent in hull defilade defending. Variables in the model also account for time offiring, probabilities of hit and of kill, round reliability, and probability of sensing(using one shot to advantage in aiming the next). Thus, this duel model evaluates twotanks by comparing the vulnerability and lethality of each, plus their respective ratesof fire and accuracy, combined significantly over range and engagement time. Thus*AMSAA generated this analysis expressly for this paper; data are Confidential. Note, however, that theXMI-El, due circa 1985, is not modeled.SECRET 13Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298rrpr(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet Armormeasured, the current and recent Soviet advantage in quality, tank for tank, is evidentin the chart labeled -Tank Quality."Tank Quality: The AMSAA View(One vs. One Duels)70%60%US Advantage40%Parity20%20%Soviet Advantage40%60%XM1772M762M48754/755M48162XM1/XM833r-11.9r:IgectionI (Worst CaseXA41 IFrgeM 0A3J71/772M1950 1960United StatesM48I I I1970M60A11980 19901979Soviet Union IOrl I I Cfll 131M60A31 XM1754 755 162.764/772780??(b)(3)(c)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)The area on the chart labeled "Intelligence Shortfall" will be discussed at greaterlength in the concluding section of this paper, but suffice to say here that possiblecomparisons between current and prospective U.S. and Soviet main battle tanks aredefined by the upper curve (T-70 lines), which is the 1974 intelligence projection usedby the Army in seeking approval for its XM-1 development program, and the lowercurve (T-64/72, T-80 lines), which represent current intelligence projections creditingSoviet armor with high protective prowess (upper bound, or worst case armor).Information available now indicates that the actual state of affairs is much closer tothe bottom curve than the upper curve. In brief, the United States is now behind, tankfor tank, and even when our developmental XM-833 depleted-uranium round for the105-mm cannon becomes available, the XM-1 is likely to be no more than an evenmatch for the T-80(b)(1)U.S. Arley data, were it available in Moscow, would confirm Soviet sensings ofthe superiority of their T-72 over contemporary U.S. tanks. The chart below draws ondata from the U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, based on test firings, whichcompare the four main tank-killing weapons of the U.S. Seventh Army in Europeagainst three Soviet tanks: the T-62, and the T-72 with our high and low estimates ofits armor thickness. The T-72 LB is a lower bound or "best case" version, the T-72 UBis an upper bound or "worst case" version. The U.S. weapons include the DRAGONand TOW antitank guided missiles, and two 105-mm tank cannon rounds: the M-735is the current tungsten alloy fin-stabilized round, and the M-774 is the depleteduranium (Staballoy), fin-stabilized round about to be issued. The plots depictprobability of kill assuming hit on an attacking, fully and frontally exposed tank:K/H*CURRENT WEAPONST-62T-72 (LB)T-72 (UB)DRAGON ATGM.65.42.18TOW ATGM.74.48.16M-735 APFSDS.77.22.22COMING WEAPONSM-774 APFSDS.78.71.50* Probability of Kill Given Hit, Firer and Target Stationary, Target Fully Exposed,00 Azimuth (Front).Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet ArmorProbability of Kill Given Hit, Firer and Target Stationary,Target Fully Exposed, 0? Azimuth (Front)US WeaponM774TankRoundM735TankRoundTOWDragonSoviet Tank762T72 LBT72 UB0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0(b)(3)(c)16Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor  (b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)As may be seen, while all weapons have provided high assurance of kill against theT-62, the M-735?planned to be the most numerous round aboard U.S. tanks?isimpotent against the T-72. Our two most powerful ATGM are marginal in a frontalattack against the lower bound-best case T-72, and virtually useless against the upperbound-worst case T-72.*To sum, whether one uses informed U.S. or Soviet calculations, the conclusion isthat NATO can expect, through 1984, no advantage over the Soviets in quality ofarmor or antiarmor weapons, and only a modest redressing of its present quantitativedisadvantage.*The graphic assessment techniques used here are in some cases original, and, in all, unusual. Amongother problems intelligence faces, that of presenting comparisons in this field of armaments is most difficult.With vehicles protected by homogeneous armor, it has been easy to express lethality of threat weapons usingas a common denominator the ability of each to penetrate some standard armor, such as "rolledhomogeneous steel plate at 00 obliquity." But with the advent of nonhomogeneous armors, such as that webelieve the Soviets employ on the T-64 and T-72, new comparative measures must be sought. As the U.S.Army Ballistic Research Laboratory puts it: "The Soviet Union has fielded two new tanks, the T-64 and theT-72. As intelligence data on these tanks accumulated, it became apparent that (a) the T-64 and T-72 werevery similar in most respects, and (b) both appeared to have an unconventional armor over most (or all) oftheir frontal areas. Continual analysis of the accumulating intelligence data has led to technical estimates ofwhat this unconventional armor might be, and how well it may perform. If our estimates of what thisunconventional axmor could be engineered into the tanks [sic], then this armor also would providesubstantially improved ballistic protection over that of an equivalent weight of homogeneous steel armor.Further, it appears that the magnitude of the improvement in ballistic protection with the unconventionalarmor is probably not some simple multiple of the equivalent weight of homogeneous steel armor, butinstead varies from weapon to weapon in a complicated way.-The advent of a new unconventional armor on fielded Soviet tanks causes two immediate problems.The first, biggest and most obvious problem is that we must immediately reconsider the capabilities of ourexisting and developmental weapons systems, and decide what actions are prudent in the face of this newthreat. The second, less obvious, problem is that this reconsideration of the capabilities of our weaponssystems is made much more difficult by the complicated phenomena involved in the terminal ballistics ofattacking munitions and the unconventional armor as we perceive it now."When tanks were made of homogeneous steel armor, it was relatively easy to get a fair idea of thelethality of most weapons against such tanks by comparing the penetration capability of the weapon intosteel armor to the known or expected thickness of armor on the tank. Thus, if a weapon could penetrate Xmm of steel armor, and it had to penetrate Y mm of steel armor to reach the internal volume of the tank,then if X> Y the attacking weapon could be said to have some significant lethality, and the more Xexceeded Y the greater the lethality was likely to be (up to a point). Such simplistic concepts are notworkable with the new unconventional armors. Attempts to communicate weapons systems lethalityagainst such armors have led to great confusion among DoD decision makers unfamiliar with thecomplicated terminal ballistics technology involved."Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Antitank Missiles(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet ArmorDoes NATO's hope lie in more and better antitank guided missiles? In precision-guided munitions? Here, too, near-future prospects are bleak. As indicated above,even the numerous, once-formidable U.S. TOW ATGM is now a questionable asset. Asthe chart depicts,* when the Soviets deployed their T-64 and T-72 tanks, they endednearly two decades of U.S. ATGM superiority. While it is possible that an improved(larger, faster) TOW-like missile may redress this deficiency vis-a-vis these currenttanks, Soviet armor on the T-80 and T-80I could stymie this development as well.*While the previous footnote deprecates such simplistic measures as those of ordinate, these can beused with some validity to rate the comparable ATGM warheads shown.US ATGM vs. Soviet Tank,-Millimeters of Armor Equivalent to Rolled Homogenous Steel700Improved TOW600T80?Range of r:64/172IEstimative /ENTACUncertainty1?4500TOWBest US ATGM? PenetrationSS-10/11400300162Best Soviet Tank154/155Armor Afield2001001950-seiner-1960 19709801979-(b)(3)(c)18Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor(b)(3)(c)SCREf?(b)(3)(n)Here are diagrams generated by the computer of the Ballistic ResearchLaboratory which portray the vulnerability of the T-62 and T-72 against frontal attackby DRAGON and TOW, the two ATGM now deployed throughout the Seventh Army.The depiction for DRAGON is valid for a 0? frontal attack from 100 to 1,000 metersrange; that for TOW for a 0? frontal attack from 500 to 3,700 meters range:Weapon:DRAGONKey:From ground mountI/1,TINOM ? ?   fo? woo ?re ? woe  of food woo...*  }?????????????  ???????????????????????????????1??????????????11? soo?of ?atatatutaTarget:T-62 ????????????1:111Wpf of000000,?????111??????f II. ?????910ffII II.  51111 1OMB ONION MOIOOOOOO Off???? OOOOOO 'Of fiolf  OOOOO IONS14.11?4110fie IMPOOfficifillee Off OfONION.COMMISf A* off ? 414 iff OfTlica????????????????????????????? f? ?????????????0????????I ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????OlonowloOolOO?????????~Of I LAI I-A ? utfttiliff4J,JJAMOffi 914.9Target:T-72(12/78)LOWER BOUNDPROTECTION u flUtilif floInternal volume perforated181 Internal volume not perforated=12 No internal volume here-Secret? (b)(3)(n)SECRET",   AMTarget:T-72?????Oit-4?41TVVIRMIRII filo??????????????????5?190?4?91??????5Oof ?f.f????????????????????????????f / ????????????????????????  / ??????????????""."??????????,??????????MI* Ma(12/78) UPPER SOUNDPROTECTIONApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062429819Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet ArmorWeapon:TOW(Current)From vehicfe mountKey:Internal volume perforatedElInternal volume not perforatedMM.= No internal volume hererrri7Ij7rrry=wpremi=n,,,. r777,/11????10??????????????  ?????01.....::......,??????1  1???????????????  1.??????~10110/?????????????????????????.,????????????????????????????11W???????11.4;MooTarget: -   T-62 11.74.14?? I lissIliallgiagagiiiifilseidn  OOOOOO ???????????????????LOOO???????????????????????? ????????????????????OOOOO ?????4?????????????11?????411?0111011111?411?11411110?111111104?????????16111???11114111?114?11????4???????11?1???? MI6OMB IMMIWASSOMON 040400441441Trainr:::::??????124 111.w.=  ellINNI411118???????DOM.????4110?4111Target:(12/78)L0wER BOUNDPROTECTIONh.craveTarget:T-72114411.11.1""ISIS..,/revoneilmffIZIMPR?????????????????????1????????????????????l?????????(12/78) UPPER BOUNDPROTECTION20Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298SECRETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)These diagrams illustrate vividly the intelligence dimensions of the ATGM problemfacing U.S. commanders in Europe today: our ATGM clearly can defeat the T-62, butthe T-72?and the like-armored T-64?could be largely invulnerable to them. In fact,chances are better than 50-50 that either TOW or DRAGON would explode withouteffect against the nose of the T-72, even if that tank's armor is only of -lower bound,best case- toughness. In the upper bound, worst case, the probability of kill declines toless than .20. Prudence dictates a change in tactics to seek flanking, rear, or top shotsfor our ATGM?adjustments which to some extent will require them, to sacrifice theirrange advantage, and render them more vulnerable to suppressive fires and infantryattack. (The U.S. Army is now developing an improved TOW missile which uses alarger warhead plus a nose probe to optimize penetration?but this will not appearuntil 1982.)Tactics of SuppressionIn any event, for coping with NATO ATGM the Soviets probably rely as much onsuppressive fires as on armor protection. Soviet doctrine stresses four types ofsuppression for ATGMs and other antiarmor defenses: direct fire from tanks,supporting infantry fighting vehicles, and attack helicopters, and indirect fire fromartillery and mortars.The Warsaw Treaty Organization intends to use its tank superiority to overwhelmNATO ATGM. They believe that a high density of attacking tanks can saturate thedefense in any given sector. They know tank guns can fire more rapidly than ATGM,and that Soviet tanks are heavily armored to the front, and built low to present aminimal target. Their crews are drilled in frontal engagement of ATGM while on themove. Whereas ammunition aboard U.S. tanks in Germany consists mainly of steeldarts for killing tanks (less than 20 percent high explosive or incendiary rounds), Soviettanks carry mainly high explosive antipersonnel rounds for ATGM suppression.Aside from tanks, the Soviets prize for suppression other direct fire weaponswhich can reach deep into NATO defensive positions to destroy defending tanks andATGM on vehicles or in bunkers. Here Soviet ATGM play a role. During the 1960sand 1970s, while the United States has fielded just two ATGM systems?DRAGON(range 1,000 meters) and TOW (range 3,000-3,700 meters)?the Soviets have fieldedsix. The latest Soviet antitank missile is the AT-6 SPIRAL, a radio-controlled,semiautomatic, command-to-line-of-sight system of 5,000 meters range. AlthoughNATO has many more antitank weapons than the Pact, and will substantially increaseits lead in numbers of fielded AT weapons over the next several years (through 1984),*most such weapons will be of short range and of doubtful use against advanced armorlike that of the T-72. Considering only antitank systems with ranges greater than 1,000meters, which are generally the more capable systems which figure in suppressivefires, by 1984 the Warsaw Pact will have increased its advantage over NATO by 70percent. As for armored vehicles to move these and other infantry support weaponsabout the battlefield, the Pact has a clear superiority now, and will maintain a 5:1superiority in infantry fighting vehicles through 1984.Attack helicopters provide a type of mobile firepower most useful against ATGM,for which the Soviets are pressing hard. As the table on page 3 makes evident,helicopter procurement receives high priority in Soviet defense spending. Over the sixmonths (April-October 1979), in Central Europe alone, the Pact increased its groundattack helicopters some 40 percent, and formed two new MI-24 regiments.*For example, the U.S. VIPER, replacing the M72A2 LAW, will add many thousands of short-rangeAT rockets to the NATO inventory.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298SCCRrT  (b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet ArmorBoth the HIND D and HIP E are heavily armed with direct fire weapons whichcan suppress or destroy NATO tanks and ATGM. Both are being produced in largenumbers, and by 1984 the Pact is expected to have a 1.7:1 advantage over NATO inattack helicopters.Warsaw Pact GroundAttack HelicoptersFigure 11-15Year operational19771976Length (m)18.217.3Maximum usefulload (kilograms, fueland payload)*4,5005,300Maximum combatradius* (nm)95120*Maximum useful load and combat radius calculated with amaximum payload at maximum gross weight using a rolling takeoff.?Secret?(b)(3)(c)As for artillery, which the Soviets regard as their main suppressive counter toATGMs, the Warsaw Treaty Organization will maintain its current overall superiorityin numbers of tubes (about 2.5:1) through 1984. Soviet artillery modernizationprograms include both mechanization (self-propelled guns/howitzers) and upgradedmunitions, including bomblet dispensing rounds, flechette-type shrapnel, andproximity fuzes calculated to be especially effective against ATGM, even if protectedby currently issued nylon blankets. The crucial difference for the force balance inEurope is perhaps best measured by relative firepower surge capabilities. Theseexpress on the Warsaw Pact (WTO) side the capability for fires to kill or blindpreparatory to an attack, or ATGM suppression/obscuration during an attack. On theApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor  (b)(3)(c)parxra____(b)(3)(n)NATO side, these show maximum counterbattery fires. As the chart below makesevident, by 1984 NATO's relative inferiority will increase: new (b)(3)(n)Comparative Artillery Surge Throw WeightsCentral Europe 1979 & 19845000e'4000-.3000  rn-ct)g 2000 -0?-?1..a) 1000-0WARSAW PACT NATO7>20 km 20 km10 kmFrit 10 km?SWUM7 op20 km >20 km?(b)(3)(n)LegendM19041979To summarize, through 1984 at least, large numbers of Soviet armored vehicleswill weigh heavily in the balance of forces in Europe:? The Warsaw Pact will retain numerical superiority in armor and will increasetheir qualitative edge.? The Pact is building ever more effective counters to NATO ATGM in the formof both direct fire weapons on armored vehicles and on helicopters, and apreponderance of indirect (artillery) fires.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Va-V--P'Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet ArmorSECRETII. THE OUTLOOK FOR ARMORTrends in Armor-Antiarmor Warfare(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Tanks are designed to provide direct fire from cannon, machinegun, guidedmissile or flame weapons which are both armor-protected and mobile. Modern tanksare significantly more lethal than the armored vehicles which fought in World War II.Trying to hit another stationary tank at a range of 1,500 meters, the U.S. Armymedium tank of World War II could fire 13 rounds, and would still have only a 50-50chance of hitting. The standard U.S. medium tank of the mid-.1970s commanded thesame hit probability with a single shot.TO OBTAIN 50-50 PROBABILITY OF HIT ON STANDING TANKAT 1500 METERS:WORLD WAR II MEDIUM TANK?HAD TO FIRE 13 ROUNDSKOREAN WAR MEDIUM TANK?HAD TO FIRE 3 ROUNDSMID-'70'S MEDIUM TANK?NEEDS TO FIRE 1 ROUNDSHERMANTANKWORLD WAR II---? 0ARMOR ?,,- ?i \V u.%CURRENTUS MEDIUMTANK500 METERS----4.----"--s--1000 METERS-----i.1500 METERS2000 METERS----N.,/ ?i-e-?-.---ARMOR \???? ,",W0?...?oiThe Sherman tanks of General Patton's Third Army had to close to within 500 metersof the German PzV Panther tank before the American 76mm gun could punchthrough the German's 4.8 inches of frontal armor. Current US medium tanks canpenetrate nearly twice that much armor at four times the range.The Sherman tanks of General Patton's Third Army had to close to within 500 metersof the German PzV Panther tank before the American 76mm gun could punchthrough the German's 4.8 inches of frontal armor. Current US medium tanks canpenetrate nearly twice that much armor at four times the range.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062429825Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)These charts plot characteristics of the main battle tanks of the two major tank-producing nations over three decades, up to the mid-1970s. Each point records theyear in which a significant improvement was introduced. By 1975, the technicaldevelopments shown led many to conclude that the tank had been engineered toexpectable economic limits.Soviet ArmorTANK GUN SIZEModem tank guns are largerby one-third than the guns of1945.MUZZLE VELOCITYThe muzzle velocity of tankprojectiles has more thandoubled. Rounds travel nearlyone mile per second.11201100090so705000400030002000FIRE CONTROLINSTRUMENTSRange finders, computers ofsuperelevation and lead,sights and other aiming aids43have improved by a factor of 4.21r-KEY .4-ar-1=IHMI41,26 SECRETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Improvements in gun accuracy and range have increased the area a single tankcould command with its weapon...,?po ?--640so1500100064050050-50 PROBABILITY HITACCURACY OF RANGEFINDERSSince most tank misses arecaused by inaccurate rangeestimation, the unaidedoptical sights of WW ll werereplaced first by stereoscopicrange finders, then bycoincidence rangefinders, andfinally, in the mid-'70's, bylaser range finders.ADVANCE IN TANKCANNON TECHNOLOGYTaken together, theseadvances have increased hitprobabilities ten-fold--andfuture tanks will mount gunsof even greater range andaccuracy.Ph: Probability of hitCOMMAND OF GROUNDOne implication of thisincrease in range and hittingpower is that the tankinfluences much more terrainthan formerly. The tacticalreach of the modern tankerextends over 7 times as muchground.Modern tanks have not only bigger guns, improved ammunition, and moresophisticated fire control apparatus, but armor protection roughly double that ofWorld War II tanks. Nonetheless, the chief tank-producing nations have designedtheir main battle tanks to constrain bulk, and to balance increases in engines, track andsuspension systems.For example, while the modern U.S. main battle tank is one-third heavier than itsWorld War II predecessor, it's equipped with an engine more than two times aspowerful. Its agility has actually increased: its horsepower-to-ton ratio has increasedby one-fourth, its ground pressure has decreased by one-fourth, and its maximumcruising range has increased by three times. Both the United States and the USSR havefielded amphibious light tanks, and many nations have developed various snorkelingdevices for underwater fording. Tanks of the United Kingdom have tended to beApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298SECRETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298 (b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet Armorsomewhat heavier than U.S. designs over the period; Soviet and German designs havetended to be lighter. But virtually all new designs have added armor protection andfirepower.At the same time, mechanical reliability has advanced. During the German thrustthrough the Ardennes into France in May-June 1940, more than half the tanksparticipating went out of action due to mechanical failures. Modern main battle tanksare expected to average 300-400 km between mechanical failures.Tank development accelerated in the 1970s with emphasis on increasingfirepower and improving armor protection. Tanks appeared which can fire antitankguided missiles as well as cannon rounds. The missiles have much higher accuracy andgreater range than cannons-50-100 percent greater. Such missile-tanks can hit tank-size targets nine out of ten times at a range of 3,000 meters.Also, most modern tanks have been equipped with night vision devices. Activesights let soldiers see targets illuminated with invisible infrared beams out to ranges of1,500 meters. More significant, there are passive sights with comparable rangecapability, which let the operator see targets by natural light (for example, starlight),or by detecting the heat emitted by the target (thermal imagery sights). Thermal sightsare effective out to 4,000 to 6,000 meters.Not the least of modern developments are tanks with stabilized turrets whichmaterially aid gunners acquiring a target, and facilitate firing on the move.In sum, the capabilities of modern tanks have been extended to as far as thetanker can see. What he can see, he can hit.THE TANK, WITH ITS CROSS-COUNTRY MOBILITY, ITS PROTECTIVEARMOR, ITS FORMIDABLE FIREPOWER, HAS BEEN AND IS LIKELY TOREMAIN THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT WEAPON FOR FIGHTING THELAND BATTLEApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet AIMOr(b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)While tanks are usually rated vis-a-vis another tank, it is well to remember thatinfantry-manned weapons are both a main target for tanks and a main threat to them.Tanks were invented to defeat the infantry defenses of World War I, and remainedfor nearly 50 years the nemesis of foot-soldiers. During World War II, shoulder-launched rockets with shape-charge explosives (for example, bazooka, panzerfaust)began to erode the tank's invincibility. But rockets, and the related recoilless rifleswhich followed soon thereafter, called for infantrymen courageous enough to duel atank well within the lethal range of the tank's cannons and machineguns. By the1970s, infantry weapons could outreach those of the tank, and their penetrating poweroutstripped the protective capacity of armor, leading many to anticipate theelimination of the tank as an effective instrument of war.ANTITANK VS. TANKRANGES'The line across the middle ofthe chart shows the trend forthe principal Warsaw Pactmedium tanks. The other lineshows the trend in rangecapability for the antitankweapon of the US ArmyInfantry in the same timeframe. The leaping crossoverwas the result of introducingthe tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW)missile in the early '70's.PENETRATION VS. ARMORTHICKNESSIncreases in armor penetratingcapability kept pace with theincreases in range andaccuracy. This chart showsthe trend in penetrating powerof US weapons comparedwith the growth In themaximum thickness of armorof the Warsaw Pact tanks.TIME FRAME1945 1955 1965 1975ANTITANK WEAPONSTATA K CANNONPENETRATING POWERMAXIMUM ARMORTHICKNESS29Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062429871:127R1=_(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Soviet ArmorOther nations, notably the USSR, progressively fielded anti-tank (AT) missilesand rockets of comparable range and accuracy and hitting power. Additionally, boththe United States and the USSR improved shorter range weapons, so as to achieve highaccuracy with light, man-packed, hand-held weapons within a range of 1,000 metersor so. The charts below reflect the ATGM status of the mid-1970s.TINE FRAME1945 1955 1965 19751000 800 600 400 200Future DesignsPh* FOR CREW-SERVEDWEAPONSUS and USSR crew-servedinfantry antitank weaponshave tripled their range in lessthan 20 years.Ph FOR INDIVIDUALWEAPONSUS and USSR individualantitank weapons haveincreased their ranges by fourtimes in the past decade.'Probability of hitTrends cited for both tank and antitank weapons have posed complex technicalproblems for armor designers, who must devise counters to antiarmor penetrants andincapacitants. Penetrants defeat armor by punching through it to attack the men orthe machinery inside. Incapacitants impair the vehicle's ability to move, to shoot, orto communicate. Penetrants rely on one of three forms of energy: kinetic, chemical, ornuclear. Incapacitants may be either active or passive; the former might use chemicalexplosives or toxic gas, the latter physical obstacles. In general, armor developers are30Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet ArmorSECRET(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)concerned with the following types of threat, and attempt to cope with them asindicated:Threat TypeExampleProbable Design CounterPenetrantsKineticenergyChemicalenergyArmor-Piercing, fin-stabilized, dis-carding sabot projectile (APFSDS)High-explosive antitank (HEAT)rocketHigh obliquity armor, especially forfrontal surfaces; low silhouette;stand-off plates and skirtingNuclearenergyEnhanced-radiation warhead (ERW)for artillery projectileAnti-radiation linerIncapacitantsActivePressure-fuzed blast mine; chemical(gas) mineTurbines for high horsepower/ton;agile vehicles with rugged tracksand protected suspension; closed,filtered crew air systemPassiveTank ditchOver the past several decades most NATO antitank weapons have sought toexploit chemical energy penetrants: metal jets formed by the Munroe Effect, typicallya warhead consisting of a metal-lined, conical cavity imbedded in a cylinder of anexplosive. Shaped charge warheads have figures in almost all U.S. ATGM or AT rocketdesigns, from, the World War H -bazooka- through TOW. Today's shaped chargedesigns achieve extraordinary penetrating power, readily perforating steel of five (ormore) warhead diameters in thickness.* Even relatively small warheads-60-mm or soin diameter?can perforate armor of the T-62 or M60A1 tanks. Short-range, unguided,shoulder-launched rockets thus armed, such as the U.S. M-72 LAW, or the SovietRPG7, provide the individual foot soldier with an organic self-defense capabilityagainst such tanks. Longer range, guided missiles, such as TOW, achieve high hit andkill probabilities at ranges beyond the reach of their cannon, and hence can beemployed in defensive or offensive overwatch roles from highly protected or evenunarmored vehicles, such as APCs or helicopters. Modern armor, such as that of theT-80, could change some or all of these tactical relationships. But in the meantimechemical energy warhead evolution proceeds apace, and some believe it can equal orsurpass armor evolution.Within the past ten years, NATO antitank weapons designers have also exhibitedmarked interest in kinetic energy penetrants. Unlike missile-borne chemical energypenetrants, which form their penetrators explosively on impact, and hence do not relyon projectile velocity to kill the target, kinetic energy penetrators accumulate theirlethal energy as they are accelerated down a gun tube by expanding propellant gases.The capacity of any to penetrate depends upon its velocity at the target, and its length,diameter and density. To achieve deeper penetration with a fixed-mass penetrator,longer, thinner, faster and denser bullets are better in principle, and evolving inpractice: the objective is a very high ratio of Length to Diameter, high L to D.Early tank guns borrowed from small arms technology, and had rifled barrelsfiring short, steel, full-bore-diameter bullets. In the 1940s the sabot concept wasdeveloped. The sabot is a cylindrical shoe which carries a -less-than-bore-diameter-bullet down the barrel, impounds the propellant gases, provides structural support tothe penetrator, and is discarded on muzzle-exit. Since the sabot's energy is notdelivered to the target, designers attempt to minimize sabot weight and maximize* Penetration is also a function of -standoff," the distance from base of cone to surface, and damage isa function not only of the jet, but -span," pieces of armor blown into the interior of the target.SECRET 31Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298-SEC-RE-T-(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet ArmorExplosiveTargetCharge DiameterStandoffDepth of Penetration*`???,Profile Hole Diameter at SeveralDepths of Penetration/ ///Performance Characteristics for a Shaped Charge Warhead.? ?? ?Target Material ... 4,. ? ? . .. .. . :4 !". . ' " 1 ? %. SIP:. v '.. ?Jr-. . ? ! , _ . .* ? ?.. .?1-4---. --` ? . ? ... ? ????? OP I . -- . .... ..!..'. .. ? t. ? - ? 41.4.r.. .1. 711 ? . ??,.141. . . . ?# . ? 11 ? t4 ?? %.? f ." AD: .1! ; . ??? ?0 '?. r ? '? I ir% ; .? .. 0!... ? ? ? ?.; . .... .'. 6 ? ? Ir ???? ? ? s f ? . ? ' ' A - X..: .?. 1 ... * . ?a.? 4..?. . ,..? ? ??1 1 I .? ? ?I ? P .? ?atr.,? . ?...14. ? ? ?? 0.* .. 146, t ? " . -,?I ?? -- . ? ? e.? .. ??4$ sal Iv..-.Iv : ..??? ? ? ?? . ii.1 t? qp, gq, . ..' ::.?  1,, i ... .411 ? 4 II. ? ?.? 1 1.,.. 0 ? . ? . ? ? ?.41 ?1, .44_ .j, ,_ .?? .. I. -...- . .... ? -,/ 1.?? ? ?, .- ? .? ?? ? . ? .- ?-..a., . .1. . -1.Spell Fragments ?.? e -.:.-.. ...:? ? .?I.Typical Behind-Armor Spell Fragments Formed when a Shaped Charge Perforates Armor.Jet32Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298-S-E  Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armorrcvr(b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)  penetrator weight, under the constraint that both must survive the violence of launch.Even with such constraints, the result is not that of a zero-sum game. Sabots openedthe way to higher muzzle velocity and penetrators of denser if somewhat weakeralloys than steel, since structural loads on the penetrator can be reduced by gooddesign. Rifled bores could still be used to spin the saboted bullet for accuracy, but thelength-to-diameter ratio of such -spin stabilized- penetrators is limited to about six.Thus, spin-stabilized armor-piercing discarding shot (APDS) rounds reached somenatural limits.To achieve stable, accurate flights without spin using higher L to D penetrators,gun ammunition designers added fins to the base of the rod. Armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot ammunition (APFSDS) is now a main threat to tanks.Rifling was no longer necessary, but could be used depending on what otherammunition might be fired from the gun. With the T-62, the Soviets switched to asmoothbore, 115-mm tank gun, firing an APFSDS steel penetrator. Current NATOAPFSDS penetrator designs use very dense uranium (staballoy)?for example, the U.S.M-774 round for the 105-mm cannon about to be fielded, and the XM-833, the veryhigh L to D staballoy round, being developed for the mid-1980s.Guns, of course, have the advantage over missiles in rate of fire, ability to -fire-and-forget," and relative invulnerability to smoke, fog, dust or other obscuration;NATO's modern, high-velocity guns and APFSDS penetrators are formidable tankkillers, notwithstanding their comparative shorter range and inaccuracy vis-a-vis someATGM.These facts, of course, well known to the Soviets, must be cause for concern intheir design bureaus. And this, in turn, should be a focus for the attention of U.S.intelligence collectors and analysts.Probably the Soviets are also worried by NATO's tendency to develop ever largershaped-charge warheads for ever more precise antitank guided missiles. (The Soviets'own Munroe Effect designs do not seem to be similarly driven. Some late SovietATGM, such as the AT-6, have featured warheads of smaller diameter thanpredecessor designs, leading to speculation that they may incorporate dual cones ofexplosive, one behind the other. Such an arrangement is something U.S. designersregard as theoretically feasible but, up to now, impractical.)Perhaps even more worrisome for the Soviets must be NATO's propensity todevelop missiles which climb and dive to attack normal to sloped armor, or otherweapons for attacking the top, bottom, and rear of tanks, where heretofore Sovietdesigns have kept armor thin. Such NATO weapons include the new HELLFIREATGM, the 30-mm depleted uranium projectiles fired by the USAF A-10's automaticcannon, the 40-mm shaped-charge grenades fired by U.S. Army helicoptors or groundtroops, and broadcast shaped-charge artillery submunitions in the form of grenades ormines. Even more dangerous will be forthcoming precision-guided munitions (PGMs)which employ various kinds of sensors to acquire the target, to either point and firethe warhead toward it, or to guide the warhead to it. These sensors generally detectand measure one component of energy from the electromagnetic spectrum, or acombination of such components. The energy may be in the form of energy reflectedby the target or from its background, energy reflected off the target by a targetilluminator, or energy emitted from the target due to its inherent operational ormaterial properties. Such PGMs pose a severe threat because of their high probabilityof hit, but they offer the Soviet designer an additional facet to exploit incountermeasure design, since it may prove easier to foil the sophisticated sensor thanto build armor to foil the kill mechanism (warhead/projectile).Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298on I? 1NETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet ArmorU.S. development effort and fielding of the family of scatterable AT and APmines (FASCAM), and NATO interest in these systems, is undoubtedly of greatinterest and concern to the Soviets. These broadcast mines can be fired from 155-mmartillery, or strewn about by ground vehicle, fixed-wing aircraft, or helicopters. Theindividual AT FASCAM mine has a magnetic fuze and explosives formed in a type ofshaped charge (Misznay-Schardin plate charge) about five inches in diameter. Themine is activated under the vehicles belly or tracks. The explosion penetrates up to66mm of belly armor, yielding about a three-inch diameter hole. The mine requiresabout an 18-inch standoff for proper penetrant formation, and therefore its effect isreadily attenuated by soil or other overburden. This suggests that enemycountermeasures to the FASCAM mine threat may include means to push dirt over themine, for example, with a dragmat under the belly. Also, attempts to provide spallsuppression liners in the belly region are considered likely. At present nothing isknown of Soviet attempts to counter FASCAM mines through more rugged bellyarmor/track and road-wheel design, or the addition of equipment (for example,dragmat) to provide overburden, but intelligence should be looking for these.Finally, Soviet designers appear to be quite conscious of nuclear penetrants,especially neutron radiation. They seem to have installed antiradiation liners on theinterior of the T-64 and T-72 expressly to counter this threat, and future designs willprobably include similar precautions.Soviet Armor: A ForecastSome commentators have held that tank design has been pushed to the outerlimits of technology, and that the 1980s will see missiles dominate the battlefield. Buthe who sounds the death knell for the tank had best ask for whom the bell tolls. Thepress of technology seems to be disclosing more highly protective, weight-efficientarmors as rapidly as missiles appear with unprecedented range and lethality. Sovietarmor designers seem to be alert to their technical possibilities for defeating the threatsdescribed above. Presently, there are five basic approaches open to them:? Homogeneous armor (e.g., U.S. M-60 series)? Spaced armor (FRG Leopard 1A1 mZ.)? Laminate armor (USSR T-64 and T-72)? -Special" armor (U.S. XM-1)? Reactive armor (FRG Leopard 3)Homogeneous armor is by far the most common type. But even whenconstructed of high-grade steels, such as electro-slag purified steel or alloys, it is bulky,heavy, and inefficient against high L to D penetrators. U.S. tank designers aver thatmetallurgy?quality or metal?can contribute only 10-15 percent to modern armorprotection. While they state they would reach for such a margin when weight and costpenalties permit, they prefer the much more cost-effective solutions available via useof certain laminar materials, or the geometry of spaced plate array, or the type andconfiguration of reactive armor. Soviet designers evidently agree, since the Sovietsabandoned homogeneous armor for their main battle tank a full decade ahead of theUnited States.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Spaced armor armor uses an outer-armor plate to cause premature triggering ofattacking Munroe Effect warheads, an inner airspace, and a second armor surfacefinally to defeat the jet penetrant. In general, these designs have not proved to be aseffective against modern penetrants as other approaches, but are being used to up-armor fielded tanks. For instance, the West Germans have sought to protect theirLeopard 1 tank against Soviet missiles by such added-armor (Zuzatzpanzerung).Mantlet ShieldIncreased ArmourrRear PlatesMounting BoltsArmour PlatesFigure 26. FRG Leopard Tank with ZuzatzpanzerungThe Soviets' last two production tanks?the T-64 and T-72?are believed to havelaminate armor, steel layers sandwiching unknown material(s)?possibly silicates,ceramics, Fiberglas, or steel balls in a matrix?which affords tough, relatively lightprotection. Our present information leads us to believe that the armor designed fortheir next production tank (the T-80) will follow a similar approach. As discussedabove, we have reason to believe that the Soviets already have under development amore advanced follow-on to the T-80, the T-801, which they consider has even higherlevels of protection. Such a tank could exoloit  "special" armor?like that which the  United States has devised for the XM-11(b)(1 )(b)(3)(n)Analyses conducted by the U.S. Army show that an effective medium tanksatisfying perceived Soviet design constraints (interior volume, exterior dimensions,track pressure, turret balance, etc.), could be built using U.S.-style "special" armor,per the XM-1. But the Soviet "T-801" may be built with reactive armor?steel platessandwiching explosive cells which literally blow penetrants to pieces. The WestGermans have been experimenting with such armor, and have found it promisingenough to design a follow-on to the Leopard 2 around it. While U.S. experiments withreactive armor are as yet inconclusive, prospective tanks thus armored could be small,light, and agile.One feature of laminate, "special" and reactive armor is high potential forupgrading armor protection on fielded tanks. By bolting on new laminate or "special"armor arrays designed to defeat specific threat penetrants, or by hanging reactivearmor plates over vulnerable areas as a "battle dress" for tanks, a tank fleet can besubstantially "uparmored." It is possible that the Soviets have already designed suchApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062429835rRr  Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Soviet Armorways to make their tanks proof against current NATO anti-ta9k guided missiles?TOW, HOT, MILAN, SWINGFIRE, etc., and that these methods may be applicableto the already fielded T-64 and T-72 (via add-on plates) as well as to the forthcomingT-80 and T-80I.Both the T-64 and T-72 are relatively small, low tanks: they weigh 20 percentless, and their presented area is 30 percent less than that of the contemporary U.S.M-60 series tanks. From what we know of the T-80, it is also small and low slung.The Soviet predilection for small, low-profile tanks probably conflicts somewhatwith the use of -special- armor, since it costs heavily in weight and volume, as thenewest U.S., UK, and FRG designs attest. Use of reactive armor would facilitate therelatively light and agile tanks the Soviets favor. Given the breadth and depth ofSoviet armor programs, as well as the extent of Soviet espionage within NATO, itseems prudent to credit the Soviets with involvement in both -special- and reactivearmor technology. From past Soviet design choices, we would expect them to opt inthe future for smaller, lighter, faster tanks, with a very large main gun andformidable armor, especially across the vehicle's frontal arc.The Soviet designer is faced with a vexing problem when it comes to designingcountermeasures against precision guided munitions which attack armored vehiclesfrom the top. On the one hand, protecting against the kill mechanism (warhead)requires the same type of armor technology considerations discussed above, and mayresult in unacceptable weight and space penalties. On the other hand, protectingagainst the .PGM's sensor may require detailed intelligence information on theoperating frequencies and sensor logic used to process the measured target signal. Tocounter the sensor, the designer must develop some method of modifying the energyspectrum of the reflected and/or emitted target signature. The modification mayconsist of eliminating certain components in the energy spectrum of the target, or ofchanging the ratio between components of the energy spectrum in the signature. Theintent of the signature modification is to make the target blend in with thebackground, or to make the target appear to the sensor as something which it isprogrammed to ignore (that is, a false target). Signature modification can beaccomplished by simple means such as blankets, plywood shielding, or chaff, or bymore complicated means such as jammers. We can expect strong Soviet intelligenceefforts to inform their sensor designers of U.S. efforts in tank signature modification topreclude fielding expensive precision-guided munitions which could be completelynegated by U.S. countermeasures.Soviet tank designers, like our own, probably now believe that they can designarmored vehicles proof against virtually any penetrant, provided they are informed ofits composition and size. Probably too, they hold that they can design a penetrant orincapacitant for any tank provided they know how it is protected. Their intelligenceservice will no doubt strive to provide the key information in both respects.Over the whole range of armament technology, that of armor/anti-armorweapons seems in unusual flux. It is far from being the case, as is often supposed, thatmissiles have won assured ascendancy over the tank, or that the lumbering mechanicalmonsters have been engineered to the limits of their potential. New armors, engines,fire control devices, guns and munitions have made possible tanks of new capabilities,including levels of protection beyond the penetrants of most current ATGM. Thepenetrant-protection race is likely to be intense throughout the 1980s. As of thiswriting, the Soviets can be expected to develop some or all of the following:? Tanks with variable armor, and capabilities to -uparmor- existing fleets tomeet perceived new threats.36 SECRET  Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)? Tank guns increased in range and accuracy, to redress much of the gun'sdisadvantage vis-a-vis the ATGM evident in the 1970s.? ATGM with larger-diameter, heavier warheads, and nose probes foroptimizing stand-off and attack angle, and/or multiple cones per warhead, aswell as precision guidance mechanisms.? Individual infantry weapons for top, bottom or rear attack of tanks, anddeemphasis on direct-fire, shoulder-fired rockets or missiles for frontalattack.? Infantry combat vehicles built with armor offering levels of protectioncomparable to that of tanks.? Dragmats and bottom shields to counter broadcast mines? Trellis-like spaced armor to protect from top attack.? Automatic, range finders coupled with thermal imagery sights.? Electronic detectors and emitters for countering threat lasers and PGM.? Drapes for camouflage and thermal suppression.SECRET 37Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298giiiinK Pale,P'Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet ArmorThe StakesIII. WHAT IS TO BE DONE(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Like all nations, the United States nurtures myths about its strengths. We areconfident, for example, that our national genius for war lies in applying advancedtechnology to solve military problems: early in the 19th Century, Eli Whitney'spower-milled, interchangeable parts for muskets armed us against France andEngland; in the mid-19th Century, American inventors and industrialists madepossible the first of the modern wars; in the late 19th to early 20th Century, machineguns invented by the Americans Gatling, Maxim, Browning, Lewis, and Thompsonarmed us for both internal and external wars. But it is a sober fact that in the worldwars of the 20th Century what has counted militarily for the United States is lessadvanced technology than superior manpower resources and sheer preponderance ofmateriel. In 1918, Pershing overwhelmed German defenders in the Meuse-Argonnewith fresh reserves. In 1944, Patton's slash across France was underwritten withdominance in numbers of tanks (overall 3:1), guns and planes?often not betterweapons (for diany compared poorly with German counterparts), but assuredly moreweapons. And, it is also sober fact that World War III, were such a calamity ever tocome in Central Europe, would pit U.S. soldiers against adversaries armed as ournational myths would have Americans armed. We would have to fight that war inEurope outnumbered, against Soviet-equipped forces trained to thrust through ourdefenses in just days or weeks, before we could mobilize our reserves, long before ourindustry could be brought to bear. It is well to remember that Patton's numerical edgein armor in 1944 was achieved by five years of industrial mobilization in the UnitedStates, Detroit having begun war-volume tank production with the inception of Lend-Lease in 1939. We shall not have five years, or even five months, to turn our trickle ofarmor to full flow.It is also well to remember that Soviet armor has, in at least one war, torn deepinto American defenses: in Korea, 1950, when the vaunted U.S. 2.36-inch antitankrockets, the World War II "bazooka," exploded without effect on the frontal armor ofNorth Korean manned T-34 tanks, more than one U.S. unit broke in panic, wordspreading that U.S. weapons had failed. Victory of Soviet-built armor was oneprobable cause of the "bug-out fever" that ultimately infected our whole force afield,and presented General Ridgway with his greatest leadership challenge. But tacticalpanic in the Eighth Army in Korea, disastrous as it was, proved remediable. Panic inthe Seventh Army in Europe could have catastrophic consequences. Potentially evenmore catastrophic would be the peacetime equivalent of battle panic among thepeoples and parliaments of NATO: defeatist presumptions that the alliance's armswere futile against Russian armor. In brief, World War III would draw closer:if the Soviets field invulnerable armored vehicles, or think they have done so;if our NATO allies come to believe that Soviet armor is invulnerable; andif U.S. soldiers lose confidence in their antiarmor weapons.Short of these larger implications of the current penetrant-protection race, thereare large sums in U.S. defense funds involved in decisions which turn on ourintelligence estimates of Soviet development. The chart on page 14 identified theSECRETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062429839Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298-(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Soviet Armor"intelligence shortfall" vis-a-vis the T-72 tank, depicting the billion dollar-plus XM-1tank program directed toward a projected superiority which has diminishedsignificantly over time as our estimate of the Soviet armor sharpened.But, other development/procurement decisions were affected as well. Forexample, the U.S. Army has moved to protect its ATGM inventory by upgradingTOW's warhead to hole the T-72 UB (upper bound, worst case), a $100 million-plusdecision. At the same time, it rejected reengineering of the DRAGON because weight,time of flight, and range could not be kept within tolerable limits for attacking thesame threat armor. Had intelligence led the Army to put its credence in the T-72 LB(lower bound, best case estimate), the decision might have gone the other way: acceptTOW as is, and up-engineer DRAGON. Similarly, confronted with evidence of theM-735 105-mm APFSDS tank round's dismal performance against T-72 UB armor,the Army reduced its purchase of that munition and transferred funds to the morecapable XM-774 APFSDS. Yet, in 1980, these and comparable decisions pertaining toSoviet tanks fielded eight years ago still rest on uncertainty.The Intelligence CardsFor Soviet armor developers, the penetrant-protection race is an open game:every move Che United States makes is potentially known to our adversaries. In yearspast, in weapon system after system, we have seen the Soviets move to field countersbefore we could bring a lengthy development cycle to fruition. Conversely, for U.S.developers it is a closed game, our developers perforce proceeding largely uninformedof what their Soviet counterparts have under way. Often U.S. intelligence will collectearly, sketchy information foreshadowing a new Soviet armor weapon system, butyears pass before we are able to estimate its effectiveness. Thus, a sure assessment ofarmor on the T-64 and T-72 tanks, which seem to have been issued to Soviet troopunits as early as 1972, remains a significant intelligence shortfall. The T-80, whichunderwent field trials with troops in 1976, is even more problematic, and the T-80Iremains an enigma. Our information on current and coming generation Sovietantiarmor weapons?ATGM or PGM?is likewise sparse. However acceptable it mayhave been in years past to trust American technology and industry to equip U.S. troopswell enough to cope with such Soviet unknowns, that trust scarcely seems prudent forthe 1980s.The U. S. Army properly takes the lead in tracking Soviet armor developments.Throughout the Army apparatus, there seems to be an understanding of the issues, andhigh priority accorded to resolving them. For example, the Assistant Chief of Staff forIntelligence, Department of the Army, has a special task force focused full time oncollection and analysis re Soviet armor, and has used Army resources imaginatively inboth respects. But this is an intelligence problem of much larger dimensions than theArmy itself can tackle. Here are examples:(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)40Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624298Soviet Armor  (b)(3)(c) ccrocr(b)(3)(n)What Sort of Intelligence Might Have Made a Difference?? Exact warhead diameters and details of internal cone construction for latemodel Soviet ATGM (AT-4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) from which the effectiveness ofchemical energy penetrants could be calculated.? Dimensions of Soviet APFSDS rounds, particularly the length of the ogive(nose), the diameters of the projectile, from which L to D might be inferred.? Evidence of use of staballoy (depleted uranium) penetrators; extent thereof.? Data on the materials used in manufacturing Soviet unconventional armor,and the thickness thereof.? Soviet capabilities with -special- armor.? Evidence of Soviet interest in, or capabilities, for reactiVe armor.? Date of issue of new model tanks or ATGM to troops.? Data on new or advanced training techniques?for example, night firing, useof lasers for gunnery simulation, or very long-range target engagement?whichportends new materiel capabilities.? Other indiCations that Soviets are working with the developments previouslylisted.(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)RecommendationsWhile it may have been reasonable in past years to assign to collection on thearmor penetrant-protection race a priority lower than that for strategic armaments ortactical nuclear systems, two considerations urge reconsideration:? Strategic nuclear parity raises the premium on non-nuclear weapons.? Given the centrality of armor in Soviet strategy, increments of effort expendedon better intelligence could exert strong leverage on the "conventionalbalance."Some U.S. armor designers hold that there is no undertaking across the wholefield of armaments which is in greater technological flux, none more sensitive tointelligence inputs, and few with higher stakes. This view seems well founded: whilewe have many intelligence shortfalls pertaining to nuclear weaponry?for example,the range of the BACKFIRE or the SS-20, ref ires for the SS-4/5, nuclear artillery inEast Germany?few of these would, if overcome, cause any change whatsoever in U.S.defense programs. In contrast, intelligence on the armor of the T-80 or T-80I, or onSoviet 125-mm tank gun ammunition penetration potential, or on Soviet antiarmorPGM sensors, could alter the XM-1 tank and PGM programs directly and quickly.(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062429841