THE STORY OF THE LOCKHEED U-2 AIRPLANE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B00170R000200280023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 23
• Content Type: REPORT

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Jim Cunningham:
9-16-81
This- is what I have accomplished
.-so far, and it is about halfway
through.- (Also it is the rough
draft.)
Clarence L. Johnson
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THE STORY OF THE LOCKHEED U-2 AIRPLANE
INTRODUCTION
I have been requested numerous.times to tell the story of the
Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance airplane, but the United States Govern-
ment security directives have not allowed this to be done up until
the present time. In view of the fact that the first U-2 flew over
26 years ago (August 4, 1955) and our potential enemies have had
ample opportunities to measure most of its performance in flight,
permission has now been granted to write a short history of this
versatile aircraft and-the remarkable program used to design, build,
test, and operate the U-2.
Throughout this period, I was in charge of the Lockheed Advanced
Development Projects group (better known as the Lockheed Skunk Works)
in Burbank, California. We made the initial unsolicited proposal to
our government and designed, built and tested all the U-2's.
Mr. Richard Bissell was in overall charge of the project for the
United States government during the first seven years of its existence
and General Ozzie Ritland was the ranking Air Force officer during the
same time period. Colonel Leo Geary replaced Ritland in 1963 and others
followed him later.
I believe the best and most accurate way to describe the U-2 program
is by direct use of the log I kept throughout the program. You will,
of course, understand that these are my personal observations and
many others may have quite different views from those I saw in my
position. There are many other aspects in the training and operational
phases away from Lockheed where I may have only generalized information
but I think I was kept well informed on these subjects by both thg CIA
and the Air Force, particularly during crisis conditions such as the
Gary Powers incident and the Cuban missile crisis.
CHAPTER I - HOW IT BEGAN
The U-2 concept took. place in 1953 when the writer was told of our
desperate need for an aircraft that could safely fly over the USSR
and bring back information on their missile capability and other
military useful data. To start the studies I issued a directive to
our engineering department to see if it was possible to use any part
of the F-104 fighter to be the basis of a new aircraft having our
Lockheed California Company design number of the CL-281 (see appendix
for first proposal report).
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 Approved For Release 2008/05/29: CIA-RDP90B00170R000200280023-8 'age 2
Let us now go directly to my log on developments from that period
through the first flight August 4, 1955, and the "Official" first
flight August 8, 1955.
December 1953 I wrote to Mr. Colman and Mr. Frost in our
Preliminary Design Department to start an
investigation of wing area modifications and
weight reducing procedures to modify the F-104
airplane to get the maximum possible altitude
for reconnaissance purposes.
February 1954 Jack Carter and Gene Root, of LMSC and the
Scientific Advisory Board told me of Air Force
interest that would be developed with an airplane
having the characteristics we were finally able
to obtain on the F-104A study.-
March 5, 1954 I had about four men work up Lockheed Report #9732,
describing the CL-282 high altitude aircraft.
This was a complete report, still tying the high
altitude airplane to the F-104. This report was
sent to General B. A. Schriever early in March
1954. He was extremely interested and asked
Lockheed to prepare a specific proposal.
April 1954 Early in April, I presented Lockheed letter LAC/
156876 and a full description of the CL-282 (our
design number) to Trevor Gardner, Gary Norton,
and others in the Pentagon, including Generals
Putt, Price, Kelsey, and Holloway. This proposal
covered our construction of 30 airplanes, Lockheed
taking complete responsibility for the whole
program, including servicing of the airplanes in
the field. I had a good reception on the part
of Gardner and Norton - uncertain reaction from
the others.
May 1954 Jack Carter visited Trevor Gardner and found that
the Air Force was proceeding with the Martin
Canberra, and that they were not too impressed
with our CL-282 proposal.
June 7, 1954 Received a letter from General Floyd Wood of the.
Air Force Systems Command which turned down our
proposal on the basis that it was too unusual,
that it was a single engine aircraft, and that
they were already committed to the Martin program.
November 17, 1954 I had a call from Trevor Gardner asking me to go-
to Washington at once on this project. Lockheed
was in a big mess on engineering, due to having
started Project Star and several military projects.
My instructions were to not commit to any program
during the visit, but to get the information and
return.
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November 19, 1954 I met with Trevor Gardner, Dr. Land, Dr. Baker,
Dr. Purcell, General Putt, Allen Latham, and
J. W. Kennedy for several hours. They wanted to
be reassured that our proposal was technically
feasible. I took Verne Johnson of our Washington
office along, but he was not admitted to the
meeting.
Later, I met and had lunch with Secretary for
Air Force Talbott, Allen Dulles, and Dulles'
.right-had man in the CIA, Larry Houston. They
believed my story that we could make such an
airplane in the time mentioned and also asked
why Lockheed seemed to be the only one who could
do this job. General Putt answered graciously
that we had proven it three times; on the P-80,
P-80A and F-104.
I was impressed with the secrecy aspect and was
told by Gardner that I was essentially being
drafted for the project. It seemed, in fact,
that if I did not talk quietly, I might have to
take a leave of absence from my job at Lockheed
to do this special project.
I returned to Burbank in the evening, with
instructions to talk only to Robert Gross and
Hall Hibbard. They agreed that we must do the
project.
November 21, 1954 Met with Robert Gross and Hall Hibbard at Mr. Gross
home. I proposed that Engineering Experimental do
the job, in spite of the large number of airplanes
involved. This was accepted.
November 22-23, 1954 Spent two days personally in a redesign of the
airplane to provide for use of a new landing
gear, different engine, different camera bay,
and means for improving performance.
November 29 -
December 3, 1954 I organized the project using 25 engineers
including CLJ. Appointed A. M. Viereck in charge
of shop which was gradually staffed to a total of
81 personnel.
December.14, 1954 I flew to Washington.
December 15-17, 1954 On the 15th, I met with Trevor Gardner General
Putt, Ozzie Ritland, and Messrs BisseSTAT
Houston of the special agency. We discussed at
long length problems of security and method of
dealing with each other. Large amount of time
taken on the optimum cover story for the project.
I reported status of the airplane and presented
cost letter for $22,500,000. Emphasized again
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 the importance of getting engine data. Wright
Parkins and Bill Gwynn of Pratt & Whitney were
called down, but they knew nothing of the general
problem. I flew up to Hartford and back in their
airplane. and discussed altitude operating problems
on the engine. It requires the P37 engine, and
even then the fuel consumption and power are less
favorable than what we estimated. I told all
concerned that we would.los,e 2,000 to 3,000 feet
of altitude and 200 miles in radius.
December 18, 1954 Returned to Burbank.
December 20-30, 1954 Working like made on the airplane. Initial tunnel
tests successful. Had a-visit from STAT
discussed security problems with our Administrative
Committee and told them, in a nice way, not to
ask me for any information or otherwise interfere
with the program.
December 30,
1954
January 19,
1955
I called Ozzie Ritland to give a brief rundown
on where we were. Planning to meet him Monday,
January 3rd.. Also Gary Norton. We do not meet
at Lockheed.
Was visited by Colonel Jerry Keeling and discussed
the equipment procurement problem. Set up a means
for our obtaining equipment from STAT
and STAT
January 31,'1955 Visited NACA, Cleveland, to discuss certain fuels.
Proceeded on to Washington.
February-1-4, 19.55. -Spent considerable time with Washington group,
discussing first progress report, power plant
problems, etc. Discussed a clearance problem
with Cost contract STAT
sent out. It was signed by Lockheed February Stn.
Very good visit. Ray Caleen of Pratt & Whitney
was made their representative on the project.
Had special visit from Wright Parkins to tell of
troubles on -31. He wanted to retreat to -37
configuration, but I would not accept this and
requested their further studies for two weeks.
February-9,1955 Visit from General Flickinger to discuss aero-
medical aspects. Made arrangement for pilots
to get pressure suits and indoctrination. He
seemed pleased with our approach to the cockpit
problem.
February 10, 1955 Had visit from of CIA. Spe(STAT
data given me an method o payment set up.
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 Approved For Release 2008/05/29: CIA-RDP90B00170R000200280023-8 'age 5
February 15, 1955 Ray Caleen of Pratt & Whitney called and spent
much of the day going over our power plant
problems. He had nothing to offer in the way
of information and was merely getting educated
on the project.
February 16, 1955 Trevor Gardner came out. He asked to be shown
the construction, area and I took him over there.
February 18, 1955 Secretary Talbott and Trevor Gardner discussed
the project with me for an hour or so and then
asked to be taken to Bldg 82A. They seemed very
impressed with the progress to date.
We picked up the mock-up-engine, in spite of the
fact that X's clearance had been lifted, so he
could not go to-get it. A truck driver named
Ritchie and George Welty picked it up. The
shipping crate was damaged, with a big hole in
it, where anyone who wanted to try could see the
engine. Pratt & Whitney distributed 21 copies
of the shipping instructions, stating that the
engine was for Project Shoehorn. The 'ust don't
seem to get the idea on this job. ca1STAT
and I gave him photographs that we LUU& 01 the
broken box.
February 21, 1955 We submitted our first voucher for payment on the
contract. Actually, there were two, for a total
of $1,256,000. A check for this amount was sent
to me at my Encino home! Later ones to a special
bank account.
March 15-16, 1955 A Mr. Bissell, Flinkger and MacAfferty cams. out
and went over the mock-up. Discussed base plans.
I gave them our proposal and data on towing the U-2
March 29, 1955 Ray Caleen was here with data on latest test of
P31 engine. We discussed ram distribution and I
brought up proposal for running complete mission
profile in their tunnel. P&W not receptive.
April 6, 1955
came out on contract status. 1STAT
stated that contract was in good shape as far
as work definition went, but that additional
contracts would be necessary for extraneous items
like T-33 flight tests and Phase II operations.
Had Bias, Welty, and White in on discussions. Had
Kucera approve a letter on single bids for certain
special aircraft items.
April 12, 1955 Bissell, Ritland, Bert Miller and I met to discuss
electronic problem. Lockheed is to fly a T-33 for
Bert Miller. Problem of basing airplane is still
up in the air. We are to get one C-47 and two
T-33's in June. On the same date, discussed with.
Dick and Ozzie advanced phase on project design.
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Will propose additional airplane with lightweight
radar and a "D" package. Furthermore, we discussed
the project continuing into design of new advanced
special fuel airplanes. We will make a proposal
on this subject. -
April 12-13, 1955 With LeVier, Bissell and Ozzie, we flew all over
Nevada looking for base sites. MrN, G. Greenway
had come out in March and we had s~ him our
various sites off of the governmep
Security was not sufficient at the test site and
he gave an unfavorable report to our runway deal..
When we showed Ozzie and Dick this site, however,
they were much impressed'. We flew over to
Frenchman's Flats (quite illegally) and found
another site in the atomic test area. Checked
fallout radiation and it was apparently OK. Site
was a dandy, but will take much red tape to get
cleared.
April 14-25,
1955_
April 25-29,
1955-
May 2, 1955
May 4, 1955
Workin on base design for special site and Phase II
proposal. Airplanes are coming along well. Will
go to Washington April 25 with Buschmann to report
on tactics, current problems and base studies.
Should present study on "D" package at that time.
Spent full time in Washington. Had discussions on
which they will accept my proposed name of CSTAT]I
base problems, training program, coordination of al
equipment, presented our operational study with
Rudi Buschmann and, in general,.had thorough
discussion of project.
Base location has been decided as Site II,'for
-not be built in time for first flights, and so
reported;to Herb, Dick and Ozzie. I also told them
that.the cost would be considerably higher. than at
Site I.
Have a growing feeling that our government friends
are not getting organized for the project in the
same manner in which we are building the'airplane.
I presented an improved schedule for the 5th and
6th airplanes.
Started contract proposal for our crew training
operation with Bias, White, and Welty.
Tony, Dorsey, and I flew to Las Vegas, meeting
with Mr. Donnell, Seth Woodruff, and engineers
from the Silas Mason Construction Company. Donnell
represents Washington and will take over responsi-
bility for the base, which we give up at this
point, except as it affects our particular
operation. Herb Miller stated strongly that the
It I am greatly concerned that the baseSTAT]:
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May 5, 1955
May 9, 1955
base's primary purpose is for us to test airplanes
and "bygosh" he would see that it ended up that
way. Donnell, being unfamiliar with the project,
had little to say during this meeting, during which
we gave to the Silas Mason Company the results of
our three months' study on base requirements.
Had called the Butler Company to tell them that wor
we had done and bids received from them would now
be transferred to another group. I then proposed
that we go to Site II and try to realign the runway
in keeping with our best wind information. Flew
out and located runway at south end of lake, marked
out general area for buildings, then flew back
over the atom bomb sitting on its tower about nine
hours before it was set off. Arrived home at 7:30
in the evening, after a rough ride in our Bonanza.
Started installation study of an autopilot.
Reviewed with each man major problem on his
particular work. Most engineers considered they
didn't have any, but after I suggested four or
five each, they agreed we still have some problems.
Asked group to record patents in special file for
future record.
Said goodbye to X, who is leaving project because
of association with a Communist woman. A very
dirty case.
Air Force sent out proposal for a weapon system
called the X-17. Apparently they copied our
original proposal and circularized the industry.
A dead ringer for our original set-up. I called
Bissell Sunday night to point out the breach of
security that this would involve. I saw Ozzie
the next day. Ozzie thought, after discussing
with Kelsey, that this was an entirely new type
of airplane. I arrived there Tuesday, May 10th,
expecting to stop two days later at Wright Field
for a meeting. Was amazed to find that neither
Bissell nor Ozzie was concerned about the competi-
tion. This changed to stark horror when I showed
them actual spec requirements. We went to Gardner'
office and he went to Talbott. It was stopped in
ten minutes.
This is a wonderful example of a mixup in require-
ments, in gettire a new airplane started because
no one in the Pentagon knew a thing about the
request to industry for a bid which would require
the Air Force to spend from three to six million
dollars, when actually a better airplane would be
flying six weeks before they had the design
proposals from the company.
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May "x",
1955
May 9-13
1955
Saw General LeMay and explained project in
Gross' office.
week on base problems, etc. Presented our oper-
ational study with Buschmann. Our friends-are not
organized to handle airplanes when they get them
at this time. Much confusion.
To Washington for coordination meeting. Spent all
May 17-19, 1955 In Washington again. More base discussions. Costs
now up to $832,000 from our original'proposal of
$200,000 to $225,000. Reason is new locale, 300%
expansion, and permanent base. Site One came to
$450,000 on same deal,, but was not as good or
secure. We had Site One-base all designed ready
to go.
May 21, 1955 Number one fuselage out of jig. Having a tough
time on wing. Put almost everybody on it.
May 24-25, 1955 Herb, Ozzie, Al Donnell came out. Reviewed base.
They went to'Las Vegas with Dorsey. Base proceedin;
fast. .Hit a limited water supply. Decided to buy
a Lockheed flight test trailer on our money.
Flickinger, Knauber and Maher here on suit problems
May 27, 1955 Sent in cost proposal on Phase II - training and
III - operation. Bias made knowledgeable on
May 23 (?). Archie L. (Colonel, AAF) came out on
bailment of C-47 and two T-33's. He loused things
up. Contract he signed given back to Herb M.
June 1-3,, 1955 Spent these days at Colorado Springs, flying up
with Roger Lewis and back with Trevor Gardirer.
Spent extremely interesting period discussing
Russian trend and what we could do about it. Gave
two-hour speech on how to make airplanes more
quickly and with less confusion. Discussed
engineering training programs. Became very good
friends with Tom Power, in spite of our clash on
the F-104 several weeks previously. Raymond,
Weliwood Beall and I represented the aircraft
industry, but Roger asked me to give the basic
speec from an individual, not a company, standpoint
Proposed the Lockheed system for construction of
the airplanes, and showed why the Cook-Craigie
plan was no good in general. Wellwood Beall gave
enthusiastic support. Raymond said very little,
but generally agreed. North American was
represented by Larry Waite. In view of the fact
that I was called upon as an individual, not to
represent the company point of view, I am a little
uncertain as to how much of 47 pages of notes I
can passion to Lockheed Management.
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June 7-8, 1955 Coordination meeting at Staler Hotel with Herb,
Ozzie, and others. Quite concerned whether base
will be available on time. Having trouble drillinj
well. Coordination with Hycon and R-W pointed up
several problems.
kid
Had big discussion
ies for
overseas' crews. Dick Cunningham an , STAT
work for Dick Biss , stayed here an wit Welty
interviewed nine people for overseas. Most showed
that they would accept terms. One of the more
experienced in this matter said he wouldn't touch
it with a ten-foot pole.
June 20, 1955 Returned to work. Avery busy time, in that we
have only 650 odd hours to the airplane completion
point. Having terrific struggle with the wing.
Our C-47 has been delivered and conditioned. Have
one T-33 and second will be delivered July 15th.
June 24, 1955 Auto accident. Out til July 2 with four busted
ribs, etc.
June 29,1955 Terrific drive to finish airplane. Working on
B "X"-H-which Gardner said was very interesting
to him when returning from Colorado Springs.
July 7-8, 1955 To in C-47. Doesn't look like it will SSTAT
ready in An excellent job for only $800,000
in time allowed. I'll bet this is one of the best
Air Force bargains they've ever gotten. Trouble
with water well.
Bissell, General Perrie Cabell and Ozzie here.
Reviewed new work. Priority on Intruder SL radar,
Air Defense fighter. Big meeting at Colorado
July 11, 1955
Springs - LeMay, Smith, Talbott, Dulles, Bissell -
on who runs project!!
Major Welch and Lt Co.]. Wilson here on spares.
Maj
or Wel
ch to stay
STAT
July 13,
1955
Ga
Col
ve them
onel M
to Welty.
. C. Mixon, Majors R. H. Carney and
R. W. Burroughs here. Delivered C-47 spares, one
more T-33. Saw bird. RWB is SAC navigation office
Electronics Package #2 won't work. Back to dead
reckoning.
First flight - T-33 - #1 electronic package.
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age 10
July 15, 1955 Airplane essentially completed. Terrifically long
hours. Everybody almost dead.
July 17-21, 1955 Ran flutter and vibration tests, control proof
tests, and I inspected the airplane personally on
a 689, finding about thirty items to improve.
July 22, 1955 Airplane turned over to inspection for final check.
July 23,-'1955 Airplane disassembled and loaded in loading carts.
July 24, 1955 Ozzie came out. We came down to the plant at
4:00 and loading operations were started at day-
break. Took about three hours to load into the
C-124. Rained at STAT
July 25, 1955 Took off at 5:30 in C-47. We were informed that
lake was unusable and that the 124 could not fly up
We landed on the runway and after quick inspection
decided that it would be safe to land the 124 if we
let lots of air out of the tires.. Dick Newton,
recently appointed Base Commander, would not allow
airplane to land, so I attempted to call Washington
on field telephone. They refused to allow this.
I expressed certain dissatisfaction, and five
minutes later called Washington. Talking to Dick,
he said that while Donnell, who built the runway,
would no doubt shoot himself, it was up to me to
determine whether the 124 should come in. Two
hours later it landed in a cloud of dust, using
reversing propellers, making a beautiful landing.
The runway was indented k inch for a distance
of 50 feet and 3/8 inch when the airplane turned
around, where the inboard tire was held stationary.
Newton wired Washington that the airplane landed
with minimum damage to the runway. I didn't like
this, because there was no damage to the runway.
We unloaded the bird on schedule into the semi-
completed hangars and assembled it.
July 27-August 2,.1.955 Made various taxi tests. Our special fuel would
-not-start. On second taxi run, airplane flew
inadvertently to 35 foot height and almost crashed
because Tony LeVier didn't expect it to fly.
Automatic observer data showed airplane doing what
it should. In stopping the airplane, Tony.blew
both tires, and brakes caught on fire directly under
the fuel tank. We were following in radio trucks,
and finally got extinguishers on the brakes. No
hap done. Airplane was subjected to terrific test.
Pogosticks worked real well. Having fuel system
troubles on paper.
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rage 11
August 4, 1955 Made first flight to 8,000 feet in a rainstorm.
Lake was dry but we flew through rain just north
of the field. Airplane flew beautifully, but in
landing Tony came in tail high and airplane
porposied badly. Made five other attempts before
I could talk him down from C-47 chase plane.
Makes fine landing when tail wheel hits at same
time or slightly ahead of main gear. Airplane
landing characteristics quite unusual, but this was
not unexpected. Ten minutes after landing, the
lake was flooded with two inches of rain. This
quite impossible, because average rainfall for last
five years has been 4.3 inches and we have had
almost this much in the last two weeks.
STAT
August 7,
1955
August 8,
1955
Celebrated first flight night of August 4th.
Bissell and Ozzie out here at my home. Worked all
day on various project problems.
Had Hibbard, Gross and Monesmith aboard. They
had walked through shop and seen airplane for the
Took off at 6:00 am in the C-47 for the ~STAT
first time on August 5th. After landing at the
got into our parachutes and took off at three - .
minutes after nine. Flew to 31,000 feet. Had good
flight. Tail gear didn't come down on first attempt
but did on second. Bob Mayte and I chased in the
T-33. After an hour's flight, we came in, and Ray
Goudey and Bill Bryden escorted him in to land.
Made good landing, but put up gust control too
soon and stalled left wing. We put airplane on
display. General Power was brought in from STAT
and we had a short session with him. Dick Horner
and Gary Norton were there, but Trevor Gardner
could not come. We met the schedule.
In May of 1956 two-U-2A aircraft were deployed to England STAT
for a short period. They caused the British to scramble many
interceptors to try to get up to theU-2's which they were unable
to do. To complicate the situation further, Russian frogmen caught
a British diver examining one of their cruisers in an English harbor so
a tense political situation developed. The U-2's left England for
other parts of thp. world and began their design missions of overflying
the USSR. These.were stopped four years later when Gary Powers was
shot down May 1, 1960.
I announced the program for the day. We STAT
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 Approved For Release 2008/05/29: CIA-RDP90B00170R000200280023-8+ age 12.
THE POWERS INCIDENT
Mr. Powers was to have flown over the USSR from Pakistan to Norway.
He was flying a U-2C with the Pratt & Whitney J-75 engine which had a
cruising altitude of three to five thousand feet higher than the
original U-2A's. In other overflights, pictures taken from the U-2's
showed as many as 30 Russian fighters trying to climb to intercept
the U-2 which they could not do. During the time of the U-2
operations, the Russians worked very diligently on improving their
SA-2 missile and radar systems which finally shot down Powers west
of Sverdlovsk. Mr. Kruschev promptly announced their victory to
the world and published a photograph proported to be of the U-2
wreckage. I was certain that the wreckage shown was not the U-2
at all. In fact I'believe they shot down one or more of their own
fighters which were trying to get up to-the-U-2.. I was instructed
to make public my views on the subject because we did not know
whether Powers 'defected or landed the airplane safely in Russia. This
operation was successful in that the USSR put on public display in
Moscow the complete wreckage and equipment of the U-Bird. Life
magazine took such excellent photographs of the display that we made
a. very accurate story of the whole shoot-down event. When Powers
was returned to the United States, I interviewed him on February.14, 1962,
and recorded my comments to our goverment on February 21, 1962 as
noted below.
"The following report covers my observations and further study on
the U-2 incident involving Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960. I
would like to summarize my thoughts regarding the cause and sequence
of failure in the aircraft in which Powers was shot down. In our
visit to Powers on .14 February, he described to us his reactions to
the incident. All statements he made correlate extremely well with
results of my studies. made immediately after the May 1960 incident
and reviewed again during this last week.
"As you-know,..in May 1960 we simulated Powers' flight mission and
studied what aircraft components could fail at altitude to cause
him to lose cruising altitude._ We were particularly concerned at
that time as to whether a hydraulic system failure could have lost
him boost pump pressure and caused him to have a flameout and descend
to a vulnerable altitude. Results of this and other tests are
? included in our report SP-173. We were unable, even with the boost
pump failed, to get a blowout in cruising flight, such as would have
occurred in the earlier type U-2's with the J-57 engines. We found
nothing basically wrong in the aircraft or its systems which. would
have been likely to cause the 1 May incident. After these studies,
my conclusion---was--that we had to assume that the aircraft had been
hit at high altitude by a missile, as stated by the Russians at the
time.
"We were provided with many excellent photographs of the wrecked
U-2 on display in-Moscow, particularly shots made by Carl Mydans of
Life Magazine. These pictures were of a sufficient quality that we
could determine a number of interesting things about the wreckage
and compare. it to other U-2 crashes. Following are the important
conclusions from the photographic study:
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1. Both wings failed due to down-bending and not due to
penetration of critical structure by shrapnel from the
missile.
2. In none of the pictures was there evidence to show that the
horizontal tail was recovered. Mydans photograph 858-C6-18
shows clearly that the left horizontal surface broke off
in up-bending. It also appears from the position of the aft
end of the fuselage in a corner that the right section of
the stabilizer is also missing. I have one other photograph
which you provided me with--a print approximately 4 x 5
entitled "the fin and the rudder," in which it appears that
the right stabilizer is very severely damaged and can be
considered absolutely ineffective.
3. The latter photograph also shows the parachute can which
was housing the Grainger Box to be demolished.
4. While the damage to the stabilizer could have taken place
conceivably on landing, it does not seem very likely,
because of the-relatively undamaged status of the vertical
tail itself.
5. I repeat that it is interesting that nowhere in the exhibit
was there any sign,of the horizontal tail. Refer also to
photograph USSR WAC 167B Moscow 55 45 N 37 35 E. This photo
also carries a number 435411. This photograph indicates
that the fuselage probably hit on the right lower side in a
manner that would not damage the lefthand stabilizer as
badly as the picture indicates.
6. Life photograph 858-C6-12 was studied very carefully by us
to-determine-whether or not an attempt had been made to fire
the seat.. We concluded that it had not been. We did note.
that the Russians had made a very complete study of the seat
and in the process of disassembling it had reconnected the
lap belt initiator and had not reassembled it properly for
the display.
7. In our discussions with Frank Powers on 14 February, he
described-his flight, making the following points:
a. He was a cruising altitude below the maximum obtainable
but above 68,000 feet, and the engine was throttled back
and running smoothly. His statements of the cockpit
instrument readings in terms of tailpipe temperature and
other details were as they should have been for his
distance out after takeoff and the altitude he was flying.
b. His first indication of trouble resulted in the aircraft
gradually rolling to the right, which he corrected
readily; then nosing down to an attitude that broke off
both-wings.
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 Approved For Release 2008/05/29: CIA-RDP90B00170R000200280023-8 sage 14
The aircraft spun with great violence, so that the
engine blew out or was thrown out. His suit then
inflated and he attempted to escape. He did not fire
the seat and immediately prior to leaving the aircraft
he was so far forward in his harness that he could not
reach the destructor switches.
8. This series of events would come about by anything which
resulted in loss of half or all of the horizontal tail. The
U-2 wing is very highly cambered and without a tail surface.
to balance the very high pitching moment, the aircraft
immediately goes over. on its back and, in severe cases, has
broken off the wings in down-bending. This occurred once in
the early testing days when the pilot inadvertently extended
the wing flaps at high cruising speed, which resulted in a
horizontal tail failure. It has resulted in two other cases
where the aircraft exceeded its design speed after the pilot
passed out due to lack of oxygen. In all these cases, the
wing failures- are similar to those shown in the U-2 photographos.
This type of-failure is common not only to the U-2 but to all
aircraft which balance out the pitching moment by use of the
"horizontal tail. The failure takes place in general in a
very few seconds, creating high accelerations and generally
leaving the fuselage spinning inverted.
9. I was able to correlate all of the Powers' statements with
our studies of the photographs, our knowledge of the
aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft, and experience
in-flight test with all the miscellaneous gear involved in
attempting an escape from the cockpit as he described.
10. I am still unable to confirm that the Grainger Box was not
acting as a beacon for a missile guidance system. You have
made studies of this possibility and I know that in the early
days when we were first given the device for test it did
exhibit such tendencies. Powers stated he had the box turned
on, as he was told to do; so this is one question that remains
in my mind as a very important one to settle in connection
,with this accident.
11. I was so impressed by the very clear description of the
.incident by Frank, and having direct knowledge of what he was
ordered to do in case-of capture, that I will gladly contribute
to a fund for decorating. this officer for the fine job he
did under the most difficult circumstances'. He satisfied me,
by detailed questions, that the Russians could not have
brainwashed him on detail matters of his escape from the
aircraft."
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Approved For Release 2008/05/29: CIA-RDP90B00170R000200280023-8
HORIZONTAL
TAIL
AREA
500 SOFT.
47.5 SO. FT.
ASPECT RATIO
10.
2.98
TAPER RATIO
.25
.31
ROOT CHORD
TIP CHORD
136 IN.
34 IN.
73. IN.
22.7 IN.
VERTICAL
TAIL
34.7 SO. FT.
1.10
.50
112.5 IN.
43 IN.
SECTIONS
WING: ROOT NACA 64A409 INCIDENCE 4 3?
TIP NACA 64A406 INCIDENCE + 10
TAIL SURFACES NACA 64AOOS
BALANCE
MOST FORWARD 'C.O. 13% MAC & P.S. 419.4
DESIGN GROSS WT. C.O. 18.4% MAC & F.S. 424.5
ALTERNATE GROSS WT. C.O. 23.2% MAC & F.S. 429.1