RESPONDING TO FLOGGERS IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000601740002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Dept. review completed
SEC R ETSENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Responding to Flogaers in Cuba
Renewed Soviet shipment of Flogger fighter aircraft to
Cuba is a serious act to which we must respond. This memoran-
dum seeks your approval of a series of political, economic,
and military measures which take account of the Flogger issue
in the context of our broader strategy to counter Cuban inter-
ventionism and to meet the global challenge posed by the
Soviets and their proxies.
Background
The arrival of eight crates containing Flogger aircraft
is the first shipment since twelve MiG-23s and MjG-27s (both
of which are designated "Flogger") were delivered to Cuba in
1978. When Secretary Vance raised the issue with Dobrynin
at the time of the 1978 deliveries, the Soviets insisted that
the Flo44ers in Cuba could not carry nuclear weapons and had
nothing to do with the 1962 Understandings.
We responded that if the planes were not nuclear-capable,
and if the quantity were limited, we would not regard them as
constituting a threat. We added, both in Washington and
Moscow, that an increase in the number of around attack Mig-23s
in Cuba would have a seriously adverse effect on US-Soviet re-
lations.
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- 2 -
Implications of Renewed Flogger Shipments
Military. The second shipment of Floaters in itself will
not significantly enhance Cuban military capabilities. Al-
though this model of aircraft can he quickly equipped to de-
liver nuclear weapons without detection by the US, we have no
evidence that there are nuclear weapons in Cuba or that the
Soviets intend to deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba. Considered
in this light, we do not now face a crisis resembling the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis.
If the renewed shipment of Floqgers is viewed as part of
a continuing process of Cuba military modernization and expan-
sion, however, the military implications go beyond the immedi-
ate capabilities provided by these new aircraft:
? A Cuban Air Force modernized with multi-mission aircraft
such as the Flogger could force us to upgrade substantially air
defense capabilities in order to defend targets in the South-
eastern United States and Central America, including the
Panama Canal.
? De facto US acceptance of additional Flogger deployments
could open the door to further Soviet qualitative improvements
in Cuban military capabilities (e.g., Foxbat aircraft, modern
submarines, amphibious forces).
Political. Whether or not it was intended as a direct
Soviet challenge, the renewed shipment of Floggers -- after a
40 month hiatus and despite repeated US demarches about the
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arms buildup in Cuba -- almost certainly was a purposeful, pre-
meditated act which the Soviets took in full recognition of the
risks of a US reaction. Whatever the Soviet motive, moreover,
the absence of an effective US response could be regarded by
Moscow -- and by certain Latin American governments -- as
American acquiescence in continuing Soviet augmentation of
Cuban power projection capabilities to, threaten our fundamental
interests in the region. Such miscalculation about US strength
and determination also could increase Soviet willingness to
take aggressive actions against US interests elsewhere in
the world.
1962 US-Soviet Understanding on Cuba. This refers to a
series of US-Soviet diplomatic exchanges -- both oral and writ-
ten -- which occurred in the wake of the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis. No formal agreement was ever concluded.
There are two basic elements. First is a US understand-
ing that the Soviets would withdraw and would not reintroduce
"offensive weapon systems." Following that understanding, the
Soviets withdrew not only their ballistic missiles, but also
the IL-28 nuclear-capable bombers (which had a mission similar
to that now performed by Flogger).
Second is a Soviet understanding that the US "had no
intention of invading Cuba." However, the two conditions
upon which our no-invasion pledge rested -- UN supervision
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of Soviet missile withdrawals and adequate safeguards against
their reintroduction -- were never satisfied because of
Castro's objections. It can be argued, therefore, that the
US is not bound by the no-invasion pledae it made as part of
the 1962 Understanding. (Additional background on the 1962
Understanding is attached.)
The Floggers appear to fall into a "gray area" of the
1962 Understanding. On the one hand, the Flogger model can
be quickly and covertly converted to carry nuclear weapons
(whether or not the specific aircraft delivered to Cuba pres-
ently are nuclear configured). On the other hand, the Carter
Administration (as the Soviets would be likely to remind us)
accepted Soviet assurances that the Floggers in Cuba were not
nuclear-capable and were not covered by the 1962 Understanding
(although the Carter Administration's 1978 marker on the con-
sequences of additional Flogger deliveries would facilitate a
new US demarche on the issue).
In any event, continued Soviet modernization of the Cuban
Air Force with dual-capable aircraft such as Flogger undermines
the value to the United States of the 1962 Understandinq which
has been a principal facet of US policy toward Soviet activi-
ties in Cuba. The MiG-23 is particularly objectionable because
it can be rapidly converted to a nuclear attack mode without
being detected by the US.
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In addition, delivery of MiG-23s directly undercuts two
previous US positions reoardina Soviet aircraft in Cuba. -In
1962, Kennedy successfully insisted upon removal of IL-28
bombers on grounds they were dual-capable. In 1978, the US
put the Soviets on notice that delivery of further ground-
attack MiG-23s to Cuba would adversely affect US-Soviet rela-
tions.
US Objectives
We want to respond to renewed Soviet deliveries of Floggers
to Cuba in a manner which will contribute to our longer-term
efforts to counter Cuban intervention in the region and will
support our broader strategy of meeting the challenge posed by
the Soviets and their proxies. Our response must be clearly
distinguishable from the Carter Administration's 1978 accept-
ance of unverifiable Soviet assurances on Flogger. It should
not, however, provoke a US-Soviet confrontation in the Carib-
bean which would divert attention from Poland and feed Allied
suspicions that we were over-reacting to Castro.
In NSDD-17, you authorized a series of measures to counter
the Cuban export of revolution in the hemisphere. The Flogger
shipments provide both the need and the opportunity to sup-
plement and accelerate that program. In doing so, we can at-
tempt to:
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? increase Soviet concerns about US intentions, and
Soviet willingness to limit further modernization/
expansion of Cuban military capabilities;
? exacerbate Castro's sense of isolation and
doubts about the depth of the Soviet security
commitment to him; and
? build support for our regional, strategy.
Possible Responses
Military and Intelligence. An increased program of in-
telligence collection and air surveillance (SR-71, U-2, P-3,
RC-135 flights) already is underway. Other options include:
? Increasing the readiness of our defense capabil-
ities at Homestead, AFB in southern Florida, in-
cluding increased ordnance stocks, visits and/or
deployment of tacair units;
? Reinforcing Guantanamo, including deployment of
the dual-capable Lance (which we believe would
be consistent with the Treaty of Tlatelolco);
? Scrambling fighter aircraft whenever Cuban (and
possibly Soviet) military aircraft approach US
airspace;
? Increasing naval activity around Cuba. A large-
scale naval exercise, including two CVBG s, al-
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ready is scheduled for April. Other surface
combatants may be able to conduct a smaller
exercise earlier;
? Deploying tactical fighter aircraft to the
Western Caribbean. The Colombian island of San
Andres (midway between Colombia anti Nicaragua),
Howard AFB in Panama, and airbases in Honduras
are possible sites; and
? Repeating a communications exercise simulating
US military preparations against Cuba designed to
increase Soviet and Cuban concerns about US inten-
tions.
? Accelerating the timetable for beginning Radio
Marti broadcasts (including announcement of the
composition of the Presidential commission).
Diplomatic. Walt Stoessel already has made a demarche to
Dobrynin. Amb. Hartman will be following up in Moscow in the
context of a presentation of our concerns about Cuba and Central
America.
We also can press the Soviets for a clarification of the
1962 Understanding which would encompass nuclear capable air-
craft such as Flogger. If we pursue this course, we would
reject any Soviet efforts to raise issues which would restrain
our actions against Castro by making clear that our demarches
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did not signal any willingness to reopen the 19b2 Understanding
for renegotiation or to enter into any negotiation concerning
US or Soviet arms transfers.
Finally, we could initiate a series of consultations with
countries in the region about the deteriorating security en-
vironment and about cooperative measures to improve the pros-
pects for peace and stability in the area.
Security and Economic Assistance. The Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI) is a comprehensive strategy for countering
Cuban intervention by improving economic conditions in the
region. A budget supplemental to fund the CBI is now being
prepared. We also are planning major security assistance in-
creases for El Salvador and Honduras.
Economic Sanctions. We can further increase the pressure
on the Cuban economy by blacklisting ships which call in Cuban
ports, curtailing tourism, and other measures to improve the
effectiveness of the embargo. We also can decrease Nicaragua's
access to trade and credit.
Implementation Strategy
We want to select and move forward with individual re-
sponses on a schedule which will steadily increase the pres-
sure on the Soviets and Cubans (short of provoking a crisis
which diverts attention from Poland), and will build support
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for our longer-term program to counter Castro. The near-term
actions we choose, therefore, should increase our leverage
over the Soviets and the Cubans and put us in a better
position--diplomatically, militarily, and politically--to
take more forceful actions in the event that our concerns
are not satisfied.
Timetable. During January, you could use your State of
the Union address to describe our concerns about Cuban activ-
ities in the context of describing the challences posed by the
Soviets and their proxies around the globe. In that address,
you can announce the CBI, the $3U0 million supplemental for
emergency economic assistance to the region, and steps for ac-
celerating the start of broadcasts by Radio Marti (including
the announcement of the members of the Presidential commis-
sion). As a separate but related action, we also could notify
Congress of your decisions to use your Section 506(a) author-
ity to increase security assistance for El Salvador and
Honduras.
During their meeting next week, Secretary Haig can make
a demarche to Gromyko about the Floggers in the context of our
growing concern about continuinq Soviet modernization and ex-
pansion of Cuban power projection capabilities. Secretary
Haiq can press for Soviet clarification of the 1962 Understand-
inn to encompass nuclear capable aircraft such as Flogger,
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and sianal that the US may have no alternative but to recon-
sider its position on the Understanding -- and the no-invasion
pledge -- if the Soviets do not satisfy our concern about the
erosion of the limits it contains.
The increased pattern of surveillance flights over and
around Cuba should be maintained. Preparations for more visi-
ble military measures also should be begun, and overt movement
of ordnance to Homestead AFB should be considered."
In February, additional military measures should be im-
plemented. These miqht include temporary deployment of tac-
tical fighter units to Homestead AFB and, if feasible, to
Howard AFB in Panama and to San Andres island in the context
of a US-Colombian exercise. We also should do the preparatory
work necessary to facilitate prompt deployment of US tacair to
Honduras, but should not implement deployment unless MiGs are
delivered to Nicaragua or other circumstances dictate. If
feasible, naval activity around Cuba could be increased and
small-scale naval exercises could be staged. Finally, a com-
munications exercise designed to raise Soviet and Cuban anxi-
eties about US actions against Cuba could be conducted.
During the same time period, you could give a major
foreign policy speech focusing on the situation in the Carib-
bean and Central America. Depending on the circumstances,
you could use the occasion to announce additional economic
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sanctions against Cuba, defensive military measures (e.g.,
reinforcement of Guantanamo, orders to challenge Cuban/Soviet
military aircraft approaching US airspace), and/or political
progress in Central America (e.g., Central American Regional
Grouping, security consultations with selected regional govern-
ments on cooperative measures to deal with the chancing secur-
ity environment).
The choice of, and schedule for, specific subsequent
actions (e.g., accelerated timetable for CVBG exercises,
deployment of aircraft to Honduras, further diplomatic
exchanges with the Soviets, reconsideration of the 1962
Understanding) would depend on developments over the comina
weeks and months. All, however, would be part of our longer-
term regional strategy.
Congressional Strategy. Consultations initially should
be confined to the leadership and to the chairmen and ranking
minority members of appropriate committees. They should
outline our objectives and broad approach in general terms,
and describe the kinds of near-tern measures and NSDD-17
initiatives we are considering. %e should be particularly
circumspect about discussing the prospect of any diplomatic
exchanges with the Soviets regarding the 1962 Understanding.
The presentations also will have to be made in such a way as
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to avoid any impression that we were conducting consultations
under the War Powers Act.
Public Affairs. We want to increase public awareness of
the situation in the region and public support for the measures
we will be taking in response. At the same time, we want to
avoid raisinq unrealistic expectations or stimulating a sense
of crisis, either of which could force our hand before we were
ready and jeopardize our broader objectives.
Our public posture leading up to your State of the Union
address therefore should be low-key. We should acknowledge
the second shipment of Floggers to Cuba, state that we con-
sider this development to be serious, and say that we have
raised our concerns with the Soviets at a hiah level (making
clear these are diplomatic exchanges and not negotiations).
We should avoid raising the 1962 Understanding, but should
say, if asked, that the Floggers may touch on that under-
taking.
Recommendations
That you approve the general approach described above.
Approve Disapprove
Additionally, that in the context of this approach you ap-
prove:
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- Announcinq the economic assistance supplemental and
other measures in your State of the Union address.
Approve Disapprove
- A stepped up program of air surveillance over and
around Cuba.
Approve Disapprove
- A demarche by Secretary Haig to Gromyko in Geneva
next week.
Approve Disapprove
- An accelerated timetable for naval exercises around
Cuba and increased readiness for air defense capa-
bilities in the Southeastern US.
Approve Disapprove
- Approaching the Colombians and Panamians on de-
ploying US aircraft to bases on their territory,
and approaching the Hondurans on preparing for
possible deployments to their facilities.
Approve Disapprove
- A communications exercise designed to increase
Soviet and Cuban concerns.
Approve Disapprove
- Naming the members of the Presidential commission
in order to move forward with Radio Marti broad-
casts.
Approve Disapprove
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- The concept of a major foreign policy speech in
February describing additional diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and military measures we are taking in
the region.
Approve Disapprove
- The Congressional consultation strategy described
above.
Approve Disapprove
- The initial public affairs strategy described
above.
Approve Disapprove
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Background on the 1962 Understanding
The 1962 Understanding, as embodied in the exchange of
letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev, was never formalized
because Castro refusee to permit verification that offensive
weapons would not be reintroduced into Cuba. Kennedy made
clear to the Soviets that a formal US non-invasion commitment
would, in addition, have to be conditioned on responsible
Cuban behavior. When he announced the lifting of the naval
quarantine (November 20, 1962), Kennedy stated:
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons are re-
moved from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safe-
guards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of
aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace
in the Caribbean."
Indications that the Soviets
ties at Cienfuegos led to a
4
building submarine f acil-
subsequent series of diplomatic
exchanges in 1970 and 1971 which broadened the 1962 Understand-
ing to include a ban on "servicing in or from Cuba of nuclear
submarines and submarines carrying offensive weapons."
In expressing US concern over Soviet naval activities at
the Cuban port of Cienfuegos in 1970, Kissinger called atten-
tion on the record to Kennedy's November 20, 1962 statement,
noting "this, of course, remains the policy of this Government."
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To our knowledge, the Carter Administration did not make
a definitive public statement regarding the 1962 Understanding.
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