CUBA: EXPANDING LDC ECONOMIC SERVICES PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000100260002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Communist Activities
Cuba: Expanding LDC
Economic Services Program
Summary Cuba penetrates national economies and increases its presence and influ-
ence in much of the Third World by providing technical and economic
services. We estimate that more than 20,000 Cuban technicians were
assigned to development projects last year in some 29 LDCs. While several
setbacks reduced the number of technicians abroad from the record level
set in 1981, only 13,600 technicians were abroad five years ago. The
personnel are concentrated in teaching and medical services and construc-
tion work, with others placed as civilian advisers to ministries and planning
agencies. Although some technicians are provided free to many poorer
LDCs, wealthier clients pay hard currency for their services. We estimate
that Cuba charged an estimated $150 million last year from its overseas
personnel, an amount equal to about 10 percent of its total hard currency
export earnings. Recent developments may slow the growth of its civilian
presence in southern Africa and Latin America, but Cuba appears to be
shifting its attention to commercial development activities in the Middle
East.
The Program
Havana uses its economic services program to achieve
several objectives in the developing world:
? Initiate and strengthen relationships with LDCs of
various political leanings.
? Exert direct influence on national bureaucracies.
? Earn hard currency.
? Communicate the Cuban version of Marxism to
large numbers of Third World students through its
teaching contingents.
? Enhance Cuba's international image as a champion
of poorer nations.
? Gather intelligence and recruit agents of influence.
? Syphon off excess labor from the Cuban work force.
that in 1983 more than 20,000 Cuban techni-
cians were working in LDCs, nearly a 50-percent
increase over the number abroad five years ago (see
table). Medical personnel, teachers, and construction
workers made up the large majority of Cuban civil-
ians overseas, although Havana also placed some
4,200 other advisers and experts in a number of fields
suited to economic development. The Cuban contin-
gent abroad last year included:
? About 2,400 medical personnel in more than 20
LDCs, ranging from 750 people in Nicaragua to less
than 25 in a number of Sub-Saharan countries.
Most furnished basic health care in rural areas.
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Cuba: Economic Technicians
in Non-Communist LDCs, 1983 a
Number of
Persons
20,085
3,890
3,500
15
100
9,170
6,000
Congo 200
Equatorial Guinea 15
Ethiopia 1,000
1,000
225
Nicaragua
Middle East
Iran
6,200
610
100
loo
? About 5,000 teachers concentrated in Angola
(2,000) and Nicaragua (2,000). Cuban teachers in-
structed at all educational levels, and some helped
design school systems based on the Cuban model.
? More than 8,500 construction workers, with most
employed on roadbuilding and housing projects;
Angola, Libya, and Nicaragua each hosted more
than 2,000 workers
Terms of employment vary by recipient. For poorer
countries, such as Ethiopia and the majority of Afri-
can recipients, Cuba provides free technicians or
charges only a nominal amount. For others, such as
Angola and Mozambique, there are reports that Cuba
charges up to $1,000 a month in hard currency for
each technician. Wealthier LDCs-Algeria, Libya,
and Iraq-pay Cuba up to $2,000 monthly per person
in hard currency. These payments are transferred
directly to Havana. We estimate that Cuba charges a
total of about $150 million in foreign exchange a year
from its paying customers.
First Major Setbacks for Cuban Program
Havana's economic services program has been well
received by most Third World clients. While Cuba
has encountered some complaints about the quality of
its personnel or their activities, it still has been able to
increase its contingents abroad at a steady pace.
Recently, however, Cuba's program has experienced
unaccustomed setbacks:
? Grenada expelled nearly 700 Cuban technicians
after the invasion, forcing Cuba to abandon con-
struction of the airport that was its largest aid
project abroad.
? Suriname ejected Cuban personnel in October be-
cause of concern that their presence might provoke
a US intervention there as well.
? Havana chose to replace most women and older
technical personnel in Nicaragua with young men
who were able to defend themselves against rebel
attacks or a foreign invasion.
? Cuba evacuated more workers from war zones in
Iraq-a move that was criticized harshly by Bagh-
dad and that cut deeply into Cuban hard currency
earnings from Iraq.
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? Syria ordered Cuban sugar industry officials out of
the country for incompetence.
? Angolan rebels this year have begun to mount
attacks specifically against civilian technicians; in
April there were 80 casualties in a bombing of a
facility housing Cuban workers.
Cuba probably will respond to these developments
with more careful planning of its foreign activities and
a tightening of control over its technicians to avoid the
appearance of illegal or otherwise unacceptable be-
havior. Havana also may step up efforts to create
more stable commercial and business ties as a way to
maintain and then expand its presence
Impact: Political Returns Emphasized
Havana has tailored its services program to exploit
opportunities for influence in the Third World while
enhancing its international image. Castro has openly
admitted that Cuba provides educational assistance to
exert long-term influence on LDCs. Cuba expects to
gain from its educational presence overseas through
the rise to prominence of alumni of Cuban programs,
as well as a broad diffusion of Cuban-trained students
within the technical and political infrastructure of
LDCs. According to open sources, Cuban teachers
have influenced primary and secondary school sys-
tems in Ethiopia, Guyana, Nicaragua, and South
Yemen using the Cuban model, which emphasizes
Communist ideology. The Cuban press also has re-
ported that educational personnel are selected for
overseas duty on the basis of their loyalty and the
strength of their Communist beliefs. They then re-
ceive six months of training on the political and
educational goals of their mission, as well as on social
and economic conditions of their assigned country.
Other open sources report that in the last five years
Cuban teachers in Angola have taught over 300,000
students. According to the press in Managua, 80,000
Nicaraguan students were taught by Cuban teachers
in 1981
Economic technicians placed in ministries and plan-
ning agencies also advance Cuban policies in the
LDCs. An estimated 4,200 Cubans are assigned as
advisers to the economic bureaucracies of more than
20 Third World countries. These personnel, unlike
most Cuban civilians overseas, work closely with host-
country officials on a daily basis. They have been
hired to assist in economic planning, trade develop-
ment, agricultural reorganization, mass communica-
tions, social and cultural affairs, and other specialties.
In the course of their duties, they probably introduce
or reinforce Communist concepts of social, political,
and economic organization. We estimate that between
1,000 and 1,500 such advisory personnel are in Nica-
ragua, dispersed throughout every sector of govern-
ment. Another 1,500 are in Angola and nearly 500
are in Mozambique.
Cuban medical and construction personnel are usually
less effective instruments of influence because they
often operate in sparsely populated areas and their
work is apolitical. Cuban construction workers live in
self-contained camps near their jobsites, and most are
motivated by material incentives. Still, Havana propa-
gandizes the activities of its medical and construction
personnel in the interest of international image. build-
ing. The personnel themselves, particularly the medi-
cal technicians, also may have a positive impact on the
rural populaces that benefit directly from their serv-
ices.
Havana also uses its presence in the Third World to
gather intelligence and to recruit agents of influence.
The extension of political-ideological influence was a
main objective of plans personally supervised by Cas-
tro a few years ago to increase technical assistance to
Cuban economic technicians also are capable of play-
ing a limited military role in their assigned LDC. For
example, construction workers in Grenada had access
to small arms, and Cuban teachers have had to defend
themselves in Nicaragua. Technicians at Cuba's
showcase sugar mill project in Nicaragua have drilled
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secret
extensively to defend the site against rebel attack,
While their
fighting skills are limited, Cubans are expected to be
able to use small arms in response to hostile action
because they often are stationed in dangerous areas.
Most Cubans have had basic military instruction in
Managua has hinted about plans this year to replace
some 1,500 Cuban teachers with Nicaraguans
trained in Cuban institutes. Rebel activities have
already caused the substitution of young Cuban
men with recent military training for most women
and older technicians.
the armed forces or militia organizations,
Economic Spinoffs Growing in Importance
Hard currency earnings from Cuba's activities abroad
last year more than offset any negative impact the
export of some skills might have had on Cuba's own
economy. We estimate that Cuba charged about $150
million for its technical assistance programs in the
Third World last year.' Nearly a fourth of all Cuban
economic technicians abroad worked under hard cur-
rency contracts in Arab countries; other receipts came
from Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. The ex-
port of labor also has slightly reduced unemployment
in Cuba-a desirable side effect for a country whose
rapidly growing 3-million-member work force is al-
ready underemployed.
Prospects
We believe that recent events in the Third World may
slow the growth of the Cuban technical services
program, at least over the near term. These include:
? In Latin America, the expulsion from Grenada and
growing problems in Nicaragua. In the wake of the
public revelation of Cuban penetration of Grenada's
military and economic establishment, we expect
many potential recipients to proceed more cautious-
ly in permitting a Cuban presence, particularly in
the Western Hemisphere. In Nicaragua, even
though the Cubans remain firmly entrenched,
' In data released to its creditors, Cuba claims to have earned only
about 10 percent of that figure from its civilian technicians
overseas. Actual receipts could have been less than charges because
? In southern Africa, further progress in regional
negotiations may reduce tensions and narrow the
opportunities for Cuba to maintain large numbers of
technicians in the area, particularly if Western
influence begins to grow. Therefore, the Nkomati
accords and Angola's Cuban troop withdrawal dis-
cussions are both threats to the substantial Cuban
civilian presence in southern Africa. Also, Angolan
rebels this year have announced they now will
include civilian technicians in their attacks until all
Cubans leave the country. More than one-third of
Cuban technicians currently abroad are concentrat-
ed in the region.
Nonetheless, we expect Cuba to pursue all available
opportunities to preserve its technical presence
abroad. Through its program, Cuba has increased its
influence abroad at low cost, maximized foreign
exchange earnings, and eased unemployment at home.
For their part, some economically desperate LDCs
will continue to accept material assistance and aid
personnel from almost any source, including Havana.
In the event of Cuban troop withdrawals from major
client states, Cuba may find it has to rely primarily on
its economic technicians to preserve its Third World
influence.
While maintaining as much as possible its existing
Third World ties, Cuba may now be trying to promote
the commercial construction component of the pro-
gram and forge more economic relationships in the
Middle East and diplomatic ties in Africa. Despite
financial constraints, Castro has ordered that no
embassies in Africa be closed and that new ones be
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The head of Cuban overseas construction has publicly
stated that Havana actively seeks a larger role in
commercial construction activities. The important
commercial relationship with Libya appears healthy,
and this year Havana named high-level foreign assist-
ance experts as ambassadors to Baghdad and
Maputo. New construction projects in Congo and
Angola already have been set up,
in Kuwait and South Yemen, joint
construction companies have been organized recently.
All these activities will generate hard currency re-
ceipts for Havana while setting the stage for a
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