DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000090009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 10, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Developments in Indochina
10 January
Top Secret
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
(Information as of 1500)
SOUTH VIETNAM
President Thieu has publicized another decree
issued under his emergency powers--this one
deals with military service. Saigon's Infor-
mation Ministry has been placed directly un-
der the President.
NORTH VIETNAM
Truong Chinh tours bomb-damaged areas. The
North Vietnamese are making contingency plans
for a resumption of US bombing north of the
20th parallel.
LAOS
Government units near Sarivane are still un-
der Communist attack. Communist units in
the central panhandle are beginning to stir.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
F The Mekong Coordinating Committee
has prepared a new $3.2-billion aid package.
CAMBODIA
Government reinforcements have arrived at
Tram Khnar.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
President Thieu has made public another of the
30-odd decrees promulgated at the end of I_!cem-
ber shortly before his authority under the Emergency
Powers Law expired. The decree, revealed in the Sai-
gon press over the past weekend,,deals with military
service. It appears to codify and expand three
basic areas of military obligation set forth in
previous directives and decrees. These areas are:
exemptions and deferrals, mobilization (including
the "regularization" of a civilian defense force
both as a reserve force for home defense and a
source of manpower for the regular army) , and penal
sanctions. The most sweeping change brought about
by the new decree will be a significant expansion
of the civil self-defense force, apparently to per-
mit the government to maintain a sizable reserve
military force in the event a peace settlement re-
stricts or calls for scaling down the size of the
regular army.
The new decree also specifies various degrees
of mobilization, varying from "normal circumstances"
to "general mobilization." Under a state of general
mobilization, all male citizens from 16 to 50 years
of age can be called into active military duty. Ex-
cept in this extreme emergency, however, males be-
tween 18 and 38 will continue to serve as the basic
age group for the draft, with younger candidates
selected for service ahead of older persons. The
age gap can be broadened to include males between
17 and 43 if draft calls out of the previous group
are not sufficient. The new decree also stipulates
that draftees will serve a two-year tour of active
duty, whereas previously they could be forced to
serve almost indefinitely. Upon completion of
their two-year tour, draftees are placed in active
reserve; during a state of general mobilization,
they can be recalled to duty until age 50.
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Exemptions for military service can be granted
only to those individuals considered physically
unable to perform any useful combat or support
role. Deferments can be granted to "outstanding"
college and high school students, male heads of
family, and individuals who are temporarily in
poor health. A special deferment can be arranged
for persons engaged in certain kinds of religious
activities. In each of these instances, however,
an individual must serve a minimum of two years
active military duty in either the regular army
or the active reserve once the reason for his
deferment no longer applies. In addition, except
in special cases approved by the Prime Minister,
no male citizen can travel abroad, be elected to
public office, or be appointed to a civilian gov-
ernmental position until he has fulfilled his
minimal military duty. This appears to be aimed
primarily at reducing the number of draft age stu-
dents who go abroad to study in foreign universi-
ties and return home only after they are fairly
certain they will not be drafted.
The penal section toughens penalties imposed
on draft dodgers and on other individuals who as-
sist them in falsifying draft eligibility documents,
such as birth certificates and medical examinations.
Penalties in the new decree have been expanded to
include those for persons who willfully employ any-
one trying to avoid the draft. Some sentences have
been stiffened, and all offenses can now be tried
in military courts. Civilians aiding and abetting
draft dodgers usually would be brought before a
civilian tribunal, although this provision is waived
in some states of emergency.
Change in Information Ministry
South Vietnam's Information Ministry is being
reorganized and placed directly under the presidency,
according to press reports. The government announced
on 10 January that the ministry has been renamed the
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National Commission for Information and that key
presidential aide I-Ioang Duc Nha has been placed
in charge. Nha is Thieu's nephew, and the Presi-
dent clearly regards him as a man he can trust.
Nha had indicated privately as early as last sum-
mer that such a change was in the wind and that
it might be part of a broader reorganization of
the government. There is no indication as to
whether Thieu is planning any other changes at
this time.
The change in the Information Ministry appears
to be a follow-up to the press decree that tightened
government control over opposition papers last sum-
mer, and .may also be part of Thieu's effort to con-
solidate his powers prior to a cease-fire. Senior
government officials have recently indicated in
private that they believe the press decree, as well
as the recent decree on political parties, have
significantly enhanced their ability to control
the population after the fighting stops. The press
decree, they feel, already is preventing opposition
journals from undermining confidence in the govern-
ment, while the decree on parties will. block the
Viet Cong from infiltratin and gaining control
non-Communist part
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NORTH VIETNAM
National Assembly President Truong Chinh visited
various bomb-damaged localities on 5 January, accom-
panied by much adulation in the North Vietnamese
media. Hanoi's domestic service seemed to go out
of its way to excuse Chinh's absence in the Soviet
Union during the bombing and noted that he had been
named by the "party, national assembly, and govern-
ment" to head a ceremonial delegation, as an indi-
vidual "constantly and closely associated with the
people," to view the bomb damage as soon as possi-
ble after his return. The radio made much of the
empathy between Chinh and the bombing victims he
talked with and noted that his listeners were
"boundlessly moved" by his remarks.
All the other top leaders in Hanoi have made
bomb-damage tours, and a similar visit from Chinh
was to he expected. The level of adulation he re-
ceived, compared with the treatment accorded his
colleagues, suggests he is as firmly ensconced
as ever in the number two positi n the hier-
archy.
Hanoi Expects More Bombing
Hanoi apparently is making contingency plans
for the resum ti on of US bombing above the 20th
parallel.
Air defense preparations--
including the formation of even more home guard
anti-aircraft units--are proceeding apace, accord-
ing to Radio Hanoi. Moreover, a French press dis-
patch from Hanoi reports that a local newspaper of
9 January warned the populace to expect an "ex-
tremely violent resumption" of the bombings. These
warnings seem to be based on the assumption that
another impasse in Paris is a real possibility.
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Preliminary reports indicate that on 10 Janu-
ary North Vietnamese infantry and artillery units
in south Laos continued to attack government units
near Saravane, forc'ng the irregulars to pull back
farther south and west. Heavy air strikes are
still being directed against enemy troop concentra-
tions around the town despite increasingly intense
anti-aircraft fire.
Communist Stirrings in the Panhandle
Communist units in the central panhandle that
have been kept on the defensive since mid-October by
air strikes and government sweep operations are show-
ing some signs of trying to regain the initiative.
Late last week, North Vietnamese units routed a small
Lao Army unit from Ban Tangvai, some 20 miles south
of Muong Phalane, while other enemy elements fired
several rockets into the town of Thakhek.
More ambitious Communist operations may be in
the offing in this region. In the past few days, US
pilots have reported signs of enemy armor and a
troop concentration in the same area where Communist
tanks and troops assembled for their mid-December
attack on the Se Bangfai bridge.
A recently captured North Vietnamese officer has
claimed that Communist ..troops are planning an attack
on Seno. He also stated that the attack would coin-
cide with a move against Muong Phalane by the North
Vietnamese 29th Regiment -- the major enemy force in
-
the central panhandle./
Although the Communists probably wi try
to retake Muong Phalane -- because of its proximity to
the Ho Chi Minh Trail -- there is no evidence that they
are planning any other major military efforts in the
central panhandle. F777 I
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Mekong Nations Present Wish-List
Representatives of the Mekong Coordinating Com-
mittee, which is seeking to use the potential of the
Mekong River and its tributaries to restore the war-
shattered Mekong countries, have presented a $3.2-
billion package of construction projects to the
United States, pending the termination of hostilities.
This committee represents South Vietnam, Laos, Cam-
bodia, and Thailand; project planning, however, has
been based on the assumption that North Vietnam will
eventually join.
The ;proposed program includes power, irrigation
and communications projects that would require $12
billion in investment by the year 2000. It includes
a plan to rehabilitate the irriga.cion and transporta-
tion canals in South Vietnam's Mekong delta to en-
able the country to realize its former rice-growing
potential. Another plan would restore the watershed
areas damaged by massive forest devastation. The
major project, however, is the Pa Mong dam on the
Lao,-Thai' border; this project would supply 1,200 MW
of hydroelectric power to the region--including North
Vietnam--and would irrigate 100,000 acres of land,
primarily in southern Laos and northern Thailand.
The US Bureau of Reclamation conducted a feasibility
study of Pa Mond and recommended starting the $1.1-
billion project pending favorable security conditions.
These projects will greatly aid in the restora-
tion of the war zone and provide employment to many
refugees once the fighting ends. Some projects of the
Mekong Development Plan have been completed during the
war; the most important has been the Nam Ngum dam and
hydroelectric power station in Laos--built with finan-
cial assistance from 21 non-communist countries and
dedicated in December 1972? The major portion of the
Mekong projects, however, can be undertaken only upon
cessation of hostilities when the World Bank and other
aid organizations would be more optimistic about the
possibilities of the region.
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CAMBODIA
The government garrison at Tram Khnar on Route
3 south of Phnom Penh, which had been under heavy
Khmer Communist pressure for almost a week, has been
bolstered by the arrival of four additional infantry
battalions and a squadron of armored personnel car-
riers. These forces apparently are to participate
in clearing operations south of Tram Khnar. On the
Route 2 front, the insurgents are sustaining their
harassing attacks north of Takeo against Cambodian
positions at Thnal Totung and Svay Prey. Three
government paratroop battalions that had been opera-
ting with South Vietnamese units along Route 2 below
Takeo are now trying to reach Svay Prey.
Communist attacks by fire and ground probes
against several small government positions in the
vicinity of Vihear Suor, 15 miles northeast of Phnom
Penh, continue to be reported. Some reinforcements
have been sent to that area, but they are also meet-
ing Communist resistance. The actions in this area
may be aimed at preventing Cambodian troops from in-
terfering with Communist supply movements southward
along the Ton'.e Toch River.
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