THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00024R000400230011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORT

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TheSino -Soviet Conflict Global Perspective. -.Edited by H.J. Ellison. Seattle:
Universityof?WashingtonrPress, 1982 xxii, 408 pp Maps,?Forward, Introduction
The breadth of coverage, excellence of the index, abundance of footnotes, and
critique by Donald Treadgold of Western explanations for the Sino-Soviet conflict
make this compilation an excellent introductory work for graduate students. The
expertise of ; the contributors? gives rise to numerous insights which specialists
will find thought-provoking ,'Joan Urban 's suggestion that Soviet anxiety over,
Chinese .rapprochement with: West Europe stemmed not from fear of a China armed with
With the laudable ambition of both exploring the complexities of Sino-Soviet
relations-and projecting "the likely trends of the 1980s," Herbert Ellison has
compiled a wide-ranging', insightful set of essays on Sino-Soviet relations. This
refreshingly balanced treatment of each side proceeds from the internal politics,
security concerns, and economic circumstances of the USSR and PRC through the
international repercussions of their mutual hostility to three summary discussions.
Western weapons so much as from concern that China might encourage Western anti-Soy-
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, .< ietism (p. :)uyj is np.Le. Another is LMight?r1W ' argument, based on
potential growth rates, that China might be able to approach military parity with
the Soviet Union within 20 years (p. 110). Yet for analysts of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions frustrated by the mass of currently available descriptive summaries almost
untouched by scientific analysis, this highly traditional volume will provide
little consolation.
An unimaginative conceptual framework lacking scientific rigor has left the
disappointing whole less than the sum of the admittedly stimulating parts. Kenneth
Lieberthal's lead article on Chinese domestic politics adds to a su; nary of his
previous writings a set of scenarios for the future of Sino-Soviet relations
which warn that close Sino-Western ties may well depend on rapid economic develop-
ment in China. Seweryn Bialer, in contrast to Lieberthal's factional model, argues
from a unitary actor approach that incoming Soviet leaders should logically want
better Sino-Soviet relations and, as with Lieberthal,.that slow economic growth
would very possibly persuade China to go along. Jonathan Pollack's contention
that' Soviet. foreign panty."has alternately flailed, probed, and stood perfectly
still, without any internal agreement on. . .positive goals" (p. 75) suggests that
even for the relatively more unified Soviet elite, the unitary actor approach is
unlikely to reveal all the motivations for Soviet attitudes toward China in the
near future. (Fedor Burlatskiy's various critiques of Maoism, which can be read
as attacks on Stalinist tendencies in Brezhnev's Russia come to mind in this regard.)
Paul Borsuk's opinion that Soviet elite perceptions of China are rigid and unrealistic
,also calls into question Bialer's implication that the post-Brezhnev leadership will
be logical.
The. inclusion of such divergent views is stimulating but the reader must search
diligently to locate them because the type of introduction listing key hypotheses
which a student trained-.in the behavioral era hopes for was not included. "Cne is
in no way belittling the value of contrasting views lucidly presented in asking for
a list of hypotheses accompanied by explicit assumptions underlying them and by
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definition of what ObcTT
confirm those hypotheses.
among these three areas of uncertainty and a fourth - the possibility of instability
in a Soviet Union faced with managing the replacement of the ruling generation in a
If such a systematic effort at organizing the book had been made, explanatory
variables might have been more thoroughly examined and.their significance more
clearly ranked. ?One'possible reason for Chinese verbal hostility toward the USSR
which was totally ignored by this volume, for example, is China's desire to enhance
its global status. It cannot compete economically or militarily with the super-
powers, but China can, by leading a verbal crusade (read "united front") against
hegemony or imperialism as the case may be, cheaply attain a certain global status.
However individual specialists may wish to rank this variable in comparison with
ideological discord, security concerns, idiosyncratic factors, or the need for
Western technology, a 400-page study of Sino-Soviet relations should certainly not
have ignored it. Does the title, Sino-Soviet Conflict (rather than the neutral
"relations"), indicate that hostility is assumed? As individual contributors
repeatedly pointed out; to take Sino-Soviet hostility as a given is very risky.
Harry Gelman's first-rate concluding overview of Sino-Soviet relations underlines
the danger of making any assumptions about this relationship because of three areas
of uncertainty: Chinese political stability, American foreign policy consistency,
and the contradiction between Chinese hostility toward the USSR and its weakness.
Gelman's conclusion might have been,.the best point at which to start this book, for
the field of Sino-Soviet studies needs a methodical exploration of the interplay
concluding chapter evaluating the various contributors'
efforts in this regard would also be of value.
period of severe foreign policy challenges and domestic economic constraints.
STAT
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