TENTATIVE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00024R000400230009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP85-00024R000400230009-3 persons named
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TENTATIVE PROGRAM
for a Princeton University Conference on The.U.S. and China's Modernization
Sponsored by the Program in Sino-American Relations and co-sponsored by the
Center of International Studies and the Woodrow Wilson School
Director: Lynn T. White III
Time and Place: Thursday & Friday, November 5 & 6, 1981, Princeton University
1:00 Registration, Woodrow Wilson School Lobby
1:30 Welcoming Remarks (President Bowen), WWS Auditorium
1:45 Introductory Remarks (White)
1:50 Session I: China's Interests in U.S. Trade (Prof. Gregory Chow, chair)
PANEL: Prof. Nicholas Lardy, Economics, Yale (emphasizing agriculture)
Prof. Jan Prybyla, Economics, Penn State (emphasizing industry)
GENERAL DISCUSSION
3:00 Session II: U.S. Interests in China's Development (Dean Donald Stokes, chair)
PANEL: Prof. Michel Oksenberg, Political Science, Michigan (formerly NSC)
Dr. James Lilley, National Security Council
6:00 Reception at Prospect House
7:00 Dinner at Prospect House
8:15 Hon. Leonard Woodcock, Formerly U.S. Ambassador to the P.R.C.
speaking in the Woodrow Wilson School Auditorium
9:00 Session III: The U.S. and China's Defense (Prof. Cyril Black, chair)
PANEL: Prof. Allen Whiting, Political Science, Michigan
Dr. Robert Sutter, Congressional Research Service
Dr. Jonathan Pollack, The RAND Corporation
GENERAL DISCUSSION
10:30 Coffee Break
10:45 Session IV: Legal Modernization in China (Prof. Marius Jansen, chair)
PANEL: Prof. Randle Edwards, Columbia Law
Prof. Hungdah Chiu, Maryland Law (on the rise of proceduralism?)
Prof. Karl Herbst, Pittsburgh Law (on inter-enterprise contracts?)
GENERAL DISCUSSION
12:15 Luncheon in Corwin Hall
2:00 Session V: The U.S., China, and the U.S.S.R. (Prof. Robert Tucker, chair)
PANEL: Prof. Harold Hinton, George Washington University
Prof. Edward Friedman, Subcommittee on Asian & Pacific Affairs, House
Central Intelligence Agency STAT
4:00 Concluding Remarks: The U.S. and China's Modernization
Prof. A. Doak Barnett, Brookings Institution
5:00 Adjourn
It is proposed that the Conference be held in memory of Hon. David Bruce,
Princeton, '19.
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-Purpose: attempt to discuss China's relationships with the United States
and the USSR from the perspective of China's own domestic affairs. China's
relations with the two superpowers certainly conducted to a high degree
by Beijing's assessments of the broad geopolitical situation prevailing
global politics, but at the same time its approach is also conditioned
and shaped by China's own internal political situation, its prevailing
policies and its approach to China's modernization.
-First outline the prevailing approach today--the program associated with
DIP--then outline some of the domestic pressures, constraints, sensitivites,
and alternative viewpoints which line up against him; and finally suggest
how these contribute to China's foreign policy, and specifically its relations
with the US USSR. -
-Deng's program: essentially a blueprint for rapid, drastic economic and
political reform which will (to use Beijing's phrase) "make China into a powerful
modern socialist. country by the year 2000."
+economic reform: a broad relaxation of the political constraints
which .had predominated during the CR yearn on acceptable economic.
institutions and activity; greater willingness to as tolerate
application of advanced technology and expertise, economic diversity
and managerial initiative.
+political reform: transform party into more suitable instrument to
guide modernization through reassertion of internal party rules and
procedures, loosening of doctrinal constraints (demaoification), and
removal of cadres promoted during CR years in favor of cadres more
competent to administer increasingly complex and technologically
developed society; in society itself, greater toleration of initiative
and opinion conducive to modernization and rigorous application of
socialist law as final arbiter of political conflict emerging from
process of modernization.
+the implications of DXP's domestic program for foreign policy follow
directly from the requirements of rapid reform:
-period of prolonged regional tranquillity, which, in DXP's view, is
secured by close association with West/US strategically against China's
main enemy, the USSR.
-extensive importation of Western/US technology, expertise and assistance
to speed Chinese modernization: evidence of this everywhere in China:
Xinhua bookstore foreign language texts and s&t translations.
+Deng's program thus a package of interrelated, highyl coherent policies
which presume a longterm relationship with the West and the US in particular,
both for strategic and for developmental needs.
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-The coherence r interlocking nature of Deng's reform program, however, makes
it peculiarly vulnerable: challenge or defeat of one aspect easily translates
into challenge and potentially defeat for the other aspects. Because DXP's
program is so drastic, naturally it faces opposition of all sorts:
+economic opposition: variety of people whose basic economic interests
are bhreatended or hurt by Deng's reforms : PIA obvious example.
+political opposition: many oppose DXP's reforms for various political
reasons, either because their execution will hurt their careers or
position or because they genuinely find them to violate fundamental
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist principles.
+nationalistic opposition: one kind of nationalism is served by Deng's
reforms (wealth and power type); but another strain finis Deng's reforms
--and particular the extent to which the "Chinese essence" is violated
or corrupted by the reforms' reliance on foreign models, practices,
aid, etc.
?Lots of examples of this : Deng and cowboy hat, Fang Yi and Donald
Duck and Goofy; cancer research and crime;
-Most volatile symbol of this ambivalence is Taiwan question: a
symbol much more expl6sive and sensitive than any teritory deemed
by the Chinese to be held by the Soviets.
-This body of opposition to Deng's reforms is by no means an organized
unified or 'coherent opposition faction; it is a disparate group of .
those whose interests or political cmvictions are offended by one or
more aspects of DXG"s reform package. As a loose collection of dissaitsfied
groups they are not singly enough to overturn the thrust of Deng Is reform
effort. On occasion, however, when one particular aspect of Deng's reforms
fail, this disparate opposition has demonstrated the ability to coalesce
into an opposition strong enough to blunt Deng's programs and even overturn
them. Two clearcut episodes in China's recent political history demonstrate
this point:
+spring pf 1979: uncertain regional environment, together with
domestic anxiety over spreading urban social disorders (partly
springing from Deng's initiatives themselves) and new appreciation
of national economy's disarray, led to serious setbakcs for Deng's
reform program momentarily and, significantly, a proposal to the
Soviets to open broad political talks as a way of reducing tension
in China's regional environment while it attempts to put its domestic
house in. order.
+winter of 1980-81: bleakly pessimistic new appraisal of China's economic
situation, together with escalating uncertainty in Peking o r the
attitudes of the new Reagan administration toward China policy led to
the halting of Deng's economic reforms in their tracks, the stalling
of major political efforts underway (6th plenum, HGF), and the emergence
of a new foreign policy debate in the Chinese capital.
-This interlinkage between Chinese foreign policy and its domestic affairs
suggests two or three general conclusions:
+Major change in China's relationships with the US and Soviet Union
will entail corresponding major changes on China's domestic scene.
+Major changes on China's domestic scene may have correspondingly
major impact on China's strategic relations with the US & USSR.
+The foreign policy-domestic politics linkage conditions the extent
and speed with which change along one leg of the Sino-Soviet-US
trianige translates immediately into change along the other two:
"playing the Soviet card" against the US,= for.example is too
simplistic a notion of how the geopolitics of the situation actually
works: there are steps in between, on China's domestic scene, which
may or may not lead to that.
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