WEINBERGER VIEW ON NUCLEAR WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00274R000300110006-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Re tease 2007/05/16: CIA-RDP84B00274F~0030011000J2
(( O Attgeleo Mira"
The Times
Weinberger View
The Times welcome expessions of elf dews from
r*odors. Letters should be kept as brief as possible w14
two. WW ,nailing address and telephone number, if any.
on Nuclear War
P"udmy me?ec oiv%M >h k-Avidual letter#
carrot be ecknowledped. Said W.
I am increasingly concerned with Letters, tothefdit.r.LeeAngeles Tlrnee,
Ttmes Mirror Sgtrers, Lee MgMee. CA 90063
news accounts that portray this Ad
ministration as planning to wage
protracted nuclear war, or seeking
to acquire a nuclear "war-fighting"
capability. This is completely inac-'
curate, and these stories misrepre-
sent the Administration's policies to
the American public and to our al-
lies and adversaries abroad.
It is the first and foremost goal of
.this Administration to take every.
step to ensure that nuclear weapons
are never used again, for we do not ?
believe there ? c ouuld be any "win-
ners" in a nuclear.=war. Our entire
strategy aims to'deter?war of all,.
kinds, but most particularly to deter
nuclear war. To accomplish this ob
jective, our forces must be able to
respond in a measured and prudent
manner to the threat posed by the
Soviet Union. That will require the
improvements in *our strategic.
forces that the President has pro-
posed. But it does-not mean that we
endorse the concept of protracted
nuclear war, or nuclear "war-fight-
ing." It Is the Soviet Union that ap-
pears to be building forces for' a,
"protracted" conflict
The policy of deterrence is diffi-.
cult for some to grasp because it is
based on a paradox- But this is quite:
simple- to make the cost of nuclear
war much higher than any possible
benefit. If the Soviets know in ad-
vance that a nuclear attack on the
United States would bring swift nu-
clear retaliation, they would never
attack in the first place. They would
be "deterred" from ever beginning
a nuclear war.
? There is nouung new about our
pelt,. Since the awful age of nu-
clear weapons began, the United
States has sought to prevent nu-
clear war through a policy of deter-
rence. This policy has been ap-
proved, through the political
processes of the democratic nations
it protects, since at least 1950. More
important, it works. It has worked
in the face of major international'
tensions involving the great pow-
ers, and it has worked in the face of,
war itself.
But, for deterrence to continue to
be successful in the future, we must
take steps to offset the Soviet mili=
Lary buildup. If we do not modernize
our arsenal now, as the Soviets'
have been doing for more than 20..
years, we will, within a few years,
no longer have the ability to retali-
ate. The Soviet Union would then
be in a position to threaten or ac-...
tually to attack us with the knowl-
edge that we would be incapable of
responding. We have seen in Po-
land, in Afghanistan, in Eastern Eu-
rope and elsewhere that the Soviet
Union does not hesitate to take ad-
vantage of a weaker adversary. We
cannot allow the Soviet Union to,
.think It could begin a nuclear war l,
with us and win.
This is not just idle speculation.
The Soviet Union has engaged in a
frenzied military buildup, in spite of
their ~ economic 'difficulties. They
have continued to build greater
numbers of nuclear weapons far be-
yond those necessary for deter-
rence. They now have over 5,000
nuclear warheads on ICBMs, com-
pared to about 2,000 only five years
ago. They have modified the design
of these weapons and their launch-
ers so that many of their land-based
missiles are now more accurate,
more survivable and more powerful
than our own. They have also
developed a refiring capability that
will allow them to reload their de-
livery systems several times. They I
have elaborate plans for civil de-
tense and air defense against any
retaliation we might attempt. And,.
finally, their writings and military ? Sq
doctrine-emphasize a nuclear war-
, fighting scenario. Whatever they
claim their intentiofla to be, the fact:`'
remains . that' * they are designing
their weapons in such a way and in
sufficient numbers to indicate to us '
'that they think, they could begin.
and win, a nuclear war.
In the face of ali this, it is my re-
sponsibility and duty as secretary of
defense to make every effort to
-modertiiize our nuclear forces in.
such a'wi that the United States,
retains the capability to deter the
Soviet Union from ever beginning a
nuclear war. We must take the
steps necessary to match the Soviet
Union's greatly improved nuclear
capability.
That is exactly why we must
have a capability for. a survivable
and enduring response-to demon-
strate that our strategic forces could
survive Soviet strikes over'an ex-
tended period. Thus we believe we
could deter, any attack. Otherwise,
we would be tempting them to em-:'
.ploy 'nuclear weapons or' 'try to
blackmail us. In short, we cannot
afford to place ourselves in the posi-
tion where the survivability of our
deterrent would force the President
to choose between usingourstrate-
gic forces before they :,were de- 'a
strayed or surrendering.
Those who object to a policy that
would strengthen our deterrent.
then, would force us into a more
dangerous, hair-triggered posture.
Forces that must be used in the
very first instant of an enemy at-
tack are not the tools of a prudent
:e strategy. A posture that encourages
+t Soviet nuclear adventurism is not
' the basis of an effective deterrent.
Our entire strategic program, in-
eluding the development of a re-
sponse capability that has been so
maligned in the press recently. has
been developed with the express in-
tention of assuring that nuclear war
will never be fought.
I know that this doctrine of deter-
rence is a difficult paradox to un-
derstand. It Is an uncomfortable
-way to keep the peace. We under-
stand deterrence and accept the fact
that we must do much more in order
to continue to keep the peace. It Is
my fervent hope that all can under-
stand and accept this so that we can
avoid the sort of sensationalist
treatment of every mention of the
word "nuclear" that only serves to
distort our policy and to frighten
people all over the world. Our poli-
cy is peace, and we deeply believe
that the best and surest road to
peace is to secure and maintain an
effective and credible deterrent. .
The purpose of U.S. policy re-
mains to - prevent aggression
through an effective policy of-
de-terrence-the very goal which
prompted the formation of the
North Atlantic Alliance, an alliance
which Is as vital today as it was the
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C.