A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE NPIC MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (MIS) AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION NEEDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73T00325R000100080002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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6dOP.KING; PAPER
A Preliminary Study of the
NPIC Manacem.ont. 1n oiiiation Stistem (MIS)
and M na +ment Informat on N e ~~~
Table of Contents
Page
Main Report
1
Appendix A:
Terms of Reference
14
Appendix B:
Questions on Definition of Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of
the MIS
17
Appendix C:
Brief Description of the Current MIS
20
Appendix D:
Management Information and Planning and
Control
23
Appendix E:
Responses to Questions on Definition of
Management Information Needs and
Reassessment of the MIS
34
Appendix F:
Samples of MIS Standard Output
47
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The tasks to which this study is addressed are the definition of managLiw-jit
information needs, reassessment of the current Management n:ormation system
QIS) and consi. 'oration of alternatives. The intent is to view the MIS and
nagem not in. o ee , relationships to Center activities, in
general, in broad perspective so as not to obscure the issues with unnecessary
detail. No attempt will be made to fully summarize the appendices, since that
information speaks for itself. However, the appendices will be liberally
referred to and significant points noted.
It is extremely difficult to place a specific.,YA1=- upon management infor-
mation, particularly in a non-profit environment. About all that can be said
is~tlh.at Center management (and other appropriate authority) should have avail-
able, by one means or another, that information which it must have to accomplish
its objectives and fulfill its missions and that the associated costs should
not be excessive. Certainly this information requirement can be met at a cost
commensurate with the importance of the NPIC product and with fulfillment of
the national role in the intelligence community.
The problem then is briefly one of, fi~rstlY, defining the objectives and
missions and, secondly, defining the in which is essentia_ JLTbmplish
these in order to as ess the assets and liabilities o the MIS an consi e
alternatives. The importance of objectives, goals, etc., has been discussed
elsewhere a number of times, so the focus of this study will be upon the second
item. This deceptively complex subject, the information necessary to manage,
nothing more and nothing less, is the legitimate concern; that is,,a management
informa.tionystem, not a strategic planning tool, not an operations ?ch
techni.c{ue, and~e init ly not jus a 1 contro evice for monitoring
per
specific tasks, although this latter activity is certain y re aced to a management
'information system and may indeed be a subset of such a system.
There is much confusion about management information systems in general and
the MIS in particular; this is the root cause of many of the problems besetting
the current MIS. Questions such 'as "ti iat do I want it to do and why?" "what
should it do?" "What can it do?"' "What can't l o. nee answers. Stated
bluntly, it is quite clear that many persons do not either understand or agree,
or perhaps both, upon the purposes and capabilities of the MIS, or any manage-
ment information system for that matter. This is evident from the responses
obtained from the Groups and Staff, and from discussions with IAS, to certain
questions posed to them on the MIS and management information needs (see
Appendices B, Questions on Definition of Management Information Needs and
Reassessment of the MIS, and E, which summarizes responses to t lie questions) .
Perhaps, too, it is naive and unrealistic-to.expect full understanding and
agreement, and it should not be inferred'that any one answer to a question
posed is necessarily correct. The answer to a question such as "What are your
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Management Control: the process by which managers assure
that resources are obtained and used effectively and
management information needs?" will depend upon, among other things, such
variables as what the person is supposed to do, what he actually does, how he
does it, the particular problems he has encountered in the past, the requests
he has had and anticipates for information about his areas of responsibility,
and even personal biases.
When trying to categorize and analyze the substance and validity of responses
stating information needs, plus opinions as to what is wrong with or lacking in
an ongoing system, which also reflect the variables mentioned above, it is next
to impossible to classify, much less reach conclusions about, the responses
unless some sort of framework is provided upon which to "hang" the information;
that is, to relate its parts and make it a cohesive picture, so as to furnish
a perspective which is valid and can be of some use in making the appropriate
decisions.
Such a framework is provided in Appendix D, Management Information and
Planning and Control. Although some might consider such an approaci too
theoretical" and a "waste of time," it is hoped that the point has been made,
and it will be reinforced below, that this is absolutely essential. All too
direction with solutions
often, there is a tendency to go charging off in a
to the problems before the problems are really defined or understood. The
intent herein is to derive the right solution for the real problem, not what
someone thinks it is but what it actually is. (For example, would it not be
rather foolish to make the MIS real time when there is almost unanimous agree-
ment.that the MIS information content is inadequate?) And it does not matter
so much whether or not there is agreement upon the conceptual framework (there
probably won't be since there are almost as many views of the management process
as there are managers); what is important is that the classification scheme is
understood so that there is communication using a language meaning the same
things to all involved. For example, it is hoped that, when operational control
decisions are referred to, all are thinking about roughly the same type of
decisions with respect to time span, organizational level, importance, amount,
of judgment involved, and so forth, no matter what others might have preferred
or even what might have been preferable to term that class of decisions. The
main definitions derived in Appendix D are repeated here for convenience.
Strategic Planning: the process of deciding on objectives of
trgan afion, on changes in the objectives, on the
gross resources used to attain these objectives, and on
policies that are to govern the acquisition and use of
these resources.
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efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization's
objectives. It combines both planning and control within
the context of objectives and policies determined in the
strategic planning process; effectiveness and efficiency
are the criteria relevant for judging actions.
Operational Control: the process of assuring that specific
tasks are cared out efficiently. and effectively; emphasis
is upon execution of tasks.
It was not possible to obtain the first or original cost of the current
MIS, but a very conservative estimate-of current al costs to NPIC, more
or less directly attributable to MIS operat' or, looking at
it another way, less hardware costs of abou this is the
equivalent of about 12 It should be
noted that hardware cost is essentially a sunk cost sine NPIC owns its computers
and contracts for regular maintenance, and those costs equivalent to the extent
that MIS output obviates other systems probably should be subtracted from the
annual cost figure if it is desired to arrive at an absolute cost figure.
Appendix C, Brief Description of the Current MIS,'and Appendix F, Samples
of MIS Standard Output, roughly sketch the operation of the System and indicate
its capabilities. Briefly, the MIS can provide regular time hours, overtime hours,
and dollar equivalents sorted in various ways according to organizational element
(Group, Division, etc.), project block (major work effort, such as 1-1-4A
processing, basic reporting, etc.), specific project number, and activity or
skill code(s). It is capable of providing reports or listings showing active
projects on record, active projects by responsible component, all projects on
record, new projects established, projects completed during a period, projects
cancelled, and products and time recorded against cancelled and completed pro-
jects. These reports generally include project number, project title, organiza-
tional element responsible for the project, category or specific type of project,
country or area of interest, requesting organization, project priority/weight,
begin, deadline, and completion/cancellation dates, and security classification
code of the requirement form. Also available is a report, Component Time
Allocation, giving weekly information on each employee by component; it shows
name, badge number, grade, component, week ending date, projects worked on,
activities against projects, and regular time, overtime, and dollar equivalents.
In addition, there is a MIS capability for specially formatted reports; that is,
presentation of data in other than standard. formats in answer to ad hoc requests
-but not necessarily in any format desired--there are constraints as to how
the data may be aggregated and presented.
25X1
25X1
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In short, this is the current MIS capability, which does not mean the
System cannot be improved, if desirable, in a number of ways, including perhaps
reprogramming. The most serious constraints by far on improvement of the
MIS are dictated by its record structure, which simply means that it is
possible to input and store data only in certain rigid formats and amounts and
to associate the data in only certain ways. In other words, there are some real
constraints upon what may be done,'within reason, with the current MIS. By
"within reason" is meant that, if we are speaking of making the MIS into a real-
time system, with near real-time input and output, then, for all intents and
purposes, we are, or ought to be, speaking-about a new system, one in which
it would be worse than foolish to incorporate these serious constraints. This
implies a very fundamental change, comprising redesign. and at least major re-
programmning. If, on-the other hand, we are really considering only making the
current MIS configuration real-time; that is, imagine that essentially the
current output were available in real time, then we are no longer speaking of
a management system with real applicability to management planning and control
(exception reporting), but only of what would be basically an operational control
mechanism.
The current MIS is mainly oriented toward project accounting, or the re-
cording of data against. discrete tasks. This has meant that, since all the
time of every employee is recorded in the MIS, when utilizing the MIS all Center
activity must be conceived of as being applied to discrete tasks, an obvious
and serious error. The System tries to "hedge" against this misconception,
which unfortunately has had certain ramifications in how some persons fundamentally
view the activities of the Center, by setting up "open" project numbers and
other devices which in fact obscure rather than aid assessment of accomplish-
ments and often greatly frustrate management attempts to use the System. Perhaps
it is of relatively minor importance, but this has also increased costs through
undesirable redundancy between organizational element, activity code, and
project number.
Not to belabor the point, but this essentially task-oriented approach is
conceptually invalid and is the greatest single detriment to the System's
imputed purpose, to provide management information. Although there is some
legitimate management information "fallout" from the System, comprising certain
aggregations of project oriented data, the System is by design basically an
operational control mechanism which has been forced to masquerade as a manage-
ment information system. And as a specific task-oriented system, by consensus
it fails a most crucial test--it is not timely enough.
In managing specific tasks, it is important to know when, and also how
far, something is deviating from plan or is out-of-control, so corrective
action can be taken either by supervision or line management. It is, of course,
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a matter of judgment and a function of the particular activity being monitored
just how timely information must be, but apparently the System is not timely
enough because it rarely, if ever, is actually used for control purposes by line
management and supervision; that is, either to ascertain if things are going
according to plan or if things are out-of-control. The Pivll3 is moving into the
control area, monitoring projects using the MIS, but its position also is that
the MIS is not timely enough for this purpose. And with respect to monitoring
specific projects, upon which the PMB scheduling function is actually based,
one could wonder if this line function, project scheduling and control, has not
been relegated to what could be considered a rather high-level staff activity
(even though, the PINS is composed primarily of line representatives who meet
daily) due in great part to the failure to provide line management with the
data it needs in a timely fashion. Of course, the PMB has the additional
responsibility of scrutinizing and validating requests for products or services.
As mentioned, it is the consensus of NPIC components that the MIS is not
timely enough for those uses the components envisage for it. It is safe to
say that IAS would prefer more timely output. As pointed out in Appendix C,
.output relating to time sheets is normally received about one week after the
data is submitted to AID. This can mean that, for a specific project, since
the time sheets cover a one-week period, it could be up to two weeks before
information were available; for example, if the information pertained to time
recorded against a project completed on a Monday. For other types of data,
even.though the data is often input daily to AID, the lag in time can be from
about two days (as a best case for items such.as products produced, changes
in project status, picking up new projects, etc.) to about one full week.
This is because updating is accomplished only once a week.
No system can be all things to all people, in spite of what some computer
specialists will say, but this is the position in which the MIS has been placed.
It is perhaps worthwhile to note that, while system's designers and operators
may have many virtues, managerial insight and competence are not necessarily
among them, but management is often afraid to challenge these specialists
publically lest it display its ignorance. Such discussions usually get bogged
down in detailed technical considerations, freely laced with confusing computer
jargon, and the battle is fought on the computer specialist's own field, so to
speak. This is unfortunate, and it should be just the reverse--the system
exists to serve management and the computer center is a service organization
which should be able to communicate with management in the language of manage-
ment.
Because expectations and needs have not and can not be matched by per-
formance, the MIS has failed to. do any job as well as it should be done, either
in the areas of strategic planning, management control, or operational control..
It might be preferable to modify, as. needed, and improve the MIS (incidentially
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also to rename it) and essentially assign to it the job for which it is best
suited; that is, monitoring specific tasks in the operational control area.
To expect it to function truly as a true management system, at least in its
present configuration, is just unrealistic. Perhaps with modification, ulti-
mately it could have real utility for those discrete activities which are
amenable to establishment as specific projects. This does not mean, however,
that the management information "fallout" mentioned earlier.should be disregard-
ed unless or until other provisions are made.
Interestingly, the MIS has found its greatest applicability in an area
inconsistent with its design; that is, in the area of what is primarily manage-
ment planning (a subset of what is called management control). This is exem-
plified by its use in the PPB process, including PPB documentation; for example,
in the planning and programming of resources to accomplish approved program
elements and sub-elements. And within this use, the non-financial accounting
function is greatest; that is, keeping track of how manpower resources were
applied to major work categories. Rough measures, based upon this historical
data, are used mainly for projecting future manpower needs; those who use these
measures are quite aware of the slack within the System. The total financial
aspect, the touchstone of the PPB System, is essentially outside the MIS
capability, as is any object class/program element crosswalking. In addition,
certain other uses are made of MIS data, such as forecasting for the PMB, with,
the express knowledge that the figures are rough, overall planning inputs wherein
the values of the real variables comprising the estimating statistics are not
known.
Aside from the obvious deficiencies in capabilities and operation of the
System, too much information needed by line management is not incorporated;
.i.e. financial human resource, and supplies and materiel resource information,
especially if film with a its a ra oa age s, sc a ul.es, etc.
is as a ma a aps an uncontrolled input, u none-
e e s a ma erial resour e.~ n e future, electronic transmissions o a
real- ime collection system would be analogous to this primary materiel input.
Appendix D makes a point of the primacy of the management decision process,
whether it be for planning or controlling purposes, or any blend of these
activities; this is the area toward which a management information system must
be directed--it must provide comprehensive information on the ongoing operation.
To be comprehensive, it must provide human resource, supplies and materiel
resource, and internal and external financial information geared to the type
of decisions which must be made and to external requirements for information.,
and all this must be accomplished in the proper time frame. Also, as was noted
in Appendix D, the central function of a management control system is motiva-
tion, motivating management to make decisions and act in ways consistent with
the overall organizational objectives. The relationship of the system to.
other systems must be recognized, but the system should filter and condense
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information, removing that which is irrelevant for management purposes.
While the MIS is used primarily as a historical record, often the basis
for rough manpower projections, and relatively little for operational decision-
making by line management, in those cases where MIS information conceivably
could be used for decision-making, there is a great deal of hesitancy to do so
because of deep suspicions concerning the accuracy of the information. (There
are exceptions concerning accuracy in some components and the IAS.) The accuracy
concern basically is a function of three things: (1) certain aspects of the
System itself, not amenable to change; i.e., it is not sufficiently reflective
of Center activities; (2) certain System mechanisms and procedures which frustrate
accuracy of input and output but which'-are amenable to change, and (3) a lack of
interest in the System resulting in little enforcement of the procedures,
inadequate validation of input data, and inattention to potential uses and
worthwhile improvements. Management at all levels must share the blame for
the latter two problems; it generally does not "back the System" and turns a
deaf ear even when real problems are surfaced. Of course, this is not true
in every case, and those components in which it is not true are precisely the
ones which derive the most benefit from the MIS.
Further, this lack of backing is not necessarily the fault of top manage-
ment, as is so often charged, because it is the responsibility of the lowest
level of management dealing with the MIS input data to insure that it is accurate
and as timely as the System permits. The Executive Director, for example,
neither can, should, nor will check all the time sheets for accuracy on Monday
mornings; all he can say is that the input data must be accurate and the Group
and Staff Chiefs must reflect this command and pass it on to the appropriate
persons. If the MIS is retained for any period and in whatever form, Center
personnel should be informed thoroughly of its accuracy requirements, its
operation, capabilities, limitations, and basic purposes, perhaps through a
"short course" as suggested by TSSG and PPBS/PPS.
A reasonable approach to design of a management information system (what
it should do and why, what it can do, and what it cannot do) is to concentrate
upon the decision process, identifying the decisions to be made and the informa-
tion needed to make them. These decisions are both planning and control decisions,
all of which vary in a number of parameters. The material in Appendix E will
not be repeated here, but it is obvious that, to a very great extent, the MIS
is conceived of as a gigantic data bank able to spew out specific answers on
immediate demand to varities of questions in usable form merely by pressing a
button. For example, such capabilities as data for use in answering questions
(unspecified), compiling papers and reports, yearly summations, etc., are called
for. This completely misses the point, although in fairness decision information
is implicit in much of what was asked for. But it is also obvious that merely
asking managers for answers.as to what is needed is not nearly a precise enough
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manner in which to determine management information needs. What must be done is
to study the decision process in depth to identify the decision points, the types
of decisions made, the frequency of these decisions, the relevant time frames
in which they must be made, and the data and information needed. Then the
system can be designed, with full consideration of both hardwware and cost/
effective questions, to meet as many of the requirements as possible and to
incorporate legitimate external information requirements.
While the MIS is now adjudged inadequate in a number of respects, if all
the information cited in Appendix E, along with the new needs that will crop up
in the course of a redesign, were to be incorporated in a new system, we would
be approximately back where we started, and rest assured that any system pre-
dicated upon such an approach would be a failure, in addition to being excessively
expensive. If a new system is desired, an unhurried, in-depth study must be
undertaken to determine what information and data are actually needed by
-management and a system designed to provide these. The is no other viable
alternative to the successful design and institution of a worthwhile, new
system.
This also implies taking a good look at what the Center is actually doing
and what it will be doing in the future: that is, definition of current and
projected outputs. (Some work has been accomplished in this direction recently
which could be of use.) This also concerns inputs and is essential because
it is the ultimate concern of management; that is, the process about which
decisions must be made--what does and will the Center produce? Output is not
necessarily a visible product which can be precisely measured, but explicit
recognition of and understanding about Center output must be achieved. This
has been a problem in the past, and not only with.respect to the MIS. For
example, first-phase mission exploitation means many different things to
different people. To some it means the OAK, but obviously the hard copy OAK
is only a part of the first-phase because other tangible and intangible products
are forthcoming from the exercise; e.g., briefing boards, cables, information
transfer from film to PI to analyst perhaps via telephone, enhancement of the
PI's knowledge and expertise later reflected in a basic report or special study,
etc. It should be clear that the hard copy OAK (it is possible that there may
not even be such a report in the future) is not the only or even necessarily
the best measure of first-phase processing, that it does not adequately define
the output. Perhaps the Center should be viewed as an information processing
and transfer link in a communications network with an output susceptible to some
means of information flow measurement, rather than trying to assess output
according to discrete, tangible products which really are only the media or,
vehicles for the information transfer. This does not mean that information
on tangible output items may not be useful, but only that perhaps the emphasis
is misplaced. that then are we really speaking about as initial output when a
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mission is received for exploitation? wheat is the most significant attribute
of this process, and what should and cana management information system tell
us about the process? This is the type of analysis required.
The PPB Staff was recently asked to give OAK unit costs; these cannot be
derived objectively from the MIS for the reasons alluded to above. If hard
copy OAK production were stopped tomorrow, but something analogous to first-
phase processing continued, it is conceivable that there could be relatively
insignificant savings, particularly in PI time, the point being that we do
not have the information needed readily available in the MIS to make decisions
in this area with any degree of assurance,,nor do we know if it is possible to
obtain such information in any quantifiable sense because the activity has not
been explicitly and adequately defined. The gross figures available could be
of some use, along with a healthy input of judgment, in assessing the problem,
particularly if the question were directed toward the broad subject of all
first-phase processing, but beyond that there are serious difficulties. Nor
should be attempt to impute accuracy because we have some figures; attaching
a number to something does not make it a fact!
In spite of the many problems attendant to the current MIS and its
utilization, the System does have positive aspects which should not be overlooked
or minimized. The MIS is used: to determine grossly how the Center uses its
manpower, how and on what the components spend their time, and the costs of
specific projects or categories of projects; for various planning purposes, and
in the documentation for the PPB System. As was stated, it is mainly a historical
record on which few current operating decisions are based; however, instances
of decisions based. primarily on MIS data can be cited; for example', by IAS.
As PSG/RD pointed out,. all of the MIS data can obviously be put to some use,
although there is little evidence of a great deal of effort having been ex-
pended in this direction.
Perhaps the best way in which to look at the positive aspects of the MIS
is to consider what the state of affairs would be if the MIS were suddenly
discontinued. Obviously, Center management needs some data similar to that
available in the MIS; in fact, the real problem is that more and also certain
different types of information are needed and some of it in a more timely
fashion. If the MIS were deleted, components would be forced to establish
systems, manual and/or automated (in addition to those systems already existing
outside the MIS), to fill the gap, and at the top management level at least,
there would be a major problem of mutual reconciliation and interface of these
systems. There is absolutely no assurance that this would be any less costly
than retaining the current MIS.
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It must.be remembered also that NPIC now has an ongoing, tested system
whose capabilities--and deficiences--are known quantities; to discontinue the
MIS means moving into an area of which little is known and in which there undoubted-
ly would be many problems. Employees are now familiar with the MIS, and its
particular demands upon them, and are used to the routine. Discontinuing the
MIS would mean discarding the positive aspects, and any systems replacing the
MIS will have real costs relative to indoctrination and re-establishment of a
routine. -~_
This leads to the conclusion that, until something better is available,
the basic MIS should be retained--not necessarily in its current configuration--
unless further study proves this to be-a bad conclusion; that is, unless the
valid information requirements now met by the MIS can be met through other
decentralized and more efficient systems, probably basically manual and unit
record or ADP, whose operations and costs present a more favorable alternative.
However, before this can be determined, any and all other systems must be well
defined in further study so they can be weighed against the MIS. In other
words, it would be a mistake to announce discontinuance of the MIS and generate
probably what would be a mad scramble to establish other systems; if it were
decided to discontinue the MIS and not replace it with a more powerful centralized
and automated system, the steps following the demise and any other systems to
e operated in lieu of the MIS should be well planned, understood, and agreeseco
by all. There are positive improvements which could be made in. the MIS, along
with certain decrease in costs to be achieved, particularly with respect to
manpower savings associated with data input and interpretation and manipulation
of output. In effect, the System can be trimmed and tailored to better meet
needs more efficiently, and perhaps its primary orientation redirected so that
its potential can be better realized while, at the same time, not discarding the
information useful to management; that is, the management information "fallout"
from the System.
A new system, based upon in-depth study of Center input and output, the
decision processes, and external information requirements, would be focused
upon the management control area. However, the system should have the capability
of drawing upon data stored and used for operational control and strategic,
planning purposes. The application would therefore be an integrated data pro-
cessing system incorporating, firstly, pertinent human resource, materiel resource,
and financial information used for management decision-making and external
reporting, and, secondly, detailed operational control data, deemed necessary
and feasible to include in the system, and certain strategic planning informa-
tion. As pointed out in Appendix D, however, it is neither desirable nor
feasible for the system to support routinely the strategic planning. activity.
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3. Continue the present MIS, improving it as much as
possible, and do not consider other systems.
4. Continue the present MIS, improving it as much as
possible, and move toward a new, more powerful, centralized,
automated system.
Major factors, developed in the preceding discussion, bearing on the problem
1. As a management information system, the current MIS
is conceptually invalid primarily because of its project
account orientation and its narrow scope.
2. The MIS is now actually inadequate as a management
information system, and for other purposes for that matter,
in a number of respects, including timeliness, accuracy, output
formats, and data content.
3. The full potential of the current MIS has not been
realized.
WORKING PAi11"R S-E-C-R-E-T
Therefore, flexibility is of paramount importance; that is,-the capability
to add, delete, and alter both application programs and storage files, because
management information needs, much less operational control systems-, are not
static over time and. lead times are often such that a system can be outdated
before it is operational. This approach is now within the state-of-the-art.
For example, with such a system, it would be possible to add new types of infor-
mation as needs change, to delete files no longer worthwhile to retain, and to
change programs which assemble and manipulate data drawn from storage files.
This capability, possibly along with real-time access and remote display devices,
would be built into and be an integral part of the system, obviating the exten-
sive and expensive reprogramming now attendant to any major changes to the MIS.
Such a system is usually termed a computer-based, genera]. purpose, information
management-system; private industry is now working on the concept.
Viable alternatives to the management information problem are:
1. Discontinue the present MIS; reject the centralized,
automated system concept, and establish the appropriate de-
centralized systems.
. . 2. Discontinue the present MIS; use other interim systems,
and move toward a new, more powerful, centralized, automated
system.
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Main Report
4. The current MIS is not excessively costly in view
of its stated purpose, but it is costly in view of its actual
performance.
5. The current MIS can be modified to make it more efficient.
6. If the MIS is discontinued certain benefits will be
foregone.
7. There is no assurance that there will be any savings
to accrue from discontinuance of the MIS.
8. Replacement of the MIS with decentralized systems is
liable to be fraught with problems wherein significant information
gaps could emerge.
9. It is doubtful that other than a centralized, automated
system can meet the needs of Center management.
10. Except for one Group, there is unanimous interest in
more timely information, particularly in real-time capability
and remote output devices.
11. In certain cases, NPIC management conceives of a new
system as a gigantic data bank able to respond rapidly to almost
any question. This is not a practical concept.
12. There are two fundamental objectives for a management
information system: to provide essential information needed
for management decision-making and to provide information
legitimately demanded by external authority. Any'new system
should be designed to achieve only these objectives. Extraneous
and "nice-to-have" information should be excluded from the
system.
13. The type of system able to achieve the objectives is
within the state-of-the-art.
Matching the alternatives with the major factors bearing on the problem,
the following conclusions and recommendations have been reached:
1. The Center should stick with the concept of a
centralized, automated management information system; to
reject this concept is a step backward. This is in line
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Main Report
with the Executive Director's stated desire that the Center
move toward automation and optimization of the exploitation
process.
2. The current MIS should be retained and modified at
.a reasonable level-of-effort.
3. The modified MIS should be kept in operation while
a study of management information needs, with emphasis on
the decision processes and external information requirements,
is performed.
4. As a result of the study, a new system concept should
be developed.
S. Preliminary cost estimates for modification of the
current MIS, if feasible, and new systems capable of fulfilling
the needs stated in the systems concept should be generated.
6. Cost/effectiveness evaluation of the alternatives
should be carried out and the results, along with-the final
systems concepts, presented for executive decision.
7. The decision reached in step 6 should be pursued
vigorously and strongly backed by NPIC management through
to and after implementation. It will be not only desirable,
but necessary, to assign some of the best assets of the
Center to this task.
8. Because development of a new systems concept will
require an in-depth study of NPIC with respect to current
and future input, output, decision processes, and external
information requirements, there will be worthwhile side
benefits from the study with. applicability to other Center
problems.
9. Such a study should be run primarily in-house,
With contractual assistance as needed.
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Appendix A: T.erms of Reference
25 April 1969 APPENDIX A
A ,M.ORANDUM FOR: Chief, Group
n
Chef In, , ..:...o;z .scup
Chief, Technical Serve. -;es 4 Support Group
SUBJECT Terms of Reference: Review of Management Information.
System .
1. At the direction of the F:ec;wive: Director, NPIC, the PPB
Staff has been tasked to "define managem..-nt infi,n ion needs, reassess
the need for MIS, and consider alternatives". would like
to have a response'. to his request by 29 May 19 ..
2., Our report t should incorporate the needs, views.,
and best efforts of all Center components. The utility of the final
product will depend in great part on your active participation. thus,
the cooperation and assistance of the Groups and Staff will be required
to carry out this task,
3. The attached Questions Bearing on the Problem are forwarded
for your information and review. We would like to meet with your
representatives to discuss the Terms of Reference and the general
approach to the task at 1000 hours, Monday, 28 April, in the Green Roo-as
4. Please telephone giving the names
of your representatives. W'e'would ask you to insure that there is. at
least one representative from your Group,. but feel free to include as
many representatives as you wish
Attachment: a/s.
Distribution:
1 - NPIC/PSG
1 - NPIC/IEG
1 - NPIC/TSSG
1 - NPIC/PPBS
Chiet
Planning, Programming F, Budgeting Staff
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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
Appendix A: "ferns of
Reference
I. Definition of ~aanagement Infonnation Needs
A. What levels of management should be included in view
of the short deadline? Will restriction to these
management levels be adequate in terms of producing
a meaningful report?
B. What' components should be involved?
C. 1What are the missions and functions of each management
component? What is the actual management structure;
that is, what plans are formulated and decisions made
by the organizational components?
D. What information is now utilized at each management point?
Why is it required? How is it obtained? How is it used?
E. What information, not now available, is needed? Why and
for whom is it needed? Why*can it not be obtained currently?
F. What information will be needed in the future? Why,will it
be needed? Flow will it be used?
II. Reassess the Need-for the MIS
A. What factors should be considered? Can data on these
factors be gathered in the required detail and within the
time frame?
B. Does a reasonable criteria for assessing the MIS exist?
If not, can one be established?
C. How does the MIS operate?-
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 any information collected not used?
E. what are the costs of the MIS?' In view of 1 and 2 above,
does the payoff from the MIS in its current form justify.
its costs?
111, Consider Alternatives
A. What level of detail can be incorporated within the time
frame? Will this.level be meaningful? If not, what
must follow-on to make it ineanin;ful?
What components should participate. in the generation of
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A; pendiX A: Terms of Reference
D. how is the MIS used by management? Is it deficient, and
if so, in what respects? What are its strengths? .Is
alternatives?
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a. Estimate personnel costs
(1) How much time do employees spend filling in time
sheets?
(2) Are they accurate? What problems frustrate accuracy?
(3) How many persons (organizational unit, grade) are
specifically assigned MIS duties other than the
filling out of personal time sheets? How much time
per period (e.g., week) do they put on MIS activities?
What are these duties (input, output, etc.)?
b. Equipment costs
(1) How much computer time does MIS use per period?
Can this be translated into dollar costs (how much)?
(2) How much keypunch and other equipment time is tied
up in the MIS (i.e., not available for other uses)?
c. Output
(1) What periodic output does each component get?
(2) What output does each component actually use? For
what purposes?. Is the information timely enough?
Aendix B: Questions on Definition of
Management Information Needs
and Reassessment of the MIS
1. At this time, the areas of most concern to you are: -defining your
management information needs and your reassessment of the need for
the MIS. The two areas are inextricably related. Although we can
certainly say something about the MIS after looking at its costs
and the uses to which it is now put, it is also necessary to
evaluate how well it does or could meet the real needs of manage-
ment.
2. In reassessing the MIS, certain questions must be answered by each
component:
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Appendix B: Questions on Definition of
Management Information Needs
and Reassessment of the MIS
(3) What non-routine output has been requested and how
or for what was it used?
(4) What additional periodic output would be desirable?
Purpose?
(5) What output, periodic and/or non-routine, not now
available in the MIS would be desired? For what?
3. With respect to management information needs, certain questions must
be answered by each component (the below is not restricted to MIS
information):
a. Who are management? List the positions, duties (if not
clear from position title).
b. What information does each now use? Break into routine
and ad hoc.
c. Where and/or how is this information now obtained?
d. How is it used (purpose)?
e. What information does each manager now get which is of
(1) little or (2) no use?
f. Assuming that the manager now gets no information, what
information, including timeliness, does he feel is essential
to have to perform his job. Why is it essential? In what
form would-it be preferred?
g. In addition to that essential information, what information
would each manager like to have? Why, in what form, and when?
4. The answers to the above questions,'and any other questions and comments
which may be relevant to the contributions by the components should be
submitted in writing according to the following schedule:. (Partial
submissions can be made prior to these dates).
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Appendix B: Questions on Definition of
'Management Information Needs
and Reassessment of the MIS
a. MIS Costs and Current Uses to be completed by 7 May.
b. Definition of Needs to be completed by 16 May.
Meetings will be scheduled throughout the course of the effort.
of the PPB Staff will
be available.to provide guidance and lend any assistance they can
in the preparation of your contributions.
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Appendix C: Brief Description of the
Current MIS
APPENDIX C
To place the MIS in perspective historically, the original published
paper which came out in 1964 was entitled "Proposal for The Establishment
of An Automated Time and Work Reporting System." In the early stages
of development of the MIS, what was called the "total systems concept,"
at that time a very in-vogue buzz-phrase, was often invoked and unfortu-
nately misinterpreted, at least within NPIC, to mean that all that had
to be done was to file or computerize every bit of conceivably relevant
information which, in turn, could he combined in any way in the output
to satisfy all information needs. In certain cases, management was told
and believed this tale which, needless to say, proved to be untrue. And
when it proved to be untrue in practice, naturally there was a good deal
of justified resentment, disappointment, and disenchantment with the MIS
and computer-based information systems in general. These feelings have
persisted and today detract from the potential utility of the MIS in a
number of ways, running the gamut from affecting accuracy of input to
unfounded criticism of the system and reluctance to use it. It is perhaps
an understatement to say that there is a credibility gap with respect to
the current MIS. Actually, in its current configuration, the system is
very much in line with the title of the original paper--an automated time
and work reporting system, nothing more, nothing less. It is indeed
unfortunate that so much misunderstanding as to the system's purpose and
capabilities was created in the past and so much harmful oversell promul-
gated not only internally but also externally to the Center; for example,
at Headquarters, the Bureau of the Budget, and elsewhere.
The MIS records the time spent by personnel (and generates dollar
equivalents) in satisfying external and internal requests for products
or services or in performing the routine activities of their organiza-
tional unit. These distributions can be examined from various view-
points, such as allocation of effort among the Center's major tasks,
timeliness of project completion as compared with requested or "deadline"
date, the expenditure of time against discrete projects, and so forth.
In addition, since much information about a project is stored in the
basic project "account"; e.g., requester, products, country or area,
priority/weight, title, etc., the MIS also performs a project library
function along with the basic time recording task.
The project request, once it has been accepted by the Requirements
and Analysis Division and estimated and scheduled by the Production
Management Board, becomes the basis for the establishment of a project
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Appendix C: Brief Description of the
Current MIS
"account" in the MIS. This unique account number, the project number,
designates the major, type of work being clone, and the other descriptors
(title, requester, etc.) indicate certain characteristics pertinent to
.the request. The final requirement is translated into a format com-
patible with the MIS and is prepared for keypunching by the Systems
Integration Staff of AID. Each week the basic file is updated by add-
ing new data to current projects, changing data on current projects as
appropriate, adding new projects, and closing completed projects.
As the basic project account is being established in the computer
system, xeroxed copies of the original requirements are disseminated
to those components that will participate in the project; the project
number is then transmitted to the individuals who will do the actual
work. As employees work on the project, they record the specific
activities undertaken against the project and the time expended for
each activity. This recording mechanism is the weekly time sheet filled
out by each employee; in addition to employee name, badge number,
component, and grade, all projects worked on during the week are recorded,
along with the specific activities and manhours for each project and
certain other "overhead" activities, such as leave, training, etc.
On Monday mornings, the time sheets of all employees are collected
by designated persons and delivered to the Systems Integration Staff.
On the following Tuesday and Wednesday, the new data is edited, key-
punched, and verified and corrected; normally on Thursday the magnetic
tape containing the main file is updated. On Friday, when the updated
file is ready to be queried, the regular and ad-hoc MIS reports-are
printed out. The PMB has an additional program that reads the updated
file, performs some scheduling computations, and prints out the results.
In addition to the time sheet data, two other forms containing
data elements are transmitted to AID as required, but usually daily.
These are added to the main file during the weekly updates. One, the
work phase notice, primarily signals the start and finish dates for a
project in each component; the other is used to report product information
against a specific project.
The major data elements comprising the current, MIS are:
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1. Organizational Element -- Group, Staff, Division, Branch,
Section.
2. Personnel -- Badge number, grade, name.
3., Project Time -- Regular time, overtime, and dollar equivalents.
4. Activity (Skill) Code
S. Project Title
6. Project Priority/Weight
7. Project Number
8. Project Country/Geographic Area
9. Project Category Code -- Indicator of specific type of project.
10. Project Requester -- Organization levying request.
11. Security Classification of Project Requirement Form
12. Project Begin Date (by Component)
13. Project Deadline (or Estimated Completion) Date (by Component)
14. Actual Completion/Cancellation Date (by Component)
15. Project Product Code'-- Numbers of discrete output items
produced under the project number.
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Appendix D: Management Information and
Planning and Control
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APPENDIX D
To address the NPIC management information problem in detail, it is
essential to provide a practical framework comprising definitions of
certain terms and pertinent concepts concerning the management process,
management information systems, and planning and control or command and
control. This appendix, which deals with these topics, is divided into
four sections. The first, Definition of Planning, Control, and Manage-
ment Information, is essential to the.Main Report since the terms defined
are used throughout. The second, third, and fourth sections, Strategic
Planning versus Management Control, Management Control versus Operational
Control, and Systems Design Implications, respectively, are presented,
firstly, in amplification of the definitions and to show their inter-
relationships and, secondly, to present pertinent generalizations'about
a management information system based upon the discussions in the first
three sections.
Definition of Planning, Control,
and Management Information
The central function of management, its raison d'etre, is decision-
making. Except for a relatively straightforward class of decisions
readily amenable to operations research (OR) or purely mathematical
solution, where enough of the decision varia.bles can be rather explicitly
quantified (e.g.; inventory control, resource allocation of the assign-
ment and distribution type, replacement, maintenance, and reliability
problems, sequencing and coordination problems--PERT and CPM, routing
problems, etc.), decision-making not only involves but depends upon
human judgment. Judgment can be enhanced by good information; this is
the sole purpose of a management information system--to inform management
of the facts available relevant to the decision at hand. Therefore, a
management information system is not a substitute for, but only an aid
to, management, as the name implies. As a corollary, the "perfect"
information system would be of little overall value to the organization,
if management were not competent.
These simple and what might appear to be quite obvious facts are
often overlooked, consciously or unconsciously, by those involved with
automated information systems, whether it be in their design, implemen-
tation, operation, or evaluation. That is, no matter how effective, an
information system does not automatically produce good decisions.
Unfortunately, automated information systems along with OR and systems
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Appendix D: Management Information and
. Planning'and Control
WORKING PAPER
analysis techniques, are often "sold," either openly or implicitly, as
universal remedies for any and all management problems. Nothing could
be further from the truth.
These facts are pointed out not in denigration of OR, systems
analysis, or information specialists, or the usefulness of their skills
and products. These disciplines are not only worthwhile, but are even
essential, in today's environment; the intent is to put them in proper
perspective, which often is not done. For example, an OR specialist
worth his salt will openly state that OR techniques are applicable only
to a certain class of problems and not necessarily to management problems
in general; the good ones will not attempt to apply techniques where they
do not belong--the "solution looking for a problem" approach with which
many of us are all too familiar. (OR techniques are most applicable to
that class of decisions which falls under the management function of
operational control, as is discussed below.) Likewise, a competent
systems analyst will stress. emphatically that. systems analysis is an aid
to decision-making (generally at the other end of the management spectrum
from.OR-type problems); systems analysis does not make decisions. An
analogous statement could be made concerning automated information systems
and those specialists dealing with them..
Coupled with the pervasive lack of attention to the principal. -
purpose of a management information system--an aid to management--often
is the failure to provide a meaningful, practical framework for con-
sideration of the information problem, both of which auger against worth-
while automated systems and often insure their failure. That is, not
only is the basic purpose of the system not made explicit, but the very
process which the system is intended to facilitate, the management
process, is also neglected. .
' It is fine to talk of planning and control or command and control
systems because conceptually these classifications have validity; however,
under careful consideration and particularly when applied to real-world
problems, such broad classifications of management activity are of little
value. In fact, they often cloud rather than aid the issue. This is
because planning or command (roughly, determining what is to be done) and
control (roughly insuring that to be done is done) do not correspond to
distinct, separable management activities either with respect to time,
organizational position or authority, or various discrete issues or
problems.
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Appendix D: Management Information and
Planning and Control
For example, many persons in an organization engage in planning;
but its basic purposes and nature vary so significantly that any
generalizations valid to encompass all types of planning within an
organization are so vague and broad that they are of little help in
solutions of practical problems. A similar statement can be made for
the control activity which involves, among other things, decision-
making. The basic steps in.the annual Congressional Budget, simplified
for this example, illustrate these facts. The cycle starts with prepara-
tion and approval at the appropriate time of the Congressional Budget,
which is clearly a planning activity. However, the budget is also used
as a basis for control (many say budget preparation is the principal
means of achieving control), and during the budget year, many activities
occur that clearly pertain to control while, simultaneously and as part
of the same process, there may be budget revision, which is a planning
activity. In short, planning and control activities are so closely
interwoven in the budgeting process that to describe each separately is
not only difficult but also pointless, because those involved with the
process are interested in both its planning aspect and its control
aspect.
As with the budgetary example, planning or command and control in
general. are, in fact, so closely interwoven, especially outside the
military, and so often occur simultaneously that there is nothing to be
gained from such distinctions. A more realistic and useful framework
for considering the NPIC management information problem, along with the
necessary definitions, is given below:
Strategic Planning: the process of deciding on objectives of the
.organization, on changes in these objectives, on the gross
resources used to attain these objectives, and on the policies
that are to govern the acquisition and use of these resources.
(Systems analysis is most applicable here.)
Management Control: the process by which managers assure that
resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently
in the accomplishment of the organization's objectives. It
combines both planning and control within the context of
objectives and policies determined in the strategic planning
process; effectiveness and efficiency are the criteria
relevant for judging actions. Decisions in this process can
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be categorized as non-programmed; management decides what is
to be done within the general constraints of the strategic
plans. (Long-range planning, conceptually quite distinct
from strategic planning, is applicable to this process.)
Operational Control: the process of assuring that specific tasks
are carried out efficiently and effectively. Decisions in
this process often can be categorized as programmed or
structured, as opposed to management control decisions;
emphasis is upon execution of tasks. (Operations research
has its greatest utility in this process.)
WORKING PAPER S-E-C-R-E-T
Appendix D: Management Information and
Planning and Control
Strategic Planning versus Management Control
Strategic planning highlights objectives, which are what the
organization wishes to accomplish or its mission, and policies, which are
guidelines to be used in the choice of the most appropriate courses of
action to achieve the objectives. This type of planning is concerned
with plans and policies which determine or change the character or
direction of the organization; such decisions affect the physical, financial,
and organizational framework within which operations are conducted.
Management control incorporates the concepts of effectiveness and
efficiency, effectiveness referring to the accomplishment of the
organization's objectives and efficiency referring to an optimum rela-
tionship between input and output. It should be noted that management
control embraces both planning and control, and the usual connotation
given control; that is, conformance to plan, is missing. This is
intentional, because to the extent that middle management can make deci-
sions better than those implied in a plan, it should do so. Therefore,
top management should not necessarily want operations to conform to plans,
and rigid conformance to plans is not the standard against which perform-
ance should be measured. However, plans should be followed in the absence
of evidence to the contrary.
The management control process.is carried on within the guidelines
established by strategic planning; its intent is to make possible the
attainment of planned objectives as effectively and efficiently as possible
within given constraints. This process involves making decisions about
what to do in the future (the usual interpretation of planning), but the
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Appendix D: Management Information and
Planning and Control
planning decisions made in the management control process are of a some-
what different character from those made in the strategic planning proc-
ess, although the dividing line may at times be fuzzy and certainly there
are interactions between the two processes.
A main distinction lies in the fact that management control relates
to current operations while strategic planning relates to objectives,
policies, organizational structure, etc. Also, strategic planning
involves a preponderance of value judgments while management control
decisions involve a preponderance of facts. Management control is less
complex than strategic planning, since it does not set but only works
within precedents; that is, policies and plans already decided upon.
In addition, it tends to be rhythmic; e.g., the budgeting process, while
strategic planning is essentially irregular because problems, opportuni-
ties, good ideas, and technological breakthroughs do not occur according
to a timetable and there is no essential condition to cumulate strategic
plans and present them in a nice, neat package on a specific date.
Management control systems, with rare exceptions, have an underlying
financial structure; that is, plans and results expressed in monetary
units; for example, as in the PPB system. This does not mean that money
is the only basis for measurement, however, or even that it is,the most
important measure; it does mean that money is a common denominator to
relate various pieces to one another, although other measurements such
as manpower, product output, timeliness, etc., may be essential, as well
as certain non-qualitative attributes such as quality, ability, coopera-
tion, etc.
Management control systems should be integrated, coordinated systems
which means that, although data collected for one purpose may differ from
that collected for other purposes, these data should all be reconcilable
with one another, or equivalently that non-monetary information should be
reconcilable with monetary information. For example, information or the
number of personnel must be relatable to information or the cost of
personnel. While strategic planning data often is "one-shot" and can
rely heavily on external information, a good deal of which may be relatively
inprecise, management control data have the same definitions and are put
together in the same way time after time. These data are intended to
influence line managers to take actions that will lead to desired results;
management control decisions are made by the line, not the staff.
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Appendix D: Management Information and
Planning and Control
WORKING PAPER
In contrast, the data relevant-for strategic planning purposes are
put together specifically for decision concerning a particular plan. The
estimates used in strategic planning are intended to show the expected
results of the plan. This usually predominately staff function, carried
on in consort with line management, can best be characterized as creative
as opposed to mana i trol which is exercising ea e i even
organizational distinction may not e clear-cut. The only
control aspects of strategic planning, if they may be called that, have
to do with the top management need to check on the progress being made by
it is not the essence of the process of making new decisions.
the staff toward arriving at a. decision on a problem being analyzed, to
appraise the ability of those involved in the process, and to determine
whether general policies are being followed in the implementation of
procedures. And it should be pointed out that the PPG five-year plan,
the PFP, is actually an exercise in management control.because the plan
itself is a projection of costs anticipated under policies and programs
already approved, rather than a device for consideration of and decision
on new policies and programs; this function is accomplished through the
Program Memoranda. The PFP reflects strategic decisions already taken;
required for strategic planning that an attempt to design an
It is because of the varied and unpredictable nature,of data
purpose internal information system is robabl ho eless the same
reason, the dream of some oper specialists of a gigantic data bank,
from which planners can obtain all the information they wish by flicking
a switch, is probably no-more than a dream. However, conceptually at
least, a management control system should be a single system, or an
integrated set of subsystems. In practice, attainment of this goal of
"integrated data processing" is so fantastically complicated even for a
moderate size organization that few, if any, organizations would even
claim its achievement. Nevertheless, this is the goal, and those
interested in improving management control systems will work toward it.
The error arises in attempts to meet the needs for strategic planning
data from the same system; the data needed to plan and control ongoing
activities are quite different from those needed to analyze proposed
major changes in operations. To ask that data be collected routinely
in elemental building blocks that can be combined in various ways to
answer all conceivable questions is a completely unrealistic request
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since no one can foresee the possible ways in which data might be used,
and even if foreseen, some,of the uses occur so infrequently that the
routine collection of data for them is not economically justified.
Management Control versus Operational Control
As with strategic planning and management control, the distinction
between management control and operational control is not always precise.
Operational control takes place within the context of decisions made and
rules formulated in the management control process and to some extent in
the strategic planning process, and overall performance in activities
where operational control is applicable is reviewed as part of the manage-
ment control process. As indicated, the focus of operational control is
upon specific tasks or transactions: scheduling and monitoring and not
measuring overall performance; obtaining certain equipment and not manag-
ing inventory; personnel actions and not determining personnel policy,
etc.
Outputs are the products, services, or other effects created by an
organization; inputs are the resources the organization consumes. Out-
puts, in every case, many not being clearly definable or readily meas-
urable. In addition to the overall organization's outputs, every unit
within an organization has outputs, either products or services or
combinations thereof, which again may be difficult to measure.
One of the important management tasks in an organization is to seek
the optimum relationship between inputs and outputs; that is, either the
best combination of outputs when inputs can be varied or the combination
of resources that will produce the desired outputs at the lowest costs
in an environment where the desired outputs are taken as given. Of
course, there may be gradations of the above, wherein there are varying
degrees of latitude between given outputs and variation of inputs; that
is, each may be varied to a certain extent, but there are real constraints.
When there is the option of varying inputs, it is rarely, if ever, possible
to determine the optimum relationship between outputs and inputs objec-
tively, in spite of many opinions to the contrary. This choice of a
relationship is a matter of subjective judgment, and this is true because,
generally, there is no scientific or objective way of determining how
final output will be affected by changes in inputs or necessarily what
is the "best" output mix, especially where it comprises services. However,
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if output is taken as given, then there is at least the possibility that
an optimum relationship between outputs and inputs can be found, but
perhaps not absolutely since new ways of doing things are continually
being developed. Therefore, optimum in this case must mean that combi-
nation of resources, out of all known combinations, that will produce
the desired output at the lowest cost. For some activities, the
optimum relationship may be. rather easy to determine; for others, there
exists no way of establishing the relationship, and again, decisions' as
to what costs to incur depend upon human judgment. In the latter case,
the term overhead roughly corresponds to this class of inputs or costs.
It should be noted that the importance of the input-output relation-
ship can be overemphasized. Decisions in this area should be weighed
very carefully. For example, conflicts between input-output objectives
and organizational goals can arise; that is, large increases in economy,
efficiency, or productivity may be possible only at the costs of dis-
satisfactions to some employees and even external groups, curtailments
in output quality which may be very difficult to measure, dissipation of
organizational assets, etc. However, with this caveat in mind, if the
optimum input-output.relationship can be determined for a given activity,
the inputs that should be employed in a given set of circumstances can be
described and reduced to rules; that is, they can be programmed. These
are the activities for which programmed operational control is applicable,
and as new techniques are developed, there is a tendency for more and more
activities to be susceptible to programmed control. But operational
control and programmed control are not synonomous, for there are many, in
fact a preponderance of,'specific tasks that cannot be explicitly pro-
grammed; for example, certain research tasks as might be undertaken by the
PSG/R&RD,. special studies performed by staff officers, analysis of new
types of targets or very significant "finds" or changes in known targets,
the entire class of activities often referred to as overhead, etc.
To make the distinction between management control and operational
control clear, management control focuses upon the whole stream of on-
going activities whi e o erationa con ro ocuses upon J.nci.vi ua tasks
or ' a sac ions. Just as management control occurs within a set of
policies derived from strategic planning, operational control occurs within
a set of,well-defined procedures and rules that are derived from both
strategic planning a
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An operational control system is a rational system; that is, in
general, the action-to be taken is decided by a set of logical rules,
which may or may not cover all aspects of a given problem. Situations
not covered by rules are exceptions and are handled by human judgment,
but other than these exceptions, the rules are applied automatically.
In management control psychological. considerations are dominant. The
management control system at most assists those who take action; it
does not directly or by itself result in action without human inter-
vention. A management control system is ordinarily built around a
financial core; operational control data are often non-monetary. Data
in an.operational control system are in real-time and relate to indi-
vidual events, whereas data in a management control system are either
prospective or retrospective and summarize many separate events.
Computer specialists and even managers who do not make a proper
distinction between management and operational control dream about a
system that will display to management the current status of every
project and activity within the organization. Although theoretically
this could be done, it should not be done, because management does
not want, or should not want, such detail. It does not need to know
when project 112076NA was transferred from the PI to the editor; rather,
it needs to know only that the process is, or is not, proceeding as
planned. That is, information shows up in the management control
system only when it is exceptional, when a situation arises that is not
covered by the rules included in the operational control system or when
there is a significant departure from those rules.. Some means of call-
ing these exceptional situations to management's attention are essential,
and this is the interface between operational and management control.
Operational control uses exact data, whereas management control
needs only approximations. The formal manage n ro sys em is
only one aspect of the management control process, actually a relatively
unimportant aspect. The system can help motivate a manager to make
decisions in the best interests of the organization and the system
provides information that aids the manager in making these decisions.
The success or failure of the management control process depends upon
the personal characteristics of the manager: his judgment, his knowl-
edge, his ability to influence others. The distinction between the
system and the process is apparent in such comments as "WVe are bogged
down in red tape" or "Paperwork keeps me from getting the job done."
Such comments are symptoms that the system is impeding the proper
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functioning of the management control process. While in operational
control, the system itself .is a much more important aspect of the whole
process, it is not the entire process unless the system is automated,
but it ordinarily states what action should be taken. With a properly
designed system, operational control will require a minimum of manage-
ment intervention; the degree of management involvement in operational
control will be small, directed toward exceptions.
Systems Design Implications
Some generalizations.for systems design of what is often called a
planning and control system, can be drawn from the preceding discussion.
First, it seems clear that the starting point is construction of the
overall system should be management control, as distinguished from
strategic planning and operational control. The management control
system deals with the ongoing operation of the entire organization.
It must encompass all parts of the enterprise so as to assist manage-
ment in determining that the parts are in balance with one another.
The central function of a'management control system is motivation;
the system should be designed in such a way that it assists and guides
operating management to make decisions and to act in ways that are
consistent with the overall organizational objectives.
Strategic planning, management control, and operational control
tend to correspond to a hierarchy in any of several dimensions: as
to time-span of consequences (long range, medium range, day-to-day);
as to level in the organization (top management, top and operating
management, supervision); as to importance of a single action (major
importance, medium importance, little importance); as to amount of
judgment involved (great, some, none), and so on. Along each of these
continuums, management control is in the middle.
Second, although the management control system is the logical
starting point, its relationship to the other systems should be
recognized. The management control system can be designed so as to
take into account the more important needs of the.strategic planners,
for current and historical operating information, but it cannot pos-
sibly foresee all these needs, nor would it be worthwhile to supply
routinely information that is needed only occasionally, even if the
need could be foreseen.
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Appendix E
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APPENDIX E
Responses to Questions on Definition
of Management Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
This appendix essentially summarizes the responses, as received,
to questions posed to the Groups and Staff and the results of discussions
carried out during the course of the study.
The Groups, Staff, and PMB were asked to respond to two distinct
sets of questions; the first dealt with the current MIS and the second
with management information needs. l Unfortunately, the responses were
in some cases not as specific as might have been desired, undoubtedly
due in great part to the short deadline for the project, but it was
felt that enough good information was provided and that a re-do for
purposes of this study was not required. In addition, a survey on usage
of the MIS, conducted by PSG/AID toward the end of the last calendar
year, provided some added insights into the problem, as did discussions
with IAD concerning its usage of, opinions about, and desires for the
MIS. Although the problem must be viewed in its entirety and there is
a certain amount of overlap in that which follows, for convenience this
appendix is subdivided into four sections: Costs; MIS Input Accuracy;
MIS Output, and Management Information Needs.
Costs
With respect to current costs, it was felt that dollar values
provided the best, most comprehensive common denominator, although cer-
tainly man-hours and machine time are relevant statistics and have been
included where feasible. Replies to specific questions about costs were
received in most cases from the Groups and Staff; approximate costs were
inferred where necessary and translated into dollar equivalents. For
example, man-hour costs for time sheet preparation, input/output acti-
vities, and MIS coordination were converted using the dollar values
found in the MIS Handbook; where specific grades were known the figures
were converted directly and, in cases, the average NPIC grade of
was used.
For this study, overly detailed costs are not necessary, nor were
they feasible to obtain in the time period allotted. Such detailed
costs would be required only in the highly unlikely event that two or
more effective alternatives. were so'identical in all aspects that the
1. See Appendices A and B.
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Appendix E: Responses to Questions on Definition of Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
ultimate decision would be based solely upon incremental dollar values.
The premise is that management needs certain information, and there are
a number of ways in.which it can be provided. Once legitimate needs
are established and prioritized or defined at a certain level, within
the constraints of available and justifiable expenditures, only what
amounts to an ordinal ranking of feasible alternatives, those which meet
the requirements within the constraints, is needed. That is, the system
objectives can be accomplished within the constraints with system alter-
natives A, B, and C and not D or E; therefore choose alternative B be-
cause it does the job and is less costly than A or C. It is not neces-
sary to say how much less, that is, to know the precise costs, but only
to say that the ranking according to costs from highest to lowest is A,
C. and B. (Of course, at least conceptually alternative B might be a
significantly or totally manual system.) Some other reasons, among
many, for not including precise costs are that MIS costs can vary from
period-to-period, that is, they are not standard so certain assumptions
must be made; hardware costs are to a great extent sunk costs making
the only relevant measures functions of available machine time and/or
work precluded by the MIS or other systems; estimates of man-hour costs
for a totally or significantly manual system would indeed be very rough
estimates since they must be predicated upon the system configuration
which, of course, does not now exist, and it is most difficult (again,
particularly in view of the time frame for the study) to impute a 'dollar
value to management information, particularl - s non-profit environ-
mcvi
If purchased, computer time for the MIS would cost about
per year at the current rate~ time
56 hours per week at an average salary o
The AID functions of input/output/maintenance dissemination cost about
and the cost of filling out time sheets in AID is esti-
\ mated to e .a ou $~77The PSG/R&RD annual costs are about
for time sheets and____ for I/O. TSSG annual costs are.. estimated
\to be $10,000 f eets an~ for I/O activitie TEr, annual
costs are about or time sheets (includes DIA) an
\/0 activities. 0 DIR and PPB Staff annual costs are abo for
both time sheets and I/O activities. The tota cost more or less
d ectly attributable to the MIS then is about it is felt that
this is probably a very conservative estimate. For obvious reasons,
IAS input time has not been included in this figure. Or looking at it
in other way, less computer costs, the Center expends about 12
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Appendix E: Responses to Questions on Definition of Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
(NPIC average grade) man-years on the MIS. The original cost of
analysis and programming, both in-house and contractual, was not avail-
able; however, the contractual effort b punted to at least
six man-years and the total NPIC contribution was at least double that.
MIS Input Accuracy
Concerning input accuracy, which is at least a function of the
structure or procedures of the system, the emphasis placed by manage-
ment upon the system, and the care with which input data is verified
for accuracy, TSSG commented that time sheet accuracy for the Group
ranged from "meticulous to meaningless." It further commented:
"The time of those employees primarily engaged in direct
project work is fairly well recorded. But much of the Group's
resources is expended against general overhead, and time is re-
corded rather casually. Probably the greatest detriments to
accurate time charging, where accuracy is aspired to, are the
practices of filling out time sheets weekly--so that many de-
tails are forgotten--and the complexities engendered by the
multiplicity of project numbers and activity codes. Overall,
the major factor behind poor reporting is lack of incentive.
This is the same problem widely recognized and often discussed
in terms of lack of understanding regarding the System's capabil-
ity and utility."
PSG comments with respect to input accuracy can be summarized
as follows: AID, estimates a 95% level of accuracy; R&RD, the physical
recording of project numbers, activity codes, hours, component, name,
etc., are entered with about 85% accuracy; RD, accuracy is as good as
a quick check permits. R&RD elaborated upon the accuracy subject, say-
ing essentially that, despite a conscientious effort, as a service
organization many of its activities do not fit easily into the MIS for-
mat; for example, project numbers furnished to the Division must be
verified for accuracy but project listings are usually out-of-date,
the Division often supports very current projects or "pre-requirements"
which are rejected by the computer,, people often forget project num-
bers when requesting service and. priority requests cannot be denied
for lack of a number, etc. RD added that most inaccuracies occur as a
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Appendix_E: Responses to Questions on Definition of Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
result of transposed numbers; incorrect splits assigned by originating
components; inadvertent dropping of legitimate splits; flagrant misuse
of continuing project numbers, and a lack of understanding on the part
of the individual employees of both the functioning of the System and
its purposes.
The PPB Staff and the PMB expressed concern about the accuracy ani,
in certain cases, lack of input data, reflecting at perhaps a more
aggregated level the concerns of the Groups as pointed out. above. IEG
categorized MIS input as "not accurate".
MIS Output
Questions were asked the Groups and Staff concerning MIS output,
the uses to which it is put, its timeliness, and additional desired
reports.
TSSG receives the following listings: active projects; component
time allocation; cancelled projects; completed. projects, and active
projects by component. It commented that these are "...low-level manage-
ment tools to keep track of active projects and employee activity."
During the previous year, TSSG also requested two special listings for
costing studies. It recommended that, if the MIS is retained, manage-
ment be given instructions in its usage.
With respect to output, PSG/AID components receive the following
listings: active projects_(two .copies); component time allocation (two
copies); active projects by component (two copies); completed projects
(two copies); cancelled projects (two copies); and incorrect input (one
copy). It commented that actual usage of these listings varies by com-
ponent; however, most components agreed that the information generally
is not timely enough and that there are too many project numbers and
activity codes. A certain amount of non-routine output has been reques-
ted by AID for special studies, and an additional regular report giving
computer utilization time for peripheral equipment would be useful.
PSG/R&RD Branch Chiefs routinely. receive the component time alloca-
tion and active project listings; the Division office receives the above
plus Options 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10. Certain special requests for output
have been levied by the Division in the past. The active project listing
is used to monitor projects and check the validity of project numbers.
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Appendix E: Responses to Questions on Definition of Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
Component time allocation is used to assess the activities of Division
employees. The other options are used mainly to compile monthly running
totals of regular and overtime activities by project block. These totals
are portrayed graphically hopefully to reveal significant trends showing
production gaps, slippages, or deficient reporting methods. PSG/R&RD
cormnented.that statistical information derived from MIS output is used
in the budget cycle and for special reports, but the inaccuracy of. MIS
information "...may lead to false conclusions, particularly regarding
the various support activities of R&RD. This has occurred several times
in the past because of the inability to relate, in any meaningful way,
projects to activities to products and finally to man-hours consumed.
Our records have been kept manually and are accurate, but they are not
as acceptable to top management as an inaccurate machine run."
PSG/RD receives the following listings: active projects; component
time by project and activity; incorrect input; completed projects, and
PMB scheduling listings. Each RD component how uses these listings for
various purposes, but with the exception of the active project listing
.and the PMB scheduling report, the information is mostly historical
and is used only for predictive purposes. RD added, "The information
never seems to be timely enough to answer questions regarding project
costs, overhead, or activity breakdowns. This is not necessarily a
fault of the MIS but rather the fact. that the information seems always
to be needed by top management before it is actually available. Cost
data has been requested on an ad hoc basis in the past but could not be
interpreted correctly because of insufficient information in the MIS
record." RD feels that an additional, timely PMB listing for purposes
of project estimating and scheduling is needed and that the value of
the MIS could be enhanced if a "reorientation" of individual employees
toward the MIS were made available.
for "an expanded MIS system," saying that "Whenever staff papers, budget
reviews, yearly summations, etc., must be prepared, IEG must compile its
statistics through manual methods and, finds these methods leave much to
be desired." The output desired by EEG is covered below under the dis-
cussion of management information needs.
limited because of its very narrow reporting spectrum." The Group called
IEG "conducted a thorough review" of the MIS and found "its use
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Appendix E: Responses to Questions on Definition of Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
a graphic approach to forecasting showing estimated and scheduled man-
hours versus projected on-hand strengths.
quirements unsatisfied and now recommends one of two alternative report-
ing systems, one being a real-time reporting system and the other being
The PMB finds the MIS impractical for its uses. A special report
format incorporating the desires of the P M B was written b
f the PPBS; however, the PMB still finds its information re-
ment and the solid backing of all levels. of NPIC management and supervision.
system needs attention, including revision and/or eventual replace-
timeliness is not'adequate, product reporting is next to'worthless, the
DIA/CIA time reporting problem needs resolution, the category codes are
obsolete, there is useless information in the system while, on the other
hand, there are very significant information gaps; in short, the entire
tions posed by the O/DIR. You are quite familiar with the scope and
content of this work, so the details have not been included. Specifi-
cally with respect to MIS output, the PPB Staff feels the inaccuracies
of input are also applicable to output, the levels of retrieval are
clumsy, skill/activity codes are poor, weekly reports need revision,
of ad hoc requests based, at least in part, upon-MIS data, ranging from
in-depth analytic studies to brief responses to specific one-shot ques-
The PPB Staff has certain routine output requirements in order to
accomplish its functions (e.g.; situation reporting, CCMIREX quarterly
report, budget cycle documentation, etc.), and it must answer a number
IAS makes positive use of the MIS and.can cite examples of decisions
based upon MIS data. Specifically, IAS uses MIS data in combination with
a manual system, where applicable, to generate the following standard
reports: Five-Year Plan of the Imagery Analysis Service; Summary of IAS
Workload (Monthly); New Projects in Work for Period---(Weekly); and
Charts (Quarterly and Yearly) showing IAS Division of Labor (PI time)
by consumers, geographic area, and subject. IAS obviously has a good
deal of confidence in the IAS portion of the MIS output, and it is used
by IAS top management. However, this was not accomplished without effort;
the Service spent considerable effort. on tightening up the system, par-
ticularly the activity codes and project establishment, and conscientiously
validates input. In IAS, the top management requirement that data input
be accurate has been and is explicitly made known. (This is not univer-
sally true within the Center.)
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Appendix E: Responses to Questions on Definition of Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
of the replies indicated a report to be either
"Presently Useful"
or
"Would Like to Receive"; 69.9% of the answers
indicated the report
to
be of no use. Similarly, of those 10 reports
regularly available,
35.8%
It was mentioned that, at the close of the last calendar year,
PSG/AID ran a survey on the "Usefulness of Standard Management Infor-
mation System (MIS) Reports." At the time, 17 standardized reports
were available, 10 on a regular basis and seven on an ad hoc basis.
Respondents were asked to categorize reports according to "Presently
Useful., No Present Need, Would Like to Receive, and Did Not Know Report
.Existed." Replies were received from all the Groups,, the PPB Staff,
and IAS; specifically, of the 69 EPIC organizational elements listed
in the MIS Handbook, 39 replied, including a significant portion of
the substantive components. In this sample, of the 17 reports avail-
able to each of the 40 potential users, responses were received indi-
cating that the reports were of use in 30.1% of the cases. That is, of
the sample space of 680 (40 components X 17 reports = 680), only 30.1%
of the responses indicated a use for the report, and 6)+.2% indicated no
use, and of the seven ad hoc reports not regularly disseminated, 16.9%
indicated a use for the report and 83.1% indicated no use.
Management Information Needs
With respect to management information needs, IEG expressed a desire
that the following data elements be included in the MIS:
1. Target information -- Number by mission, collection
system, and geographic area, completed weekly, monthly, and
yearly; number added and deleted weekly; number by country,
reporting phase, mission; number in each basic report category
and completed quarterly and yearly; number of NAC and IDO by
mission and system, monthly and yearly; on a real-time basis,
number to be read out on each mission and IEG progress in com-
pleting readout.
2. Publications -- Number by type, monthly and yearly;
number of pages by report type, monthly and yearly; number of
graphics by type, monthly and yearly.
3. Briefing Boards -- Number by mission, system, and
geographic area monthly and yearly; special boards by type,
monthly and yearly.
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Appendix E: Responses to Questions on Definition of.' Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
ii. Monthly First- and Second-phase Statistical Report --
Number of targets by country and reporting phase, and target counts
by mission as the exploitation and reporting are completed. I---
5. Processing -- Weekly total of units received in PCS/IEG
categorized by processed, forwarded, and pending; weekly total
of briefings conducted with preparation and presentation time.
6. Visitors -- Number of visitors and time spent on tours,
briefings, etc., monthly and yearly.
M)5
7. Scheduling --.Plan for a real-time system to show progress
toward completion of estimated level-of-effort to complete a given
project with daily output showing, for example, First-, Second-,
and Third-phase project time, briefing time, leave, training,
etc., by section, branch, division; that is, daily information
available to managers and supervisors each morning to help them
direct or reassess the effectiveness of their operation. The
computer could provide machine runs to show, for example, a week
or month ahead, the time needed to accomplish First-, Second-,
and Third-phase reporting and other tasks, such as briefings.
L
8.. Aircraft Missions -- Number by type of mission, footage,
and geographic area, received and completed daily, weekly, monthly
and yearly.
IEG added that, if current on a daily basis, the MIS would be a
main production c.ontrol tool and cited an existing example of such a
system (ACIC, St.Louis). Such a capability would allow management to
adjust schedules in time to avoid production problems. IEG concluded
"Until the system goes on a more real-time basis, the information that
is entered is not accurate because the average NPIC employee only fills
out his time sheet once a week and this creates errors, thereby making
the system ineffective except for general studies to show trends or his-
torical information."
PSG/AID, in considering management information needs, cited that
it now uses certain routine MIS outputs (active project list, component
time use, active projects by component, projects completed, cancelled
projects, and incorrect input notices) for the purpose of determining
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Appendix E: Responses to Questions on Definition of Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
if the MIS is current and to verify projects/requests levied on the
component. Three AID Branches were mentioned as having requested
special runs for time studies on particular projects. The Division
commented that, with the exception of the active project listings and
certain ad hoc output, it feels the MIS information-is not current
enough. It concluded, "In the case of AID, it is essential that manage-
ment knows'at any given time its manpower and machine allocation. This
is important in the scheduling of tasks according to priority with the
capability of handling crisis-type projects upon demand."
PSG/RD regularly receives those reports listed previously, plus
time reports on specific projects on an ad hoc basis and the PMB esti-
mating and scheduling listings. There uses are chiefly as a historical
record for project costing, as a basis for future personnel strength
and/or overtime requests, and as a reference tool to maintain the accu-
racy of individual time sheets. The PMB runs are used. to determine
project status, to improve estimating and scheduling methods, and to
provide a record of committed time by activity versus available time.
.The Division stated, With the exception of the active project listing
and ad hoc requests for total time to date for specific projects, the
available MIS information is of little use to RD personnel. All of the
MIS statistics can obviously be put to some use but, as far as the various
options are concerned, one system of reporting time charged by project,
component, and activity should be sufficient for all." RD expressed the
hope that, through the PMB vehicle, eventually all of those projects that
can be estimated and scheduled will be, so that "we can then deal with
the ad hoc, non-scheduled,-almost daily crash projects, such as PSG/RD
support to the CIA budget and to NRO," the immediate goal being "...to
have the capability to manage our seemingly endless crises more purpose-
fully." RD closed by offering a concept of future operation of an MIS:
"The ultimate in availability of MIS-type information should be built
into the future IIS. A manager, sitting at a console, should be able
to determine the status of any project at any time merely by flicking
a switch. The idea, in any event, is to obtain essential information
regarding production planning and management on a near real-time basis."
PSG/R&RD uses both manual systems and the MIS to compile statistics
mainly relative to products and requests processed by month. The MIS
has no capability. for clocking processed requests or backlogged material,
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Appendix E: Responses to Questions on Definition of Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
and certain statistical information is maintained manually for compilation
of monthly reports. In view of the above and the MIS output utilized,
as mentioned previously, R&RD comments, "Because of the basic structure
of the MIS and the difficulty the Division has in participating in it,
most of the information derived from the system is of little value.
For our purposes, it is an inaccurate and inadequate picture of our
activities' because the basic data put into it is distorted in order to
conform to the pattern set. We use time sheet data to match with statis-
tical information kept manually in order to arrive at an average figure
for processing materials or answering research and reference questions.
But with the known inaccuracies of input, the resulting inaccuracies
cannot be considered as anything more than an estimate. Much of the
information contained in the various option runs reveals only that an
individual is performing the duties for which he was hired." The Divi-
sion stated that it needs basically the kind of data it now compiles
manually, and often on an immediate basis, specifically, numbers and
originators of requests for services; types and number s of materials
processed, on hand, and disseminated; regular and overtime allocations
to these activities; a print format to relate time, product, activity,
and requester, and information on the inter-relationships of projects
among various responsible components. It would like to have the capabil-
ity for on-line display or printed graphical forms of this information.
R&RD summarized by saying that management information is needed by the
Division to give an accurate picture of its overall services to the Center;
to identify the chief users of Division facilities; to develop service
time statistics; to develop trend information so appropriate actions
can be taken; to plan for the future; to provide standards for compari-
son with similar facilities in other organizations, and to provide
higher management with the information it needs for planning.
In responding to the,questions on management information needs,
TSSG noted that the Group, aside from SSD, has only a few formal systems
for obtaining and maintaining information. This is a function perhaps
of the facts that the Group is small in size, is charged with activities
of a radically diverse nature, and has some strict compartmentalization
because of security, all of which encourages many person-to-person infor-
mation exchanges. Also, the Support Services is regulated by DDS proce-
dures and has what is tantamount to a separate information system. Aside
from records kept for DDS activities, the main TSSG information files
concern personnel and project status. These files may be largely overlapping
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Appendix E: Responses to Questions on Definition of Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
and redundant, but they are manual, rudimentary means of keeping managers
aware of where their employees are and what they are doing, what tasks
are pending, and whether deadlines and cost estimates are being met.
TSSG commented that, for all intents and purposes, "...the people in
this Group do not use the MIS. Furthermore, most managers have only
vague notions about the System's capabilities." The Group.suggested
that a "NPIC Data Center," keeping both manual and machine records,
might answer some Center problems and obviate duplicate files to a cer-
tain extent. The stated TSSG managerial information needs are:
1. New Collection System Data -- For Planning R&D Programs
and Center operations.
2. Higher Management Policies and Objectives -- A self-
evident need, but one which some managers feel is often
overlooked.
3. Status of Projects -- In TSSG, emphasis is placed upon
ascertaining and documenting the status of R&D proj-
ects. Each manager must have available certain
project information; although some smaller components
tend to rely on memory for the information, the most
orderly and efficient keep some written records regard-
less of size.
It. Contractor Standards and Performance --. Currently, this
need is met by information recorded mainly in individual
project files; such a file should be part of the Agency-
wide systems being developed by DD/S&T and O/L.
5. File of Technical Specifications -- A library of "boiler-
plate"..-papers giving routine passages in development
objectives and specifications.
6. NPIC Equipment Inventories -- An inventory with consistent
terminology giving items on hand, age, condition,. main-
tenance requirements, and technical specifications such
as size, weight, and power needs.
7. Mission Schedules -- Size, type, and date of anticipated input.
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Appendix E: Responses to Questions on Definition of. Management
Information Needs and Reassessment of the MIS
8. Personnel Locator and Attendance Records '-- The need is
well established,and being met, but not efficiently
since many duplicative files exist.
The specific needs of the FMB were mentioned under the Output
section; essentially, this comprises near real-time reporting of avail-
ability and utilization or resources versus on-hand and estimated require-
ments and other valid tasks. Obviously, this is both an accounting and
forecasting function. PPB/RAD now accurately forecasts satellite mission
processing man-hour requirements, based upon numbers of targets, for the
PMB using MIS data. In addition, the PMB is moving toward better fore-
casting for the other. NTP categories or whatever meaningful breakdown
of Center activities is devised in the future. The P1v113 needs data in
a timely fashion to greatly improve both the. accounting and forecasting
capabilities.
The needs of the PPB Staff can be divided into routine and special
or non-routine. The routine needs are the data and properly formatted
output relevant to the budgeting cycle and the five-year planning and
programming effort and the data to keep the O/DIR and other legitimate
authority adequately informed concerning operations, current and future.
Although these may appear to be rather straightforward requirements,
they are complex endeavors which require accurate measurement and re-
porting of resources and their uses, classified at least three ways
(dollars, human resources, anu materiel resources) with a crosswalk
capability, meaningful assessments of the future environment and its
demands upon and resource implications for the Center, and. policy and
plans to meet these future requirements, expressed in appropriate units
of resources required. The non-routine or special needs are more diffi-
cult to assess, which implies a significant degree of flexibility in the
data base and the system with respect to content and input and output.
However, certain data needs can be foreseen and incorporated in the sys-
tem with the assurance that the expense will be less than the benefits
to be derived; other needs must be carefully weighed, cost versus benefit,
before they are routinely incorporated. And one other capability, not
now present in the MIS, is that the results of certain significant special
studies, including the data generated, must be incorporated in the system.
It is also worth mention that, to a greater or lesser extent, within
the Groups certain scheduling and production controlmechanisms exist.
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APPENDIX F. Samples of MIS Standard Output
This appendix includes samples of the MIS Standard Output, except
for Option 7, a copy of which was not available. Option 7 shows regular
time, overtime, and equivalent dollars by Branch, Activity, and Project
Nunber..
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