WARNING AND FORECASTING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97M00248R000500070006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 19, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP97M00248R000500070006-3
SECRET/NOFORN
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Vational Intelligence Council
NIC #06010-84/1
19 October 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)
A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on
16 October 1984. The attached report has not been coordinated with
meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe
their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant
additional concerns, I'll report further to you.
Attachment:
NIC #06010-84
This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from Attachment.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple
SECRET/NOFORN
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP97M00248R000500070006-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP97M00248R000500070006-3
N I C #06010-84
19 October 1984
WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The situation in Chad remains fluid. The joint French-Libyan pullout
is proceeding, albeit at a slow Dace and is like1
December.
The Libyans are withdrawing from key strongholds but
their onge intentions remain suspect. The French appear to expect
that Libya will attempt to ensure that northern dissidents remain in
position with supplies once Qadhafi's troops leave.
There is speculation a
Habre could seek to modify the 1976 military agreement with France in
order to gain greater assurance of French help if Qadhafi should
reintervene.
Habre can take little comfort from his position in Chad. Violence is
continuing in the south amid reports and rumors of harsh retaliation by
Habre's northern troops against southern dissidents. Although still
squabbling among themselves and their Libyan backers, northern dissidents
are likely to continue pushing their cause once the Libyans are gone.
There is little reason to expect substantive movement on the part of any
of the factions at preparatory reconciliation talks scheduled for
Brazzaville on 20 October.
Warnin Note: There is little cause for optimism over Chad. The
comp etion o t e withdrawal may well usher in a new cycle of fighting
between Habre and Libyan-backed dissidents. Habre could find himself in
an even more precarious position if he must cope with expanding
insurgencies in both the south and the north.
SECRET/NOFORN
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP97M00248R000500070006-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP97M00248R000500070006-3
JtUKt I/NUYUKN
?,~ JZAMBI QUE
Details of the agreement signed in Pretoria between FRELIMO and
'RENAMO are not yet available. Both sides have agreed in principle to a
ceasefire but talks have been inconclusive and fighting is continuing.
How far RENAMO and FRELIMO are willing and able to go remains uncertain.
Both sides have staked out initial bargaining positions that will make
subsequent negotiations difficult and time consuming.
There was considerable speculation among Community representatives
about how the internal political dynamics of FRELIMO and RENAMO will
influence any future negotiations. Discussions focused on how much
leeway Machel had in negotiating, whether he could deliver and "tough
out" any fallout from an agreement, and how soon and how much Machel
could expect from the IMF. Questions also were raised about the
cohesiveness of RENAMO's leadership and whether Machel could split the
leadership by offering "carrots" to the military wing of RENAMO, the most
important element of the insurgent movement.
suggested that South Africa probably feels
under some pressure to keep the momentum gained from Nkomati going.
While there was general agreement that South Africa might be able to push
through a ceasefire, the direct monitoring of the ceasefire by Pretoria
will be a considerably more contentious and risky task for the Botha
government.
ANGOLA
It appears that Luanda has launched an offensive of some sort in
central and southeastern Angola.
SECRET/NOFORN
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP97M00248R000500070006-3 In
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP97M00248R000500070006-3
SECRET/NOFORN
In addition to fending off the Angolan offensive, Savimbi has been
moving his operations closer to Luanda and is promising to take the war
to the capital as well as broaden UNITA's appeal by reaching out to
ethnic groups beyond his own. There was general agreement that if, in
fact, UNITA has successfully established a presence in the mountains of
iorthwestern Angola and can hang on there it would represent a
significant strengthening of its position and that it would be difficult
for Angolan forces to dislodge them.
FOOD CRISIS
The NSC representative noted growing policy interest in the food
crisis, focusing most heavily at present on the situation in Ethiopia.
The Community should be alert to the political impact of what appears to
be a growing food crisis throughout the continent, as well as the ability
of African governments to effectively absorb and distribute food
assistance. It was noted that Nigerien President Kountche--scheduled to
meet with the President in early December--took power in 1974 in part
because the sitting government was unable to respond to drought
conditions and food shortages.
SECRET/NOFORN
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP97M00248R000500070006-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP97M00248R000500070006-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP97M00248R000500070006-3