LATIN AMERICA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING NOVEMBER 1984

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP91B00776R000100150013-1
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 7, 2009
Sequence Number: 
13
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 20, 1984
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP91B00776R000100150013-1.pdf138.55 KB
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.? Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1 4P The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505 ? NIC 06550-84 20 November 1984 National Intelligence Council MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM: Acting Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Latin America SUBJECT: Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting November 1984 1. The Warning Meeting of 14 November 1984 addressed recent and potential developments in Uruguay, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Jamaica. Uruguay. 2. Uruguay's 25 November elections appear to be a fairly tight three-man race, with the moderate Colorado Party still in the lead over the leftist Blancos and the far left Broad Front. However: -- The less moderate candidates may dominate the newly-elected parliament, and Uruguayan foreign policy may become more "nationalist"--i.e., opposed--to some United States interests, particularly concerning the mounting foreign debt and relations with the IMF. -- The Broad Front appears better organized and financed and more popular than we earlier expected, although the military establish t men probably will continue to bar its path to power. 1 SECRET,I CL BY SIGNER DECL: OADR Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1 4P El Salvador. 4. Analysts considered it worth recording that since last July the Warning Meetings had predicted--correctly--that there would be no major guerrilla offensive prior to the US elections. -- Sustained offensive sweeps by the Army generally have kept the insurgents off balance and forced them to revert to smaller unit operations. Nevertheless, the recent major attack on Suchitoto showed the guerrillas are still capable of surprise large-scale -- At present we anticipate that the next round of negotiations between the government and the guerrilla leaders, tentatively scheduled for late November will produce few results. Nevertheless, the insurgents may try to put Duarte on the defensive by offering a series of moderate proposals, including a holiday ceasefire. These would be designed to cause friction between the President and conservative hardliners opposed to any reconciliation with the insurgents. Nicaragua. 6. Key items of equipment delivered by the Bulgarian ship Khristo Botev and the Soviet ship Bakuriani included MI-24 Hind helicopters and TT. AAA with fire control radars. Analysts agreed there are at least seven of the Hinds now in the Sandinistas' inventory, with the likelihood that they will end up with at least 12. -- There is a possibility that foreigners (Cubans) may be piloting the Hinds or operating the fire control radars for the 57 mm. AAA. -- The next improvement in Nicaraguan air defense most analysts expect are SA-2s or SA-3s. Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1 ? SECRET/ ? 7. Politically, the Sandinistas may have begun the crackdown expected in the wake of the elections. La Prensa is being harassed again, and the security forces of hardline Minister of Interior Borge are more active. Jamaica. 9. The Community's concerns have eased somewhat since this topic was inscribed on the warning agenda. do not see any correlation between a recent increase in leftist violence and outside funding of radical leftist groups. Nevertheless, the violence is a serious domestic problem, and over the long term serves Havana's goal of destabilizing the pro-US government. Meanwhile, the worsening economic situation spells real trouble for the political future of Seaga. Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1 ? SECRE ? 25X1 SUBJECT: Warning Report for Latin Amer ca NIC t06554-84 DATE: NUVEt1BER 1984 DISTRIBUTION: 1 - Department of State (DeWitt) 1 - Department of State/INR/IC/RD (Suzanne D. Kuser, Room 6845) 1 - NSA 1 - NSA 1 - Treasury (Mulholland) 1 - DIA/ 1 - DIA 1 - DIA 1 - Vice President's Office (Hughes) 1 - NSC (Menges) 1 - USMC (Call) 1 - ONI (LeBauve) 1 - NAVOPINTCEN (Greene) 1 - USArnpr (Brown) 1 - USAF (Silva/Kelbaugh) SECREII Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1 0 SECRET S SUBJECT: WARNING REPORT FOR LATIN AMERICA NIC 06554-84 DATE: NOVEMBER 1984 DISTRIBUTION: 1 - DC I 1 - DDCI 1 - EXDI R 1 - ER 1 - DDI 1 - DDO/EPDS 1 - DDO/PCS Room 2D55 Hqs) 1 - C/NIC 1 - VC/NIC 1 - DDI Registry 1 - NIO/W 1 - NIO/AF 1 - NIO/EA 1 - NIO/GPF 1 - NIO/NESA 1 - NIO/AL (Low) 1 - NIO/AL (Ford) 1 - NIO/AL (Hutchinson) 1 - NIO/USSR 1 - NIO/Europe 1 - NIO/SP 1 - NIO/ECON 1 - NIO/S&T 1 - NIO/Counterterrorism 1 - NIO/FDIA 1 - SRP 1 - IPC/DDI 1 - D/CPAS 1 - D/OCR 1 - D/SOVA (Room 4E58 HQS) 1 - D/OIA 1 - D/NES 1 - D/OEA 1 - D/OSWR 1 - D/NPIC 1 - CE::AD (Room 3DOO Hqs) SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150013-1