WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100150007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 28, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8
? SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC 07219-84/1
28 December 1984
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Near East and South Asia
1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held 20
December 1984. If there are any significant amendments or additions you
would wish to make, please let me know.
2. Next month's warning meeting will be held on 24 January 1985 at
1015 in room 7E62. CIA rters. Please have your clearances passed
and call with names of the attendees by noon 23
January 1985.
3. I also encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and
proposals to make opening presentations. It would be helpful to have
your comments for the next meeting by Monday, 14 January 1985.
Graham E. Fuller
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 BOO776ROOO1OO15OOO7-8
0 SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
?
NIC 07219-84
28 December 1984
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Near East and South Asia
1. Sri Lanka
Current Situation: The current disorders in Sri Lanka are the
worst since the communal bloodbath in July 1983. The Tamil insurgency in
the northern and eastern part of the island has resulted in de facto
partition. The insurgents have large stockpiles of weapons and are
becoming more effective fighters. The military is contributing to the
problem because of its inability to control discipline in the ranks,
especially to prevent revenge killings by government troops. Government
talks with moderate Tamils continue but without signs of progress.
Moderate Tamils--now on the defensive within their community--might
reassert themselves against extremists, but only if the government were
to accede to a unified autonomous Tamil region, including particularly
Tamil control over law and order and control of disbursement of federal
funds spent in Tamil areas.
DIA did not agree that there was de facto partition in the
north. DIA argued that the Army has not been fully committed to the
struggle with the insurgents. Army reserves have not been called up
and--for reasons that are difficult to understand--the government and
Army appear apathetic about regaining control of the security situation
in the north.
Involvement of Powers Outside South Asia: There is some outside
support for the insurgents, particularly from radical Muslims, but it is
symbolic and not crucial to the success of the insurgency. We have
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 BOO776ROOO1OO15OOO7-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8
9
evidence of insurgent contacts with the PLO over the last 2-3 years
Iran has increased its support--mostly
financial--for the insurgents since Israel opened an Interests Section in
the US Embassy in Colombo. The USSR has offered some rhetorical support
to the insurgents but there is little evidence of more concrete
assistance. Moscow's priority in South Asia is India; Sri Lanka is a
sideshow. Interestingly, the insurgents have not claimed Soviet support
but have claimed assistance from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and other
Eastern European countries.
Warning Notes
The failure of President Jayewardene's recent proposal to create
limited regional autonomy in Tamil areas is likely to trigger symbolic
terrorists acts by the insurgents. There is an increased possibility
that US facilities or personnel would be the targets of Tamil terrorism,
particularly because of Iranian involvement with the insurgents.
View from New Delhi: India is profoundly disquieted over
developments in Sri Lanka. India has a general fear of internal problems
in neighboring countries that might spill over into India. New Delhi is
following a two-track policy of providing humanitarian aid to the victims
of the civil strife, while simultaneously tolerating the activities and
training of Tamil Tigers insurgents in southern India. New Delhi is
asserting its right to intervene if events threaten Indian security. The
Israeli connection and rumors of US desires for bases on the island have
further stirred Indian concerns. New Delhi's policy toward the
insurgents is complicated by sympathy in Tamil Nadu for the insurgency.
New Delhi is uncomfortable with the publicity about the insurgent
training in Tamil Nadu and there is some question about whether India can
control the Tamil Tigers.
New Delhi sees the following problems with a Tamil separatist
state in Sri Lanka:
-- large numbers of Tamil refugees would want to enter India;
-- the new state would request aid from New Delhi; and
-- Tamil separatist agitation in Tamil Nadu might revive.
2
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8
0 SECRET
?
In the eyes of the Tamil community, the US has become identified
with the central government and is an increasingly attractive target for
terrorism. The intelligence community should be alert to signs of
internalization of the civil strife.
2. Syria
Responses to Recent Moderate Arab Moves: Despite the sharp
challenge to Syria by recent moves among the Arab moderates, there has
been little overt Syrian response so far:
The resumption of Iraqi-US diplomatic ties--although
unwelcome--did not come as a surprise to Damascus. The US
is a useful card for Syria to play in its dealings with the
USSR, and US-Syrian relations are not likely to be affected
by US-Iraqi relations.
In reaction to increased Jordanian-PLO-Egyptian ties, Assad
has so far limited his response to several "deniable"
terrorist attacks aimed at Jordan and the PLO. Assad is
waiting to see if the new links will bear fruit or wither.
Assad is feeling threatened but is biding his time because he
has few options at the moment. A Damascus-based rump PLO does not appear
viable, nor does the revival of a confrontation states alliance. Syrian
ties with Libya are of limited usefulness to Assad because of mutual
distrust and Qadhafi's lack of reliability. Ties with Iran are better
and more useful, with Damascus serving as a conduit for arms to Tehran
and Iran providing bargain-priced oil.
Warning Notes
We are entering an especially dangerous period with Syria.
Assad appears to have few options but terrorism to influence regional
players. If a moderate Arab alliance becomes more viable and especially
if Jordan--perhaps in conjunction with the PLO or other moderate
Arabs--moves toward negotiations with Israel, Assad will probably step up
the use of terrorism and assassination and would consider military
threats against Jordan.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8
? Jtl.Kt I
?
3. Libya: Qadhafi's Next Moves
Malta: Qadhafi has everything to gain and little to lose from
the recent announced Libyan-Malta military and economic treaty. Libya
in particular will gain access to Maltese ports. It is not clear whether
Qadhafi's goal is to attempt to control the sea lanes in the central
Mediterranean, or (more likely) this is just one more of his many moves
to increase his diplomatic ties and to isolate the US in opposition to
his regime.
Chad: Qadhafi will gain de facto control of the country down to
the 16th parallel if the French do not stop him. Given recent French
policy, it appears few care about Libya's involvement in Chad except for
Qadhafi's neighbors and the US.
Egypt: The latest flare up in tensions appears to be dying
down. In the short term the Libyans are unlikely to attempt overt or
covert actions against Egypt, but over the longer term Qadhafi is likely
to revert to covert attacks against opposition figures in Egypt.
Tunisia: With 8ourguiba's health failing, Qadhafi will continue
to look for means to build influence and he can be expected to take
advantage of the turmoil when Bourguiba leaves the scene. Without
Bourguiba, the Tunisians will be more susceptible to Libyan pressure and
more vulnerable to Qadhafi's blandishments. Qadhafi may resurrect his
previous proposals for union of the two countries. Algeria will provide
the key counterweight to Libyan pressure on Tunisia.
4. Morocco
Morocco's financial and social problems are getting worse. They
do not appear threatening to King Hassan's regime in the short term, but
there is always the potential for urban violence. If large scale
violence should break out, security forces in the cities would be hard
pressed and could be overwhelmed because most of the Army's troops are in
the Sahara.
The Union with Libya. There was a difference of views between
DDI/NESA analysts and the NI /NESA on the implications of the
Moroccan-Libyan union for King Hassan. DDI/NESA analysts believe that
the union is not an entirely negative development for King Hassan. More
Moroccans--up to 1,000 a month--are going to Libya for work, Moroccan
firms have won some contracts in Libya, and there has been a small amount
of aid from Tripoli. Politically, there is some rhetorical agreement
between the two countries on Middle East issues but Morocco continues
quiet talks with Israel. Hassan is not going to admit--at least so
soon--that the union is failing and he still hopes to get Qadhafi to
decrease--if not end--his support for the Polisario. Increased Saudi oil
aid since announcement of the union was mentioned as a possible sign of
Riyadh's approval of Hassan's efforts to moderate Qadhafi's behavior.
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8
? SECRET
ID
Hassan is extending the berm closer than previously thought to
Algeria, which is seen as a sign that he will not back down in his effort
to consolidate control of the Western Sahara. Both Morocco and Algeria
state that they want to talk, but there appears to be little prospect for
meaningful negotiations. In sum, the union appears to have put the
Polisario ahead politically but Morocco ahead militarily.
NI0/NESA believes the fallout from the union has been almost
entirely negative for Morocco
The union is already going sour, e
.Algerians are a more serious military backer of the Polisario than Libya,
and Moroccan economic expectations of the benefits from the union are too
high. The union hurts Hassan more than it helps him. The negative
implications of the union bear watching, particularly should Hassan try
to push the US to choose between Morocco or Algeria.
'4~ C' ~'&
5
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150007-8