MONTHLY WARNING AND FORECAST MEETINGS FOR DECEMBER 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100150001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 8, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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49 SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC #00105-85
8 January 1985
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR:. Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings for December 1984
1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:
USSR
Community analysts agree that Soviet defense spending increased in
1983. CIA estimates a growth of 2-3 percent (rubles) in procurement, a
conclusion supported by increased industrial performance and defense
floorspace. DIA believes the growth rate is somewhat higher. DIA further
notes that computed in dollars the Soviets increased procurements by 5-10
percent in 1983.
The future is not clear and the 1985-90 five-year plan is not finalized,
but Moscow's recent announcement of a 12 percent defense spending increase is
a good indicator that spending is up or will be rising and is more than a
purely political warning.
The January meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko
is giving rise to unrealistic hopes for near-term arms control progress.
European governments seem receptive to Soviet arguments against SDI for
reasons such as fear of "decoupling from Europe", domestic political problems
and disarmament movements.
Moscow's objective in arms control is to arouse enough public
anticipation of an agreement to constrain the SDI program and ASAT testing.
The Soviets will likely stress the interconnectedness of space, offensive
systems and INF and insist that US concessions on space are necessary before
ICBM and INF issues can be addressed.
On the other hand, the Soviets are aware of the US technology lead and
cannot afford to wait for a major US SDI procurement decision. NIO/USSR
believes that the Soviets would be taking an enormous risk if they do not
reallocate resources.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
25X1
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Some analysts believe that the costs to the Soviets and their probably
painful tradeoffs in a lackluster economy may represent corollary reasons why
they are coming to negotiations and thereby offer opportunities for the West.
Western Europe
Analysts agree that the Belgium INF deployment is unlikely to occur in
1985. Prime Minister Martens will probably opt for early elections that will
probably result in the strengthening of anti-INF forces and an indefinite
postponement of a deployment decision.
USSR/Yugoslavia
For the first time in recent years, the Soviets publicly attempted to
sway deliberations at a highly sensitive plenum in Belgrade. Pravda
selectively quoted Yugoslav journals to publicize its misgivings about
decentralization, ideological drift in the society, and the use of "democratic
consensus" in decision making. It also showed concern about Western lenders'
growing influence in Yugoslavia's debt-ridden economy. Much of the Soviet
posture supported Serbian leaders who are determined, against major
opposition, to seek centralization.
Chile
Pinochet's declaration of a state of seige on 6 November and his adamancy
in dealing with opposition parties portends further delays in the transition
to democracy. Violence, the legacy of abuses and the radical leftist
opposition, has grown worse. Time is working against US interests, because
the more the transition to democracy is delayed, the greater is the likelihood
of serious instability.
El Salvador
The FMLN has adopted a harder line in negotiations with the government.
Yet, its capabilities to engage in large-scale combat operations remain low.
The FMLN seems to be emphasizing urban terrorism, disruption of the coffee
harvest in western El Salvador and perhaps occasional attacks on departmental
capitals.
Latin America
The threat of drug-related violence targeted at US and foreign officials
will continue to increase. Powerful Colombian traffickers are capable of
instigating an international campaign of coordinated, systematic violence. In
Columbia, the extradition issue will fuel the violence, but Bolivia and Peru
will also remain high-threat areas.
Sri Lanka
The current disorders in Sri Lanka are the worst since the communal
bloodbath in July 1983. The insurgents have large stockpiles of weapons and
are becoming more effective fighters. The military is contributing to the
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problem because of its inability to discipline the ranks, especially to
prevent revenge killings. Moderate Tamils might reassert themselves against
extremists if the government were to accede to demands for a unified
autonomous Tamil region.
There is an increased possibility that US facilities or personnel will be
targets, because to many Tamils the US is identified with the central
government.
The N1O/NESA also notes that India is an important player in the Tamil
problem. The 41 million Tamils in India's southern state of Tamil Nadu have
strong ethnic ties with Sri Lanka's 3 million Tamils. Both the central
government in New Delhi and the state government in Tamil Nadu have provided
substantial support--including humanitarian and military assistance--for the
Sri Lank an Tamils for several years. The state of Tamil Nadu continues to be
an important haven for Tamil refugees fleeing ethnic violence in Sri Lanka and
for the island's Tamil militants seeking a safehaven.
India has a general fear of internal problems in neighboring countries
spilling over into India. New Delhi is asserting its right to intervene if
events threaten Indian security. The "Israeli connection" and rumors of US
desires for bases on the island have also stirred Indian concerns.
Syri a
We are entering an especially dangerous period with Syria. Assad appears
to have few options, but terrorism, to influence regional players. In
reaction to increased Jordanian-PLO-Egyptian ties, Assad has initiated several
terrorist attacks aimed at Jordan and the PLO. If a moderate Arab alliance
becomes more viable and perhaps moves toward negotiations with Israel, Assad
will probably step up terrorism and assassination and would consider military
threats against Jordan. Assad has already become frustrated by his lack of
ability to affect the PLO discussions.
Uganda
Obote is plagued by a deteriorating security situation and political
infighting in his government. Guerrillas are not a threat to the government
at present, but the army is also unlikely to defeat the guerrillas. There are
some 330 North Koreans in Uganda, some of whom are evidently serving as unit
advisors in the field.
The publication of the upcoming Human Rights Report almost certainly will
further sour US/Ugandan relations. Obote could use the report as a pretext to
turn more to the East, most likely North Korea and possibly Cuba.
Nigeria
The community agrees that a change at the top of the Nigerian government
could come within the next month or so. Discontented officers of all ranks
have numerous reasons to support a coup.
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2. Trend Commentary:
Greece
Papandreou continues to move away from the NATO consensus. Recent
"retirements" by senior Greek officers are probably connected to his
declarations that the Greek defense strategy would shift from the Soviet Union
toward the "Turkish threat." Questions arise about the possibility of an
effective military opposition to this decision developing. There is, however,
no evidence to date of any concerted military counteraction to Papandreou's
moves.
US/PRC/Taiwan
The maturing of the US/PRC relationship wil make dealing on a wide
variety of strategic and economic issues easier, but relations with Taiwan
will become more difficult as Taiwan will view the developments as counter to
its interests. Taiwan wants more direct US assistance and less aid to
Beijing. They will press the US.
USSR/Vietnam
While the arrival of Soviet MIG-23s in Vietnam will not significantly
increase the threat to ASEAN countries, it will play a role in their decisions
on combat aircraft purchases. Pressure will mount for the F-16 rather than
the F-20 and may include requests for earlier aircraft delivery.
Nicaragua
There is a general consensus that the military balance between the
Nicaraguan armed forces and the Contras is tilting in favor of the
Sandinistas. The Sandinistas are becoming more efficient in coordinating
combat operations and using newly-arrived equipment. In contrast, they have
problems in recruiting, the draft and a high desertion rate.
Narcotics
The Chihuahua, Mexico marijuana plantation seizures demonstrate the
potential threat to the US from remote regions of northern Mexico. The market
price could provide incentives to develop additional plantations to fill the
void if Colombian marijuana control programs are successful.
Libya
The Libyan diplomatic offensive continues. Qadhafi has everything to
gain and little to lose from the recently announced treaty with Malta. Libya
will gain access to Maltese ports.
Qadhafi will gain de facto control of Chad down to the 16th parallel if
the French do not stop him.
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With Bourguiba's health failing, Qadhafi will continue to seek means to
build influence. in Tunisia. Without Bourguiba's influence, the Tunisians will
be more susceptible to Libyan pressure and blandishments.
Morocco
Morocco's financial and social problems are getting worse. They do not
threaten the regime in the short term, but there is a potential for urban
violence. If large-scale violence should break out, security forces in the
cities would be hard pressed and could be overwhelmed because most of the army
is in the Sahara.
NI0/NESA believes the results of the Morocco/Libya union have been almost
entirely negative for Morocco. The implications of the union bear our
attention, particularly if the results cause Hassan to push the US to choose
between Morocco and Algeria.
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