MONTHLY WARNING AND FORECAST MEETINGS FOR NOVEMBER 1984
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91B00776R000100110006-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 23, 2009
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 12, 1984
Content Type:
MEMO
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
12 December 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings for November 1984
1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:
Pol and
The killing of Father Popieluszko will probably galvanize the previously
floundering opposition, radicalize the lower clergy, complicate church/state
relations and dampen any near-term improvement in Polish relations with the
West. Jaruzelski must decide how to conduct a murder investigation without
further angering Moscow or stimulating a backlash within the Polish internal
security services. He must also contain the opposition without alienating the
church even further. Against this background of growing political unrest and
potentially adverse Western responses to his methods, he must proceed with a
difficult economic problem. The outlook is for renewed instability in Poland.
Yugoslavia
The trial and probable sentencing of six dissidents is likely to result
in more opposition activities in Yugoslavia and increased Western criticism of
human rights practices which will complicate relations with the West at a time
when economic problems make support from the US and the West a critical
element for stability.
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Western Europe
French sponsorship of a revitalized West European Union (WEU) is
motivated by the threat of Congressional action to reduce the US troop level,
fears of an FRG drift toward neutralism and interest in improving defense
cooperation.
Although the WEU is concentrating on relatively limited objectives, it
could pose some challenges to US interests over the longer term. Some West
Germans are suggesting it could become a forum for European discussion of arms
control issues and some might use the meetings to develop a consensus on
security issues prior to consultation with the US.
Ind i a
The situation in India is returning to normal, but remains fragile.
Rajiv has moved quickly to appoint advisors, put his men in key posts and
called elections. The Sikh-Hindu conflict has produced deep tensions in the
army, but those affected are primarily junior officers and new recruits rather
than seasoned veterans. While there will be severe strains generated, the
Indian military will maintain its integrity.
No signficant Indian foreign policy changes are foreseen. There could be
opportunities for improvement in relations with Pakistan and the US, but Rajiv
seems to be expecting others to make the first moves.
Indian debate over security from a Pakistani threat revolves around
India's nuclear program. Hawks want to proceed now with developing an Indian
bomb. The more cautious wish to wait pending evidence on a Pakistani nuclear
bomb. The NI0/Warning notes that in addition to the internal lobbying
unconfirmed evidence suggests the Soviets have been encouraging Indian action
against Pakistan.
Philippines
Despite General Ver's leave of absence as Chief of Staff and his stepping
down as head of national intelligence and security, his access and behind-the-
scenes authority remains. We expect Marcos to keep firm control of Ramos
rather than allowing him to gain power at Ver's expense. There are rumors
that Ramos may retire rather than be a figurehead. The potential for conflict
over leadership in the Armed Forces is growing, but we expect Marcos to
continue to exercise control of the Armed Forces if he can survive his near-
term health problem.
Southeast Asia
Aggressive Vietnamese action during the past wet season resulted in a
much more favorable position for an early dry season offensive. The
Vietnamese are likely to press ahead with an offensive, the Chinese action on
the Sino-Vietnamese or the Sino-Laotian borders notwithstanding.
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TOP SECRET
Egypt/Libya
New Libyan terrorist acts remain probable
Morocco/Algeria
Unconfirmed reporting indicates that Morocco expects an escalation in its
current conflict with Algeria and is preparing the civil population both
logistically and psychologically for such an eventuality.
NI0/Warning adds that
a-significant escalation between
Moroccan and Algerian forces is becoming more likely.
Sudan
Sudan faces an economic crisis in the next two-to-three months that could
seriously threaten the Nimeiri regime. Sudan is hopelessly in arrears to the
IMF, oil stocks are nearly depleted, food demonstrations have occurred in the
outskirts of Khartoum and the low level of the Nile River will cause power
shortages. Despite Nimeiri's moderating of the Islamization campaign, he will
be politically vulnerable in the near term. He is scheduled to be traveling
outside Sudan during December. NI0/Warning notes that conditions of
instability are chronic and are likely to worsen if Nimeiri actually leaves
the country.
Africa
The community has begun to focus on the political and policy implications
of the food crisis in Africa. NIO/Warning notes that the long-term nature of
the famine, agricultural policy failures, environmental issues, and overall
patterns of economic decline present serious and continuing potential for
political instability. Many of the affected countries in Africa are
especially susceptible to manipulation by aid donors which could include Libya
or the USSR.
El Salvador
Sustained offensive sweeps by the Army have kept the insurgents off
balance and generally forced them to revert to smaller unit operations.
Nevertheless the guerrillas are still capable of large-scale surprise
operations against vulnerable targets.
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2. Trend Commentary:
USSR/Afghanistan
After five years in Afghanistan the Soviets have made little progress
against the insurgents and the Karmal regime remains dependent on the Soviet
military presence. Despite military morale problems and some civilian
grumbling, a negotiated agreement or a Soviet withdrawal are out of the
question. The Soviets are likely pursuing a long term favorable outcome. The
problems in Afghanistan are probably not well known by Moscow and have not
been regularly reported. Analysts anticipate the deployment of more troops,
but consider it unlikely that the Soviets would increase troop strength by
more than 30 percent in the near future.
Chad
About half of the military-force that had been moved out of Libyan
garrisons in Chad are back in the old positions. Qadhafi 's intentions remain
unclear, but suspect, as he continues to take the initiative, leaving the West
and others to respond.
Jamaica
Although concerns about violence and instability in Jamaica have eased
somewhat recently, the worsening economic situation means trouble for the
political future of Seaga as former Prime Minister Manley gathers increasing
support.
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12 December 1984
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings for November 1984
Distribution:
Cy 1 - DCI (w/att)
Cy 2
Cy 3
Cy 4
Cy 5
Cy 6
Cy 7
Cy 8
Cy 9
Cy 10
Cy 11
Cy 12
Cy 13
CY 14
Cy 15
Cy 16
Cy 17
Cy 18
Cy 19
Cy 20
Cy 21
Cy 22
Cy 23
Cy 24
Cy 25
Cy 26
Cy 27
Cy 28
Cy 29
Cy 30
Cy 31
Cy 32
Cy 33
Cy 34
Cy 35
Cy 36
Cy 37
Cy 38
Cy 39
Cy 40
Cy 41
Cy 42
Cy 43
Cy 44
- DDCI (w/att)
- Executive Director (w/att)
- SA/DCI/IS (w/o att)
- Executive Registry (w/att)
- C/NIC (w/att)
- DDO/C/EPDS (w/att)
DDO/C/PCS (w/att)
VC/NIC (w/att)
UVI eRep/ULL (w/o att
D/AG (w/o att)
NI0/AF (w/o att)
NIO/AL (Hutchinson) (w/o att)
NI0/AL (Low) (w/o att)
NIO/EA (w/o att)
NI0/GPF (w/o att)
NIO/LA (w/o att)
NI0/NESA (w/o att)
NIO/Econ (w/o att)
NIO/SP (w/o att)
NIO/USSR (w/o att)
NIO/Europe (w/o att)
NIO/S&T (w/o att)
NIO/CT (w/o att)
NI0/FDIA (w/o att)
D/CPAS (w/o att)
D/OCR (w/o att)
D/SOVA (w/o att)
D/EURA (w/o att)
D/ALA (w/o att)
D/OIA (w/o att)
D/NESA (w/o att)
D/OEA (w/o att),
D/OGI (w/o att)
D/OSWR (w/o att)
C/COMIREX (w/o att)
U/HKU watt)
James Lucas, WHCMF (w/o att)
NWS (w/o att)
DDI/IPC (w/o att)
C/SIGINT Com. (w/o att)
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Cy 45 - SRP (w/o att)
Cy 46 - DDI/CRES (w/o att)
Cy 47 - Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (w/o att)
Cy 48 Director, INR (w/o att)
Cy 49 INR/IC/RD (S. Kuser) (w/o att)
Cy 50 - A/NI0/W (w/o att)
Cy 51 - SA/W (w/o att)
Cy 52 - NIO/W Chron (w/o att)
Cy 53 - NIO/W Subject File (w/att)
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