MONTHLY WARNING MEETINGS FOR FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100080042-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: March 13, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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? T O P S E C R E T ?
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01670-84
13 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence?
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT Monthly Warning Meetings for February 1984
The highlights of the monthly warning meetings follow with
comments:
a. Soviet Leadership
NIO/USSR-EE at his monthly warning meeting
called for a more systematic effort towards
perceiving the truth behind the flood of
information and disinformation emerging from
the USSR. We (NIO/Wl wholeheartedly endorse
such an effort and caution against reliance on
signals from "American Opinion Handlers" who
have a record of trying to mislead the United
States as well as other outside observers.
We believe, on the basis of
post-mortem on Andropov, that it is ig y
likely that the struggle for succession was
begun and ended well before his death.
Therefore, the naming of Chernenko was the
realization of already concluded discussions
and debates and that a power struggle is not
ensuing.
We understand that an in-depth analysis
is underway within the Intelligence Community
of sources of information we have for what is
going on in the Kremlin with an eye toward
identifying the "American Handlers" and
sources of disinformation. This analysis is
REGRADE AS SECRET
WHEN SEPARATED FROM T O P S E C R E T
ATTACHMENTS
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critical to western understanding of Kremlin
activities.
b. Iran-Iraq
CIA analysts expect a major Iranian
offensive to begin by the end of March,
probably centering on the al Basra front
although several other areas are also likely
to see major Iranian efforts. Analysts agree
that the Iraqi response is almost certain to
include air attacks on Iranian economic
targets--spec ificall,y Khark Island and ships
entering and leaving Iranian ports.
Baghdad recently threatened to counter
the Iranian offensive with new weapons. DIA,
NSA and CIA analysts expect a widespread use
of mustard agents to help blunt the offensive;
there is also concern that Iraq's aggressive
program to produce CW nerve agents may make
them available by late summer. Use of nerve
agents has many potential implications
including breach of a significant lethal CW
threshold, a severe Iranian reaction, Iraqi
supply to other Arab States, and renewed
rationale for Israeli military actions against
the new weapons capability.
Analysts questioned whether either Iran
or Iraq could shut down the flow of oil
through the Strait of Hormuz. NIO/W and
NIO/Economics, however, emphasize about the
psychological impact on the merchant marine
insurance companies of sinking just one or two
oil tankers - and whether or not they could
effectively close the Strait by simply raising
their insurance rates on shipping in the
Persian Gulf. Both NIO's also question
whether oil tankers could be protected from
suicide attacks even after a U.S, and Western
intervention to keep the Strait open.
c. Lebanon
Analysts agreed that President Gemayel has
few if any options left. Whatever short-term
results, Lebanon will probably return to
something like the status quo before the
Israeli invasion minus the Palestinians--
Syrian control in north and east, a Christian
heartland, a Druze canton, small areas of Shia
T O P S E C R E T
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control, and a permament Israeli zone in the
south. The emergence of an exceptionally
strong Shia movement or the return of the
Palestinians to West Beirut could provoke
aggressive actions by either Israel or
Syria. Analysts concluded that the Soviets
have achieved their major goal in Lebanon--the
withdrawal of U.S. troops--and, because of
Syria jealously guarding its position in
Lebanon, the Soviets might not want to play a
larger role there.
d. South Africa/Mozambique/Angola
Pretoria seems to have improved its
relations with Maputo, but analysts are not
certain about whether South Africa will
abandon the insurgents in Mozambique or if
abandonment will seriously hurt the
insurgents' activities. South African
withdrawal from Angola seems to be proceeding
slowly with Pretoria maintaining the
capability to return to southern Angola if
necessary. Despite negotiations between the
two countries, the guerrilla war between UNITA
and Angola seems to be heating up. Analysts
are watchful for hints of Soviet intentions,
the extent of Cuban involvement, the level of
activity by SWAPO, and the outcome of various
maneuvers on all sides .in Angola.
Nigeria
The new regime appears to be trying to
calm tensions and is beginning to deal with
the economic situation. The punishment of
former officials charged with corruption may
be an indicator to junior officers of the
government's intentions. Nonetheless, rumors
of dissatisfaction among the officer corps in
the military persist and could lead to another
coup, especially if regional unrest continues.
f. Sudan
Analysts are concerned about the growing
insurgency in the south and President
Nimeiri's ineffective efforts to deal with
it. Continued attacks on economic targets in
the south could cost Sudan the support of the
international economic and financial
community. Some analysts are worried about
T O P S E C R E T
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the state of Nimeiri's health and its effect
on his activity. He has not moved decisively
as he did in previous crises, but forceful
action is required to avoid a prolonged
insurgency in the south.
g. Kampuchea
The Vietnamese dry season offensive has
not yet materialized, although there are
increasing reports of preparations.
Vietnamese hesitation may be the result of
increased Democratic Kampuchean forces
activity -- the highest in five years.
h. F-16 Sales to ASEAN
F-16/100 appears to be the most preferred
fighter aircraft by several ASEAN nations.
The French government might offer terms for
the Mirage 2000 that could make it
competitive. ASEAN regards U.S. approval of
F-16/100 sales as an indicator of U.S.
commitment to their security needs.
i. Chile
The prospect for a political confrontation
in Chile in the next few months is better than
50/50. Several protests have been proclaimed
for March and April. May and June have been
troubled times in the past. A serious crisis
could result from either:
--Major changes in the political parties'
law
--The resignation of Interior Minister
Jarpa
--The handling of opposition political or
labor activities
--Attacks on the church, on rights, or on
political activity
--Widespread support for a national strike
--Firing of military personnel for
political remarks.
j. El Salvador
Analysts expect the guerrillas to keep up
their military activity, despite their
statement that they would not oppose the
elections. Castro is working diplomatically
T O P S E C R E T
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? T O P S E C R E T ?
with West Europeans, particularly the French,
and Central Americans to avoid either a
victory by the E1 Salvadoran Army or a U.S.
reaction to an insurgent victory that could
spill over to policy toward Nicaragua. He
stresses the reasonableness of Salvadoran
insurgents and the value of negotiations. The
U.S. Congress has also been a target of his
political activity. Cuba may desire a right-
wing election victory, counting on a negative
reaction by our Congress.
k. Pakistan/Afghanistan/USSR/India
Afghan aircraft attacked Afghan refugee
camps in Pakistan in late January. Analysts
were divided over the question of whether this
represents an escalation on the part of the
Soviets or a passing incident; however, there
is also a Soviet media campaign to incite
Indian animosity toward Pakistan. Most
analysts doubted that the Soviets had launched
a new chase of their involvement in south
Asia, but the situation needs careful
observation.
1. Pakistan's Uranium Production
Th Intelligence Community presently thinks
that Pakistan will not be able to produce
bomb-significant amounts of fissile material
for at least two years. Pakistani officials,
however, are boasting of their progress in
this area. We in the Intelligence Community
do not have adequate information on Pakistani
activities while at the same time we
acknowledge that there is an unsettling amount
of work going on. A reassessment of the
evidence is underway.
Attachments:
Warning Reports (h/w)
T O P S E C R E T
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