NIO MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENTS: FEBRUARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100010038-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: March 9, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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National Intelligence Council
9 March 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: February
1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situation.
a. PLO-Jordan
(1) The outcome of the Palestine National
Council session will not enable King Hussein
to take positive initiatives in response to
President Reagan's Middle East proposals.
Arafat succeeded in averting a damaging split
in the PLO but at the price of restricting his
maneuverability in further talks with
Hussein. Although Arafat won approval for
continuing the dialogue, he did not secure the
Council's authority to appoint non-PLO
Palestinians to a joint negotiating team with
Jordan.
(3) There is a somewhat greater chance
that Syria, Libya and their Palestinian
clients will attempt to nullify Arafat's
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modest success by pressing the Saudis to
withhold support for PLO strategy or by
mounting terrorist actions, including
assassination attempts against Arafat and his
supporters.
b. Iran-Iraq
(1) Another large Iranian attack on the
Doveyrich River front is likely in the next
few weeks, but the prospects for a major
breakthrough are remote.
(2) A second Iranian failure probably
will oblige Tehran to revert to an indefinite
war of attrition in the hope that a
deterioration of Iraqi troop morale and the
Iraqi economy will eventually force Saddam
Hussein's overthrow.
c. Libya-Sudan-Egypt
(1) Qadhafi is undoubtedly smarting from
the failure of the latest plot to oust
Sudanese President Nimeiri. While he will
probably remain cautious for a time, we can
fully expect further actions against the
nations of Subsaharan Africa and the U.S. and
its allies.
d. Sino-Soviet Talks
(1) Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese
expect a breakthrough in the second round of
talks. The Chinese have introduced a
complicating factor by stating they will raise
the issue of the possible transfer of SS-20's
to the Soviet Far East. Both sides, however,
remain interested in keeping the door open to
agreement on at least cultural and scientific
exchanges. Alexander Bovin's mission to
Beijing last month may have explored prospects
for agreement on confidence-building measures
along the border which could prepare the way
for eventual mutual force reductions.
e. Southern Africa
(1) The infiltration of SWAPO guerrillas
into northern Namibia last month and South
Africa's military reaction have reduced the
chances of even a limited disengagement of
South African and Angolan/Cuban forces. South
Africa probably will use the infiltration to.
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justify increased military operations against
SWAPO bases deep in Angola.
(2) The expansion of UNITA operations in
central Angola also is likely to lead to a
substantial increase in military activity on
the Angola-Namibia front in the next few
weeks.
f. Argentina
(1) President Bignone's announcement that
elections will be held on 30 October and that
the new government will take office in late
January or early February 1984 has eased
domestic tensions temporarily. Despite stern
warnings by the government, the coming
election campaign will generate renewed
criticism of military rule, and another
political crisis is likely before the
elections.
g. El Salvador
(1) The issue of Defense Minister
Garcia's resignation probably will come to a
head by the end of March. If he reneges on
the earlier understanding that he would retire
this spring, President Magana will either have
to act on the military commission's likely
recommendation that Garcia step down or risk a
coup attempt by anti-Garcia officers.
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(2) The insurgents will attempt to
exploit the power struggle in the officer
corps by launching further large-scale attacks
against towns, military outposts, and economic
targets.
avi Y. McManis
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