NIO MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENTS: APRIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100010016-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: May 9, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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S E C R E T
9
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NIC #3400-83
9 May 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: April
1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situation.
a. USSR
(1) Andropov has deepened the Soviet
commitment to respond firmly to INF deployment
next winter. In his speech at a dinner in
honor of East German party chief Honecker on 4 May,
Andropov warned that a "chain reaction is
inevitable" and that the USSR, East Germany,
and the other Warsaw Pact states "will be
compelled to adopt response measures." His
offer to negotiate an INF accord based on
equality of both warheads and delivery
vehicles "in Europe" was aimed at encouraging
West European governments, especially West
Germany, to press for a delay in INF
deployment. If these tactics are
unsuccessful, however, the Soviets will have
to proceed with threatened countermeasures or
risk having their warnings exposed as bluff.
(2) Honecker's cancellation of his visit
to Bonn next fall was in part an attempt to
influence politics and policy in the CDU-FDP
coalition, but it may also have been related
to Soviet Bloc plans for responding to INF
deployment. East Germany's threat on 26 April
to curtail West German access to West Berlin
raises the possibility that Bloc reactions
will include restrictions on or harassment of
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Western access to both West and East Berlin.
The fact that the East Germans were willing to
invoke even an indirect warning of a new
Berlin crisis underscores Moscow's resolve to
defeat INF deployment or at least to respond
with forceful measures to counter the
strengthening of the U.S. political and
strategic position in Europe and to defend the
Soviet Union's insistence on "equality and
equal security" in the East-West nuclear
balance.
b. Middle East
(1)i
Assad's tactics may include
demands for security arrangements in eastern
Lebanon similar to the Israeli security zone
in southern Lebanon. He may also attempt to
establish linkage between a withdrawal
agreement and Israeli and U.S. commitments to
broader negotiations that would include
Syria's demand for recovering the Golan
Heights.
(2) A prolonged stalemate over Syrian
conditions for withdrawing will increase the
potential for clashes between Israeli forces
and Syrian-su rted Palestinian
Lebanon.
25X1
25X1
Jordanian moves to limit immigration
into the East Bank could also stimulate
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c. Central America
(1) The Sandinistas are attempting to
exploit the Contadora group's mediation
initiative to focus international attention on
the US and Honduran relationship with the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force and to influence
the Central American dialogue toward calling
for a cessation of foreign support for and
withdrawal of Nicaraguan insurgent forces.
Foreign Minister D'Escoto's protest over
alleged U.S. and Honduran support for a "new
aggression", claiming that 1,000 Honduran
troops are supporting insurgent attacks inside
Nicaragua, illustrates the Sandinistas'
calculation that Contadora mediation can be
manipulated to intimidate Honduras and to
place the U.S. on the defensive.
(2) The Nicaraguans are also building a
case to justify cross-border military
operations against insurgent bases in
Honduras. They probably believe they can
capitalize on traditional Latin American
emphasis on non-intervention to defend limited
military reprisals and to force Honduras to
withdraw support from the insurgents.
(3) If Sandinista political tactics
appear to be succeeding, the Cubans may adopt
a higher profile in supporting Nicaragua,
including the dispatch of more military
advisers and perhaps even direct Cuban
participation in Sandinista military
operations against the insurgents. In the
event that developments in the next few months
seem to place the US and Honduras on the
defensive, Castro would be tempted to make
demonstrative displays of political and
military support in order to claim credit for
having protected the Nicaraguan revolution
from U.S. attempts to overthrow it.
d. Southern Africa
(1) The South Africans are preparing for
another major offensive in southern Angola and
they are establishing a justification by
alleging a buildup of Angolan, SWAPO, and
S E C R E T
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Cuban forces. South African claims that a
large Angolan force with Cuban tanks is moving
to recapture UNITA-held positions in eastern
Angola are also intended to justify a major
incursiion and greater support for reported
UNITA plans to conduct an offensive near
Luanda before the end of May.
(2) Coordinated South African and UNITA
offensives would heighten the likelihood of a
clash with Angolan and Cuban forces. The
Soviets could be expected to focus
international attention on such an encounter
and to exploit the opportunity to increase
their military assistance/t,'8\Angola.
~P" /^ - '~
David Y. Mc,Manis
S E C R E T
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