WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91B00776R000100010010-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 14, 2008
Sequence Number:
10
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 20, 1983
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP91B00776R000100010010-9.pdf | 168.53 KB |
Body:
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The Director of Central Intelligence
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC #3692-83/1
20 May 1983
THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa
Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
Community representatives and specialists met on 17 May 1983 with the
Acting NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with
the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their
views have been misinterpreted, or if the_v__ave significant additional
concerns, I'll report further to you.
---Attachment
NIC #3692-83
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NIC #3692-83
20 May 1983
WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Discussion on southern Africa focused primarily on collection concerns.
INR opened the discussion by referring to reports
that had just been received from Luanda that an additional - Cuban
troops had arrived in Angola in early April without the authorization" of the
Angolan government.
South African press reports in March state
that 7,000 Cuban reinforcements had arrived in Angola in February. The varied
and often contradictory nature of the reporting on Cubans in Angola once again
highlights the difficulties in obtaining reliable intellignce on this
subject.
Angola/USSR: Analysts took note of the warm reception accorded Angolan
President dos Santos in Moscow, including a one-on-one meeting with
Andropov. No details were yet available on the discussions dos Santos had
with Soviet officials.
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
The discussion led off with a presentation on conditions in Chad by the
INR Chad analyst who-had just returned from a one-month TDY. This was
followed by comments on Habre's recent unsuccessful military operations
against the dissidents. The defeat of President Habre's forces in their
attempt to retake Ounianga Kebir in northern Chad was regarded by Community
analysts as a major setback but one that would not necessarily lead to the
collapse of the Habre government over the short term. Nevertheless, prospects
for Habre's government over the longer term are problematical. CIA analysts
warned that Habre must make gains in the north if he is to consolidate his
power, yet the northern Libyan-backed dissidents could remain in defensive
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positions there and draw down Habre's meager military resources as he
attempted to defeat the dissidents. Even if the dissidents did not move south
and a military stalemate resulted, Habre's position could erode. Continued
uncertainty about the situation in the north could well result 1n slippage in
much needed private investment and development funding, thereby threatening
even further a government that already is barely functioning.
Prospects for a reconciliation between northern and southern Chad are
also problematical. Habre himself is highly regarded in the south but his
military forces, which the government cannot afford to pay or supply
regularly, prey on the local population and thus encourge local opposition.
The Habre government is suspicious of French motives in Chad and believe that
Paris is holding back on military and economic aid. The Nigerians also are
resented for having opened hostilities on the Lake Chad border at a time when
Chad is facing other challenges.
-Tensions in Ghana are on the upswing. Food shortages continue to worsen
and have now even begun to reach the military. Opposition to the recently
announced budget is strong and has been greeted by student demonstrations and
threats of strikes by Ghana's various professional groups.
Upper Volta
Prospects for instability in Upper Volta appear to have diminished
considerably as a result of the arrest on 17 May of pro-Libyan Prime Minister
Sankara and most of his leftist supporters.
Kenya
Analysts throughout the Community are concerned that President Moi's
recent strident accusations of a Western-backed Kikuyu plot against him could
further inflame the Kikuyu and prod them to take action against him. Some
analysts feel tht Moi has underestimated the degree of hatred toward the
Kikuyu, Kenya's dominant tribe, by the other tribal groups that Moi has been
courting and that Moi's accusations could lead to serious tribal frictions
that threaten internal stability.
Somalia
The National Security Council representative noted that construction to
upgrade the military facilities at Berbera that will be used by the US is
about to begin .__He feared that US personnel involved in the construction
program-could be an attractive target for Libyan or Ethiopian attacks. He
--expressed skepticism over the Somali government's ability to provide adequate
security for US personnel.
US/Africa
The DI0 for Africa and the NSC representative also expressed concern over
the safety of US personnel in a number of African countries. They noted
disinformation campaigns in Nigeria and Ghana alleging CIA campaigns to
destabilize those governments. They also cited the possibility of growing
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problems in US-Kenyan relations stemming from Moi's accusations -- which are
primarily targetted against the British but also have a slight anti-US
undercurrent -- that could increase if US assistance to Kenya does not measure
up to Moi's expectations.
SNIPPETS
Organization of Africa Unity
The OAU is schedu_1_ed to hold its long-postponed summit in Addis Ababa on
June 6-10 and the prospects are not good for a harmonious meeting. The
controversy over the seating of-the-P` isario delegation has not been settled
"out of court" and could prove as disruptive at the upcoming meeting as it was
at the aborted summit meeting in Tripoli last August. Moreover, should former
president Goukouni, leader of the Libyan-backed anti-Habre dissidents, appear
in Addis, the session could well lapse into total disarray. Libyan leader
Qadhafi's hopes to revive his claim to chair the summit may have been a
motivating factor in his recent swing through Benin, Nigeria, and'Upper Volta
and his renewed interest in West Africa in general.
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