NIO MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENTS: MAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100010009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 6, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NIC #4060-83
6 June 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: May
1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situation.
a. USSR
(1) The Soviet campaign to block INF
deployments has intensified. The government
statement on 28 May warned that Soviet
countermeasures will include termination of
the unilateral moratorium on further SS-20
deployments in the European USSR, deployment
of "additional means" in Eastern Europe, and
unspecified countermeasures against U.S.
territory. In private remarks, Soviet and
East German officials have stated that SS-22
and SS-23 missiles will be emplaced in East
Germany and Czechoslovakia. A Hungarian
diplomat has asserted that Budapest has agreed
to accept Soviet missiles to counter NATO
missiles in Sicily.
(2) These warnings of countermeasures
have been accompanied by private. Soviet
assurances to West German Social Democrats
that the USSR will continue to seek a
compromise at the Geneva talks in order to
avert INF deployment. The Soviets clearly
hope to encourage sentiment in the SPD for a
postponement of deployment as long as the
Geneva talks continue and to intensify public
reaction in Western Europe if initial
deployments proceed on schedule. The Soviets
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apparently believe the SPD is sympathetic to
their offer to negotiate an agreement based on
equality between Soviet and UK-French medium-
range nuclear forces.
b. Middle East
(1) Syria's determination to scuttle the
Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement is
likely to lead to increased Syrian
interference in Lebanese politics and to
stepped-up Palestinian attacks on Israeli
troops in Lebanon. If the Lebanese parliament
ratifies the withdrawal accord, the Syrians
probably will intensify their efforts to
establish a "National Front" and a
"Presidential Council" that would act as
rivals to the Gemayel Government. Syrian and
Palestinian moves to destabilize the
government may include attempts to assassinate
Gemayel and other Maronite leaders.
(2) Syrian political efforts to
intimidate and subvert the Lebanese government
probably will be accompanied by periodic "war
scares" similar to the command and control
exercise in late May. The potential for
confrontation between Israeli and Syrian and
Palestinian forces has been increased by the
confusion in the PLO created by the Fatah
mutiny against Arafat's authority.
Internecine warfare within the PLO and Syrian
attempts to expand their control over the
organization could result in Arafat's removal
or assassination. Palestinian power struggles
may trigger provocative attacks on Israeli
troops that would oblige the Begin government
to launch reprisals against Palestinian and
Syrian forces in Lebanon.
(3) The prospect of expanding violence
and greater Israeli casualties may force Begin
to order a withdrawal to the 45-kilometer
security zone in southern Lebanon. Gemayel
probably would respond to an Israeli pullback
by increasing pressure on the U.S. and its MNF
partners to deploy their forces to the Shuf
area.
c. Poland
(1) There is some chance that the Pope's
visit will stimulate large anti-regime
demonstrations or provide opportunities for
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provocations by hardline elements in the
Polish establishment, perhaps with
encouragement by factions in Moscow. The
papal visit seems to have generated renewed
tensions between the hardliners and moderates
loyal to Jaruzelski.
(2) The potential for surpise rests in
part on possible Soviet support for attempts
by pro-Moscow conservatives in the Polish
party to exploit the Pope's visit to discredit
Jaruzelski's efforts to establish good
relations with the Church and reach an
accommodation with Polish society. Two Soviet
journals last month criticized alleged
political "pluralism" in Poland and demanded a
reassertion of orthodox principles and
ideological discipline. These themes were
repeated in a conservative Warsaw weekly that
was created in 1981 by Stefan Olszowski, a
pro-Soviet hardliner, to combat antisocialist
views.
d. Central America
(1) Changes in the Salvadoran military
command which have strengthened the extreme
right's influence may lead to a new round of
infighting that would further impair the
Army's ability to cope with the insurgents'
growing strength. The agrarian reform
program, moreover, could be jeopardized by
Defense Minister Vides' reported opposition to
enforcing reforms.
(2) There have been no further
indications that the Sandinistas are
contemplating early military initiatives to
force Honduras to end support for the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force. Managua may
intend to delay major decisions until it can
judge the prospects for exploiting the
Contadora group's mediation effort against
Honduras and the U.S. In the meantime, the
Sandinistas presumably believe ongoing arms
deliveries from the USSR and Cuba eventually
will place them in a position to force a
showdown with the contras and Honduras.
avid V. )Oqx s
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