MONTHLY WARNING MEETING - JUNE 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100010006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 24, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
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/ `~
j /,
National Intelligence_ Council
NIC 4621-83
24 June 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
/VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Assistan a tonal Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - June 1983
1. Implications of the PLO Infighting
Analysts concur that, whatever the origins of the so-called Fatah
mutiny, it is now clear that Syria is orchestratin the anti-Araf at unrest
in order to enhance further its strap e o on t e Mi a ast eace
rocess. Syria is exploiting ongstan ing ifferences within Fata and the
to weaken Araf at and undermine his claim to be the internationally
recognized spokesman/symbol of the PLO.
It is unlikely that the anti-Araf at dissidents number more than a
few hundred Fatah members. The Syrians have had to resort to using PFLP-GC
troops and Syrian tanks in the latest clashes because their Fatah
?mutineers" are too weak numerically. The Syrian goal in encouraging the
dissidents to seize PLO supply routes is mostly psychological since Syria
already controls the PLO's supply lines. The objective is to steadi~l~
t
dikt
.
a
diminish Araf at's stature and compel him to follow Syrian
In the near term Damascus probably does not want to oust Araft
completely. Total and explicit Syrian control over the PLO would erode its
usefulness to Damascus and give Israel greater excuse to hold Syria
responsible for any and all Palestinian terrorism. Rather Syria wants to
clip Arafat's wings. In particular President Ass ad wants to be certain
that the PLO will not revive the Jordanian option or deal directly with the
US. Syria's objective is to remove any option from the peace process other
than one that primarily serves Syrian interests.
There is always the danger, however, that events will force or
encourage Assad and his radical Palestinian allies to go further. Assad's
decision to expel Arafat from Damascus on 24 June may be a si
In any case, the risk of Araf at's assassination remains high.
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Although the other Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia and Algeria, and
the Soviets have given Arafat verbal support, none have taken practical
moves to help him. Arafat wants the Arabs to offer him an alternative
supply route through Tripoli in northern Lebanon but no Arab state seems
willing to take 'ng with the Syrian forces stationed just
outside Tripoli.
Arafat will probably seek to contain the dispute with Syria while
rallying Arab and Soviet pressure. His new term goal is to preserve as
much independence as possible in the Tripoli region. The local Lebanese
factions in Tripoli, both pro- and anti-Syrian, are not eager to see their
city turned i headquarters, however, for fear of Israeli
retaliation.
Arafat's diminished stature and reduced room for maneuver
increases the risk that he will lift the Fatah "ban" on international
terrorism or, at least, take fewer steps to curb non-Fatah radicals. Such
a dramatic reversal does not appear imminent but is a serious long term
risk. In any case Arafat's growing weaknesses and loss of control make
more terrorism by fringe groups like Black June and May 15 more likely.
Syria's role in su
hacnmina more evident
2. Lebanon - Implications of the Guerrilla Attacks on the Israelis
The attacks on IDF units in the south are primarily the work of
Lebanese leftists with some PLO support. Elements of the Shia Amal group,
communists and others are involved. Attacks average 5-10 per week. Some
evidence suggests PLO elements are trying to aet more involved in the war
of -attrition especially in the Sidon area.
The greatest danger in the current situation is that the
guerrillas will sooner or later stage a ver successful raid with
significant IDF casualties.
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There are several PLO
targets, for example, that could be k d b air or commandos without
involving significantly the Syrians.
The longer the guerrilla war continues the more it will erode the
Lebanese government's standing in the south. As leftist groups gain
popular support in the area they will become barriers to the GOL's
reassertion of its authority after an IDF pullback.
3. Syrian-Soviet Ties
There is general agreement that the Soviets are likely to ship SS-
21 surface-to-surface missiles to Syria t~ii~aT~l
e - is an improve - missy a which will enhance
Syrian long range artillery capabilities somewhat to disrupt IDF force
buildups and other behind-the-lines activities. It will not, however,
significantly alter the balance of power between the two sides. The
decision to send the -21 is further evidence of Moscow's support for
Assad.
ran-Iraq War
Efforts to mediate the conflict by the GCC states have collapsed
and recent Iranian propaganda clearly indicates that Tehran still believes
time is on its side. Iran is ursuin a lon term strate a war of
attrition aimed at sapping raq's finances an its wi to fig t.
Analysts concur
that Iraq can s ave off i s economi c proti rams r~'cn~
remain er o 83 but will face serious debt problems in 1984. Iraq
remains frustrated by its inability to seize the initiative but numerous
constraints -- especially the fears of its Gulf allies -- continue to
restrain Bag launching a major attack on Iran's Kharg Island oil
facilities.
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A small-scale Iranian offensive may be imminent in the central
border region at Naft-e shah or Mehran. It is likely to make only limited
'
s goal is
advances since Iraq is aware of the Iranian buildup. Tehran
primarily psychological, i.e. to keep the pressure on Saddam Hussein.
5. Western Sahara: Implications of the OAU Summit Resolution
The 11 June summit resolution reaffirmed previous OAU calls for a
referendum (scheduled for December) and for the first time labeled Morocco
and the Polisario Front as "the parties to the dispute." The OAU also
called for direct talks between Rabat and the Polisario.
Many problems remain to be resolved before a referendum can be
carried out and public Moroccan-Polisario talks are not likely any time
soon. Private negotiations are a possibility, however. The key is
Algeria's attitude. Algiers seems determined to pursue regional stability
and economic development as its first priority and appears eager for an
"honorable" Saharan solution. No dramatic breakthrough seems imminent.
Analysts are skeptical of Libya's pronouncement that it is
finished with the Saharan conflict and expects renewed Libyan meddling
sooner or later. Algeria, however, will retain its dominance over the
Polisario due to geographical facts.
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i~ECRET~
f
NIC 4621-83
24 June 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intellig
Deputy Director of Central I
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - Ju
en
nt
ne
ce
elligence
1983 25X1
NIC/NIO/NESA
24 June 83
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Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1
- DDCI
1
- State/INR/RNA
1
- ER
1
- DIO/NE
1
- Exec. Dir.
1
- DIA/DB-3C
1
- DDI
1
- DIA/JSI
.~
ADDI
1
- DIA/DE-4
1
- SA/IA
1
- DIA/DB-2
1
- C/IPC Staff
1
- DIA/DB-2C2
1
- C/NIC
1
- DIA/JSI-5A
1
- VC/NICs
1
- DIA/JSI-56
2
- NIO/NESA
1
- DIA/JSI-36
5
- NIO/W
1
- DIA/JSI-2B
1
- Each NIO
1
- OJCS MEAF Div.
1
- Each Office Director
1
- NSA/G-609
1
- SRP
1
- ACSI DAMI FII
1
- NIC/AG
1
- ONI Estimates Br.
1
- D0
1
- AF/INER 25X1
1
- DO
~
1
- AF/INES
1
- C/OCR/NEA
1
- HQ USMC CODE INTP
1
- OGI/CI/I/ITR
1
- NSC/ME
1
- NESA/AI/D
1
- Bill Eckert, Office of VP
1
- NESA/PG/D
1
- Cmdr. Phil Dur, NSC
1
- NESA/SO/D
1
- WLO/USCENTCOM
1
- DDI/CRES
1
- DDI Registry
1
- CPAS/ILS
1
- SIGINT Chairman
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1
- DDO/NE
25X1
1
- DD
O
25X1
1-DD
1 - DD
O
O
1 - C/CA
25X1
1 - SOVA
1 - C/DCD
25X1
1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD
1 - NPIC/IEG/TWFD/SAAB
1 - NPIC/IEG/NANENB
2 - ICS/OHC/DIR
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