NIO MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENTS: JUNE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 6, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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0 '0
S E C R E T
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC #4899-83
National Intelligence Council 6 J u l y 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: June
1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situation.
a. USSR
(1) The Soviets probably will intensify
their anti-INF campaign in the next three
months through further threats and
inducements. West Germany will remain the
pr incipal target of Soviet i
The as
Germans might
be "forced" to harass transit an
communications between West Germany and West
Berlin.
(2) Moscow probably will refrain from
blatant threats during Chancellor Kohl's visit
in early July, calculating that the most
effective way to induce his government to
change its support for adhering to the present
INF deployment schedule is by stimulating
public and political opposition in West
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
(3) Recent Soviet comments on the nature
of intended countermeasures against the U.S.
are consistent with current assessments that
the USSR is unlikely to introduce land-based
missiles in Cuba or base missile submarines at
Cuban ports. Officials of the USA Institute
implied in early June that the Soviets would
reposition missile submarines or deploy cruise
missile ships along the U.S. 200-mile
territorial waters limits, but they ruled out
deploying missiles to Cuba or Nicaragua.
b. Middle East
(1) Syria's maneuvers to secure firm
control of the PLO as an instrument of Syrian
policy will have far-reaching consequences in
Arab politics. It will substantially
strengthen Syria's position in Lebanon,
particularly if the Syrians bring the northern
port of Tripoli under their control, and
reinforce Syria's capacity to intimidate
Jordan and Saudi Arabia into supporting its
policy toward Israel and an Arab-Israeli
settlement.
(2) Syria's reported intention to
instigate disturbances in Tripoli as part of a
plan to bring the city and its surrounding
area under firm control may be a prelude to
the creation of a separatist government in
Lebanon headed by former president Franjiyah,
former primer minister Karami, and Druze
leader Junblatt. Formation of a Syrian-
controlled regime would be intended in part as
a reaction to the Lebanese parliament's
ratification of the Lebanese-Israeli
withdrawal agreement and, more ominously, as a
harbinger of Syrian moves to destabilize the
Gemayel government and eventually to overthrow
it.
(3) Although neither Syria nor Israel
intends to initiate major hostilities in the
next three months, Syrian moves to subvert the
Gemayel government or intensify Palestinian
attacks on Israeli troops in Lebanon would
force the Begin government to respond with
political pressures to counter Syrian
interference in Lebanese politics and perhaps
with reprisal strikes against Palestinian and
Syrian forces in Lebanon. The fragmentation
of the PLO and the possible removal or
assassination of Arafat will strengthen the
S E C R E T
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S 'PC R E T
influence of radical P
military operations LO factions advocating
Lebanon and generate against the Israelis
Lebanese Christians terrorist attacks onin
and on modeate rab
.S. targets in the M
U
Euope.
iddle Eastrand West and
Wester
c. Chile
Pinochet The authority
y and stability of the
tested in the next probably will be severely
demonstrations in May months.
ie
July, Opposition y and June will beotest
in Jul to Pinochet renewed
a s a rowing steadily in the last has been
g
result of Chile's economicar and a half
Economic growth declined crisis.
14 and t h i s trend has led b u s i n e s s
ini ne l ast
associations t major year,
the governmento join labor union sn
s austere economic POpposing
(Z) Pinochet' olicies.
changes in s response to demands for
five-year-oledcosntoamic policy, an end to the
of political of emergency, legalization
Paries
elections befo
retthe' and presidential
in 1989 will determinePresident's term expires
If Pinochet's efforts to course
in Of events.
Opposition forc
timidate
es fail,
and divide
revert to harsh re he will be inclined to
-pressive measures a ainst
the middle ~>
(3) If
fu
t
r
her anti_
result
a in violenovmenrtes cerntherr e w pwould ouldts
forces chance of a the de
that could rapidl split in the armed
and stimulate military y undermine the r
Pinochet. Y Pressure to re e9ime
place
(4) The Soviets have respond* by instructing the Chilean ed to events
abandon its polic Coommmmuun nist Part
roader y of armed stru y to
rivals Political alliances with igle ts Bts and seek
evolutiincluding the Movement left-
of the wing
oderates y Left. Chilean Political
ir
are concerned that the
he are e gaining the most from
Communists
te unrest
eadershipest organized forhundergrounbdecause
S E C R E T
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d. Central America
(1) The chances of a Sandinista military
response to incidents in which Honduran forces
have fired into Nicaragua are increasing. The
Sandinistas claim that the insurgents would be
unable to hold territory without Honduran
military support. Ongoing Soviet and Cuban
military deliveries and the apparent
augmentation of Cuban advisers may embolden
the Sandinistas to escalate military pressures
duras.
Attachments:
NIO/AF
NIO/EA
NIO/NARC
NI0/LA
NIO/NESA
NIO/USSR-EE
NIO/WE
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?
SUBJECT: NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: June
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI (w/atts)
Copy 2 - DDCI (w/atts)
3 - Executive Director (w/atts)
4 - SA/IS/DCI (w/o atts)
5 - Executive Registry (w/atts)
6 - DDI w/atts)
7 - DO (w/atts)
8 - DO w/atts)
9 - C/NIC (w/atts)
10 - VC/NIC (Mr. Meyer) (w/atts)
11 - VC/NIC (Mr. Waterman) (w/atts)
12 - D/AG
13 - NIO/AF
14 - NIO/AL
15 - NIO/EA
16 - NIO/GPF
17 - NIO/LA
18 - NIO/NESA
19 - NIO/E
20 - NIO/SP
21 - NIO/USSR-EE
22 - NIO/WE
23 - NIO/AG
24 - D/CPAS
25 - D/OCR
26 - D/SOVA
27 - D/EURA
28 - D/ALA
29 - D/OIA
30 - D/NESA
31 - D/OEA
32 - D/OGI
33 - D/OSWR
34 - C/COMIREX
35 - C/SIGINT Com.
36 - C/HRC
37 - SRP
38 - SA/DDI/CS
39 - NIO/W
40 - A/NIO/W
41 - SA/W
42 - NWS
43 - NIO/W Chron
44 - Warning Reports File (w/atts)
45 - DDI Registry (w/atts)
NIC #4899-83
6 July 1983
(w/o atts)
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