TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE -- STAP WORKING GROUP R

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00046R000300420001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Technological Surprise -- STAP Working Group Report
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
STAP 88-0004
Chairman, STAP
DATE
3 Febraur 1988'
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Executive Registry
1 0 FE
1999
2.
DDCI
~e~)
r;L
3.
z
-,4d4',
rz.14~4
T
5
.
6.
Ni 0
B.
9.
10.
11.
12.
~cl
13
RC
.
14.
15.
FORM
i-79
6AT
STAT
CTOT
STAT
610 USE PREVIOUS iF U.S. Government Printing Office; 1985-494.934/49156
EDITIONS
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP
Date
3 February 1988
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
building, Agency/Post)
1. E0/ICS
Initials
Date
~'"
DDR&E/ICS
-V/
s.
DD/ICS
V
4
D/ICs
5FEB 1988
/
0
196
g,
ICS/Pp0
ction
File
Note and Return
pproval
For Clearance
Per Conversation
As Requested
for Correction
Prepare Reply
irculate
For Your Information
See Me
omment
Investigate
Signature
Coordination
Justify
REMARKS
~.c A'QQ.w." wJl jbw~ aE(c~-fro
elk
t9a cAI ~'04't csPc
FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)
Room No.-Bldg.
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
Director of Central Intelligence
Science & Technology Advisory Panel
10 August 1988
NOTE FOR: Dr. Julian C. Nall
N I O/ S&T
Executive Secretary
SUBJECT: Technology Surprise Report
As we discussed on the telephone, attached is
the report cover sheet with the DDCI's comments.
It does not appear that the DCI signed off on the
report; he may not have seen it. I have also
attached a copy of the report itself in case your
files have been purged. 25X1
Attachment:
STAP 88-0004
CONTAINS Sly INFORMATION-
REGRADE UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
SECRET
 CC t DC'r
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2 25X1
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Science and Technology Advisory Panel
STAP 88-0004
3 February 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligen
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Technological Surprise - STAP Working Group Report
1. Purpose This memorandum reports the findings of a STAP working group
question of how intelligence could be enhanced to reduce the likelihood of
technological surprise, with particular emphasis on the Soviet Union. After
defining the kinds of surprise that can occur, the working group followed two
main lines of inquiry: a review of the organizational structure and process
the Intelligence Community uses to study technological issues; and an
examination of some key substantive areas that are likely to see technological
advances. The findings of the group are summarized in this report. A
detailed list of procedural recommendations (Attachment A) and vey of
substantive areas for emphasis (Attachment B) are attached.
2. Kinds of Surprise Because of its dramatic effect in combat, we are
usually inclined to conceive of surprise in the sense suggested by the Trojan
Horse or Pearl Harbor, a sense that limits our perspective to an immediate
cause and effect. But it is no less essential to examine surprise in a
broader context, to look at the means as well as the conduct of warfare.
Innovations in military technology--such as the longbow, gunpowder, the
machine gun, the long-range missile, and so on--have changed the face of
warfare and the political map. The history of these innovations illustrates a
range of development paths, and underscores the important point that there is
no single way of thinking about surprise. Analysts must be aware of the
diversity of routes by which surprise can occur.
a. Scientific Surprise Surprise here most nearly equates to
scientific notions of "discovery." Most dramatic would be the
unilateral discovery of a new scientific principle, like nuclear
fission or stimulated emission, whose military applications would be
held secret until a surprise attack--an unlikely event. Given the
broad reach of science, it is difficult to predict a comprehensive
ran e of areas that could rove troublin .
CONTAINS SECRET INFORMATION--
REGRADE CONFIDENTIAL UPON
REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
 ccrncT
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
SUBJECT: Technological Surprise - STAP Working Group Report
b. Technological Innovation Equally high stakes, at somewhat higher
probability, are associated with the technological development or
novel combination of established scientific principles for military
uses. At issue are both the exploitation of new scientific
principles and the integration of different technologies in
unanticipated ways. For example, the fission of atomic nuclei by
neutron capture was a publicly available scientific fact just before
World War II. The program to develop the technology for a
feasibility demonstration of a nuclear weapowas ot (although it
was later acquired by Soviet espionage).
d. Fielding of New Military Systems Many divergences between the
US and the Soviets in this category are already known, but their
significance may not yet be fully appreciated; others remain to be
identified. In organizing efforts to avert surprise, it will be
important to focus careful attention on identifying potential
countermeasures to our existing systems. In many cases we are well
aware of the technoloqies that might be applicable
and we are attempting to avoid
surprise by preparing for the possibility that our adversaries have
expended the effort to deploy them. Technological surprise in this
vein can also be compounded by innovations in doctrine and tactics;
again, the main surprise would be that an adversary actually did what
we knew (technically) to be possible.
3. It is also important to emphasize the point that surprise has a
political dimension. During a period of cold war, for example, the political
impact of a surprise (as with Sputnik in 1957) merges with military leverage
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
 ccrncr
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2 25X1
SUBJECT: Technological Surprise - STAP Working Group Report
as an important area of concern. An emerging concern should be noted in this
category--the potential for application of more sophisticated technologies by
terrorist groups. A.final consideration that may tend to confound our ability
to predict technological advances is the part played by Soviet espionage
efforts, especially those directed at covert acquisition of technology and
technical information. As we have seen, system development times can be
significantly shortened by such methods.
4. Responding to the Possibility of Surprise A program to anticipate and
avert technological surprise should have several dimensions because of the
various forms that surprise may take. What follows is a survey of conceptual
and organizational steps that would enhance the intell genc effort. The
strategy behind the recommendations has three parts:
Increase awareness, emphasis, and continuity within the Intelligence
Community on technological surprise considerations.
o Improve contact and communication between the Intelligence Community
and policymakers to enhance prospects for early action to counter
potential surprises and to identify areas where surprises may be
particularly worrisome. This is especially relevant to military
applications of technology and the fielding of new military systems
a. Conceptual Recommendations
(1) Review of US R&D efforts We would do well to review,
systematically, US military technology development programs,
including proposals for development that have not been pursued.
(This approach will require a high standard of cooperation
between intelligence and DoD and Service Research and
Development organizations, especially with respect to highly
classified programs, which will raise difficult questions of
access.) Technology application programs should be reviewed to
determine:
o Their potential in some circumstances to do us serious harm
were they successfully developed by the Soviets.
o The Soviet technological capacity to undertake the
necessary development, acquisition, and deployment.
o An intelligence assessment of the real and potential
indicators of their current status in the USSR.
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
I I
SUBJECT: Technological Surprise - STAP Working Group Report
We should`?also scan our vulnerabilities with these same
questions in mind, particularly with respect to potential
countermeasures to currently programmed US systems
the USSR.
Beyond this, it will be important to have a small, highly
creative effort to identify technological innovations that,
though clearly inappropriate for the US, might be rewarding for
(2) Doctrinal, Socio-political and Geomilitary Dimensions. The
use of high technology in warfare could produce disastrous
surprises if we rely on constraints that may be of a political
rather than a technical nature, for example, disarmament
treaties, non-proliferation a reements or expectations of a
country's intentions.
example, of fusion).
Technology
eveoped in third countries not dust the US and USSR) should
not be neglected, and attention should be paid to the fact that
surprise implications are not limited to military issues;
economic implications are also important (as in the case, for
It is not enough, however, to grasp the potential for
surprise; it is as important to increase the awareness of those who
must act on that potential. A list of recommendations that would
accomplish these objectives at very little cost is shown in
Attachment A.
5. Substantive Areas Where Surprises May Occur Although implementation
of the above recommendations is believed to be the most important action
needed to reduce the chance that another Sputnik, ALFA-class submarine, or
mycotoxin biological agent will take US policymakers unaware, the Panel
believes it would also be useful to identify key areas where intelligence
attention should be concentrated. These areas include technological
opportunities that may be exploited in ways that would have significance for
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
 Ccf`CtCT
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
SUBJECT: Technological Surprise - STAP Working Group Report
military capabilities, the civilian economy or its institutions, public
perception, or political relations in the next 10-20 years. Most scientific
or technical intelligence analysts either are aware of these opportunities or
are likely to become so within a few years. The Panel's purpose is to
heighten those analysts' awareness of the possible implications and sensitize
them to activities in the identified fields earlier than might otherwise
occur. F I
6. The specific areas and their extrapolations were selected as a result
of interviews with leading scientists and engineers, active in research,
development, or management. Those interviewed were not constrained to limit
their ideas to their own fields of activity or expertise. They were, however,
asked to think in terms of reduction to application within the next 10-20
years. Would it be reasonable, for example, to believe that builders and
users could plan, design, and construct systems or components incorporating
the technology in question with a fair degree of confidence in availability
and reliability?
7. In several instances, the question is not one of developing and
applying a new technology, but rather applying an existing technology either
in an innovative way--not previously seen or thought likely or feasible, or in
a well understood manner--to achieve a goal not previously attained. Again,
in some cases, it is not a new technology but the ramifications of extensive
application of an existing technology which has been illuminated. Although
not the exclusive target, the USSR was clearly country of primary concern
for matters of political or military import.
8. A list of some of the technologies that the working group believes
should bear increased scrutiny is attached (Attachment B). Others will occur
to the reader or will be derived from the procedural suggestions noted above.
These are included simply to initiate the necessary thought-process. The main
application areas are in:
9. As an aside it is worth pointing out that one knowledgeable observer
of the Soviet political and scientific scene suggested that despite apparent
changes in atmosphere in the USSR, including the stress on "glasnost",
activities in R&D institutions will not change much in the foreseeable
future. There will be younger institute directors, and some relaxation of
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
 CC'(I T
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
I I
25X1
SUBJECT: Technological Surprise - STAP Working Group Report 25X1
constraints on communication, but most things, including the areas being
worked, will go on as before.
10. We intend to continue working closely with Community S&T officers to
reduce the likelihood of surprise, and would be happy to discuss any of these
issues with you in further detail if you wish.
A. Procedural Recommendations) 25X1
B. Some Technologies and Substantive Areas for Emphasise 25X1
6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
 crrur-r
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
SUBJECT: Technological Surprise - STAP Working Group Report
DISTRIBUTION: (STAP 88-0004)
Copy 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - ER File
4 - D/ICS
5 - DD/ICS
6 - DDR&E/ICS
7 - C/STAP
8 - NIO/S&T Nall
9 - D/OSWR
10 - DD/OSWR
11 - C/STIC
12 - STAP Subject
13 - STAP Chrono
14 - ICS Registry
DCI/ICS/PPO
25X1
(25 January 1988) 25X1
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2009/10/08: CIA-RDP91 B00046R000300420001-2