IMPLEMENTATION OF NSDD 19, PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000100040009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 29, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SUBJECT: Implementation of NSDD 19, "Protection of Classified.
National Security Council and Intelligence Information"
2bx1 19 for the Intelligence Community, and your guidance on how to proceed.
2. Background: The President tasked Mr. Clark to prepare implementation
procedures for NSDD 19. Mr. Clark has directed you to develop procedures for
protection of sensitive classified intelligence information similar to. those
prescribed- for-i'iSC- fafortatio.i. They are to be cleared- withtrr= the Ccr: uR:ity-
and submitted to the NSC in draft no later than 15 February 1982, with any
3. Discussion: Preliminary analysis within CIA suggests divisions that
might surface in the Community. One view is that we should use the NSDD as a
lever to impose strict controls over all intelligence information - this seems
incompatible with timely handling of high volumes of data. Another view is
that only cosmetic adjustments need to be made. A middle course would be to lI j
use this opportunity to tighten control over truly sensitive material in a
25X1 manner that recognizes resource limitations and timeliness imperatives.
4. Staff Position: Our proposals on specific aspects of this- are;
a. Definition of "sensitive classified intelligence information" you
are to address -- We propose that this be defined as Sensitive Coinpart-
mented Information (SCI), Operations Directorate Blue Border series
raaterivai , and, vrithin Deferrse special access progr-a:4.inforraati=o44-related-.
25X1, to intelligence These types of data- are:
tightly controlled now because of their sensitivity.
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 1."
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b. Strict access controls and polygraph use in case of leaks -- We
propose only slight modifications to existing procedures. Access to SCI,
etc., is only granted now based on must-know considerations. A restate-
ment of that seems to be all that is needed. Personal responsibility
associated with access is clearcut under the current policy requiring
signature of nondisclosure agreements as a condition of access. However,
current policy encourages but does not mandate having those agreements
include specific prepublication review requirements. The absence of such
may blur- a signatory's sense of responsibility. The NSDDs requirements
that those granted access to strictly controlled material be subject to
use of all legal methods" (read polygraph) in investigations of leaks is
a Presidential mandate. We propose that you specifically tell the
Community that this requirement applies to all who now have or are
subsequently granted access to SCI, etc. We further propose that
....Community nandisclosure agreements be modified to include this -
requirement.
c. Tight control over contacts with the news media -- We propose
that you state to the Community that you see no reason for working-level
intelligence officers and little reason for senior ones to be talking to
the press. Further, that you-state that where some contact is deemed
absolutely necessary in a Community department or agency, contact may be
made only with the advance approval of the responsible Senior Intelligence
official (SIO) (defined to be a member of NFIB or NFIC) in accordance with
NSDD 19 provisions, with a copy of the required memorandum of what
-- - (transpired- provided=to you.,._. - -?-
d. Limits on dissemination of sensitive material -- We propose that
you task SIGs to conduct critical reviews of their dissemination practices
and procedures for SCI, etc., aimed at eliminating duplicative and
unnecessary dissemination and limiting the balance to cases of clear "must
know." Further, that you require SIOs to report to you in writing that
they have done this and that they personally vouch for the necessity of
residual dissemination.
e. Unauthorized disclosures investigations -- We propose that you
restate current procedures in somewhat more emphatic-form. Specifically,.
-that-you require SIOs-to conduct internal investigations when--they
determine that a leak occurred in their agency; that they report all such
determinations to you; and that you tell the SIOs you will refer
significant leaks to the Justice Department, asking for FBI investigation
and/or legal action.. Further, that you inform SIOs that the FBI may have
access to the. resu-its `of internal ?imvesti gations-and h-as - been -autbari zed
tto conduct polygraph examinations-inc-iderit-to leak investig3tidns for
those agencies which lack a polygraph capability.-
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f. Tactics -- We propose that you and the DDCI consider:
(1) Discussion by the DCI at an early NFIC meeting of NSDD 19
requirements and your proposed implementation of it. Specific
dissents should be requested in writing in time to be attached to the
material you are to send the NSC by 15 February.
(2) Emphasizing to the Community that these changes are driven
by Presidential decision and are not subject to debate within the
NFIC structure.
(3) Having the DDCI address an early meeting of the Security
Committee (after the NFIC one) to provide implementation guidance for
those who will have to work out procedures for the Community
agencies.
5. Recommendation: Your review of these proposals as reflected in
attached draft material for your use in communicating requirements to SIOs and
Attachment:
Proposals
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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Ssa_`f.,L ?71Z
SUBJECT: Implementation of NSDD 19 on Protection of NSC and Intelligence
Information
1. The President has signed NSDD 19 on protection of sensitive.
information (copy attached). Mr. Clark, the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs has been directed to establish the detailed
procedures to implement policies. Fir. Clark has directed me to develop similar
procedures for protection of sensitive classified intelligence information and
submit draft procedures by February 15, 1982.
2. My implementing procedures are attached. We will discuss this issue
at an early NFIC meeting.
Attachment:
Proposed Procedures
NSDD 19
29 Jan 1988
Signer .
CONFIDENTIAL
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 rnr1CTnrMITT At
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The following is issued in response to the instructions of the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs to prepare procedures for
protection of sensitive classified intelligence similar to those established in
accordance with NSDD 19 for protection of NSC information.
Sensitive Classified Intelligence
Sensitive Classified Intelligence includes (1) all information bearing SCI
special Community controls indicating restricted handling within present and
future Community intelligence collection programs and their end products for
which Community systems of canpartmentation have been or will be formally
established, (2) all DDO/CIA's Blue Border series material, (3) those Special
Access Programs related to intelligence established by department heads in
accordance with provisions of E.O. 12065.
There should be no reason for intelligence officials to discuss classified
intelligence with the news media. In those rare cases where it is deemed
essential for an intelligence. officer to meet with the press, approval will be
required in advance by a Senior Intelligence Official (a member of NFIB or
NFIC). No approval will be given to discuss classified intelligence matters.
Subsequent to the approved interview an administrative memorandum will be
forwarded to the SiO. If in his discretion it is appropriate, a copy will be
furnished to the DCI.
Access and Investigation
Agencies that handle sensitive intelligence information will keep the
number of individuals with access to such information to the absolute minimum.
While the restriction on billets has been removed, it is encumbent on SIOs to
ensure that inertia and out-dated justifications do not contribute to automatic'
access by individuals who have no need-to-know.
Agencies will strictly control document dissemination in both hard copy
arid by electrical, means. Dissemination practices are to be critically reviewed
by SIOs toward a. goal of eliminating repetition and redundancy. A strict
application and rejustification of need-to-know is required.. SIOs aye directed
to personally review current dissemination practices and procedures and report
to the DCI by 1 April 1982 on actions taken to reduce distribution.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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Cover sheets will continue to be used on sensitive intelligence
information.
The signature of an individual on a nondisclosure of intelligence
agreement is considered sufficient to make that individual subject to
investigation by all legal means including, the polygraph, in the event of
unauthorized disclosure. Nondisclosure agreements are to be revised to include
explicitly the provisions of NSDD 19 for investigation by all legal means,
including polygraph.
SIOs are directed to conduct timely internal investigations when they
determine that an unauthorized disclosure has occurred of material in their
custody. All such determinations of unauthorized disclosure shall be reported
to the DCI. The DCI will refer significant unauthorized disclosures to the
Justice Department requesting investigation. In the event of an investigation
directed by Justice Department and conducted by the FBI, the FBI is to be
provided access to the full scope of internal investigation results. The FBI
will have the authority to conduct polygraph examinations incident to
investigations for those agencies which lack a polygraph capability.
rONICTnChITTAt
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