PARDON ME, BUT AM I THAT 'HARD-LINER' THE ANONYMOUS SOURCES ARE TALKING ABOUT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000303310024-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: June 20, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/23: CIA-RDP9O-00552ROO0303310024-7
AATI CZ:B
ON rma_L_1,L-
WA SHINGTCN POET
20 June 1983
Pardon Me, But Am I Thaw
`Hard-Liner' the Anonymous
Sources Are Talking About?
Tint ~Va- I believed a leak was the unau-
th,,rized disclosure of confidential information
abut actual events-such as for example,
conversations within the executive branch.
That was before I understood thata leak is
the weapon of choice in Washington's unend-
ing internal wars-ideally suited -to -,spreading
disinformation about fictive events.
Undocumented allegations and anonymous
sources link -private ambitions to public policy
in.labyrinthine webs of personal and political
relations. Two or three well-placed "sources"
working with two or three well-placed journal-
ists can create an issue, shape an interpreta-
:itat. i'uiid or destroy a reputation. From the
perspective of political science. it is fascinat=
in- Fn,nn, the perspective of public office, it is
trustrating beyond heiiet.
Hf,%, du you correct. the record when t'h
disc ~.-eons are all confidential`.' My interest is
"In my memorandum to
the president ... I took a
rerl- `hard line' on
hunger, malnutrition.
infant mortality,
illiteracy. economic
underdevelopment.
more than academic or personal. The paper
triangle that links symbiotically anonymous
and interested bureaucrats and politicians
with dependent journalists is as much a threat
to an informed public as the "iron triangle" of
bureaucrats. politicians and the "Interests" is
to honest government.
During the past month or two, much of the
V .S. national media have relied on undocu-
rnenteci ieaks and unidentified sources to ton-
al(-:: political melodrama in which some
hat' "hard-liners"-are pitted
e-aim ~,,me (-,,d guys-the "moderates
Jeane Kirkpatrick
in a contest for control ctf U.S. policy toward
El Salvador and the Central American region.
According to this scenario. the good guys sup-
port political solutions,-negotiations,, regional
d-salog a bppartison' ,consensus. and are deeply
concerned about "underlyh' g economic and
social problems" "Hard-liners." we are told,
oppose these good things:-they advocate mili-
tary solutions, and are dead set against ne-
gotiations, regional dialogue and bipartisan
consensus-building. Hard-liners prefer politi-
cal polarization.
In the current scenario, hard-liners are fre-
quent wnamed ar k an .irkpatrick though
sometimes they are called Casey. Weinberger,
tone or, even. Reagn. Their principal ac-
Uyty is giving bad advice to the president.
Because my name is also Kirkpatrick and I
hold almost none of the views attributed to
.that Kirkpatrick. I desire to clarify just what
kind of advice I have given in the weeks after
the president asked me to visit-Central Amer-
ica. I understand that it is not considered
sporting to introduce into, these Washington
games verifiable facts or on-the-record state-
ments of participants; but, then, I am not a
thoroughly seasoned player and have not lost
the predilections of my regular profession.
Obviously. I speak only for myself'. I have
not been present in most of the conversations
of other participants. However, since 1 have
often been cast by "sources" as the "hardest"
and "most militant" of the hard-liners, my
role seems relevant to 'the whole- dramatic
production, and the fact that my actual views
and recommendations bear almost no relation
to those attributed to me undermines, I
should suppose, the credibility of this melo-
drama.
Interested persons might want to know that
instead of opposing attention to economic and
humanitarian dimensions of Central Amer-
ica's problems. bipartisan participation in
policy-making, the Contadnra process and the
broadest possible participation in Salvador's
electioms, I have consistentl made opposite
recommendations. I have advocated greatly
expanded humanitarian and economic assist-
STAT
ante; bipartisan participation in furmulatinc a
new policy: unambitious support for the Coti-
tadora process and regional dialogue: and
maximum efforts to secure the broadest possi-
ble participation in Salvador's elections.
In my memorandum to the president on re-
turning from Central America I took a verb
"hard line" on hunger, malnutrition. infant
mortality, illiteracy, economic underdevelop-
ment.
Congress." I wrote. "has not provided the
resources or support needed in part. at least.
because we have not worked with them to de-
velop a hold, imaginative program which goes
beyond preventing Communist victory in the
very short run, to produce for the chro ucaii\
deprived people of the area the reality of pre-
sent progress and the promise of more tc
come."
I cited Congressman Mike Barnes' pit
posed "one-percent solution" to the rewii'-
problems (using one percent of the requested
defense budget to finance an adequate e(c,
nomic effort). I recommended for inclusion in
the speech to the joint session a program "s1
beneficial to the terribly poor, malnourished
people of the region that thr: Americas, pe(~t~'''
will be proud to support it . . ." and al-
recommended the establishment of 'ii t,,,
tional bipartisan commission 1which w aid
examine how we should apply our talent an i
resources to foster health, growth, security
and democracy among our neighbors in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean...." 1 further
explained to, the president that this was an
approach I had discussed with Sen. Jackson
and other Democrats.
Though current mythology suggests other-
wise, new broad. bipartisan initiatives were re.
sisted by the "good guys" themselves. So were
efforts by the governments of Central Amer-
ica and the-C,ontadora Four to get under way
a process of negotiations for Latins only.
President Merrera Campins last week de-
scribed to the Venezuelan press the message
he asked me to deliver to President Reagan:
"Don't let your government torpedo our con-
ference."
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2
Reasonable people may feel the chances of
success would be enhanced by our presence
among the. Contadora negotiators; they may
think democracy would be better served by
sticking with the San Jose approach. But the
fact remains that Venezuela. Mexico, Pana-
ma. Colombia, et al.,.have desired an all-Latin
conference, and our Central American friends
have supported their ,effort. So have' I. Far
from believing that "The very mention of ne-
gutiations' in El Salvador appeared.a sign of
weakness" (as charged by an anonymous
source in The Post.hcne 12), against consider-
able official resistance, I argued 'from Latin
America and in Washington that the United
States should pose moobs edestotheJnta
dora negotiations sho ila'vneke1no.,demands
that we be included; and should, instead,
standaddevoffeting uppol't*s' ppro to
On all & above issues liege has beent$rcer-
tain amouht of disagreement within ;our_-gov-
eri,ment though thesides are not thosepppu-
larly perceived. On:?:uther mportant slues
-there is a-.clear public :record-to prove there,
has been no disagreementat,all. No?one tas
proposed sending U.S. troops into combat in
Central America, no one has proposed aban-
doning Central America. No, government offi-
cial has supported-_a "two-track" approach
where one, track leads to negotiated power
sharing in $6" Salvador; everyone has sup-
ported conversations to ensure elections with
broad participation and security for all.
I have also advocated continued military
assistance at levels adequate to meet and
match guerrilla arms, but then so have-:all
other 'participants in the executive depart-
ment's policy dialogue.
Above all, I have argued in print and in per-
son from well before President Reagan invited
nit' to join his government, that the people
and governments of Central America, the
Caribbean and, indeed, South America are
important to the United States; that our se-
curity and history bind us to the Americas
'just as surely as they bind us to Europe; and
that it makes no sense at all for us to perceive
and protect'vital national interests in Europe,
the Middle East, . the Far East and Africa
(where we provide large, continuing amounts
of economic and military' assistance and in
some cases U.S. troops and trainers) while ig-
noring and neglecting friends and interests on
our own borders. I have. moreover, insisted
that the fact that the Central American peo-
pies have suffered under dictators in the past
is not a reason to consign them ter repressive
new dictators sponsored by theSoviet Union:
it is, instead, a reason to help them escape to
freedom.
What do all these views have in common
with the struggle between the "hard-liner