'NORMALIZATION' IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000302960008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 2, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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THE WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1980
Fred Charles lkle
`Normalization'
Now that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is
an accomplished fact, the process of "normaliza-
tion" can begin. The dust is about to settle behind
the tank columns that rolled across the border,
and soon someone in Washington will note "hope-
ful signs" in the fact that a few tanks are moving
back into Russia. The.hectic Soviet airlift into
Kabul will quiet down and our intelligence will re-
port that air traffic is back to normal.
Perhaps, if continued nagging from the West
seems to demand it, Moscow might even offer a
formal promise that all its troops will-be with-
drawn "as the situation in Afghanistan normal-
izes." This would be in the tradition of the Soviet
promise to the president of Czechoslovakia in Au-
gust 1968, which assured the world that the entry
of the Soviet troops would be "temporary" and
that they would be withdrawn from Czech terri-
tory "as the situation in Czechoslovakia normal-
izes." (Today, more than 11 years later, the Soviet
divisions are still there.)
The Soviet Union will see to it that the "normali-
zation" of Afghanistan continues apace. News
about armed resistance that may persist in the rug-
ged mountains will be skillfully suppressed or
drowned out by fabricated misinformation. No
outside observer will be granted access to any area
where Moslem freedom-fighters might still resist.
If refugees manage to cross the border into Paki-
stan, t eir reports will be balanced o news sto-
ries from other "refu ees," re orting that CIA
a ents are omenttng assassinations and economic
Laabotage among hapless Afghan tribesmen.
To-cheer us up, we will be reading about the gen-
uine increase in the standard of living in Afghan
cities and of the freedom of religion enjoyed by
.Moslems. Now and then our newspapers may carry
a photograph of a cherubic Soviet agronomist
teaching backward Afghan peasants how to in-
crease their crop yields.
Back in 1979, some American commentators
predicted that by invading Afghanistan, the
Soviets could only sink deeper into the quagmire
of their own "Vietnam." These "quagmire" fore-
casts will be displaced by admonitions that we
should come to terms with the new "reality,"
should cease encouraging any Moslem resistance
in Afghanistan and, instead, should, through a pro-
gram of economic aid, offer an alternative to ex-
clusive reliance on Moscow for the Karmal govern-
ment-if Babrek Karmal is then still the name of
the Afghan Gauleiter.
Those who will continue to object to the "nor-
malization" of Afghanistan will be asked what al-
ternative policy they propose. Should the United
States invade Afghanistan? Or do they propose
that we launch a nuclear war? Some will reason
The writer is former director of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency.
in Afghanistan~
that the whole Afghan "episode" was nothing new,
but simply reflected the old Russian quest to get
closer to the Indian Ocean.
However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as
Zbigniew Brzezinski stressed, is a qualitatively new
step. Indeed, if the total Soviet control of Afg
" hani-
stan resulting from this step becomes an accepted
normal" situation, the invasion will turn into a
historic watershed. It will have extended the writ
of the Brezhnev Doctrine beyond Eastern Europe.
That is to say, the "normalization" of Afghani-
stan will signify worldwide acceptance of the rule
that the Soviet Union can use its massive military
power, outside Eastern Europe as it has done in-
side, to maintain Marxist regimes against popular
opposition or to replace the leaders of these re-
gimes should they be insufficiently compliant with
the Kremlin's wishes. In particular, the Third
World, by accepting the "normalization" of Af-
ghanistan, will have accepted that Moscow-the
Rome of the "socialist" empire-is the sole and
final arbiter of the internal affairs of any "social-
ist" country. The sundry Marxist, "socialist" and
Soviet-supported regimes in the Third World w:!!1
thus give their consent to the "common laws)
governing socialist construction" that Brezhnev
laid down when he announced his doctrine in Au-
gust 1968: II
"It is known, comrades, that there also are com-
mon laws governing socialist construction, a devia-
tion from which might lead to a deviation from so-
cialism as such. And when the internal and exter-
nal forces hostile to socialism seek to revert the de-
velopment of any socialist country toward the res-
toration of the capitalist order, when a threat to?
the cause of socialism in that country, a threat to
the security of the socialist community as a whole,
emerges, this is rtti longer only a problem of the
people of thattountry but also a common problem,
concern for all socialist states."
By "normalizing" the invasion of Afghanistan,
the West-and the Third World-will make other
invasions of "socialist" Third World countries a
normal event, opposition to which would not be ex-'
pected. Brezhnev's "common law" will thus have]
been extended to cover a Soviet invasion of Yugo-;
slavia, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, An
gola, Cuba (if the Soviets can marshal sufficient'
military power) and, of course, Iran, once "socialist
construction" has begun there.
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STAT
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000302960008-5
In 1948, after tl?e first soviet takeover of Czecho-
slovakia, the leaders of Western Europe put their
ancient quarrels aside and joined with the United
States in creating the North Atlantic Alliance. That
alliance preserved the western limits to Soviet in-
vasions up to this day. Now the threat has turned
to the south. It is hence in the common interests of
the United States and the Islamic world to prevent.
Brezhnev's "socialist construction" from becoming
the vanguard of an attack by Soviet tanks and gun-
sbips. We in the United States must marshal the
strength to back up the self-defense of all inde
pendent nations in the Middle East. And the lead-
ers of these nations must rise above the destruc-i
tive fanaticism of a Khomeini. In the life of na-
tions, a mortal threat can call forth the greatest
acts of statesmanship-provided the threat is re-,
ognized.
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