THE U.S. BUNGLES ITS EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN SUBVERSION IN EL SALVADOR
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00552R000302860004-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 29, 2010
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 22, 1982
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/29 :CIA-RDP90-005528000302860004-0
AR11CL~ ~.P.PF~~D
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TIt~lE
22 r~axch 1982
The U.S. bungles its evidence offoYeign subveYSion in E~
There were briefings and
consultations, complete
with spy-plane pictures
and closed-door revela-
tions of secret intercep[.s.
It may have been the most.
intense national security
information campaign since President
Kennedy went public with graphic docu-
mentation of the Cuban missile threat 20
years ago. The purpose of the blitz was to
convince skeptics of the correctness of the
Administration's approach to the critical
problems of El Salvador and its neigh-
bors-namely, that the struggles in Cen-
tralAmerica are not si mply indigenous re-
volts bat rather are crucial battlegrounds
in a broad East-`Vest confrontation.
Facing a credibility gap at home
and abroad, the Reagan Administration
sought to prove that the fire raging in El
Salvador is primarily fueled by Soviet-
sponsored subversion spread by Cuban
surrogates and the Sandinista govern-
ment of Nicaragua. In that extreme and
simple form, their case is as yet unproved,
and indeed-by the very nature of these ~
conflicts-may never be. In a lesser
form-that there is significant involve-
ment by Cuba and Nicaragua-the case is
almost self-evident.
The campaign, to say the least, had its
problems. In fact,'the inability of the Ad-
ministration to line up convincing wit-
nesses would have seemed farcical were
the matter not so serious. First there
was the so-called "smoking Sandinista,"
grandly touted as a captured Nicaraguan
commando who had helped lead the insur-
rection in EI Salvador. But when police let
.him loose to show the way to one of his pur-
ported contacts, he disappeared into San
Salvador's Mexican embassy, which said
he was only a student and granted him
asylum. Then there were two Nicaraguan
air force defectors who were scheduled to
bear witness to their country's involve-
ment in El Salvador but by week's end
were judged "not ready" to face the press.
Finally, there was a young Nicaraguan
soldier who was produced by the State De-_-
partment but then promptly repudiated
his previous statements about being
trained in Cuba and Ethiopia and having
been sent into EI Salvador by his govern-
ment.The U.S. did have solid evidence of a
major military buildup in Nicaragua, and
former high national security officials
were persuaded by still secret intelligence
that the Sandinistas were helping the El
Salvador rebels. Nonetheless, the blundert j
and bad luck over the live witnesses to that
subversion greatly undermined the Ad-
ministration's plausibility.
Presiding over this curious series of
public presentations was the prime propo-
nent of the Administration's us-vs.-them
world view, Secretary of State Alexander
Haig. "This situation is global in charac-
ter," he told a Senate Appropriations Sub-
committee last week. "The problem is
worldwide Soviet interventionism that
poses an unprecedented challenge to the
free world. Anyone attempting to debate
the prospects for a successful outcome in
EI Saly
et rnen
the tru
l:ia
vadori
ministr
Defens
that it
stake s
rain ba_______ _.__
advisers who were reluctant to detract na-
tional attention from the President's eco-
nomic program. Convinced that this bat-
tle would be cleanly and quickly won, the
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/29 :CIA-RDP90-005528000302860004-0