NICARAGUA: WE CAN'T REMAKE IT IN OUR OWN IMAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000302490084-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 84
• Publication Date: March 24, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26 :CIA-RDP90-005528000302490084-3 STAT
AF.T T ~i.E p?PEAFID
OY Y~flE~
k'aSHINGTO:~ POST
24 i~iarch 198
Lee H. Ham~lton
' ? We Can't Remake It in Our Own Image
._ Nicaragua.
The Reagan administration poses a fair all bets would be off and all options, including a Las to keep the promise of free elections that
they made to the OAS in 1979. We certainly
question when it asks opponents of its Nica- return to hostilities, would be reserved.
raguan policy to come up with a better one. By now the Sandinistas must understand should continue to press the Sandinistas to
' ? As I see it, the heart of our policy should be just how difficult we can make their lives if keep the promise, but their failure to do so to
the negotiation of an agreement with the they do not live up to an agreement. To date is no excuse to fund a war against them.
`~ Sandinistas. the key provision of which would begin, we could isolate them diplomatically We have good relations with dozens of un-
' h usin the Organiza- democratic nations around the world, and my
e
h
' change for Sandinista concessions in impor-
' font areas of their foreign policy.
E We would insist that the Sanduristas expel
" foreign military advisers, keep all foreign mili-
tary bases and modern offensive weapons out
of their country, and stop exporting revolution
and trafficking in arms. In return, we would
abandon our efforts to interfere in the their in-
ternal affairs or change their form of govern-
ment. This is a formula that promotes our na-
' tional interest and sets out objectives that the
American people are willing to support.
As part of this agreement we should insist
on verification provisions encompassing intelli-
gence, technok~giical means, and on-site inspec-
' Lion where necessary. We would judge by our
own standards the data that we collected.
~ While enforcement of an agreement might be a
problem, there are diplomatic and poetical
steps that can be taken to make it more en-
'forceable.
~`~? In this respect a strong regional policy is
' important. We should continue to strengthen
~ Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador so that
they can resist any attempt by Nicaragua to
threaten or destabilize them. We should hel
them with milita a ui ment an mte ~-
' e8 nce. a also wo need to give pnonty o
addressing the economic problems that
cause so much turmoil in the region. Our
economic aid to Honduras, Costa Rica and EI
Salvador should be complemented by other
efforts to build and preserve peaceful demo-
~?: cratic societies that respect human rights.
? We should use our influence with interns-
' tional organizations and banks to promote
long-tens development, and try to remove
governmen
Lute our ideals o
all trade barriers between ourselves and our
~ _friends in Central America. theirs. Despite years in the field, much loll- ever, should be based not on ideol
Concerning Nicaragua, pressure on the San- ing and millions of dollars spent, the rebels ogy, but on a clearly defined as-
dinista government to change its policies will are as far from Managua as they have ever sessment of how best to protect
t' work only if we use both carrots and sticks. been. Another $14 million would not help the our national interest.
the rebels very much, but it would be another
Ni
caragua
" We should be prepared to offer
'-benefits that we offer its neighbors if its do- down payment on deeper American involve-
" mestic and foreign policies change. However, if ment. It is a dubious tactic on behalf of a
'the Sandinistas continued those external ac- doubtful policy.
lions that we did not like, or if any agreement Supporters of the rebels argue that mili-
that we reached with Nicaragua were violated, Lary action is essential to force the Sandinis-
, g
em~sp er
rv~thm the
Lion of American States as a platform for guess is that the Sandinistas simply never
voicing our concerns, and working as closely would cry "uncle" and allow the United
as possible with our Rio Treaty partners in States to dictate the fgrm that Nicaraguan
developing a unified policy. We have the Rio government and society would take.
Treaty available to us as the legal foundation It would be nice if Nicaragua were a liberal
for the use of military force against Nicara- democracy, but that is not a matter that af-
gua, should it prove necessary. We can also fects our national interest directly unless the
increase economic pressure on Nicaragua, Sandinistas persist in trying to export revolu-
working with our allies to deny it World Bank lion. There is little that we can do about in-
loans and assistance from the International ternal poetics there in the short term-short
Monetary Fund. A policy. of increased eco- of invading Nicaragua, occupying it and
nomic pressure on Nicaragua could also in- remaking it in our image. -
clude atrade cutoff. We are still Nicaragua's It ism belief that an end to
r rat
rt w
a
largest trading partner despite a fi4 percent ment m e cove
falloff in trade since 1980. Stopping Nicara- un ennuun t ~e ros for s -
gua airlines from flying to the United States, ce ne ohattons ma t
denying visas to its citizens or breaking off ener them. he current impres-
diplomatic relations-these are other poten- soon among participants in the Con-
tial options that should be considered, should States does not attach much impor-
they prove necessary.
Supporters of the rebels argue that if we tanrt r?~e g?be~ ?n~ ~ ~ge our
cease military action against Nicaragua, we po
will not be able to get the Sandinistas to ne- credibility and bring leverage if it is
gotiate seriously. The argument is an inter- obvious that we intend seriously to
esting one, but we have to regard it as incon- achieve a diplomatic settlement.
clusive unless we also believe that ending the Similarly, we will have greater suc-
covert war is the only real goal that the San- cess in obtaining the detailed veri-
dinistas hope to achieve in talks with the fication en~th ~tlu~stthe only bar-
United States. I believe that the Sandinistas is appar
have detailed economic and political agendas tier to an agreement.
that they think could be advanced in produc- Nicaragua must be watched
five discussions with the United States. closely so that we can be sure that
A second point is of equal weight. The it poses no direct or immediate
United States will be unable to change Nica- threat to our national security.
ragua's behavior in any significant way as Should that happen, we would want
long as the, Sandinistas are persuaded that to follow the Reagan administra-
we seek either to destroy them or to substi- Lion's lead and respond vigorously
how-
ion
i
d
O
,
s
ec
ur
t and society for to such a threat.
f
.The writer, a Democratic re resenta-
twe tom n Cana is c..a~rman o t e
r t
rankin? majority member of the For-
ofon A(Fnirc ~Ommittee.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26 :CIA-RDP90-005528000302490084-3