WHY US SHOULD CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO SALT II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000302490070-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: January 16, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

,' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26 :CIA-RDP90-005528000302490070-8
Why US shoWd continue to adhere to SALT II
,
and missiles and freezes the number of allowed warheads ployed launchers in excess of SALT II limits. Others
per missile. It establishes restrictive sublimits on Soviet question this, since the US has del work' out
land-based missiles, which concern the US the most. Ev- agreed procedures under SALT II for diasmantling SoSoviet
ery time the Soviets introduce a new missile, they are ob- bombers A further US charge, concerning the banned
ligated under SALT to retire one as well. According to SS-16 missile, has been downgraded in view of Soviet
the Arms Control Association, the Soviet Union removed ste s that seem to have resoled the issue.
1,007 land-based missiles and 233 sea-based missiles pis my belief that the Soviets have pushed the SALT
from its active force and dismantled 13 submarines dur- II Treaty to the limit. Charges of Soviet noncompliance
ing 1972-85 to comply with SALT II limits. Past Soviet are serious matters concerning gray areas of treaty inter-
practices suggest that without SALT II much of this peon, but they do not constitute massive violations
hardware would still be in operation. that suggest a Soviet effort to break out of the treaty. Our
Second, SALT II is in the US interests because Soviet response should not be to renounce SALT II but to draft
missile production lines remain open. Accordin too en more careful treaty language in the future and ~ Press
testimon b the Central Intell' nce A nc~ , e ov~ets out, present concerns through the private diplomatic
cou a new war ea s e mi - s - channels of the Standing Consultative Commission cre-
more tin dou in eu resent force - if the rake a~ for this purpose. We should pursue our complaints
out of SALT II. T_ a oviets could also put up to 20 or 30 ~ a manner that keeps the treaty intact. Compliance is-
warheads on each"heave" missile oyj,~ th~PB a much sues must be handled with accuracy and care, because, if
roe for a new
greater ca~acct .to~attack US targets. It is unlikely that exaggerated, they will destroy airy p pacts
the US could keep pace without enormous spending in - agreement and undermine all existing agreements.
creases Sticking with SALT II serves US interests, as the cur-
-~rd, the end of SALT II and a renewed missile race rent debate demonstrates. Without SALT II, we are like-
would likely eliminate the possibility of developing a suc- ly to experience an accelerated arms race, greater uncer-
cessful US space-based missile defense. This is the con- tainty about Soviet intentions, and an escalation of ten-
clusion of the congressional Office of Technology Assess- sion between the superpowers. We will be less secure.
ment. The Reagan administration implicitly acknowl- With SALT II, we will be able to preserve important con-
edges this in its proposal for deep missile cuts as part of straints on Soviet weapons, improve our ability to re-
sts proposal for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDII. solve questions about Soviet compliance, and increase
Without missile limits, SDI cannot work; without SALT prospects for future arms agreements at Geneva. Few
II there would be none. choices are so clear cut.
By Lee H. Hamiltfln
HE future of the unratified SALT II Treaty, which
has limited United States and Soviet nuclear
forces since 1979, is unclear. The Reagan
administration is divided. Some officials want to scrap
SALT II, but the President announced last June that the
US would follow a "no undercut" policy of adhering to
treaty limits so long as the Soviet Union "exercises com-
parable restraint." This is still official policy.
The President also said that the US would study "pro-
portionate responses" to what it views as the military
consequences of Soviet violations of arms agreements.
With the expiration of SALT II on Dec. 31, 1985, the US
may decide to pursue arms programs that breach treaty
limits. Such a decision could end all restraints on US and
Soviet nuclear forces.
There are several reasons the US should continue to
adhere to the terms of SALT II. This conclusion is shared
by a recent study by the Arms Control Association,
"Countdown on SALT.IL"
First SALT II establishes equal limits on bombers
Fourth, the end of SALT II would free the Soviets to
16 January 1986
adopt camouflage and deception techniques, now prohib-
itedunder SALT, to hide military activities.
Finally, serious political consequences are likely if
SALT II is abandoned. The Geneva talks would suffer a
big setback. So would the broader US-Soviet relation-
ship. The end of SALT II would be deeply divisive in
Congress and would lead to serious differences within
NATO, strengthening Soviet efforts to split the alliance.
The crux of the argument against SALT II focuses on
alleged Soviet violations of the treaty. First, the US con-
tends that the Soviets have introduced two new types of
land-based missiles, the SS-24 and SS-25, whereas SALT
II permits only one. The Soviets declare that the SS-25 is
a permitted modernization of the SS-13. The US disputes
this, charging that the Soviets have violated SALT II by
concealing SS-25 tests. This question is unresolved.
Second the US accuses the Soviets of encoding mis-
sile test-flight data necessary for verification ores.
This ch a miss a testtrue, utn e s oraven ca on,
specs y
fearing possible compromise o ii- nce sources and
methods. This violation is, there~o~ess an c ear cut.
a new US charge is that~the Soviets have de-
'~ Third
Lee H. Hamilton is the ranking Democrat on the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs and chairman of
the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26 :CIA-RDP90-005528000302490070-8