WILL ANTI-INTELLIGENCE' GET KEY ACLU POST?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000302470008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 28, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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`rl'i"IF A HUM HUMAN EVENTS
ON p 29 December 1985
Will Anti-I nteuigenc& Get Key
A'CL
The American Civil Liberties Union
has a personnel problem with national
security implications. The director of
'its national office in Washington, John
H. F. Shattuck.. 'has resigned to accept
an administrative post at Harvard. The
ACLU's search for a replacement-
which began in June-has been com-
plicated by the facts that (a) the group
has a self-imposed affirmative action
requirement that it search for a minor-
ity replacement before considering ap-
pointment of a white successor to Shat-
tuck, and (b) the ACLU -leadership
from which a successor would most -
naturally be chosen is lily-white.
In mid-September, with only two
applications for the job filed, both
from whites, Executive Director Ira
Glasser said up to 10 minority candi-
dates would be asked to apply and, if
none had been chosen by the time of an
October 20 board meeting, the board
would be asked to drop the affirmative
action rule. This, according to the
Washington Post, would virtually pave'
the -way for the selection of Morton
Halperin, "highly regarded by virtually
all. of the ACLU hierarchy,'.'- as.suc-
cessor to Shattuck.-October 20 came
and went, however;'with no. decision
Willa minority person be found
to fill the post? Or will Halperin,
waiting expectantly in the: wings, , .. .
get the nod? More --importantly,
would.Halperin's appointment be-,
good or bad 'news?._
. the extensiveepublictty Halperin has re
ceived in recent. years,- he has, usually
been identified as `'a 'deputy `assistant
secretary of defense in the Johnson
Administration and key aide, to Na-
tional Security. Adviser Henry Kis-
singer; as a senior staff member of the
National Security Council (NSC), in
the early days of the Nixon Administra-
tion.
Additionally, Halperitr - has made
numerous congressional and court
appearances as a reputed expert on the
classification of. Sensitive government.
documents, intelligence, and other na-
tional security issues.".
In' one of his -many appearances
before the House Intelligence Commit-
tee, Halperin said in 1978-that "in the.
spirit of full disclosure," he wanted to
make three statements for the record:
? Asa graduate student, he had ap-
plied for a job with the CIA.
? Asa freelance journalist, he had
used the CIA as an information source.
As a lecturer, he had appeared at
CIA- headquarters on invitation of the
agency and had been paid for his ser-
vices.
Seemingly, more good news.-Not-at
all a typical ACLU type. But Halperin
'then proceeded to attack the CIA for,
among other things, its handling of the
news about the December 1975 murder
of Richard Welch, CIA station chief in
Athens, after CounterSpy had identi-
---fled -Welch as a CIA intelligence bf-
:ficer. `
Halperin accused the agency of wag-
ing a "disinformation" campaign
against the American public by ascrib-
ing guilt for the killing to renegade CIA
officer Philip Agee and the magazine
CounterSpy, then Agee's principal
weapon in his continuing campaign to
expose covert U.S. intelligence person-
nel., particularly those serving in
foreign lands. '
He also tried to absolve Agee, the
self-proclaimed "revolutionary Social-
ist," of all blame in the killing by saying
he did not think CounterSpy's exposure
played "any role" in Welch's assas-
sination and by asserting of 'all those
STAT
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-who expose the identities .of secret
American intelligence personnel, "it is
difficult to. condemn people who do
that." -
Halperin has also called the CIA
"the subverter of everybody else's free-
dom" and declared it is "an open ques-
tion" whether it and other U.S. intelli-
gence services would turn to assassinat-
'ing American citizens.
So perhaps the choice of Halperin
would -not be a good thing after all.
Possibly, he is not quite the person his
past government posts would indicate
he is. In an effort to clarify what his
selection would mean, should he be
chosen; and what the high esteem of
virtually the entire ACLU leadership
for Halperin reveals about the ACLU,
the following information supplement-
ing Halperin's "confession" about his
CIA past is offered in his "spirit of full
disclosure."
Halperin-Agee Connection
Halperin's intelligence . committee
testimony is not the full extent of the
assistance he has given CIA defector
Agee. A few years ago, in upholding
the government's right to lift Agee's
passport, the Supreme Court reviewed
some of the well-publicized facts about
Agee that should be kept in mind as
Halperin's generosity toward him is
retold:..
? At a 1974 London press confer-
ence, Agee announced his "campaign
to fight the United States CIA wherever
it is operating" and his intention "to
expose CIA officers and agents and.. .
drive them out- of the countries where
they are operating" while, in the U.S.,
he worked "to have . the CIA abol-
ished" (Agee's words).
? A federal district court had found
on Agee's part "a clear intention to -
reveal classified information and to.
bring harm to the agency and its per--
sonnel."
Agee's exposures "have been fol-
lowed by... violence against the per-
sons and organizations identified.'.', In
1974, prior - to the Welch murder,
Agee's chief collaborator exposed CIA
personnel in Jamaica at-a press con-
ference there. Within a few days, the.
home of the CIA station chief was raked
with automatic gunfire and gunfire also
erupted when polipp. - challenged men
approaching the hdme;of another iden-
tified CIA officer_
? Reviewing these and other facts,'
the Supreme Court found that Agee's
activities not only presented "a serious .
danger to American - officials. abroad '
and - serious danger _to. -:the national
security,"- but also.-"endangered the
interests of countries other than the
United States thereby creating
serious problems for American foreign -`j
relations and foreign policy. -
The above facts and. findings give .1
special meaning to Halperin's addi-
tional actions in Agee's behalf:
Halperin favorably reviewed Agee's
first book, Inside the Company: A CIA
Diary, in 1975 without revealing that,
in his introduction, Agee thanked the
Cuban Communist party for the help it
had given. him in writing the book and
that. it contained the names and identi-
ties of over 700 people in all parts of the
world Agee claimed were CIA officers,
agents and cooperators. Giving full
credence to Agee's claims against the
CIA. Halperin wrote:
"The only way to stop all of this is to
dissolve the CIA covert career service
and to bar the CIA from at least devel-
oping and allied nations." (Sic.)
One of the early activities of
CounterSpy's publisher, the Orga-
nizing Committee for a Fifth Estate,
was' the creation of another intelli-
gence-undermining group called the
Public Education Project on the Intelli-
gence Community (PEPIC). Halperin
served on PEPIC's speaker's bureau.
Agee was in hot water after the assas- -
sination of Richard-Welch. He. was
afraid to return tothe'U.S. and he -was
-being expelled from -one European
country after another because of his
continuing contacts with Communist-
bloc intelligence agents. Halperin trav-
eled to London early in 1977 in an un-
successful attempt to prevent Agee's
deportation from England. - While
there, he said he hoped to arrange a i
U.S. speaking tour for Agee if he re-
turned to this country.
Agee's second book, Dirty Work:
The CIA in Western Europe, reprinted
an anti-CIA, pro-CounterSpy article,
"CIA News Management," Halperin
had written for the Washington Post.
Halperin has testified against all bills
that would criminalize Agee's activities
in exposing the identities of U.S. intel-
ligence personnel, including the one
finally enacted in 1982.
a
C011tin Lied
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Halperin and the -
Marchett i-Marks `Cult' -
Agee is not the only U.S. intelligence
detractor and exposer who has had Hal-
perin's help. Victor Marchetti, a-!
veteran of 14 years of CIA service
the last three in highly sensitive posi-
tions -- resigned in 1969 and decided to
-.write a book exposing CIA operations.
The CIA learned of his plan and,. based
on numerous secrecy agreements he
had signed while with the agency-, ob-
tained a temporary court injunction on
publication.
Marchetti, represented by' the
ACLU, then went to court to. challenge
''the CIA's right to protect national
-secrets-from disclosure by,former em-
ployes. Halperin appeared as an expert
witness in his behalf, but Marchetti lost
his case. The court upheld the validity
of the CIA secrecy pledge and issued a
permanent injunction on .Marchetti's
-publishing anything. on the .agency
;without first obtaining its -clearance...
An appellate court upheld this-decision--
and, at the end of 1972, the Supreme
Court refused to review its ruling t
Marchetti then obtained the help of
John Marks, a former employe of. the-;
State Department's Bureau, of Intelligence and Research, in writing his
book. An associate of Halperin in a
number of his anti-intelligence enter-
dis-
prises, Marks, too, later had the
one of
tinction of having Agee p
his articles in Dirty Work, an item en
titled "How to Spot a Spook." _
The CIA demanded the deletion -of
over 300 passages in. their -finished
product, The CIA and the Cult of Intel-
ligence. By the time Marchetti-Marks
went to court. to fight the CIA on the
issue, -again with the help of expert,
witness Morton Halperin, the agency
had reduced its demands by about half
- but the judge still ruled against it on
a great majority of the remaining dele-
tions demanded. -
Based. largely on Halperin's. testi-
mony, he adopted a different-standard
in determining valid classification than
he had used in the original trial. The
government appealed and his decision
was reversed, with the Supreme Court
again refusing to review the appellate
court ruling. This was not what Hal-
perin wanted, but it was a- victory for
the CiA and U.S. security.
Had Halperin had his way, the 1974.
"Cult" would have spilled much more
than it did about the CIA.
Halperin and the Spy
David Truong, who had come to the
U.S. from Vietnam in 1965, had
become a well-known antiwar activist
and "agent of influence" after com-
pleting his studies and by the time he
and Ronald Humphrey were indicted
for espionage in January 1978.
Associated initially with the Vietnam
Resource Center in the Boston area and
later with the Vietnamese-American
Reconciliation Center which he set up
in Washington after the war, Truong
wrote newspaper and magazine ar-
ticles, gave speeches, published liter-
ature and heavily lobbied Capitol Hill
where he wielded considerable influ-
ence on Vietnamese issues over the
more liberal and left-wing members of
the House and Senate and their staffs.
- The indictment charged that Hum-
phrey, a USIA officer, had been taking
classified documents and turning them
over to Truong who, through couriers,
'had been delivering them to Commu-
nist Vietnamese officials. The Tru-
ong-Humphrey defense strategy was to
claim that they could not be guilty of
espionage because the documents
Humphrey had given Truong were real-
ly not-sensitive, contained mere diplo-
matic chit-chat, and could not .harm the
U.S.
Halperin, a witness for their defense,
expressed doubt that some of the stolen
papers had been properly classified,
said others were in no -way related to the
national defense and that "no informa-
:Eon" in cabkes -given to t ommu-
nists "could injure the United States or
be advantageous to the Vietnamese.'.'-
Military intelligence and diplomatic
officials contradicted Halperin's view.
Despite Halperin's ' testimony, both
men were convicted and began serving
their 15-year prison terms in January.
1982 after an appeals court had upheld
their convictions and the Supreme
Court refused to review its decision. it
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Truong was free on S250,000 bond in
February 1979 pending the outcome of
his appeal when a group Halperin head-
ed, the Campaign for Political Rights,
staged a party in Washington to cele-
brate. the release of The Intelligence
Network, a propaganda "docu-
mentary" film against the CIA, FBI
and other U.S. intelligence agencies in
which Halperin had an important role.
Truong attended the party and Hal-
perin, smiling, posed for a press photo
with the convicted spy.
Halperin and the
Ellsberg-Russo Defense
In 1971, `Daniel Ellsberg and An-
thony Russo, both former employes of
the Defense Department and its think
tank, the Rand Corp., admitted they
had unlawfully copied a two-and-a-
half-million-word "Top Secret -
Sensitive" report on the U.S. role in
Vietnam and leaked it-to the New York
Times and other: newspapers which
published excerpts of the document
while the U.S. was still fighting in Viet-
nam.
Former President Lyndon Johnson
termed the leak "close to treason" and
Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, chairman
of the Joint.Chiefs of Staff-during our
Early involvement in to . an J t t
supreme commander of -NATO; said
the leak was "a traitorous act. The
Supreme. -Court denied the govern-
ment's request for an injunction on
publication of the material, but a
majority of its members expressed
grave concern about the leak in doing
so. Justice. White, for example, had _
noted in his opinion that "a massive
breakdown in security is known."
Ellsberg and Russo were indicted on
charges of espionage,- theft of govern-
ment property and conspiracy. The
Left rushed to their defense. Leonard
Boudin, father of convicted terror-
ist-murderer Kathy, became Ellsberg's
defense counsel and Leonard Wein-
glass, his associate in the National Law-
yers Guild and a leader of the revolu-
tionary Center for Constitutional
Rights, became Russo's. -
A defense team of some 35 people -,
experts of various types, as well as
attorneys - was assembled with Hal-
perin its reported "chief of staff." He
took leave from a position in Wash- -
ington to spend five months rf Los
Angeles working on their defense and
testifying for them. -- -
- Contradicting the testimony of high-
ranking military officers, Halperin
testified that the "Pentagon Papers,"
as they had become known, would-be
of little or no value to the enemy; also
that they had been classified almost by
whim, and were really personal papers
belonging to him, Leslie. Gelb, who
had actually directed the study, and
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul C.
Warnke, rather than government docu
menu. It was routine, he claimed, for
officials such. as they to take their per-
sonal paperywith them. when they. left
office and that this vvas-not considered
theft or a violation of security .regula--
tions.
The prosecution, however, intro-
duced two contrary affidavits signed by
Halperin. In one, executed prior to his
Defense Department employment, he
had promised to return all classified
documents when his employment end-
ed and in the other, signed when he left
the NSC in 1969, he asserted that he did
not have in his possession, custody or
control, any classified information or
documents relating to the national
defense io which he had obtained access
during his employment.
Additionally, an FBI agent who had
interviewed Halperin shortly after the
leak of the study testified that Halperin
had told him then that he had been ac-
ting as an agent of the government
when he sent one copy of it to the Rand
Corp. and that he had given Ellsberg
.access to the copy in Rand's possession
(after twice denying requests for it)
even though he was afraid Ellsberg
might be- "indiscreet" and make parts
of it public.
Gelb, contradicting Halperin, told
reporters that he considered the study
to be "government property," not his,
Halperin's or - Warnke's personal
papers.
The question of the legal guilt of Ells-
berg-Russo was never settled. In May
1973, a number of government actions
were revealed which the judge classified
as misconduct and offensive to justice,
making the key problem of separating
legitimate from illegitimate evidence
against the defendants*- - lwell-nigh
impossible." He therefore dismissed all
charges against the two.:
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One of the major reasons for his ac-
tion was the fact that ' it -was revealed
that Ellsberg had been overheard on a
warrantless national- ' security.-wiretap;
the records ofwhich -could-,: not - be
found.
The wiretap, it-w- as further:ievealed,
had been on the borne phone of Morton
H. Halperin. Ellsberg had been . -over-.
heard on it 15 times, because'- be -was,
Halperin's house guest for -a period
when the tap was in 'operation.
Ellsberg and Russo, admitted pur-
loiners of the Pentagon Papers, were
not freed for the reasons Halperin de-
sired, but freed they were with his help
- in more ways than one.
Halperin's Anti-
In telligence. Operations
Why would,-the government have
tapped Halperin?. -
A Yale 'Ph.D.' in international rela-
tions who failed the Foreign Service ex-
am, Halperin was associated with Har-
vard's Center for-International Affairs
for six years, serving as an. instructor
for two, an assistant professor for two
and producing half-a-dozen studies, all
related to disarmament. The , title of
one, "A Proposal for a Ban on the Use
of .Nuclear Weapons," indicates: the
basic theme of all.
In 1967 he got a job as a special assis-
tant to an assistant secretary of defense
and, during the last two years of the
'Johnson Administration, became Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Plans and Arms Control) under Assis-
-tant Secretaryfor-International Secur-
ity Affairs Paul Warnke:
Halperin knew_~-Heriry.Kissinger.at:,
Harvard and lectured at his national
security seminars .there. It was after::
their last joint appearance at.-such a--
seminar. in December--.1968 that Kis-._
singer asked Halperin to serve on the
staff of the National Security Council
which Kissinger was to head in the Nix- 1
on Administration.
An opponent of U.S. policy in Viet-
nam and other areas, Halperin never:
theless agreed to do so - but resigned
his NSC post in September 1969 when it
became clear to him that the Admin-
istration was not ready to cut and run
from the Vietnam War. At. Kissinger's
request, Halperin agreed to remain as a
consultant to the NSC, but severed that
tie, too, in May 1970 in protest against
the U.S. move into the Vietcong-North
Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia.
Halperin then-became a senior fellow
at the Brookings Institution in Wash-
ington, an aide to Sen. Edmund Muskie
and consultant to the intergovern
mental relations subcommittee of the
Senate Government Operations Com-
mittee which Muskie chaired. He also.
directeda- Twentieth Century Fund
study of government security classifica-
tion practices and testified on that sub-
ject for the. Muskie subcommittee as
well as -a House subcommittee and
served as a political consultant.for Sen.
:George McGovern in his 1972 presiden-
tial campaign.
Halperin's views were - so far out :
when he_ was at the Defense Department -
that he argued that, even when the U.S.
was fighting North Vietnamese forces'-.
-in South. Vietnam; recorinaisance
(intelligence) flights over North .Viet
nam were-of-no.value: Nevertheless, he
was given at least partial credit,for turn-
ing Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford
against-the war:
. His.:first=assignment fore the Nixon
Administration was production of an
improved. foreign.,policy_- decision-,.
making-procedure, one that: would fi
revitalize theNSC,_be`ceniered'in the
White House -an- d-give the President the `
full range `oT options' available':-on all
issues.Halperin''s proposal called for -
denying the NSC the advantage of the
latest and best U.S.intelligence as at
considered major policy -problems..-
CIA CIA Director Richard Helms learned
about the proposal before it was imple-
mented and succeeded in having it
-
killed..
,
A court has noted that Halperin
concentrated on antiwar activities
after. resigning- from the. NSC.'
True, but he also concentrated on
anti-intelligence activities - and
to such an extent.that, if anyone in
this country deserves the title,
"Mr. Anti-Intelligence," it is Hal-
penn.
In 1970, -the ACLU decided to under-
take a nationwide drive against-U.S.
intelligence agencies and operations.
That same year, it created the Commit- -
tee for Public Justice (CPJ) to spear-
head the drive against the FBI ? and
Department of Justice. The CPJ was
headed by playwright Lillian Hellman,
the unrepentant "ex"-Communist and
whitewasher of the CP who, when she
died recently, left part of her $4-million
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estate for-2h4establishment ofa.fund
for Communist=writers.:. Halpern has
served on CPJ's.'executive council,
newsletter committee and written for its
newsletter.
Early.in 1974,-the ACLU Foundation
and the Fund for Peace jointly setup in
Washington the -Center for-National
Security . Studies (CNSS) as. the
research, information and documenta-
tion center for its national anti-intel-
ligence -campaign. Its first director was
Robert Borosage of the Marxist think
tank, the Institute for Policy Studies
(IPS). He soon returned to the IPS,
however, and Halperin succeeded him
as director of the CLASS; a post he has
held ever since.
The ACLU next created a Project on
National Security and CiviIZaberties'as
the litigating arm-of its anti-intelligence
campaign. Halperin- became',:-and re-
mains .- the director of that;project:
In 1975, still another instrument. as
created,' a mondly, FrtstPrinciples,to
-serve as -a news;.-propaganda .and `agi-
tationweapon 'or the campaign. Hal-
perin becameits chief editorial`-writer.
Technically; 'it: As published":cby the
CNSS, which Halperin directs.-;
Something- more was-needed-to
sound - out the ACLU anti-security
operation - a-nationwide coalition or
"united -front" of - anti-intelligence
groups to ., .exert political . pressure on
both the local and national levels.
Borosage, supported by-the IPS,
ACLU, CNSS and-the Communist Na-
tional Lawyers Guild, set--about orga-
nizing one in 1976. It emerged in 1977
as the Campaign to Stop Government
Spying, with almost 50 member-and co-
- ,operating groups. Halperin emerged as
its chairperson and it soon began pub-
lishing a:monthly, Organizing Notes,
very similar in. format and style. to Hal-
perin's First Principles.-
In late 1978, the 1"Stop Government
Spying" group changed its name to the
more palatable "Campaign for Polit-
ical Rights" (CPR). "CPR member
groups included a number of officially
cited Communist fronts, as well as
CounterSpy and its successor, Covert
Action Information Bulletin, in addi-
tion fo many radical and revolutionary
groups- (and some church=affiliated
organizations).
Halperin, as CNSS_ director, has
filed numerous FO1A-(Freedom of In-
formation Act) requests; in efforts to
pry secrets out of the files of the CIA,
NSA, ;DIA,1BI,_ National Security
Council and other.U .S. intelligence-se-
curity agencies. He has, followed many
.of them up with lawsuits, and has
encouraged others to do the same. He
has followed the same course in the
field of constitutional torts, suing for
huge sums for alleged- constitutional
violations on the part of intelligence
agencies and officials in the course of
carrying out their. information-gath-
ering duties and has sought bans on.
their intelligence operations.
Representing the CNSS and ACLU, Halperin has testified against virtually
-every bill introduced in .he last decade
to "improve or strengthen American
intelligence and-..for `every bill' that
would- have the "-opposite effect. , It 'is..
doubtful-that anyonein the nation -
including the highest. intelligence offi-.
cials-have testified before Congress as
frequently as he has'.on such national
. Most depressing is the fact that,
despite the consistency of his
words and actions during the past
10 years,.members of Congress -
particularly some on the- Senate
and House intelligence-committees
= have invariably lavished praise
and gratitude on him. for his-per-
formances:
Halperin would strip the intelligence
agencies of the weapon which the '
courts, Congress and the executive have
found to be essential to the achievement
of their mission - secrecy. He would
make public their budgets, ties with.
academics and other sources, control of
proprietaries, etc. He would go so far
as to compel disclosure not only of dip-
lomatic negotiations, but all research
on new weapons systems (such as the
supersecret Manhattan Project which !
developed the A-bomb during World'
War II, saving untold numbers of
American lives) and would even oppose
CIA covert action taken to prevent Li-
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byan dictator Muammar Qaddafi -from .a
sneaking nuclear weapons into New
York harbor: All covert action by the:-
CIA and other agencies would be.
brought to a halt. - _
The FBI, if Halperin had his way,
would not be allowed to investigate
anything but crime. All domestic intel-
ligence collection would cease by
law. All wiretapping, too, would -be
brought to a halt, even that used to
catch spies and learn the intentions,
plans and plots of nations hostile to this
country.
The Halperin
Wiretap and Lawsuit
The U.S. government, however, did
not tap - Halperin's phone-'for-::any :of .-
these actions ;or-beliefs;: but.Sor-other
-The Nixon.. Administration, -hke its --~
predecessors, -was plagued by a series of
damaging national security 'teaks -.--
In April .1969, the President met.with.
Kissinger, Atty. Gen.', John Mitchell `
and FBI "Director J. Edgar. Hoover to
consider what steps could be taken to
stop them. Based,on the practices of '...
past administrations, Hoover recom-
mended wiretaps as one means - and
his proposal-was accepted. Criteria for
determining who would be tapped in
the event of future leaks -including
access to the leaked information and
adverse- information in FBI files -
were agreed upon.
A May 9, 1969, New York Times ac-
count by William Beecher of the secret
U.S: bombing of parts of Cambodia so
disturbed the President that he had Kis-
singer call Hoover from Key Biscayne
(where both were on a working vaca-
lion) and tell him to do everything pos-
sible to uncover the leaker. The Pres-
ident later deposed in court that this
leak was "directly responsible for the
deaths of thousands of Americans."
He explained that Prince Sihanouk of
Cambodia could agree to the bombing
as long as it was secret but; for internal
political reasons, could.not do so once
it became known. The leak thus forced
a halt to the bombing and guaranteed
the enemy a safe haven from which they
-could attack Aiierican troops and-then ..
escape to safety. Hoover told Kissinger that Halperin
was a prime leak'suspect and placed a
tap on his phone. that day. Not one of
the very few authorized to know of the
secret bombing, Halperin had never-
theless learned of it through aconversa-
tional slip on Kissinger's part. i
Initially, the tap produced no evi-
dence of Halperin leaking information
and, within a -month of its installation,
FBI intelligence chief William Sullivan
recommended that it be discontinued.
Kissinger asked that it be continued for
another two weeks to "establish a pat-
tern of innocence" on Halperin's part.
That was done and the tap was .actually.
-continued :in effect until Feb. 12,'1971 (about_I6months after. Halperin left.:
the' NSC) -without the"-. eriodic ? 18-
month review' process eguired by the
.Administration s owri iegulations-gov-
ernirig- warrantless =rational :security
'wiretaps: As noted; the fact of the tap
.was revealed In May 1973 during the
Elisberg-Russo-trial.> -
Represented -by six`ACLU attorneys,
Halperin and his family, on June 14,
1973, filed suit, against Nixon, Kis-
singer, Mitchell, and a number of other
White House, Justice Department and
FBI officials, charging violation of
their constitutional rights. In December
1976, the trial judge held that the origi-
nal installation of the tap was constitu-
tional but that its continuance for so .
long in violation of the Administra-
tion's own regulations violated Hal-
perin's rights. He awarded Halperin $5
in nominal damages against the three
remaining defendants in the case -
Nixon, Mitchell, and former White
House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman.
The government fought this
decision vigorously, realizing that
if the ruling stood, the President-
from the viewpoint of protecting
the national security - would be
turned into an ineffective wimp.
It was eventually resolved in June
1982 when the Supreme Court ruled in
ntinued
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two similar cases that the. President,
while acting in the scope of his author-
ity, enjoys absolute immunity from suit
for damages, even if he should break a
law or violate a citizen's rights. His top
governmental aides, on the other hand,
have only qualified immunity in such
instances.
Halperin's suit, of course, meant not
only the taking of testimony but the fil-
ing with the court of numerous deposi-
tions and affidavits by Nixon, Mitchell,
Kissinger and other defendants and wit-
?nesses, as well as the submission of FBI
file material and briefs by the Justice
Department which contained state-
ments of fact as well as legal argu-
ments.
All this material did not resolve the
question of the Cambodian bombing
leak, but it did shed interesting light on
Morton Halperin as a servant of the
government and the people, and why
the Carter Administration took the
position that continuance of the tap for
so long a period was justified.
Among the lawsuit revelations
(words in quotes, followed by the letter
"B," indicate a quotation from a ma-
jor brief filed with the court of appeals
by the Caner Justice Department in
May 1978):
? Kissinger had hired Halperin for
the NSC over the objections of J. Edgar
Hoover, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the security officer of
the NSC, Sen. 'Barry Goldwater and
White House Chief of Staff H. R.
Haldeman.
? Hoover objected to Halperin's em-
ployment in part because, when apply-
ing for official access to sensitive infor-
mation as a Defense Department em-
ploye, .he had failed to reveal visits to
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and
Greece, as well as conversations with
Soviet citizens. -
Even before. the Cambodia leak,
Hoover "had apparently already made 1,
the. determination that Dr. Halperin -1
was=a_potential security, risk. -'B.-
-Within a month of the time Sulli-_,
-van, the FBI intelligence official, had
recommended discontinuance -of the
Halperin. wiretap,' he reported in a
memo to Hoover: -
"As we know, Halperin cannot be
trusted... We have learned enough
already from the early coverage of him
to conclude this. Since... Halperin has
said almost nothing on the telephone,
my guess is that he assumes it is tapped."
- B. (On the day the tap was installed,
Kissinger warned Halperin that he was
suspected of leaking highly sensitive in-
formation to the New York Times.
"This warning may have placed Dr.
Halperin on notice as to any govern-
ment efforts to identify the source of
the leaks." - B.)
? The wiretap revealed Halperin
making "revelations on the North Viet-
namese position [Oct. 24, 1969, sum-
mary), differing internal recommenda-
tions of the Secretaries of State and
Defense and the Attorney General as to
Cambodia [May 4, 1970 summary], his
plan to meet with the representatives of
a German news magazine about the Na-
tional Security Council [Oct.13, 1970,
summary], and a planned meeting with
a representative of the Soviet Onion's
Pravda [Sept. '30, 1969, summary]" -
.B.
? Kissinger had explicitly instructed
Halperin not to talk to journalists, but
Halperin had repeatedly violated this
instruction. In September 1969, Hal-
perin told Kissinger, "I haven't7talked
to the press... since May." The rec-
ord, however, revealed that during this
period he had received calls from, con-
versed with, and met a "variety" of
journalists - B.
? In the Carter Administration's
view, Halperin's "poor judgment" in
"relating what was being considered in
the [National Security) Council is,
perhaps, best reflected" in the May 13,
1969, wiretap summary and the logs on
which it was based - B (the brief did
not reveal, however, the revelations
Halperin made on that date, or to
whom he made them).
? Two weeks after the tap was in-
stalled, Halperin (still with the NSC)
called his wife and told her that Henry
Brandon, Washington correspondent-
for the London Sunday Times, would
be coming to their home that night.
Brandon was suspected by the FBI of
being an agent of an East European in-
telligence agency and was one of the
newsmen tapped after the Cambodia
bombing leak. A few days later, on
May 27, 1969, Brandon called Hal-
perin, referred to their talk about peace
the other night, and asked Halperin's Continued
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help in finding a 1961 Dean Rusk cable
on Vietnam advisers. - -
? Halperin was a subcriber to the in-
ternational Communist magazine, the
World Marxist Review/Problems of
Peace and Socialism--
- ? A Sepj3, -1969,:Hoover report- to
the White House noted that Daniel Ells-
berg, a recent Halperin house guest,
had been overheard referring in a tele-
phone conversation with another 'per-
son to "a. satchel filled with "stuff at
his friend's house." (The meaning of
"stuff" was-not certain because Ells-
berg, in addition to being a purloiner of
classified documents, was also a sus-
pected drug user..) - ` : _,._;
? Halperin, when he left the Defense
Department, ."retained access to and
control overmany classified documents
which he took upon his leaving" - B.
? When he left the NSC, Halperin
"managed to cart off boxes of highly
classified material without the National
Security Council's permission or
knowledge" - R.
? He turned this material over to the
Rand Corp. and, in doing so, "reserved
unto himself full control of distribution
and use of the documents" - B.'After
he left the NSC, having continued ac-
cess to this material, he reviewed it "on
several occasions" - B. When he later
turned the material over to the Archives
without NSC permission, he- continued
to maintain control over it.
? The government could not act im-
mediately to resolve the security prob-
lem presented by numerous sensitive
documents being beyond its, and under
Halperin's, control because retrieval
"would have disclosed .the existence of
the tap" - R.
The preceding does not include all
relevant information in Halperin's
background, but it is sufficient to in-
dicate his basic characteristics and lean-
ings and also the nature of a group
whose leadership would hold him in
such high esteem that it would employ
him in key. posts for years, and also
consider advancing him to one of the
top posts in the organization, even if
this could be accomplished only by
abandonment of a basic fairness policy.
When past ACLU actions are consid-
ered, however, there is no surprise in.
this. Shortly after it launched its
nationwide anti-intelligence drive in
1970, the ACLU decided it needed
someone to direct the research neces-
sary for the undertaking. Whom did it
pick for this important position?
Frank Donner, a Yale law professor
identified by three witnesses as a
member of a secret Communist cell in
the NLRB (National Labor Relations
Board) while employed as a lawyer in
that agency during World War II and a
man who had invoked the 5th Amend- i
ment when questioned about his party
membership in 1956 and 1959 congres-
sional appearances.
A long-time member and official of
the National Lawyers Guild, Donner
was one of those selected to help defend
Morton Sobell, who was convicted of
espionage with the Rosenbergs, and
also 21 U.S. employes of the U.N. who
were fired in 1953 following an inves-
tigation of Communist infiltration of
the U.N. staff.
Donner was for years so active in
such matters that he was one of 43
Guild members whose biographies were
included in the 1959 congressional
report, "Communist Legal Subversion:
The Role of the Communist Lawyer"
to illustrate the subtitle of that docu-
ment..Though he testified in 1959 that
he was not a current member of the CP,
he had recently been appointed general
counsel of the UE (United Electrical
Workers), a union expelled from the
CIO as Communist and so vigorously
Red it would never hire anyone who
had actually turned against the CP and
Moscow.
More recently, Donner has served on
the advisory board of CounterSpy and
as a member of the speaker's panel of
its offshoot, PEPIC.
Again, however, there was nothing
surprising in the ACLU's selection.of
Donner, if one is. familiar' with its
history.
?
Formed in 1920, the ACLU became
an open collaborator with and defender
of the.CP and the Soviet Union, with
the result that it was branded a Com-
munist front by various agencies in the
'20s and '30s. Its founder and continu-
ing leader proclaimed in 1935 that
"Communism is the goal."
Open Communist party leaders such
as William Z. Foster and Elizabeth G.
Flynn (both later party chairmen) served
on its board, as did notorious fellow
travelers'and a number of secret party
members. CP leader Earl. Browder
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testified in 1939 that the ACLU was a
"transmission belt" of the CP, i.e., a
group through which the party dissem-
inated its line ton~on-Communists.
The Stalin-Hitler pact forced the
ACLU to take. a partial anti-Com-
munist stand in 1940. By a slim, one-
vote margin it adopted a resolution that
no member of a political organization
that supported foreign' totalitarian
powers could serve on its staff or
governing committees - and custed
the open Communist, Elizabeth Flynn,
from its executive board (Foster had
earlier routinely resigned). CP mem-
bers and officials, however, remained
eligible for ACLU membership.
The post-World War II period wit-
nessed a battle between genuine civil
libertarians and Communists and their
fellow travelers for control of the
ACLU, with the former winning for a i
period in the early 'SOs. In time, how-
ever,
they lost out as the ACLU became.
more and more radicalized and leftist..
In 1967, it rescinded its 1940 "anti-
Communist" resolution and, in 1976,
its expulsion of Flynn (who had mean-
while died in, and been buried in,'
Moscow). By these two actions it pro-
claimed, in effect, that even world
Communist leaders are genuinely com-
mitted to civil liberties as defined in the
U.S. Constitution and fully qualified to
govern an organization dedicated to
them. In a political sense, this was the
ultimate obscenity - but hardly sur-
prising, coming from the ACLU.
For at least '20 years now, the
ACLU's public record has more and
more', convincingly documented its
abandonment of its proclaimed com-
mitment to civil liberties as defined in
the Constitution. It and its sub-units
and/or its highest-ranking national
leaders have repeatedly gone to the
defense of terrorists, stooges of the
KGB, Communists, and revolutionary
destroyers of . all types - including
those in foreign lands.
At the same time, the ACLU has seen
fit to attack the Supreme Court and
every U.S. administration for some al-
leged civil liberties offense or other.
In the long run, the basic purpose of
the CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI and other
U.S. intelligence agencies is the protec-
tion of American civil liberties. Yet the
ACLU has seen fit to launch a massive,
many-faceted and concerted campaign
against them, doing everything possible
to so weaken and cripple them that, if
its goal were fulfilled, they could not
possibly carry out this most important
-constitutional mission.
Halperin, eagerly waiting in the
-wings, according to accounts, may or
may not get the post of director of the
ACLU's influential Washington office.
If he gets it, it clearly won't be good
news. But if he does not get it, it won't
be good news, either -, because the
ACLU will surely select in his stead
someone else its leaders hold .in high
regard, someone else who shares the
ACLU view of civil liberties, of U.S.
intelligence agencies and U.S. security .
Halperin may be a problem. But it is
the ACLU . that is the bigger - and
main - problem. ^
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