ALEXANDER HAIG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000302440007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 2, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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yo.
CAVEAT-
Realism,
Reagan
And
Foreign
Policy
M "Al, Join
My Team
TIME
2 April 1984
a
ALEXANDER
When Ronald Reagan asked me to be his Secretary of State. I
had spent no more than three hours alone with him. In the fall of
1978, Reagan and I met at his home on the heights above Los An-
geles. The evening had been arranged by Richard Allen, whom I
had known as an uneasy member of Henry Kissinger's staff on
the National Security Council. Allen was now Reagan's foreign
policy adviser. I was still Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
I had made some statements about U.S. policy toward the Soviets
that the press had interpreted as being critical of the policies of
my Commander in Chief, President Jimmy Carter. Thereupon
?
To my knowledge. never before my confirmation had there
been hearings so openly conducted on ideological grounds rather
than merely political ones. For some men there is a high emotive
content in terms that apply to me: soldier. Republican, conserva-
tive, patriot. Add to that tinder the burning issues of Watergate,
Viet Nam Cambodia, wiretaps, the CIA, Chile. and you have the
makings of a pretty hot time.
The question that ought to be asked of nominees for high of-
fice is this: Who are you and how did you become the person you
are today? However, it was unlikely, as the date of my confirma-
tion hearing before the Senate approached, that anyone was go-
ing to join me in a philosophical exercise on the relationship be-
tween personal experience and policymaking. The primary
subject would be Nixon.
**~~~*********
Allen had called me to say that Reagan would like to hear my
assessment of the European scene.
? "Nobody Has a
Monopoly on Virtue"
Rumors of Haig's appointment had already touched off intense
controversy about his White House years. As Kissinger's aide on the
National Security Council, Haig had requested FBI wiretaps on a
number of reporters and Government officials in 1969-71 to deter-
mine the source of embarrassing leaks to the press. Later, as Rich-
ard Nixon's chief of staff' when the Watergate scandal was ap-
proaching its climax, Haig resisted efforts by Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski to obtain Oval Office tapes that ultimately discredit-
ed Nixon. Critics also faulted Haig for having helped Nixon and
Kissinger conduct the war in Viet Nam, including the 1970 incur-
sion into Cambodia. Yet another cloud over his nomination was the
persistent though contested allegation that the Nixon Administra-
tion ordered the CIA to organize the 1973 military coup d'etat in
which Chile's Marxist President Salvador Allende Gossens, was
overthrown and killed.
M My "Grab
For Power"
For years, members of Reagan's staff had been communicat-
ing with their chief's friends and enemies through the press, re-
warding the one and punishing the other. They had often commu-
nicated with each other in the same way. It seemed natural to
them, now that they were in the White House, to communicate
thus with other officials. and even with foreign governments.
At first, I did not realize that the media had let themselves be
converted into White House bulletin boards. When I would deliv-
er a sensitive memorandum for the President's eyes only in the
early afternoon, and then hear quotations from it on the evening
news, I would react with surprise and call up the White House to
express my shock. How naive I must have seemed.
Since my meeting with Reagan on Jan. 6, we at State had been
working with Defense, the NSC staff and CIA to produce a mutual-
ly agreeable version of NSDD1, the National Security Decision Di-
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rective establishing the structure of foreign policy. State was
awarded the chairmanship and Defense the vice chairmanship of
all the interagency groups dealing with foreign policy. This ar-
rangement was accepted without demur by Secretary of Defense
Weinberger and by William Casey, the director of the Central In-
telligence Agency, and etpeciall by A en.
So it was with confidence, even camaraderie, that we four met
at the White House after the Inauguration to deliver the agreed-
upon document to the President, although we did not seek to see
the President. A certain festivity was in the air and a certain so-
lemnity too. We were living through the first hours of a new era,
and if the heart of the Government is anywhere, it is in the White
House. At the end of an Administration, it has an air of shabbi-
ness, poignant to those who remember the paint when it was new
and the furniture before it was battered. No one, I imagine, has
left the place more threadbare than President Carter.
The draft directive was received by Meese in his office. Also
present were Baker and
Deaver. Meese seemed very
much at ease, very sure of
his authority. Baker and
Deaver, favorites of Mrs.
Reagan's. seemed to be less-
er players, hanging back a
bit. Allen was there, and so
was Casey.
Also present was Wein-
berger. He is a capable man,
immensely likable and hon-
est, a talented administrator
and a stubborn fighter for
what he believes is right.
The defense policy that he
and President Reagan were
to devise is a long-needed
corrective and will heighten
the chances of keeping the
peace in small ways and
large.
Under Meese's chair-
manship, we began a point-
by-point discussion of the
document. With lawyerly
meticulousness, Meese con-
ducted a dogged critique of
the paper. In the process,
my earlier understandings
with the President-and
Weinberger's too-were disappearing in a haze of nitpicking. At
length, Meese tucked the directive into his briefcase. I would like
to be able to say that something in his manner warned me that the
document would stay there, unsigned, for well over a year. But the
truth is, I never dreamed that he would not hand it to the Presi-
dent at the start of the next day.
Once before, when the Cabinet-designates met in Washing-
ton on Jan. 7, 1 had sensed in Meese a tendency to assume an un-
usual measure of authority. In a sort of primer on Cabinet rela-
tions with the White House, he explained the President's ideas,
the President's procedures, the President's priorities. Reagan
himself spoke very little. When he did intervene, it was usually to
recall an incident from his days as Governor of California that
was in some way relevant to the subject.
As a result of Meese's pocketing the draft directive, there was
no description of duty. no rules, no expression of the essential au-
thority of the President to guide his subordinates in their task. This
failure arose from ignorance: Reagan's assistants saw a routine act
of government as a novel attempt to pre-empt power. In fact, it was
a plan to share and coordinate those duties in foreign policy that
express the President's powers under the Constitution. I left the
White House that day with the feeling that Ed Meese and his col-
leagues perceived their rank in the Administration as being supe-
rior to that of any member of the Cabinet.
Z
`All I Hear Is
Cuba, Cuba, Cuba!"
Signals were particularly necessary in Central America. It
was typical that Americans would be reluctant to treat El Salva-
dor as a strategic problem with global implications. Historically,
we have been slow to think and act in these terms. It has cost us
dearly. After World War II, an American Secretary of State de-
clared that Korea was not within the U.S. sphere of interest. A
short time later, North Korean troops attacked across the 38th
parallel. A few months later, entering Seoul with elements of X
Corps. I saw evidence of Soviet military presence down to the
battalion level in the North Korean army.
A decade later, the war in Viet Nam should have taught us
that such an expression of North Vietnamese imperialism could
not have taken place without the massive support of the U.S.S.R.
Yet we chose not to take the issue to the Soviet Union or even, in
a meaningful way, to Hanoi. We chose, instead, to tangle ineffec-
tually with the puppets, rather than the puppetmasters.
Central America offered another chance to show we had
learned this lesson. The war in El Salvador seemed to be a stale-
mate. No stalemate could have existed without the massive sup-
port of outside sources. I believed that through economic, politi-
cal and security measures we should persuade the Soviets and
Cubans to put an end to Havana's bloody activities in the hemi-
sphere and elsewhere in the world. In Central America there
could not be the slightest doubt that Cuba was at once the source
of supply and the catechist of the Salvadoran insurgency.
The insurgents said that they financed their war with the
proceeds of bank robberies and ransoms paid by rich relatives of
kidnaped members of the exploiting classes. Many accepted
these explanations. The will to disbelieve our own governments
is a very strong force in America and the West. We ran into this
phenomenon when, in February 1981, we published a State De-
partment White Paper called "Communist Interference in El
Salvador." The White Paper's critics brought in the Scottish ver-
dict: not proven. Perhaps no defense of the paper would have
been equal to the task of quieting the outrage. We had told im-
permissible truths.
To understand the circumstances of life in Central America
is to wish to change those circumstances. No one could be un-
moved by the spectacle of poverty and social injustice in a coun-
try like El Salvador. Merely by taking up arms against these
conditions, the insurgents won a measure of idealistic interna-
tional sympathy and trust. What the rebels had done in fact was
to add murder, terrorism and inestimable sorrow to the miseries
of the people.
The Reagan Administration was concerned with human
rights. But publicly denouncing friends on questions of human
rights while minimizing the abuse of those rights in the Soviet
Union and other totalitarian countries was at an end. El Salva-
dor, vital though the preservation of its democratic future is, rep-
resents a symptom of dangerous conditions in the Americas-
Cuban adventurism. Soviet strategic ambition.
When I was a private citizen, President Jose Lopez Portillo
of Mexico had told me that the difficulty he had had in a domes-
tic Mexican sense in dealing with the Carter Administration was
that, in his words, "a President of Mexico cannot survive by tak-
ing positions to the right of the President of the U.S."
Months later, as Secretary of State, I found myself seated
next to the Mexican Ambassador to the U.S. at a dinner. He
leaned over and made an offer. Would the new Administration
like to open a discreet line of communication with the rebels in
El Salvador? I exploded: no longer, I said, would Washington
deal secretly with insurgents who were attempting to overthrow
legal governments in the Western Hemisphere. In the next four
years. the Americas would see a determined U.S. effort to stamp
out Cuban-supported subversion.
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The Ambassador was at first startled by my vehemence, but
he gripped my hand wanrily. "For years," he said fervently, "I
have been waiting for an American to speak words such as these.
Tonight I will go home and sleep well!"
There was another envoy who needed to hear the message.
This was the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoli Dobrynin. "It's
good to see you back in Washington, Al," he said when he
made his first call on me at the State Department. "You belong
here." Coming quickly to the point, I raised with him the ques-
tion of the transshipment of Soviet arms through Nicaragua to
the insurgents in El Salvador. "All lies," said Dobrynin.
"Photographs don't lie." I replied for the U.S. had been
gathering intelligence on arms smuggling for a period of a year
or more from human agents and by technological means like sat-
ellite photography. "The U.S. is profoundly disturbed by Cuban
activities in the Caribbean an elsewhere in the world."
Dobrvnin said this was certainly no way to start an Adminis-
tration. How, he asked. should the U.S. and the Soviet Union be-
gin to develop a dialogue? I said, "It is not acceptable to talk
peace while acting differently. One statement we can never ac-
cept is [President Leonid) Brezhnev's insistence on your right to
support so-called wars of liberation whenever and wherever tar-
gets of opportunity develop."
This was a Bash point. Dobrynin said he could recall no such
policy. It would be very unfortunate, he added, if the Soviet leader-
ship formed the impression that the Reagan Administration was
hostile to the U.S.S.R., because first impressions often persisted.
"Not hostile," I said. "Offended by Soviet excesses. Confi-
dent, determined, prepared to do what is necessary. The Soviet
leadership must know that there must be change, for the future
good of both sides." Then and subsequently, I stressed our con-
cern with Cuba's role as a Soviet proxy.
Dobrynin complained, "All I ever hear from you, is Cuba,
Cuba, Cuba!" It is true that I raised that subject often. Cuban
troops in Ethiopia were the praetorian guard of a regime whose
policy had caused inestimable suffering. Cuban troops in Angola
were the chief impediment to a settlement that might bring
peace to that country and independence to neighboring Nami-
bia. But it was the role of Cuba in the insurgency in El Salvador
that engaged our attention in the most urgent manner.
There was not, however, a unity of views within the Admin-
istration over how to respond. Very nearly the first words spoken
on the subject of Central America in the councils of the Reagan
Administration made reference to the danger of "another Viet
Nam." Indeed, this danger existed, if Reagan repeated the errors
of the past and resorted to incrementalism. To start small, to
show hesitation, to localize our response was to Vietnamize the
situation. If it is easier to escalate step by small step, it is easier
for an adversary to respond to each step with a response that is
strong enough to compel yet another escalation on our part. That
is the lesson of Viet Nam. If an objective is worth pursuing, then
it must be pursued with enough resources to force the issue early.
The President was buffeted by the winds of opinion and
tugged by the advice of those who doubted the wisdom of a deci-
sive policy based on the strategic considerations I have outlined.
One camp favored a low-key treatment of El Salvador as a local
problem and sought to cure it through limited military and eco-
nomic aid along with certain covert measures. In that camp were
Vice President Bush, Defense Secretary Weinberger DirectQr f
Central Intelligence Casey (with reservations) National Securi ty
Adviser Allen and most of the others. Together with Baker and
Deaver. Meese was the leading voice for caution and slow deci-
sion. Meese's keen legal mind detected the risks; his deep loyalty
and affection for the President made him protective.
Some of Reagan's highest aides counseled against diluting
the impact of his domestic program with a foreign undertaking
that would generate tremendous noise in the press and in Con-
gress. Weinberger genuinely feared the creation of another un-
manageable tropical war into which American troops and mon-
ey would be poured with no result different from Viet Nam. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff, chas-
tened by Viet Nam, in
which our troops performed
with admirable success but
were declared to have been
defeated, and by the steady
decline of respect for the
military-and the decline
of military budgets-resist-
ed a major commitment. I
sensed, and understood, a
doubt on the part of the mil-
itary in the political will of
the civilians at the top to
follow through to the end
on such a commitment.
I was virtually alone
in the other camp, which
favored giving military
and economic aid to El
Salvador while bringing
the overwhelming econom-
ic strength and political in-
fluence of the U.S., together
with the reality of its mili-
tary power, to bear on Cuba
in order to treat the prob-
lem at its source. In my
view that the potential stra-
tegic gain from this combi-
nation of measures far out-
weighed the risks, and that the U.S. could contain any Soviet
countermeasures, I was isolated.
Fortunately, the protracted nature of our discussions did not
produce total paralysis. The aircraft carriers Eisenhower and
Kennedy with their battle groups totaling some 30 ships were
sent on routine Atlantic Fleet maneuvers in the waters around
Cuba. An existing task force was upgraded to the status of Carib-
bean Command. Even these limited actions produced results.
Castro ordered antiaircraft guns placed on the roofs of Ha-
vana during our naval exercises. The flow of arms into Nicara-
gua and thence into El Salvador slackened, a signal from Ha-
vana and Moscow that they had received and understood the
American message. From many sources we heard that the Cu-
ban was nervous, that he desired contacts with the Americans.
In late February. one of Richard Allen's staff assistants. Rog-
er Fontaine, took the unusual step of trying to arrange a meeting
with Castro through Jack Anderson. the columnist. Anderson. it
seems, knew a Cuban exile in Miami who claimed to have ar-
ranged for the passing of messages between the Castro regime
and previous U.S. Administrations. Fontaine met the Cuban in
Anderson's office. The question of opening a secret channel to
Havana was discussed. The President's name was invoked.
When word of this reached me, I telephoned Meese, Allen's
effective superior, to talk about its implications. We had spent
weeks putting fear into the hearts of the Cubans and getting re-
sults. This diversion undermined the whole effort. Meese seemed
to understand my objections. The President could not have been
aware of this, he said; he had told Allen not to meet with foreign-
ers without prior clearance from the State Department.
Castro's approaches became more frequent. Finally, it began
to seem that nothing could be lost by testing the waters. On
Nov. 23, the Cuban Vice President, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez,
and I met in Mexico City, in strictest secrecy and with President
Reagan's approval. Rodriguez seemed less a fearsome revolu-
tionary than a cosmopolitan member of the privileged classes.
Educated by the Jesuits, a Castroite from the first days, a trusted
collaborator of the Soviet Union. he is probably the guarantee in
human form that the Cuban revolution will outlive Castro.
The last thing Cuba wanted, Rodriguez said, was a confron-
tation with the U.S. The U.S. was mistaken, even irrational, to
think that Cuba was involved in El Salvador. Cuba could not re-
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pounce its right to solidarity
with revolutionary masses
elsewhere in the world, but
Cuba did not want a con-
frontation by mistake.
Clearly the Cubans -
were very anxious. Actual-
ly. Castro and Rodriguez
had more reason to be ner-
vous than they knew. In my
conversations with Do-
brynin. I continued to press
the question of Cuban ad-
venturism. Dobrynin's re-
sponse convinced me that
Cuban activities in the
Western Hemisphere were
a matter between the U.S.
and Cuba. Castro had fallen
between two superpowers.
^ "1'm in
Control Here"
In a severe crisis, the
fate of the nation is at stake,
and the ultimate crisis man-
ager must be the President.
In 1973, during the Octor
War, the U.S. received an ultimatum from the Soviet Union: ei-
ther the Israeli forces that were driving across the Sinai with-
draw, or the U.S.S.R. would intervene, possibly with airborne
troops. The Secretary of State, He
Kissinger, suggestd to me
nry this crisis could be managed in th Sta a Department. As the
White House chief of staff. I insisted, on instructions from the
President, that it must be brought under control by the Presi-
dent. in the White House. with the support of State and other
agencies. The Soviet challenge was handled in the West Wing
Situation Room of the White House. U.S. strategic forces went to
a higher state of readiness, a strong reply to the Soviet ultimatum
was sent to Moscow, and the President won out. In the Reagan
Administration. I envisaged the State Department providing
whatever assistance the President required in the area of crisis
management, in support of whatever system he decided he want-
ed to use. But no pre-eminent role was ever sought for the State
Department or the Secretary of State.
On March 22, 1981, I read on the front page of the Washing-
ton Post an article that quoted senior White House officials say-.
ing that Vice President Bush would be in charge of a new struc-
ture for national-security crisis management. To place a Vice
President in charge of crisis management would be a departure,
but the vice presidency can be almost anything the President
wants it to be. Nixon. who literally "learned" the Presidency in
eight years under Eisenhower, isolated Spiro Agnew as if he
were a bacillus. In at least one White House meeting that I at-
i tended, President Johnson allotted the loquacious Hubert Hum-
phrey five minutes in which to speak ("Five minutes, Hubert!");
then Johnson stood by, eyes fixed on the sweep-second hand of
his watch, while Humphrey spoke. and when the Vice President
went over the limit, pushed him, still talking, out of the room.
Reagan. on the other hand, respected Bush's experience and
listened to his views. I phoned Ed Meese on Monday morning and
asked if there was any truth in the article in the Post. "None what-
soever," Meese replied.
Zuosequenby' Reagan called me into the Oval Office. He
wore an expression of concern. "I want you to know." he said,
"that the story in the Post is a fabrication. It means that George
would sit in for me in the NSC in my absence, and that's all
it means. It doesn't affect your authority in any way." Later
that same day, he called me on the phone, evidently to reassure
me a second time: "Al,
I want you to know that
you are my foreign policy
guy." One hour later the
President's press secretary
made a statement formally
confirming that Bush would
indeed chair the Adminis-
tration's "crisis manage-
ment" team.
This was a stunning se-
quence of events. I called in
my deputy, William Clark,
who knew the mind of the
President. "Something is
wrong here," he said. "The
President wouldn't do a
thing like this. Let me
go over to the White
House and find out what
happened."
I called my wife; she
had already heard the news
on television. "Don't un-
pack, honey," I told her
with forced cheeriness.
That night I slept fitfully.
There were no more calls
from the President, and no
word from Bill Clark.
The following morning
I began dictating the draft of a letter of resignation, although I
did not sign it. The possibility that matters could be explained
still existed. Word of my "threat to resign" quickly leaked to the
press. I called Vice President Bush. "The American people can't
be served by this," I told him. "Of course you chair the NSC in the
President's absence. We didn't need to say it. I have been dealt
with duplicitously. George. The President has been used. I need
a public reaffirmation of my role or I can't stay here."
y
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on Reagan called. In fact, he was able to explain the mis-
understanding. He regarded the new arrangement as a mere
housekeeping detail, a formality. Lack of communication, aggra-
vated by staff mischief, was the root problem. I was convinced
that Ed Meese had been as misled as the President. The trouble
lay elsewhere in the President's staff.
Reagan said that he had received complaints from other Cab-
inet officers about "steamroller tactics" in connection with issues
that interested me. Perhaps the President agreed with them.
"Do we have different conceptions of what your foreign poli-
cy should be. Mr. President?" I asked.
Reagan. exasperated, raised his voice. "Damn it, Al," he
said. "we have the same views, and I need you!"
A few days later-at 2:35 p.m. on Monday, March 30-the
State Department command center informed me that the televi-
sion networks were reporting that a gunman had fired shots at
President Reagan as he left the Washington Hilton Hotel but
that the President had escaped injury. I picked up a telephone
connected to a direct White House line. James Baker told me
that the first report was inaccurate. The President had been
struck "in the back" by a bullet. "It looks quite serious," Baker
said. "I'm going to the hospital."
Vice President Bush was in Texas. "I will move immediately
to the White House." I said. Baker agreed. "You will be my point
of contact."
In my car, my mind filled with memories of the day on which
President Kennedy was assassinated and the sense of shock and
sorrow that overcame the nation. Now the terrible blow had fall-
en again. On arrival at the White House, I learned that all the
President's senior aides had rushed to the hospital. "Has the Vice
President been informed?" I asked. The answer was no. Bush
was airborne. flying from Dallas to Austin. I telephoned him on
his plane and recommended he return to Washington at once.
To Allen. I suggested that
the Secretary of Defense,
the Attorney Genera and
the director of Central In-
telligence be asked to join
Secretary of the Treasury
Donald Regan, who was al-
ready present. Allen and
me in the Situation Room.
Weinberger and Casey
were the last to arrive. Each
member of the crisis team in
his turn gave the newcomers
a report on his activities.
Weinberger seemed some-
what self-conscious. Per-
haps he was embarrassed by
his late arrival. Abruptly, he
said, "I have raised the alert
status of our forces."
I was shocked. Any such
change would be detected
promptly by the Soviet
Union. In response. the
Russians might raise their
own alert status, and that'
could cause a further escala-
tion on our side. The news
would exacerbate the exist-
ing climate of anxiety and
anger and fear. Moreover,)
the Soviet leaders might very well conclude that the U.S., in a
flight of paranoia, believed that the U.S.S.R. was involved in the
attempt to assassinate the President. Why would we alert our mil-
itary forces if a lone psychotic had been responsible?
"Cap.- 1 said, "what do you mean? Will you please tell us ex-
actly what you've done." He had some difficulty specifying. This
was natural enough: he had been Secretary of Defense for barely
70 days. hardly long enough to absorb the complete vocabulary
of the job. I kept pressing him. He said he had ordered pilots of
the Strategic Air Command to their bases.
"Then you've raised the Defcon [defense condition]." I said.
He disagreed. This raised the temperature of the conversa-
tion. I began to suspect that Weinberger did not know what he
had done. He left the room to telephone in private. He was ab-
sent for perhaps ten minutes. When he returned, he told us. un-
equivocally. that he had not formally raised the alert status of
our forces. He had merely sent a message to field commanders
informing them officially of the situation in Washington. Most
important. U.S. strategic forces remained in their normal de-
fense condition.
A short time later, I turned my chair and craned to hear
what the assistant White House press secretary, Larry Speakes.
was saving on television. The room was hushed. It was oppres-
sively hot. It appeared that Speakes had been waylaid by the
press as he returned to the White House
from the hospital. and he was fending off
hard questions that reporters were hurling
. at him.
An official White House spokesman
was being asked who was running the
government at a time of national crisis.
and he was responding that he did not
know. He was being asked if the country
was being defended, and he was saying
that he did not know. This was no fault of
Speakes'. He had not been part of our
group. "This is very bad," Allen said. "We
have to do something." "We've got to get
him off," I said. Allen and I dashed out of
the Situation Room and ran headlong up
the narrow stairs. Then we hurried along
the jigsaw passageways of the West Wing
and into the press room. With Allen at my
side, I made the following statement:
"I just wanted to touch on a few mat-
ters associated with today's tragedy.
First, as you know, we are in close touch
with the Vice President, who is returning
to Washington. We have in the Situation
Room all of the officials of the Cabinet
who should be here at this time. We
have informed our friends abroad of the
situation. The President's condition,
as we know it. is stable, [he is] now
undergoing surgery. There are absolutely
no alert measures that are necessary at
contemplating."
I then took questions and was asked, "Who is making the de-
cisions for the government right now?"
My reply: "Constitutionally, gentlemen, you have the Presi-
dent, the Vice President and the Secretary of State in that order,
and should the President decide he wants to transfer the helm to
the Vice President, he will do so. He has not done that. As of
now, I am in control here, in the White House, pending return of
the Vice President and in close touch with him. If something
came up, I would check with him, of course."
On my return to the Situation Room, Weinberger expressed
displeasure at my statement on the alert status of American
forces. I was surprised. "Cap, are we or are we not on an in-
creased alert status?" Instead of answering my question in direct
fashion, he 'made some.remarks that were less than relevant
about the status of Soviet submarines off our coasts.
Weinberger added that Ed Meese had told him on the tele-
phone that the Secretary of Defense was third in line of
command after the President and Vice President. On defense
matters, this was quite true, but the question was moot. The
Vice President would be back in Washington in little more than
two hours.
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My remark that I was "in control ...
pending return of the Vice President"
was a statement of the fact that I was
the senior Cabinet officer present. I was
talking about the arrangements we had
made in the Situation Room for the three-
or four-hour period in which we awaited
the return of the Vice President from Tex-
as. Less precise, though in the same con-
text, was my statement that "constitution-
ally . . . you have the President, the Vice
President and the Secretary of State, in
that order." I ought to have said "tradi-
tionally" or "administratively" instead of
"constitutionally."
If. at the time, anyone had suggested
to me that I believed that the Secretary of
State was third in order of succession to
the President. the press would have had
the pleasure of even more vivid quotes.
For many months, in this same house. 1j
had lived hourly with the question of
succession in case of the removal first
of a Vice President and then of a Presi-
dent: I knew the Constitution by heart on
this subject.*
My appearance on the screen that
night became a celebrated media happen-
ing. Edited versions were played and re-
played many times in the days to come.
Even if I wished to do so, it is now far too
late to correct the impressions that it
made. but I may be forgiven for saying that
I regard the way in which the tape was
edited, especially by CBS, as the height of
technical artistry. The television camera is
the siege machine of the 20th century. Per-
haps the camera and microphone magni-
fied the effects of my spring up the stairs.
Possibly I should have washed my face or
taken half a dozen deep breaths before go-
ing on camera. The fact is, I was not think-
ing about my appearance. I was wholly in-
tent on correcting any impression of
confusion and indecision that Speakes'
words may have inadvertently created.
Certainly I was guilty of a poor choice of
words, and optimistic if I imagined that I
would be forgiven the imprecision out of
respect for the tragedy of the occasion.
The "take charge" image had taken hold even before March
30. Only a few weeks before, my photograph (jaw jutting. arms
akimbo) had been on the cover of TIME magazine. With the insou-
ciant hyperbole for which that publication is famous, the caption
read "Taking Command." Inside, under a bold line reading "The
'Vicar' Takes Charge," the editors devoted several pages of snare-
drum prose to an account of my life and a description of the Rea-
gan foreign policy. ABC reported: "The sight of Alexander Haig
taking command on the cover of TIME magazine was more than
some of the President's aides could take, and since its publication
there have been several obvious White House putdowns ... The
problem seems to be that some of Mr. Reagan's closest advisers
see Haig as a political competitor who must be reminded that
while he may be vicar, he is not the Pope."
In days to follow. my vicarhood was recertified by "officials"
and "presidential assistants" with more zeal than was perhaps
good for it. When I departed two days later for a diplomatic tour
of the Middle East, the White House, in an official statement,
said that I was leaving "in the full colors of the Secretary of
State and with the full confidence of the President." TIME de-
scribed the issuance of the statement as an "extraordinary step."
So it was. Never had so many anonymous
people been so eager to reassure the
world in such an intensive way that I
was not only competent. I was also quite!
"steady." But newsmen, canny skeptics
that-.they are, were stimulated by all
this reassurance to ask themselves. and
their readers: If this fellow is really allright. why do they insist on telling us that
he's all right? ^
The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, not the
Constitution. specifies that after the Vice President.
the presidency passes to the Speaker of the House.
then-to the.president pro tempore of the Senate. then
to the Secretary of State. then down through the Cab-
inet. It was according to this law that Speaker of the
House Carl Albert was. for almost two months in
1973. in line to succeed Nixon after the resignation of
Vice President Spiro Agnew. Nixon appointed Ger-
aid Ford as Vice President under the terms of the
25th Amendment, ratified in 1967.
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