LATIN-POLICY INFIGHTING REFLECTS DEEP DIVISIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000202320019-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: July 5, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP90-00552R000202320019-4
ARTICLE AppE 5 July 1984
05 PA,E-----rL-----
L.aa-policy infighuig
lefle'ets deep divisions.
By Juan 0. Tamayo
Knight-Rider News Service
WASHINGTON - President Reagan
may insist that there are no plans to
deploy U.S. combat forces in Central
America, but at the same time an
Army general is proposing covert
- use of U.S. warplanes to strafe Salva-
doran guerrillas.
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
arranges a surprise June 1. visit to
Nicaragua, but. he, hides, his plans
from other high-level administration
officials, reportedly out of fear that
they would veto the initiative.
. Seen from afar, these discrepancies
and myriad others like them have
given Reagan policies toward Cen-
tral America a tinge of the sinister,
hinting at a "secret agenda" that
talks of peace but girds for war.
But up close, the disharmony
shows up clearly for what it is: fall-
out from an unremitting struggle
between "moderates" and "hard-lin-
ers" Althin the administration; each
side prescribing substantially differ-
ent policies for Central America's
ills. -
A detailed examination of adminis-
tration policy shows that it is mainly
the result of day-to-day debate, in.
fighting and lobbying by ' strong-,
willed officials throughout the gov-
ernment,.rather. than a reflection of
a detailed plan set down,in the Oval
Office.
This picture emerged from dozens
of interviews with current and for-
mer government officials, many of
whom refused to be identified, and
many with vested interests. To many
of those officials, the situation is so
murky that they are not certain ex-
actly where US. policy is heading.
. For instance, one, official who has
been privy to inside information at
the top levels of the administration
said-- "If Reagan had to make a deci-
n.on today on whether to go in with.
troops, I think he'd be against it.
`"After the elections, I don't know."
Moderates like Shultz agree that
the administration must squeeze Nic-
a'ragua's Sandinista government and
Bl Salvador's leftist rebels to force
them to sue for peace. But they argue
that the United States need not send
combat forces to the region.
Hard-liners like Undersecretary of
Defense Fred C. Ikle contend that the.,
Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Sal-
vadoran rebels are a "cancer" that
must be cured, through pressure if
possible, through direct' military in-
tervention if necessary.
,Occasionally the hard-liners pre-
vail, and war fever mounts. Occa-
sionally the moderates get their way,
aid peace seems within grasp. More
iten, the two. sides compromise.
"There are two souls in this admin-
iitration, and two definitive posi-.
60ns on virtually al'' foreign and .
afense policy issues," said a senior
sate Department official. "Neither
school has a dominant position."
Washington veterans say the clash-
es over Central America are the
worst in years.
;Much of the infighting stems from
the anticommunist philosophy that
Meagan brought to government
when he took office in 1981.
.,In Reagan's first 13, months, the
State Department fired, sent to far-
away posts or forced into early re-
tirement at least seven Latin Ameri-
can `.experts that the new
administration saw as tainted by in-
volvement in President Jimmy Car-
fer's human rights policies and by
the "loss" of Nicaragua-in the Sandi-
iista revolution in 1979.
Moved out were William Bowdler,
n assistant secretary of state; James
Cheek and John Bushnell, his deputy
assistant secretaries; Robert White,
ambassador to.E1 Salvador, Lawrence.
) ezzullo, ambassador to Nicaragua;
lack Binns, ambassador to Honduras,
And Wayne Smith, head of the U.S..
fnterests Section in .Cuba.__
Their replacements had little expe-
rience in the region, but they shared
several traits: conservative ideology;
military or intelligence back-
grounds; Vietnam'experience, and a
preference for the nuts-and-bolts of
policy rather than the grand design.
First among them was Secretary of
State Alexander M. Haig Jr., the re-
tired Army, general.wbo urged Rea-
gan only two days after his inaugura-
tion to put Central America "on the
front burner" and "go to the source"
of the 'region's turmoil Cuba.
Haig, in his book Caveat, said his
-ideas drew a nod from Reagan but no
immediate response. White House
chief of staff James A. Baker 3d was
unequivocal, however, vetoing the
proposals on the ground that Central
rIILA)hLPHIA INQUIRER
America was a *"sideshow '... that
diverted attention from more impor-
tant. matters such as the economy."
Since then, Baker has been urging
moderation because of the concern
by top Reagan political aides that the
President is perceived by too many
Voters as trigger-happy.
This was Haig's first experience
with what he described as "the con-
stant bugaboo of the administra-
tion's foreign policy" - a president
who kept his distance from the is;
sues and gave way to "divided coun.
cils, different voices." These would
become the enduring characteristics
of the Central America debate.
Though Reagan in the early days
was not ready to make Central Amer-
ica an administration priority, his
policy makers needed something to
mollify the hard-line conservatives
who had enthusiastically backed his
campaign: -
"Haig tried to appease U.S. conser.
vatives by throwing them a bone -
Central America," said John Car-
baugh, then an aide to conservative
Sen. Jesse Helms (R., N.C.) and now a
Washington lawyer with close ties to
administration hard-liners. -
The administration chose Thomas
0. Enders as its assistant secretary of
state for inter-American affairs. He
had no experience in Latin America, 11
though he was widely regarded as a
brilliant diplomat.
His credentials as .a hard-liner
were impeccable. As the number-two
official in the- U.S. Embassy in
Phnom Penh from 1971 to 1974, he
directed the secret US. bombing of
Cambodia.
Both administration hard-liners
and moderates were initially satis-
fied with Enders. US. military aid to
El Salvador soared while pressures
eased for agrarian and human rights..
reform. In Nicaragua, a "carrot and
stick" policy sought peace talks with
the Sandinistas while the CIA fi-.
nanced anti-Sandinista guerrillas.
Enders was finally dismissed in
early 1983, after he proposed negotia-
tions with the Salvadoran rebels and
endorsed the regional peace drive
undertaken by the Contadora Group
- Mexico, Venezuela, Panama and
Colombia. His "carrot" and "stick,"
which had evolved into the well-
known "two-track" policy of negotia-.
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