CONGRESS AND INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000202230042-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 42
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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- ARTICLE APPEARED WASHINGTON QUARTERLY
ON PAGE , _ SUMMER 1983
Senator Barn, Goldwater (R-Ariz.) is
chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence.
Barry Gol
While upholding the principles
of democracy, congressional
oversight on U.S. intelligence
activities must be careful not to
endanger the work and
well-being of those whose very
responsibility is to ensure the
freedom and securitv of thic
nation.
Congress and
Intelligence
Oversight
During the early 1970s, it appeared Con-
gress was going to hamstring the U.S. intel-
ligence services with its public investigations
of the alleged abuses within the intelligence
community. Today, six and a half years after
formation of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and its counterpart on the House
side, I believe it is possible to say that the
intelligence community is recovering very
well.
The reason for this promising outlook is
that congressional oversight of our intelli-
gence agencies is working.
The committee that held the public inves-
tigation was given one cumbersome title, the
Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelli-
gence Activities. Chaired by former Senator
Frank Church of Idaho, the committees per-
formance was a sorry demonstration of the
way Congress deals with its problems. We
spent nearly $3 million and over 15 months
investigating the intelligence community,
with a peak staff of over 130 professionals,
consultants, and clerical personnel. I wish
we could try to do to the Soviet KGB what
we tried to do to ourselves.
Clark Clifford, that wise adviser to many
presidents over the years, lamented the
committee's efforts at the time and I agreed.
That committee was formed to determine
the ixtent of abuses mentioned in the Roc-
kefeller Commission Report, made upon the
request of President Ford. I endorsed the
Senate's decision because I felt it was neces-
sary to investigate any possible abuses of the
privacy of American citizens. After endors-
ing it, however, I refused to sign the two
CONX1. ,,'
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final reports put out by the committee as I
felt both were inaccurate and played too
much to the sensational publicity.
In my comments at that time, I said that
the free-wheeling, self-righteous, and fre-
quently moralizing thrust of the report as-
sured recommendations which were prem-
ised on wish and speculation rather than fact
and testimony. It presented a strong dose of
20/20 hindsight that raised more questions
than answers. It also blackened the reputa-
tion of agencies and persons that have served
the country well. The Senate resolution that
set up this committee had promised a calm
and deliberative investigation. That promise
was not fulfilled. The committee is out of
business now and has been replaced by the
current permanent committee.
The formation of this new committee is
the only positive aspect to emerge from this
investigation. It has consolidated for the first
time all the government's intelligence ac-
tivities under the jurisdiction- of one com-
mittee in the Senate. It has focused on the
problems raised by the previous method of
accountability rather than on abuses.
The Senate majority picked a wise man,
Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), to be
the first chairman. Through his good judg-
ment, common sense and order was restored
and this in turn led to trust and respect be-
tween the intelligence community and Con-
gress. Now, the intelligence community
must account for its activities, including
covert action, and request allocations for
every dollar it wants to spend. It's the best
form of accountability known in a free soci-
ety and is similar to that which other com-
mittees of Congress have regarding the agen-
cies under their jurisdiction. The intelligence
community welcomed this greater account-
ability to Congress, the Congress was ready
for it, and the American people are better off
as a result.
In the mid-1970s, I emphasized the im-
portance of having an effective system for
collecting information and assessing the
events that bear on U.S. strategic interests,
particularly at a time when turmoil and
anti-American sentiment seemed to be in-
creasingly widespread. In reviewing our in-
telligence capabilities at the time, I com-
mented that we had been through an ex-
tended period in which intelligence agencies
of our government had been pictured more as
enemies of the American people than as
contributors and necessary adjuncts to our
national security.
The media have never shown any marked
sympathy for the collection and use of intel-
ligence information, especially if such activ-
ity required the use of secret or clandestine
methods. Nor have they shown any sym-
pathy for the men and women of the Ameri-
can intelligence community who suffer great
hardship and sacrifice in performing their
day-to-day tasks. There seems to be built-in
abhorrence on their part for anything of a
confidential nature, even in the interests of
protecting American people and interests.
In 1975, I was asked to serve on the so-
called "Church Committee" of the U.S.
Senate to investigate alleged improper intel-
ligence activity. In my humble opinion, the
Church Committee went out of its way to do
as much as it possibly could to disrupt the
activities of the Central Intelligence Agency
and other elements of our intelligence fam-
ily. Not once did that committee keep in
mind, nor did the newspapers that reported
on its activities keep in mind the fact that
everything they criticized about intelligence
activity was done by those agencies on direct
orders from the various presidents of the
United States. The operations that the media
have depicted as reprehensible in the intelli-
gence business occurred in the past two de-
cades, and all of it was approved by the pres-
ident-these activities were undertaken be-
cause the man elected to the highest office in
the land decided that they were in the best
interest of the American people.
Throughout this entire period of attacking,
criticizing, and undermining our intelligence
agencies, the question of ultimate responsi-
bility was conveniently ignored. The effect
of all this public breastbeating was to reduce
the government's capability to gather needed
intelligence and to assess it properly.
Since the mid-1970s, world events have
MCOMM-TWO
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begun to persuade the American people and
many members of Congress of the vital need
for a healthy intelligence community. Even
some members of the media are beginning to
understand that abuse cannot be heaped upon
the agencies and individuals whose job it is
to serve this country's intelligence interests
without eventually doing them grave dam-
age.
The U.S. intelligence system is the most
public intelligence system in the world.
Through proper congressional oversight, we
.may be able to maintain this openness and
still come up with the intelligence we need to
safeguard our freedom. But it is not easy.
RECOVERY
The Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence has been in business since May 19,
1976. There were two compelling reasons
why it was formed. First, to consolidate all
national and foreign intelligence activities
under the jurisdiction of our committee in
both Houses, and second, to develop charters
that would put the agencies under the rule of
law. Both tasks were intended to make intel-
ligence more accountable to the Congress.
Senate Resolution 400, which describes
the committee's functions, duties, and orga-
nization, established the permanent com-
mittee on intelligence. Previously; jurisdic-
tion for intelligence matters was shared by at
least four committees.
The attempt to put together charters was a
cumbersome one. There was a great deal of
criticism because we were unable to agree on
a 150-page intelligence charter that was a
dubious undertaking from the start. The
committee tried unsuccessfully to revise the
original draft, and neither effort was ap-
proved. The first time around the proposals
were too long and too restrictive. The second
version which emerged two years later, was
shorter, but still too restrictive. We finally
set aside both charters and agreed on a shor-
ter version, which we use today.
That version, known as the Intelligence
Oversight Act of 1980, repealed the con-
gressional reporting requirement of the un-
workable Hughes-Ryan amendment and re-
quired that significant, anticipated intelli-
gence activities be reported to the two intel-
ligence committees of the House and Senate
instead of all eight congressional commit-
tees. This new law strengthened the system
of congressional oversight of intelligence
activities of the United States by requiring
the agencies to keep the two committees
fully and currently informed, provide full ac-
cess to information, and give prior notice of
significant intelligence activities.
By agreeing on this legislation, along with
the already established budget authorization
procedure, we overcame the biggest obsta-
cle, which was ourselves.
The budget authorization process is stan-
dard procedure now, though no other nation
in the world has such a process. This method
ensures that our constitutional respon-
sibilities are fulfilled, while at the same time
maintaining the confidentiality necessary for
an effective intelligence system. We ex-
amine in detail the budget of the Central In-
telligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence activities of the
Departments of Defense, State and. Treasury,
and of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Drug Enforcement Administration.
This process allows us to determine- if intelli-
gence is being well managed and responsive
to the country's needs. It gives us a chance to
focus on a wide range of national security is-
sues, such as international trade and monet-
ary policy, nuclear proliferation, energy and
other scarce natural resources, political de-
velopments in Third World countries, and
international terrorism and narcotics.
In arriving at the shorter version of the
charter, two important items were deferred.
One was relief for the intelligence commu-
nity from the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) and the other was intelligence iden-
tities protection legislation to preserve the
anonymity of our intelligence operatives
around the world.
In June of 1982, the Senate finally took
steps to protect our covert agents by passing
the - Intelligence Identities Protection Act.
The act helps to protect our intelligence em-
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ployees abroad from other American citizens
who would expose them by the unauthorized
disclosure of their names. These unau-
thorized disclosures. have not been in-
frequent; most have been made by former
CIA employees. At least 1,200 names had
been made public in magazines or newspa-
pers, and another 700 names appeared in one
book. A bi-monthly bulletin exposed alleged
CIA, FBI and military intelligence personnel
and assignments, and a worldwide network
called "CIA Watch" operated for the pur-
pose of eliminating the CIA. Until passage of
this legislation, we had no legal means to
stop such disclosures.
The bill had broad support but had been
delayed over a misunderstanding that it
might interfere with the First Amendment
rights of the news media. These were con-
sidered and the resulting law will protect
those rights while allowing for prosecution
of those who unlawfully disclose names of
foreign intelligence operatives.
The act sends out a clear signal that U.S.
intelligence officers will no longer be fair
game for those members of their own society
who wish to take issue with the existence of
CIA or find other motives for making these
unauthorized disclosures.
FOlA NEEDS ADJUSTMENT
There's very little doubt anywhere that the
intelligence community needs relief from the
FOIA, yet this will likely be just as hard to
get as was the identities law.
The Senate Intelligence Committee hear-
ing on charter legislation demonstrated con-
siderable opposition to exemptions to FOIA
for the intelligence community but, in my
view, we must sooner or later come to grips
with the fact that openness in government
must be tempered by consideration of how
much openness our national security can af-
ford.
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966
was designed to recognize the individual's
right of access to the government's records
that concerned him. Unfortunately, the act
has had an unintended side effect on the in-
telligence community, because of its deal-
ings with classified intelligence from sources
in foreign countries. President Johnson
warned us of this when he signed the law in
1966, saying that "the welfare of the nation
or the rights of individuals may require that
some documents not be made available." In
1974, President Ford refused to sign stronger
FOIA amendments because of his concern
"that our military or intelligence secrets and
diplomatic relations could be adversely af-
fected."
These warnings have now come home to
roost. Even the Russians can make requests
to the intelligence agencies and, under this
law, their requests must be answered. Since
the act was passed in 1966 and amended in
1974, the intelligence communit y has been
denied intelligence that it normally could
have expected from foreign agents, friendly
foreign services, and Americans traveling
abroad because these sources no longer be-
lieve that the U.S. government can protect
them from public disclosure. At present,
many sources have stopped sharing informa-
tion with the United States altogether, while
others share only what they think will not
harm them if disclosed. The FOIA has also
created a problem with the CIA's record-
keeping system by necessitating distribution
of and access to information that goes be-
yond what is considered consistent with good
security practices. Testifying before the
committee recently, Frank Carlucci, former
deputy director of Central Intelligence, noted
that "If we believe we need intelligence,
then we have to accept some secrecy. FOIA
has called into question around the world our
ability to keep a secret. Its application in its'
current form is inappropriate, unnecessary in
light of current oversight by the Senate and
House Intelligence Committees, and harm-
ful."
In closed testimony before my committee.
we were told of a request that involved 150
reports and 600 documents from a foreign re-
sident in Europe. The documents involved in
this and many similar cases are filled with
names, dates, places, and details of opera-
tions which, if released, would predictably
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lead to the deaths or incarceration of numer-
ous people who had assisted the U.S. gov-
ernment in our intelligence collection mis-
sion.
The last question of that testimony poses
this question: "Would you cooperate with
the United States intelligence if you knew
that the information which you delivered,
often at risk of death, was subject to review
for disclosure under American law?" That's
a sobering question.
In addition to the serious situation this law
has created, it costs the taxpayers $16 mil-
lion or more per year to process FOIA re-
quests just for the intelligence agencies. In
effect, this is like an expensive government
subsidy to those who make the request and
I'm not sure that this is fair to the other tax-
payers.
Four years ago, in commenting on press
publicity on intelligence collection, I sug-
gested in a Congressional Record statement
that a disturbing trend has become evident
regarding the future course of our intelli-
gence efforts. Whether this trend is the result
of fascinations with "gee-whiz" technology
or whether it represented the selling of SALT
II does not matter. What does matter, how-
ever, is that our intelligence effort is based
on a triad concept not unlike that of our reg-
ular armed forces. The three legs of the triad
are communications intelligence (COM-
MINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and
human intelligence (HUMINT). If we are not
careful, we may end up crippling the
HUMINT leg of the triad.
In this regard, a recent newspaper article
sought to downplay the valuable role that the
HUMINT plays in our intelligence process.
Its conclusion was that since we have supe-
rior technology, HUMINT is an outdated
relic of the past-a conclusion with which I
fundamentally disagree.
Our satellites can give us little or no in-
formation on the intentions of hostile agents,
their plans and targets. In these areas, it re-
quires humans to be in the right places at the
right time, which is often a long, tedious,
and dangerous process. A satellite cannot be
expected to tell us where, when, and how the
next terrorism bomb will explode.
For all their sophistication, satellites can
only tell us information of a quantitative na-
ture-how many missiles or how many sub-
marines the enemy has. Knowing what the
enemy may do with his armament is com-
pletely beyond the satellites' capabilities,
and this constitutes the basic reason for hav-
ing a strong human intelligence effort- In an
age of nuclear uncertainty, having a sense of
the intentions of our enemies becomes more
and more critical if we are to preserve our
freedom. Too much reliance on our technical
systems could ultimately exclude a third al-
ternative in world affairs, namely, covert
and/or paramilitary operations. By limiting
ourselves to diplomatic responses or all-out
military intervention, we would deprive this
country of an important tool to influence
events that require more than words and less
than direct military intervention.
And let us not forget that however useful
our satellites may be, they are still suscepti-
ble to technical countermeasures and decep-
tion. Just as in modern warfare, we have a
variety of new technical systems, yet it ulti-
mately comes down to the human eyes and
ears as well as the human mind to make the
judgmental decisions which thousands of
computers can never make. If we are to
maintain a successful intelligence service,
we must keep a proper balance between
technology and man.
Perhaps because of the American love of
technology or the desire to avoid getting our
hands dirty, there has been a tendency to as-
cribe an excessive value and promise to the
space systems. The advent of the space re-
connaissance programs has been the single
most important contribution to intelligence
since the radio receiver. But the fact is that
technical and human collection resources are
both essential in assessing what is going on
in foreign countries. Our experience in re-
cent years has reinforced this, and has re-
sulted in a rebuilding of the more traditional
capabilities.
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The sanctuary of space, however, is
clearly in jeopardy. Although we believe that
peacetime operations are not presently at
risk, the capability to incapacitate space
vehicles exists today. Soviet initiatives in
this area have forced us to respond in kind,
but more important is the challenge these de-
velopments present to the collection of intel-
ligence.
U.S. initiatives in space, and especially in
the intelligence field, have always been at
the forefront of technology. There is no rea-
son to believe that we have exhausted our
technical know-how or that we have reached
a plateau in our capabilities. On the contrary,
opportunities abound for enhancing sensing
technology, propulsion technology, and data
processing technology. While technology is
unquestionably a vital ingredient in our use
of the high ground of space, we must -not lose
sight of an even more important factor. At
the core of all our progress and potential are
the dreamers and the builders and the
operators of these magnificent devises. The
intelligence space program has profited from
the application of the best minds in this
country, and the best of the best will be
needed in the future to carry on in the fine
tradition of the early space pioneers. But
where will they come from? Will there be
enough to go around? Will they have that
extra capacity and vision so essential to
tackle the challenges of the future? The edu-
cation and encouragement of the next gener-
ation of space scientists and engineers may
well be the most critical challenge we face.
Because the intelligence community went
through a difficult period during the 1970s,
the quality of collection was bound to suffer.
Unfortunately, we seem to have reached a
point where cynicism and distrust have re-
placed good will and trust. Too often we are
ready to enact laws, pass regulations, and
use the other coercive forces of government
against all sorts of seeming ills. If we con-
tinue this trend, mediocrity and do-nothing-
ism could become the watchword of the gov-
ernors and governed alike. The Senate Intel-
ligence Committee, by the very nature of the
subject it is dealing with, cannot operate in
the open and is therefore taken to task as
being excessively secretive or being a cap-
tive of the intelligence agencies. If we are to
be successful in obtaining good intelligence
information for the protection of our free-
dom, we must also understand how to safe-
guard it. As chairman of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee, I am very concerned with
our tremendous responsibility in this regard.
Because committee members need access to
classified information in order to perform our
legislative and oversight responsibilities, we
cannot afford to risk poor security and
"leaks."
Recently, however, we have begun to re-
store the trust and confidence between the
intelligence community and Congress. We
share the goal of getting the best intelligence
information possible to serve our national se-
curity and protect our freedom.
Recent years have witnessed a growing
public awareness of the importance of intel-
ligence that is timely, relevant, and of the
highest quality.
We have enjoyed freedom for 200 years.
We worked hard for it, many have fought for
it, and some have died for it. It is up to us to
decide whether we can make it last another
200 years. I think we can if we realize that
freedom and intelligence go hand in
hand. TWO
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