SOVIET DISINFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201700005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201700005-8
STRATEaIC R VI Dl
Viinter 1961
SOVIET DISINFORMAT
THE AUTHOR: Dr. Douglass has been engaged in national
security studies over the past two decades, concentrating on
Soviet security policy and plans and U.S., NATO and Soviet
military strategies and options. He is the author, among
other works, of The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive
(1976), co-author of Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War
(1979), and author of Soviet Military Strategy in Europe
(1980).
IN BRIEF
strategic intentions must operate. There -is urgent need of a concertec a c p
the more so in unticrpation of a. burst of disinformation activities that is likely to attend anew lead-
story and of the treacherous terrain of fact and fiction in w cc any J
r
2 tta h .. the oblem--alt
tlrsnz f or ma on. . ,
by Moscow into a major irrstrument of policy. Yet, the documented cases tell only the tip of the
h h conclusive anal sic of Soviet
On the shadowy U.S-Soviet battleground of intelligence and reciprocal strategic analysis, the Soviet
Union. has been able to magnify the advantages of systemic secrecy with a sustained campaign of
ti I-deeci according to U.S. intelligence testimony, disinformation has been elevated
ership succession in the-Kremlin.
fter more than three-decades of accumu-
-lated experience,-?the study of Soviet
plans, striate an& simply stated, So-
intentions.. A former Director of Central Intelli-
gence put it as follows:
The adver'sary's intention is not necessarily
viet intentions, remains one of the more diffi-
cult, controversial.; and- frustrating realms of
strategic anaivsis in the United States. It is dif-
- ficult and controversial because of the nature
and credibility of the intelligence sources on
which such analysis must be based--defectors,
in-place agents and Soviet writings, from the
unclassified to t1he most highly classified-and
the susceptibiiirv of this intelligence data to
manipulation icy the opponent. It is frustrating
not only because Soviet intentions behind the
haze of Soviet secrecy are inherently a slippery
phenomenon, but also because of a seemingly
chronic propensity in the Nest to downgrade,
in effect,.the real importance of the study of
the key to determining his future action. His
intention can change, his intention may not
yet be formed, his intention may be-rather a
hope than a commitment to action-
Another former Director, who served subse-
quently as Secretary of Defense, went so far as
to question the relevance of intentions to actual
behavior:
Doctrines control the minds of men only in
periods of nonemergency. They do not neces-
sarily control the minds of men during pe-
riods of emergency.. In the moment of truth,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201700005-8
JOSEPH D. DOUGLASS, JR.