DUMP MARCOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201670009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 27, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/19: CIA-RDP9O-00552ROO0201670009-8
ARTICLE APPLAW
ON PAGE
NEW REPUBLIC
27 November 1985
THE NEVI
REPUBLIC
DuM1' MaRCOs
When Senator Paul Laxalt, acting as President Reagan's
personal envoy, suggested to Ferdinand Marcos that he
hold early elections, the answer was an unequivocal no.
When George Will made the same suggestion to the Phil-
ippine president a few weeks later, on the Sunday morn-
ing program "This Week with David Brinkley," Marcos
was warming up to the idea. "I am decided that with these
arguments coming from the opposition, and now in this
show and interview, I'm ready. I'm ready to call a snap
election," Marcos told the stunned panelists.
Many viewers in this country saw Marcos's announce-
ment as a sign that he was giving in to demands from the
U.S., and edging a little bit closer to democratic rule. But
members of the Philippine opposition know their wily
dictator far better. The promise of an election in fact means
very little. Asked to explain his plan, Marcos said during
the interview that the "snap election" should take place
within 60 days. This would give the opposition little time
to unite behind a single candidate, raise funds, and mount
an effort to keep Marcos from buying or stealing the elec-
tion, as he has often done in the past.
Since the television broadcast, Marcos has made several
minor concessions that appear more significant than they
are. He has said he will hold the election on February 7
instead of January 17. He has said he will resign, as the
Philippine Constitution requires before a special election,
but will not leave office. In the next few weeks Marcos will
probably accredit Namfrel, the organization of volunteer
poll watchers that was responsible for the relative fairness
of the 1984 parliamentary election. But he is still demand-
ing a list of the poll watchers' names so that he can bring
the organization under his control. Between now and the
election, everything Marcos does will be calculated care-
fully to make it appear he is trying to be fair. But as Senate
Intelligence Committee staff members who recently visit-
ed the Philippines put it in a rare public report, "Marcos,
at this point, intends to do whatever is necessary to ensure
a favorable outcome in the next election."
Nevertheless, the various opposition groups are giving
the election their all, in the hope that Marcos can be pres-
sured into meeting enough of their demands that he will
STAT
lose. At the moment they are concerned with selecting a
presidential candidate, who will probably be Corazon
Aquino or former senator Salvador Laurel. Because of his
isolation from reality, which a number of recent visitors
have commented upon, Marcos may not realize how few
real supporters he has left. Most of his people are fed up
with a failing economy, internal repression, and growing
violence fostered by the communist National People's
Army (NPA). There is some hope that he will miscalculate
and lose the election. But in the event that he manages to
affirm his mandate, using "his considerable power to rig
the elections at both the national and the local levels," as
the Senate Intelligence Committee envisions, the United
States will have to consider options other than that of
continuing to prop up this sad, sagging tyrant.
If present trends continue, Assistant Secretary of De-
fense Richard Armitage estimates that the NPA. will reach
a strategic stalemate with the Philippine army in three to
i~ five years. Senator Dave Durenberger, chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee, thinks two or three years
would be an optimistic estimate. Whatever their potential
strength, the guerrillas have emerged as a real and present
danger since Benigno Aquino was assassinated in 1983.
There are now estimated to be more than 15,000 armed
fighters in nearly all of the 73 Philippine provinces. The
NPA is not currently backed by Moscow, and it apparently
prefers to remain nonaligned. But the Soviets are, to say
the least, interested.
Marcos has us in a bind. Since he is the one fighting
the NPA, the argument goes, we must step up military aid
in order to keep them from winning. But giving Marcos
more guns won't help. His army is badly organized, mis-
managed, and riddled with corruption. His solution to the
insurgency problem seems to be wishing it away. "They
are surrendering in droves," he recently told Ted Koppel
on "Nightline," insisting that he can squash the NPA
within a year. His own generals have called that assess-
ment ridiculous. In truth, there is little Marcos can do to
oppose the guerrillas, since their rise is a direct result of 20
years of his repression. As long as he stays in office, while
postponing military, political, and economic reforms,
Corstin
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the chances of an eventual NPA victory will improve.
If the guerrillas succeed in waging a protracted civil war
or in seizing power, it will be a tragedy for the 50 million
citizens of the Philippines. It would also be a tragedy of
sorts for the United States. Our two largest military bases
outside U.S. borders-the Clark air base and the naval
station at Subic Bay-are located in the Philippines. They
are essential to our strategic capability in Southeast Asia. If
we lost them (the leases expire in 1989, subject to renegoti-
ation), we would be forced to monitor Soviet activity in the
region from bases in Hawaii and Japan.
With the exception of Jerry Falwell, reliable friend to
tyrants in trouble, even most conservatives realize where
the Philippines are headed if Marcos remains in power.
Although the Reagan administration waited until the elev-
enth hour to get worried about the situation, it has backed
the International Monetary Fund's recent decision to cut
off payments on loans until Marcos breaks up sugar and
coconut monopolies run by his cronies, which have
helped wreck the economy. Even Marcos's friends are
bailing out, transferring hundreds of millions in assets to
the U.S. (See "Marcos's Nest Egg," October 7.) Sources in
the CIA, the Pentagon, and the State Department have all
been hinting darkly that Marcos's plight is far more seri-
ous than anyone knows.
"The chances for a constitutional succession could be
improved if Marcos died suddenly, as opposed to a linger-
ing period of incapacitation," the Senate Intelligence
Committee wrote in the conclusion to its recent report.
Indeed, the best solution would be if Marcos would agree
to die right away. But we can't count on his cooperation in
this matter either. Rumors of his ill health and impending
death from kidney failure have been greatly exaggerated
for more than 20 years. Senator Durenberger recently pro-
posed what would be an equally workable solution: that
Marcos resign. Unfortunately, it is equally unlikely.
It's time to do more than indicate our displeasure to Mar-
cos. Unless by some miracle he holds and wins a fair elec-
tion, we should pressure him into quitting. One form of
pressure, of course, is economic. If the U.S. cut off military
and other aid (increased to $70 million this year), other
countries and private investors would no doubt follow suit
by cutting off all new loans. Without foreign investments,
Marcos would lose his tenuous hold on the monopolies
whose powerful leaders are still standing by him.
Senator Bill Bradley recently suggested a more novel
approach to getting rid of Marcos in a New York Times Op-
Ed article: offer him safe passage and sanctuary in the U.S.
One thing keeping Marcos from relinquishing power may
be his fear of punishment for his crimes. It is estimated
that he and his wife have plundered one billion dollars
from a country that suffers from desperate poverty. He
might well be attracted to the idea of nursing his kidneys
by the swimming pools of his cronies, who are already
packing their bags for California. This conjures unpleasant
memories about our solicitude to the fallen shah, but it's
likely that Marcos's angry victims would be glad simply to
be rid of him.
20
Indeed, it's useful to remember why the situation in the
Philippines is not like Iran, or Nicaragua. The country,
which was our only actual colony, still has an abiding love
for the United States and a powerful democratic tradition.
Many Filipinos would like to see the nation become the
51st state. By supporting Marcos, we have sorely tested
this gratitude. Still, there seems to be widespread public
support for an American military presence, and strong
anti-Soviet sentiment. We don't want to antagonize the
democratic forces by supporting an inept and corrupt ty-
rant past his time. We should reach out to the opposition
now, and make clear to Marcos that a truly fair election is
his last chance to bow out gracefully.
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