CONGRESS IS CRIPPLING THE CIA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00552R000201650068-5
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 15, 2010
Sequence Number: 
68
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 1, 1986
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00552R000201650068-5.pdf103.65 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/15 :CIA-RDP90-005528000201650068-5 AR'TIL'~ AP E~ RE~,DERS DIGEST Congress Is Crippling the CIA Rowiwxn EVANS w-vn ROBERT NovAx Charged with "overseeing" U.S. intelligence, too many lawmakers, with too many political axes to grind, are leaking too many vital secrets. It's time to plug the holes ,~,T s A.M. ON OCTOBER i I, 1985, a ,`//-\~j stretch limousine carrying Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.) pulled up to C[A headquarters in Langley, Va. Vice chairman of the powerful Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Leahy had asked For a full briefing on the Achille Laura hijacking. But why before dawni' Because Leahy had agreed to appear on the CBS "Morning News" at y a.m. to comment on the interception by U.S. pilots of the hijackers' plane. Following his meeting, Leahy, who now pos- sessed every secret in the case, was driven directly to CBS studios in Washington. "It's a major triumph for the United States," reported Leahy. Then he made an extraordi- nary disclosure: "When [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak went on the news yesterday and said the hijackers had left Egypt, we knew that wasn't so. Our intelligence was very, very good." . Leahy had inadvertently tipped intelligence specialists from Cairo to Moscow that the United States had intercepted Mubarak's phone calls and heard that the Achille Laar~v hijackers were still in Egypt. The conversations had been "read" by communications intelligence and Bashed to computers in Fort Meade, Md., where the National Security Agency daily monitors thousands of intercepted voice signals. The disclosure would br Egyptian countermeasures to s guard subsequent telephone c Every government in the world t note, and reacted by tightening se city on communications. Leahy sisted to an incensed CIA dice William Casey that Administra officials had publicly disclosed hijackers' whereabouts the day fore he went on TV. This incident is one of m showing that the current era Congressional oversight of the is simply not working. Instead, Senate and House Intelligence Co __ mittees have become conduits for classified information. CIA efforts to thwart international terrorist actions or to lend support toanti-communist guerrillas are difficult enough, but keeping those operations secret has become nearly impossible. And vital intelligence-sharing by U.S. allies has been severely hampered by concerns in foreign capitals over the leakage of information passed to Washington.. Pattern of Leaks. Under the present oversight sys~m, the 31 members of the House and Senate committees, plus more than 6o staff members, are informed of pro- posed covert operations. "Any one of these people who does not be- lieve in an operation can appoint himself or herself to stop it," says Rep. Michael DeWine (R., Ohio). "All they need to do is calla report- er." Thus, the ability to make or break government policy is widely dispersed. Congressional leaks concern Rep. Henry Hyde (R., Ill.), a mem- ber of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He has bluntly scolded colleagues, remind- ingthem that with Congress's "nerd to know" for oversight purposes "goes the overriding responsibility to keep much of that information secret." The impact on U.S. relations with allies has been severe. Casey has testified that leaks "do more damage than anything else" to U.S. intelligence and to "our reputation and reliability" among allies. In fact, concern about American leak- age has spread across the world, often disrupting U.S. policy. For operations of the U-2 spy plane. Until 1974, a small group of senior members of Congress worked with Boor leaders of both parties as an informal oversight panel. They were briefed by the CIA director himself, usually with- out Congressional staff present. But questionable domestic sur- veillance activities, assassination plans, and other abuses by the CIA in the 197os Icd to the branding of the agency as a "rogue elephant," transforming that collegial atmos- phere. Arapid politicization of Intelligence marked the new era of CIA oversight. In 1982, For exam- ple, the Democratic-controlled House Intelligence Committee re- leased astaff report asserting that the Administration was cooking in- telligence to gain support for its policy in Central America. Accord- ing to the committee's own intelli- gence consultant, former deputy director of the CIA Adm. Bobby Inman, the report was "filled with biases," and in fact had been pre- pared atthe specific request of com- mittee members with a partisan ax to grind. Furious that he had not been consulted, Inman resigned. A clear breach of secrecy oc- curred, in September 1984 with press reports of a CIA briefing of the Senate Intelligence Committee that revealed our knowledge of a top-secret Indian proposal to make a preemptive strike against Paki- stan's nuclear facility. Realizing its security had been compromised, the Indian government launched an investigation. The probe broke up a French intelligence ring that Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/15 :CIA-RDP90-005528000201650068-5