REAGAN'S FOREIGN POLICY - HIS NO. 1 AIDE SPEAKS OUT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 9, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230007-8
- ~P _! LE APPEARED
ON PAIGE 35-
9 May 1983
Reagan's Foreign Policy-
His No. 1 Aide Speaks Out
In his first major interview, the President's
right-hand man at the White House hits back at
critics of administration strategy on Central
America, the Middle East, Russia, China.
*****************
Q On Central America: Why has the President, by appearing
before a joint session of Congress, created a new sense of
crisis? Has the situation there deteriorated dangerously?
A Central America was a high priority in the very begin-
ning of the administration, as you'll recall. Press attention
was very high-front page for many months-focusing on
the Marxist insurgency in El Salvador, with little attention
being paid to a buildup in Nicaragua of military force far in
excess of any defensive need.
While attention on Central America seemed to drop, our
attention did not. Last fall and winter, in the realization
that the Marxist insurgency was gaining in power primarily
through the Soviet and Cuban support through Nicaragua,
the President became increasingly concerned.
The point now is that he is concerned that the Congress
has failed to recognize the threat, failing to recognize the
basic differences between the government in Nicaragua on
one hand and that in El Salvador on the other. He felt it
necessary to go to Congress and to the people, believing as
he always has that, given the facts, the American people
always do the correct thing.
Stemming from a complete review of Central American
policy, the President did what he was so effective at doing
when he was Governor of California: Going to the Legisla-
ture-now the Congress-and to the people. He made the
decision to go to a joint session of Congress to warn of a
crisis before it begins and to get more of a response than
we've been able to get from individual congressional com-
mittees so far.
Interview With William Clark,
President's National-Security Adviser
William Clark assumed
his current position in
January, 1982, after 11
months as deputy sec-
retary of state. A lawyer,
he was Governor Ron-
ald Reagan's chief of
staff in California and re-
signed from the State
Supreme Court to join
the administration.
Q What, specifically, have you
found objectionable about the ac-
tions of Congress?
A What has not been recog-
nized in several of the subcom-
mittees in the House is the neces-
sity of establishing security within
a society so that it can have a con-
tinuing democratic process. It is in the best interest of El Sal-
vador that it call early elections, as it has, and include all
factions and all parties in those elections. But unless the Sal-
vadoran military are able to create a secure society for the
purpose of conducting elections in December, all positive
efforts will be in jeopardy.
The President feels that the word simply has not gotten
out about the threat to the Caribbean, to this hemisphere.
And, of course, there are elements in the Congress and indi-
viduals who are unwilling to accept either the threat or the
necessity to meet a threat in
Central America.
cQl VINU
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Q Is the objective of U.S.
poi;cy toward Nicaragua to
overthrow the Sandinista gov-
ernment-or what?
A The objective is not to
overthrow any govern-
ment. But a key objective is
to make known what is tru-
ly occurring there-that
they have a Marxist govern-
ment, supported by the So-
viet Union and Cuba, which
is creating a military threat
to the region, destabilizing
the area through subver-
sion. The President wants
to explain effectively to the
people what the conse-
quences are going to be if
we do not act through polit-
ical, economic and security
assistance to prevent the
subversion of democratic
governments in the region.
actions In Nicaragua? How do you respond to those But what about covert
who challenge the use of such clandestine operations?
A The instrument of covert action has existed in every
administration. It is a vital and effective tool of every Presi-
dent, to be used with great discretion and under great legal
constraint. Any attempt to curtail that authority- is always a
concern to a President.
The Boland Amendment, which prohibits the U.S. from
attempting to overthrow the Managua government, is the
law. And the administration finds no problem with the
conditions of that amendment. In Congress it's more a
questioning of our overall policy rather than whether there
should or should not be a covert element in that policy. I
don't think even Mr. Boland has suggested that we are
operating outside of his amendment.
Q Over all, are you saying that Soviet activity in Central
America poses the major challenge to the United States?
A It has been a major challenge for some time. To suggest
that it's greater there than in the Middle East-I'm not go-
ing to do that. I think that they're of equal rank in the neces-
sity of moving to meet it. But I will not go beyond that.
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