THE CIA'S SECRET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN PUTS THE AGENCY EXACTLY WHERE IT WANTS TO BE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201100005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 1, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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AMLE AM=
c arCha
28 propaganda campaz
Beck In cam VI
by Jacqueline Sharkey
How the CIA's secret propa-
ganda campaign controls
what we know about
Nicaragua.
September/October 198~
N CAs secret
b agmq aac y w
a UAW& to &0
ucis only mildly sur-
prised when a CIA
official in Honduras, a
man knout to Chamorro
as "George, " came to
his home at 2 a. m. one
night in Januan,
1984 and ordered
him to lie.
During the early 1980s, he and lie,or,ae
had often collaborated on "lies," Cha-
morro said during a recent interview at his
Key Biscayne, Fla., home. At the time,
Chamorro believed the lies were ju~ri-
tied-chat they supported a good cause.
For three years, Chamorro ~V Is a
spokesperson for the Nicaraguan Demo-
cratic Force (FDN), a group of rebels orga-
nized by the Central Intelligence Agency
in 1981 to tight the leftist Sandinista gov-
ernment.
Chamorro said he and his CIA contact
frequently had late-night meetings at
Chamorro's home in Tegucigalpa, the
capital of Honduras and a logistical center
for contra operations.
That night, "George" handed Cha-
morro a press release written in excellent
Spanish. Chamorro was amused to read
that the contras were supposed to take
credit for mining Nicaragua's harbors.
"George told me to rush to our clandes-
tine radio station and read this announce-
ment before the Sandinistas broke the
news," Chamorro said. "The truth is that
we played no role in the mining of the
harbors. But we did as instructed." The
release was broadcast about 6 a. m. on Jan-
uary 5, 1984.
In fact, Chamorro said, the operation
had been carried out by CIA commandos.
p
Jacqueline is an associate professor
of journalism at the University of An;ona.
She has won a Sidney Hillman Fouulan?n
award and an Overseas Press Club award I, ,r
her reporting on Central America for (,,,m.
mon Cause Magazine. The Washingt?n
portion of her research was underuntten by a
grant from The Fund for Investigative Jour-
nalism Inc.
In a World Court deposition 20 months
later in Nicaragua's case against U.S. sup-
port for the contras, Chamorro, who was
relieved of his FDN duties after protesting
human rights abuses and the CIA's use of
an assassination manual to train the re-
bels, said the lie about the mining of the
harbors was only one in a series.
The CIA had a contra group take credit
for bombing the airport in the Nicaraguan
capital of Managua on September 8,
1983, according to Chamorro. This oper-
ation could have killed two U.S. sena-
tors-Gary Hart (D-Colo.) and William
Cohen (R-Maine).
Cohen and Hart were en route to Ma-
nagua for meetings with Sandinista offi-
cials when a Cessna began dropping
bombs on the city's airport. Sandinista
gunners shot down the plane, which
crashed into the control tower, destroying
the area where Hart and Cohen were
scheduled to meet with reporters. The
senators learned later that the plane used
in the attack belonged to a U.S. aviation
company with CIA ties.
Other actions the CIA carried out and
asked the FDN to take credit for included
the destruction of Nicaraguan oil pipe-
lines, storage tanks, and communications
and military facilities, according to the ex-
contra, who continues to oppose the San-
dinistas' policies. After each of these oper-
ations, "We were instructed by the CIA
to publicly claim responsibility in order to
cover the CIA's involvement, and we
did," Chamorro said.
These fake press releases have far.
reaching implications. There are indica.
tions that the releases are part of an exten.
sive media campaign orchestrated by the
CIA both in the United States and in
Central America. The goal of the cam-
paign is simple: to win public and congres-
sional support for the contras' cause.
According to Chamorro and other for-
mer contras, the CIA has not only hand-
delivered fake press releases to contra
leaders but also has supervised U.S. press
conferences, told the contras to lie about
their goals to allay congressional concerns
STAT
about the Nicaraguan conflict, coached
the rebels on lobbying techniques, provid-
ed them with profiles of Members of Con-
gress, and paid the expenses of rebel leaders
who traveled to Washington and to Mem-
bers' home districts to push for U.S. aid.
"I attended meetings at which CIA of-
ficials told us that we could change the
votes of many Members of the Congress it
we knew how to 'sell' our case and place
them in a position of 'looking soft on com-
munism,' " Chamorro stated in his World
Court deposition. "They told us exactly
what to say and which Members of the
Congress to say it to. They also instructed
us to contact certain prominent individu-
als in the home districts of various Mem-
bers of Congress as a means of hring(itwl
pressure on these Members to change
their votes."
If such allegations are true, the CIA is
violating U.S. law, which bars the agency
from engaging in domestic operations de-
signed to influence political opinion, pub-
lic policy or congressional decisions.
Agency spokesperson Kath Pherson
said in a recent interview, e CIA, as
an intelligence organization, does not
confirm or deny allegations of intelligence
activities. On the specific subject of Cen-
tral America, we can say that we comply
with congressional restrictions."
During the past several years, Congress
has been deeply divided about whether to
give military and nonmilitary support co
the contras, and about what the CIA's
role should be regarding rebel activities.
The Reagan administration has argued
forcefully that the contras are freedom
fighters who desperately need L'. S. arms,
supplies and logistical support. But admin-
istration critics charge that the contras are
a CIA creation that has little support
within Nicaragua and would collapse
without U.S. hinds and leadership.
A controversial Senate vote in August,
just before Congress recessed, indicates
the campaign to portray the contras is
"freedom fighters" and their opponents as
being "soft on communism" has been very
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effective. In August the Senate approved a
$100 million military and nonmilitary aid
package for the contras. The House had
approved a similar measure in June.
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chair-
man of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, proposed that the CIA or
any government intelligence agency be
barred from administering any of the funds
allotted in the bill, but that measure was
defeated, 57 to 42. The only specific con-
gressional restriction the aid package con-
tains regarding CIA involvement with the
contras' military and paramilitary opera-
I attended meet-
ings at which CCL1 of'-
crals told us that We
could change the votes
of many Members of
the Congress if we
knew how to `sell' our
case and place them
in a position of `look-
ing soft on commu-
nism, ' " Chamorro
stated in his Wbrld
Court deposition,
tions is that U.S. military advisers cannot
go within a 20-mile radius of the Nica-
raguan border.
It puts the CIA exactly where it wants
to be-back in control.
Some critics were deeply disturbed by
the vote, saying it takes the United States
down the road toward another Vietnam.
Sen. Jim Sasser (D-Tenn.), for example,
described the decision as "a watershed in
American foreign policy."
"People understand," he said, "that
we're not simply talking about $100 mil-
lion for the funding of a military operation
in a distant land. We are talking about the
first step toward war. "
Another factor that concerned admin-
istration critics was that the vote came de-
spite a recent decision by the World
Court, the principal judicial body of the
United Nations, that the United States'
support of the contras and military opera-
tions inside Nicaragua violated interna-
tional law.
The vote was a complete reversal of
Congress' position in mid-1984, when the
House and Senate refused to extend fund-
ing for the contra program. Several factors
contributed to Congress' about-face, ac-
cording to congressional aides. They say
some Members felt frustrated by the lack
of progress in negotiations and by the San-
dinistas' refusal to restore full civil liber-
ties. Others voted for the aid package be-
cause they feared a communist threat in
Central America, or because they were
afraid that their constituents would con-
sider them soft on communism if they did
! not. What concerns administration critics
! is that these very attitudes may have been
shaped by an agency public relations ef-
tort.
CIA spokesperson Pherson denied that
the agency was trying to influence con-
gressional opinion or policies. "It's not the
'
agency
s job to be influencing U.S. opin-
ion," she said. "It's our job to collect infor-
mation abroad that will help policy mak-
ers make foreign policy decisions."
However, Chamorro, other former
contras, former CIA personnel and con-
gressional staffers believe the agency is en-
gaged in a concerted PR campaign in the
United States. They say the agency is also
involved in a major campaign in Central
I America. Although there is no law
against the CIA conducting propaganda
campaigns abroad, congressional staff and
former CIA personnel point out that this
type of operation also affects U.S. opin-
ion. They say information planted by the
CIA in foreign news media is picked up by
American journalists and State Depart-
ment officials and reported as fact.
The campaign in Central America al-
legedly is centered in Costa Rica and
Honduras and is designed to persuade the
people and governments in those coun-
tries to rally behind the contras' efforts to
overthrow the Sandinista government.
Public support in those countries is crucial
because they border Nicaragua. The con-
tras and the CIA have set up military and
logistical bases in both Costa Rica and
Honduras, despite the fears of some offi-
cials in those governments that these ac-
tivities will further embroil their na-
tions-which are democracies and offi.
cially neutral-in the Central American
conflict.
The CIA's media campaign in Central
America allegedly includes funding a con-
tra newspaper supplement distributed in
major Latin American newspapers, fi-
nancing contra radio stations, and paying
Costa Rican and Honduran journalists to
print false and misleading stories designed
to inflame public opinion against the San-
dinista government.
a.
Allegations about the CIA's public re-
lations efforts have arisen against a back-
drop of intense debate in Washington.
where the administration has not only
battled Congress on behalf of the contras
but has also criticized the House and Sen-
ate intelligence committees, which are re-
sponsible for overseeing CIA activities.
Some Members of Congress believe that
President Reagan, CIA Director William
Casey and national security advisers in the
White House want to change the over-
sight process because they believe the
committees are not supportive enough of
administration policies and covert opera-
tions such as the contra program.
Meanwhile, leaders of the House and
Senate intelligence committees have re-
cently raised questions about the Reagan
administration's extensive use of covert
operations and Congress' ability to control
them. The contra program and other
covert operations such as those in Angola
and Afghanistan are "not subject to ap-
proval or even scrutiny by the whole Con-
gress" and illustrate "the tensions between
covert operations and the principles of
open, democratic government," Rep. Lee
Hamilton, chairman of the House Select
Committee on Intelligence and ranking
Democrat on the Committee on reign
Affairs, said recently.
House and Senate approval of the rebel
aid package, which would put the CIA j
firmly in control of the contra program
again, came after months of intense lob-
bying by the administration. Private con-
servative groups joined in, spending hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars on radio and
TV advertising in the districts of repre-
sentatives who were wavering on the con-
tra issue. The ads-some of which
report-
edly were previewed by a State Depart-
ment official-suggested that legislators
voting against contra aid were not stand-
ing up to the spread of communism and
international terrorism in the hemi-
sphere.
In addition, private groups-including
some working informally with the State
Department's Office of Public Diplomacy
for Latin America and the Caribbean-
organized speaking engagements around
Congressional staffers say this type of
campaign, involving White House offi-
cials, the State Department and private
organizations-possibly bolstered by the
CIA's own secret PR campaign-is highly
unusual.
Adding to their concerns is the fact
that one of the private groups involved in
the lobbying was founded last year by Max
Hugel, former CIA deputy director for op-
erations and a friend of CIA Director Ca-
sey. Hugel was also a senior adviser on
Reagan's 1984 reelection campaign. Hu-
gel's group, Project 88: Americans for the 4
?pntinw0
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I more than a dozen Members' districts. (In
i August the group started a drive to repeal
I the 22nd Amendment, which limits a
president to two terms.)
Hugel's interest in shaping American
I opinion was evident last year when he
spearheaded an attempt to purchase Unit.
! ed Press International (UPI), one of the
world's largest news organizations. The
bid failed.
The CIA's alleged activities in the
United States and Central America raise
a number of serious legal and ethical ques-
1 tions, including:
^ To what extent is the CIA influenc-
ing U.S. foreign policy by secretly lobby- I
^ To what extent is the CIA planting
distorted or false information in the U.S.
and foreign media?
^ Does Congress have the power and
I the will to oversee the CIA, which is un-
der the direct control of the president? i
^ Are the CIA's activities undermining
the neutrality and the democratic govern- j
ments of Costa Rica and Honduras?
Some of the techniques the agency al-
legedly is using in the United States ap-
pear to be alluded to in a foreign agent's
registration statement filed with the Jus-
tice Department in September 1985 by I
FDN Washington spokesperson Bosco
Matamoros. (Persons lobbying for a for-
eign government or organization are re-
quired to file a disclosure statement
with the Justice Department every six
months.) i
In his statement, Matamoros said that
as an FDN spokesperson he "promotes the
purposes, positions and goals of the FDN"
and "through the, media and otherwise,
will endeavor to marshal growing Ameri-
can awareness of and support for the ob-
jectives of the FDN."
He indicated he had done this by pre-
paring and disseminating political propa-
ganda to public officials, the media, and
civic and educational groups. He also in-
dicated that he did this through radio and
TV broadcasts, magazine and newspaper
articles, advertising campaigns, press re-
leases and speeches.
Matamoros stated on the form that he
has been doing this work since June
1981-before the FDN was officially
formed and before congressional oversight
committees were briefed on the CIA's
contra operation. Furthermore, if CIA
funds have supported Matamoros' lobby-
ing and propaganda activities, the CIA
i has violated the prohibition against agen-
cysponsorship of activities designed to in-
fluence U. S. political opinion.
Matamoros' Justice Department regis-
tration form raises questions about state-
ments he made to the General Account-
A number of former CIA officials be-
Iietae the agency is running an intense
propaganda campaign in Costa Rica
which lies on Nicaragua s southern bor-
dter, to unn public support for the con?
tras' e, fforts to oaerthrow the Sandinistas
Carlos ,Morales director of Semanario
L'niversidad one of Costa Rica's most
outspoken neuspapers, says he knows
journalists who are paid by the CL4 to
wrote false and misleading stories about
the contras.
La Nacion, one of Costa Rica's most in-
fluential neuspapers, camel a weekly
supplement produced by the contras in
San Jose.
Continued
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La Republica is one of three Costa Ri-
can neu.spapers taenttfted bti- communtcali ms
rearrbers as biased to fatrnr of the
contras. Critics satiy the Costa Rican press
is a target of CL4 efforts.
ing Office (GAO), the investigative arm
of Congress, which tried to look into alle-
gations about CIA lobbying last year. The
GAO report, issued in December 1985,
stated, "Mr. Matamoros said he has devel-
oped contacts with Members of Congress
who have expressed interest in Nicaragua.
He said, however, he is not engaged in
any lobbying activities."
Matamoros could not be reached for
comment. The GAO report states that
Matamoros told investigators that the
j money for his activities had come from
private sources.
Edgar Chamorro, among others, is not
convinced. "It was CIA money until
1984," he said. "There were some very
small donations from rich men-but not
enough for all these projects."
During a recent interview at his Florida
home, Chamorro provided additional in-
formation about contra operations that
supplemented his September 1985 World
Court deposition.
Chamorro, 55, is a soft-spoken man
who earned his master's degree in educa-
tion at Harvard in 1972. He lives in an
airy house just outside Miami-which he
jokes is the only city the contras control.
Since FDN leaders relieved him of his du-
ties in 1984, Chamorro has spent his time
writing and lecturing about what he calls
the "tragic mistake" that the United
States is making in continuing to support
the rebels. At the same time, Chamorro
says he still opposes the Sandinistas' poli-
cies.
Chamorro reluctantly left his native
Nicaragua to move to Miami with his wife
and two children in 1979. In Managua,
I he had served as a dean at the Jesuit-affi-
hated University of Central America and
later had developed a career in advertising
and public relations. But he was con-
cerned about his family's safety during the
civil war then raging between the Sandi-
nistas and dictator Anastasio Somoza.
He hoped to return after the Sandi-
nistas took power later that year. But he
was disappointed in the regime's policies
and ultimately, in 1981, he joined the
FDN because he believed the group repre-
sented the best chance for achieving dem-
ocratic reform in Nicaragua.
When Chamorro talked about con-
ducting his public relations work for the
contras, he made it clear he was talking
about a hidden war for the hearts and
minds of the U.S. public and its leaders.
He called it a war that "reveals the dark
side of America."
It began in 1981, when the CIA orga-
nized the contras, Chamorro said. From
the first, the agency made it clear that its
personnel were going to supervise a PR
campaign whose primary purpose was "to
maintain the support of the Congress for
the CIA's activities," he said.
Chamorro was based in Miami, where
he "did political propaganda work, wrote
letters, organized rallies, set up commit-
tees in various parts of the United States
and generally worked at building support
for our cause within the United States"-
all under CIA direction, he stated in his
World Court deposition.
The CIA supervised press releases and
press conferences "to ensure maximum fa-
vorable publicity," and even wrote the
FDN's statement of principles, he said.
Agency officials also told contra leaders
to lie about the FDN's goals, Chamorro
stated in his deposition. When the CIA
formed the FDN, "the CIA agents we
"
worked with spoke openly and confidently
about replacing the government in Mana-
gua." But after Congress prohibited the
agency from using funds for this purpose in
1983, "The CIA instructed us that, if
asked, we should say that our objective
was to interdict arms supposedly being
smuggled from Nicaragua to El Salva-
dor.... The public statements by Unit-
ed States government officials about the
arms flow, we were told by the CIA agents
with whom we worked, were necessary to
maintain the support of the Congress and I
should not be taken seriously by us."
The agency also coached contra leaders
about how to lobby Congress, Chamorro
stated in the deposition. This effort was
stepped up in 1984, after Congress voted
to cut funding for the contra operation, he
added.
"Our CIA colleagues enlisted us in an
effort to lobby the Congress to resume
these appropriations," Chamorro said. He
declined to name the targeted Members,
saying it might raise unfounded questions
about their integrity.
Some CIA personnel also continued to
give the contras military advice and train-
ing'after the 1984 congressional ban on
CIA assistance for rebel military or para-
military operations, Chamorro said.
"They just stayed and kept on working
with the FDN. They simply never
stopped. "
Chamorro said that after working in
Miami for several years, he was instructed
by CIA personnel to relocate to Teguci-
galpa, the capital of Honduras, to run the
contras' public relations effort there. The
CIA and the contras had set up base
camps and logistics centers in Honduras,
which lies on Nicaragua's northern bor-
der. In addition, the Pentagon was build-
ing airfields, radar sites and base camps in
the area in conjunction with a series of
military exercises. The Pentagon allowed
the CIA and the contras to use many of
these facilities, according to congressional
staffers who work on Central American is-
sues.
"The CIA station in Tegucigalpa,
which at that time included about 20
agents working directly with the FDN,
gave me money, in cash, to hire several
writers, reporters and technicians to pre-
pare a monthly bulletin called Comandos,
to run a clandestine radio station and to
write press releases," he stated in his
World Court deposition.
"I was also given money by the CIA to
rent a house, office space and automo-
Continued
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"People under-
stand, " said Sen. Jim
Sasser, "that we're not
amply talking about
$100 million for the
funding of a military
operation in a distant
land We are talking
about the first step to-
u and war. "
biles, and to obtain office supplies and
communications equipment. I also re-
I ceived money from the CIA to bribe Hon-
duran journalists and broadcasters to
j speak favorably about the FDN and to at-
tack the government of Nicaragua and
call for its overthrow. Approximately 15
Honduran journalists and broadcasters
were on the CIA's payroll, and our influ-
i ence was thereby extended to every major
Honduran newspaper and radio and tele-
vision station," Chamorro said in the de-
position.
He added that agency personnel told
him a similar media campaign was under
way in Costa Rica.
In a recent interview, CIA spokesper-
son Pherson said, "The CIA has not re-
sponded publicly to any of Mr. Cha-
morro's other claims and will not begin
now, '
Chamorro said the agency looks at its
Doonesbury
J`~
What the newspaper doesn't tell read-
ers is that it is produced in San Jose by a
public relations official for the FDN, Pe-
dro Joaquin Chamorro (a distant cousin of
Edgar Chamorro). The ' walls of Cha-
morro's room at contra offices in the Cos-
ta Rican capital are covered with FDN lo-
gos and "The 10 Commandments of Pub-
lic Relations" in Spanish.
In an interview, Pedro Joaquin Cha-
morro refused to answer questions about
how Nicaragua Hoy, which carries no ad-
vertising, is financed. "I can't say any-
thing about that," he said.
But several former contras said the
newspaper gets its money from the agen-
cy. "Everyone knows the CIA funds it,"
said a spokesperson for former contra lead-
er Eden Pastora, who left the rebels in
May because he believed the CIA had too
much control over the movement.
"We carry the truth about Nica-
ragua-anyone who has something truth-
ful to say can get their story published,"
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro said. But despite
his insistence that his paper is not a propa-
ganda operation, it is interesting to note
that Chamorro serves as the secretary of
information for the United Nicaraguan
Opposition, an umbrella group of, contra
organizations that is controlled by FDN
personnel. Recent issues have carried
news items such as pictures of a graduation
ceremony of an FDN military unit that
had just finished its training.
Former contras and Costa Rican jour-
nalists said another major CI.A project has
involved the purchase of a San Jose radio
station.
Edgar Chamorro said the CIA gave a
Venezuelan group sympathetic to the-con-
tras enough money to purchase Radio Im-
pacto, one of Costa Rica's most powerful
stations.
Carlos Morales, a Universirv of Costa
Rica journalism professor who runs
Sernanario Uruversidad, one of the coun-
OH, YOU
MEAN
THE
NEROS 1
BY GARRY TRUDEAU
YOUR NO OFFENSE,
CIVILIAN BUT VHE5'D
GEARS YOU FIND
ARENEROS? 7HOSE
Conbmied
public relations effort in Central America
"as a marketing experiment.... How
can we get [the people of Costa Rica and
Honduras] to say, 'We need the freedom
fighters to fight the Sandinistas'."'
A recent trip to Costa Rica suggested
several reasons why such an effort might
prove worthwhile.
Costa Rica, the most prosperous Cen-
tral American country, has no armed
forces and proclaimed neutrality in the re-
gional conflict in 1983. Public opinion
polls in the early 1980s showed that Costa
Ricans overwhelmingly supported this po-
sition.
Furthermore, while Reagan administra-
tion officials continually refer to Costa
Rica as "the showcase of democracy in
Central America," the administration has
been willing in the past to use economic
and political pressure to force the Costa
Rican government to go along with U.S.
policy.
Weeks of interviews in San Jose, Costa
Rica's capital, turned up strong indica-
tions that the administration is using the
Costa Rican media to create support for
the rebels. Although Ambassador Lewis
Tambs vigorously denied that the CIA is
running a concerted media campaign in
the country, there are indications the
agency is involved in both print and
broadcast media.
It appears that the CIA's most ambi-
tious effort is Nicaragua Hoy (Nicaragua
Today), a four-page newspaper supple-
ment produced in San Jose and distributed
to 624,000 readers through major newspa-
pers in seven Latin American countries.
The supplement, whose logo is a draw-
ing of Nicaragua surrounded by barbed
wire, states that its objective is to "publish
information and articles of opinion about
the Nicaraguan reality to try to compen-
sate for the well-orchestrated disinforma-
tion campaign of the Sandinista govern-
ment. "
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`I also received
money from the CIA to
bribe Honduran jour-
nalists and broadcast-
ers to speak favorably
about [the contras]
and to attack the gov-
ernment of Nicaragua
and call for its over-
throw; " Chamorro
saidin hisWbrld
Court deposition,
try's most outspoken newspapers, said he
believes that the CIA financed the pur-
chase because it wanted an outlet for pro-
; contra programming, and because Radio
Impacto's signal can reach Nicaragua,
which increases its propaganda value.
A number of Costa Rican journalists
and policy analysts interviewed for this
story said the radio station consistently
slants the news. "The contras are por-
j trayed as saints, and the Sandinistas as an
evil threat to the hemisphere," said Fred
Morris, director of the Institute for Cen-
tral American Studies in San Jose, which
publishes a newsletter on Central Ameri-
can affairs.
In July, Radio Impacto denounced June
Erlick, a L.S. journalist based in Mana
gua who has written for various publica- tions. Isabel Ovares, who works for
tions, including Time. Impacto called Er- Agence France Presse, and Patricia Leon,
lick a "piricuaca," a derogatory term for who works for Inter Press Service, did a
Sandinistas that literally means "rabid content analysis of the papers over a
dog," and claimed she was being paid by three-month period in 1983 and pub-
the Nicaraguan government. lished their findings in Social Science, a
The attack prompted Erlick-who in Costa Rican academic journal.
fact has written numerous articles critical The three papers were "neither impar-
of the Sandinistas-to write an open let- tial nor objective" about the contras and
ter to Radio Impacto defending her jour- the Sandinistas, the journalists wrote.
nalistic integrity. The report stated that the newspapers
In an interview at her home in Mana- used "partial versions of events, omitted
gua, Erlick said, "The whole episode was information and falsified information."
very intimidating. It wouldn't have been The papers also published photographs
so bad if they had presented legitimate of contras praying and referred to their
criticism of a specific story I had writ- military operations as battles "in a holy
ten-that's fair. But they didn't do that. It war," the report said. The contras are pre-
was just a personal attack. It upset me for sented "almost like Crusaders" fighting to
days." save Christianity from the communists, it
The director of Radio Impacto did not continued.
respond to requests for an interview. Linking the contras' cause with religion
Meanwhile, the CIA is paying journal- is a major theme in the CIA's propaganda
ists to slant the news, according to jour- campaign, Edgar Chamorro said. "The
nalism professor Morales and others inter- agency knows what a tremendous influ-
viewed in Costa Rica. They said reporters ence the [Catholic] Church is in Central
and editors on the agency payroll write America, and they told us to emphasize
false or misleading stories about contra religious themes. We were to make the
successes, delete stories about human contra war look like the Crusades-an ef-
rights abuses and other problems among fort to stop the Sandinistas' 'evil, godless
the contras, and create or distort stories empire.'
about Sandinista repression and ties to in- Photographs and headlines are also dis-
ternational terrorism. torted to link the Sandinistas to interna-
"I know some journalists who, because tional terrorism, the report stated. It cited
they're hungry, work for the agency," Mo- as an example a headline in the newspaper
vales said. "They do it because they aren't La Prensa Libre, which said, ."Nicaraguan
aware of the impact their stories have, and boat transports materials of terrorism." A
because they need the money." large picture below the headline showed
CIA spokesperson Pherson said she two Costa Rican patrol boats escorting a
could not comment about allegations re- , ship that the newspaper said was trans-
garding agency operations in Costa Rica porting material "of the type generally
because the agency does not confirm or used in terrorist activities and sabotage."
deny allegations of intelligence activities. It turned out that the vessel, which was I
Allegations about media bias regarding sailing under a Panamanian flag, was car-
the contras and the Sandinistas gained tying explosives to geologic institutes in
credibility from a study of three major several Latin American countries. Nica-
newspapers done by two San Jose journal- ragua was one of its ports of call, the report
ists with master's degrees in communica- I said.
Do
onesbury
BY GARRY TRUDEAU
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"But the headline and photo had a real
effect," said Ovares, one of the authors of
the study. "People thought, 'Well, the
Nicaraguan government really is export-
ing terrorism.' "
Repeated efforts to interview editors of
newspapers that were studied were not
successful.
Costa Rican sources pointed out that
the alleged CIA campaign to portray the
Nicaraguan government as a threat to the
hemisphere dovetails with the views of
many Costa Rican newspaper owners.
Many owners are wealthy conservatives
who support Reagan administration poli-
cies toward Central America, they said.
"The CIA wouldn't have to pay the
owners or editors of most of the media
here," said Juan Jose Echeverria, a lawyer
who is a former minister of public security
and member of the Costa Rican legisla-
ture. "All the CIA has to do is call them
up and tell them what they want done."
Several Costa Rican journalists said
they believed the campaign has seriously
harmed freedom of the press. They said
reporters or editors who are not sufficient-
ly pro-contra are labeled "subversives" " or
"communists" and may be forced out of
their jobs.
The anti-Nicaragua campaign has
meant "the death of political tolerance" in
Costa Rica, said Jose Melende:, a former
radio reporter in San Jose who is now a
correspondent for the Mexico City news-
paper Excelsior. "It is one of the saddest
things that has happened here. The seeds
of hatred have been planted, and the
fruits will last 100 years."
The effects of the alleged U.S. media
campaign in Costa Rica are further evi-
dence that CIA propaganda campaigns
usually are counterproductive, according
to former CIA personnel and administra-
tion critics.
"I don't believe we get enough profit
out of it, and we just get a name for inter-
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vening in foreign countries," says Harry
Rositzke, former head of the agency's So-
viet Operations Division, who calls such
efforts "shortsighted."
He and other critics say Chile provides
an apt example of a counterproductive
campaign.
In the early 1970s, the CIA spent mil-
lions of dollars undermining President
Salvador Allende, whom the United
States regarded as a leftist threat to the
hemisphere. This operation-document-
ed in the mid-'70s by a Senate panel
chaired by former Idaho Democrat Frank
Church-included efforts to destabilize
the country's economy and involved pay-
ments to Allende's political opponents.
The mainspring of the effort was the
agency's media campaign. The CIA subsi-
dized news services, provided money for a
TV station, paid journalists to plant false
and distorted stories about the govern-
ment in national and international me-
dia, and poured $1.5 million into El Mer-
curio, one of the nation's most influential
newspapers, according to the Church
Committee report.
In 1973 Allende was overthrown and,
in Rositzke's words, "a repressive and mur-
derous military junta enjoying American
support" took power. Chile, which until
that time had one of the longest demo-
cratic traditions in Latin America, is still
under military dictatorship.
From the point of view of former CIA
official Ralph McGehee "What the agen-
cy has onerrvocably taint the Latin
American press. Genuine opposition
newspapers and broadcast stations have
lost credibility-not just with govern-
ments, but with their own people-as a
result of these agency media campaigns.
The CIA has made it impossible for Latin
Americans to tell whether media criticism
is legitimate, or the product of the agen-
cy. 11
This is exactly what appears to be hap-
pening now in Nicaragua, where the San-
dinista government closed La Prensa, the
country's only opposition newspaper, the
day after the House approved the $100
million contra aid package in June. Sandi-
nista officials said the newspaper was be-
ing closed because it was getting U.S.
funds to work with the CIA to promote !
support for the contras' efforts to over-
throw the Nicaraguan government. La
Prensa editors denied the charges, and the
newspaper's closure sparked a worldwide
debate.
It is interesting that Managua has be-
come the focus of an international debate
about press freedom.
The city has two monuments to journa-
lists-one of whom is a national hero-
erected by the Sandinistas after the revo-
lution.
The first is an amphitheater in honor of
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, a former La
Prensa editor (and father of FDN spokes-
person Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, of Nica-
ragua Hoy, who once worked for La
Prensa). The elder Chamorro was one of
dictator Anastasio Somoza's most outspo-
ken opponents and was shot down in the
street in 1978. His death gave enormous
impetus to the Sandinistas' fight against
Somoza.
The other monument is a small park in
a poor section of Managua. It was built in
honor of Bill Stewart, an ABC-TV re-
porter who was shot to death in 1979 by
Somoza's National Guard while covering
the revolution. Stewart was the first for-
eign reporter killed in the conflict, and his
death helped turn U.S. public opinion
against Somoza. The park was built across
the street from where Stewart died, and a
simple plaque there reads: "Bill
Stewart-He did not die in a strange land.
We will always remember him, because he
is part of free Nicaragua."
Many visitors to Managua find it ironic
that a city whose appearance is so unpre-
BY GARRY TRUDEAU
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'We carry the truth
about Nicaragua,)
says the supervisor of
Nicaragua Hoy, a wide-
ly distributed news
supplement, Few real-
ize, however, that it is
produced by a public
relations official for the
contras
possessing is the focal point of regional
U.S. military and foreign policy. Mana-
gua has changed little since 1972, when it
was leveled by an earthquake. The main
streets are still lined with decaying hulks
of buildings. The roof of Managua's cathe-
dral, which was destroyed by the quake,
has never been replaced. A carpet of grass
leads up the main aisle to the altar.
Few pedestrians walk downtown. Tax-
is--most dating from the 'S0s and
'60s-wheeze and rattle down the streets,
I in sharp contrast to Costa Rica, where
throngs of people crowd San Jose's side-
walks and many taxis are new Volvos.
The brightest spots in Managua are the
murals that line walls and sides of build-
I ings. Painted in bright, bold colors, they
are both works of art and propaganda de-
vices, depicting the struggle and triumph
of the Sandinistas' battle against Somoza.
Managua is in this condition for several
reasons. One is that Somoza pocketed
most of the money the United States pro-
vided to rebuild the city. Another is that
the Sandinistas are diverting much of the
national budget to defense. Sandinista of-
ficials say this is necessary because of the
war with the contras.
The city also reflects the country's Trou-
bled economic situation. The Sandinistas
say this results from the contras' strategy of
trying to cause economic hardship by at-
tacking farms, cooperatives and factories.
Reagan administration officials say the
problems result principally from the San-
dinistas' economic policies and poor man-
agement. Whatever the reasons, rice,
beans, meat and many medicines are in
short supply. Some supermarket shelves
are empty.
Food shortages are sometimes evident
even at the Hotel Inter-Continental, one
of the city's best. The Inter-Con, as it's
known, was built by Somoza and is now
controlled by the Sandinistas.
It is the center of considerable intrigue.
With the air of Rick's bar in Casablanca,
the Inter-Con is often packed with jour-
nalists, mercenaries, members of U. S. re-
ligious organizations, documentary film-
makers and Americans on fact-finding
tours.
The closed opposition newspaper La
Prensa is about a 20-minute taxi ride from
the Inter-Continental.
The outside of the newspaper's offices is
papered with stories that government cen-
sors deleted from the newspaper. La
Prensa staffers refer to it as "the wall of
censorship." Inside, the mood is somber.
The newsroom is dark, and reporters pass
the time playing chess.
None of this has daunted the newspa-
per's editor, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro.
A striking, silver-haired woman, Cha-
morro took over the newspaper after her
husband was shot dead eight years ago,
and continued his campaign against So-
moza until the dictator was overthrown in
July 1979.
When the Sandinistas took power, she
was a member of the ruling junta, but she
resigned when she felt its policies were
swinging too far to the left. Feelings about
the Sandinistas split the family. One of
Violeta's sons is a Sandinista official. A
daughter is Nicaragua's ambassador to
Costa Rica. It is her son, Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro, who produces Nicaragua Hoy
for the contras in San Jose. Another
daughter works for La Prensa.
Violeta Chamorro gives the Sandi-
nistas no quarter. She calls them "Marx-
ist-Leninist thugs" who have turned Nica-
ragua into a "concentration camp." She
angrily denies Sandinista President Daniel
Ortega's charges that La Prensa was being
funded by the Reagan administration to
help the CIA build support for the con-
tras' efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan
government.
However, the La Prensa situation is
more complex than this. Some former
CIA personnel and congressional staff be-
lieve the newspaper has indeed gotten
agency money; others say they are not
sure. But all agree that aside from this de-
bate, two factors in the situation illustrate
the larger point that the CIA's history of
propaganda campaigns has in itself com-
promised genuine voices of dissent in the
media.
One of the factors is that Violeta Cha-
morro's son is a public relations spokesper-
son for the FDN and produces a weekly
news supplement reportedly funded by the
CIA. This situation makes Violeta Cha-
morro uncomfortable, and she bristles
slightly at questions about it. "We don't
have any connection with Pedro Joaquin's
publication," she said. "We don't have
anything to do with that."
The other complicating factor is that
La Prensa indirectly received U.S. gov-
ernment funding in 1985 and 1986. Last
year, the newspaper was awarded a
$100,000 grant from the National En-
dowment for Democracy, a private U.S.
group that receives money from Congress
each year to promote democratic princi.
ples and projects abroad. The endowment
assigned the grant to PRODEMCA, an-
other private U.S. organization, which
arranged for the newspaper's longtime
supplier in Miami to buy ink, equipment,
supplies and wire service contracts for La
Prensa.
In 1986 the endowment approved an-
other $100,000 for La Prensa. The first
$50,000 was assigned to PRODEMCA,
which arranged purchases of equipment i
and supplies. Last March, shortly before a
House vote on contra aid, PRODEMCA
took out full-page ads in major U. S. news-
papers, calling on representatives to sup-
port the measure. PRODEMCA also
worked with other private groups to coor-
dinate speaking engagements by contra
leaders in the United States. When U. S.
news media carried stories about these ac-
tivities, the endowment selected another
organization to administer the $50,000 re-
maining in the original 1986 grant. En-
dowment officials also decided to supple-
ment that sum with an additional
$53,000.
None of that $103,000 went to La
Prensa, however, because the paper was
closed before the funds could be spent.
But "the endowment is holding the funds
for the newspaper pending clarification of
the situation," an endowment spokesper-
son said.
Violeta Chamorro said she knew noth-
ing about the connections between PRO-
DEMCA and contra supporters. She also i
said no one from the endowment, PRO-
DEMCA or the Reagan administration
had tried to control the editorial policy of
her newspaper.
The La Prensa situation points up a ma-
jor problem with the agency's media ma-
nipulation campaigns, former CIA offi-
cials and other critics say. The agency's !
history of paying editors and reporters to j
create or slant news still haunts Latin I
America. Because it is so difficult to track
covert CIA support for print and broad-
cast media, governments are quick to la-
bel any opposition voice "a tool of the
CIA," and to use this as a rationale for
placing restrictions on all media, agency
critics say.
"What the CIA's media campaigns
have done is undermine the democratic
=l es and institutions the agency
it is trying to protect in Central
America," says former CIA official John
4
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Stockwell, who worked in Vietnam and
Africa during his 12 years with the agency.
He and other former agency personnel
interviewed for this story say the public
relations program Edgar Chamorro de-
scribes is very similar to PR campaigns the
agency ran in the 1970s in Southeast
Asia, Africa and South America.
Ralph McGehee, a 25-year veteran of
the agency whose jobs included represent-
ative to the CIA's International Commu-
nism Branch in the Directorate for Opera-
tions, says agency personnel refer to the
mechanism that runs these campaigns as
the "mighty Wurlitzer" because it is an
"organ on which the CIA could play any
propaganda anywhere in the world at any
time."
One person who played the mighty
Wurlitzer is Stockwell, who supervised a
media campaign when he was chief of the
CIA Angola Task Force in the
mid-1970s. Stockwell-who resigned
from the agency ih 19771 and has spent
several years studying the CIA's role in
Central America-said 'in a recent inter-
view that "if you changed the names of
the countries you couldn't tell the differ-
ence" between the campaign Chamorro
describes and the one he ran in Africa.
"Even some of the issues and the rhetoric
are the same," he said.
In 1975 and 1976, Stockwell worked
with more than a dozen propaganda ex-
I perts to persuade Congress and the Amer-
ican people that the United States should
support Angolan rebel groups known as
UNITA and the FNLA to keep the coun-
try from becoming a "Soviet beachhead."
Another aspect of Stockwell's job was to
hide the fact that the U.S. government
was giving military aid and training to the
rebels, despite repeated statements by ad-
ministration officials to Congress and the
U. S. news media that America was not
directly involved. "Basically, we lied a
lot," Stockwell said.
In a recent interview in New York
City, he stated that the Angolan cam-
paign included having rebel leaders lobby
Members of Congress; drafting false state-
ments read by State Department and oth-
er officials regarding U.S. military in-
volvement in the conflict; and paying
journalists to plant false and misleading
stories in newspapers, magazines and
broadcast media.
One such story involved a report that
Cuban soldiers had raped a number of An-
golan schoolgirls. It was picked up by the
media in Angola and ran in major U.S.
newspapers. Later, another report from
the field said that the Cuban troops re-
sponsible for the assaults had been cap-
tured, tried by a local tribunal and execut-
ed by a firing squad made up of the girls
they had raped. This also got major U.S.
media play.
There was only one problem with these
stories: They were total fabrications.
"There was no commitment whatso-
ever to the truth in a program like this,"
Stockwell said. "Your commitment is .. .
to win the propaganda war, to win the
minds of the American people and the
people in the Western world."
When stories created or distorted by
the agency and placed in news media
abroad are picked up by stringers and re-
porters for U. S. media and reported here
as fact, the result is known as "blowback."
Such information also filters to the
United States through the Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service (FBIS), a com-
pendium of foreign newspaper and broad-
cast reports that is produced by the CIA.
Many congressional staffers and State De-
partment and Pentagon correspondents
use FBIS as a reference, but they have no
way of knowing which stories are genuine
and which stories are CIA fabrications.
The agency itself often doesn't know,
according to former CIA officers. The
CIA's own disinformation is often picked
up and filed as genuine intelligence, fur-
ther distorting the information and analy-
sis that legislators and government offi-
cials use as the foundation for U.S. policy.
"There was no mechanism that pre-
vented that disinformation from contami-
nating and spoiling the CIA's own infor-
mation files," said McGehee, who moni-
tored newspapers, magazines and cables
while working with the CIA's Directorate
for Operations. "Many articles that I kept
and filed, that served as background for
studies I wrote, later turned out to be CIA
propaganda. "
McGehee, other former CIA officers
and congressional staff said they believe
the CIA deliberately uses blowback to in-
fluence public opinion about its own co-
'Silenced but not subjugated" sans the
sign at Ii Prensa, the Nicaraguan neus-
paper shut down by the Sandinista gov-
ernment the day after the L:S. House of
Representatives approved the conl'fa aid
package in June. Editor Videta Cha-
morm (inset left) denies charges that
la Prensa is helping the CIA.
The National Palace on Managua's
main plant, now occupied by the Sandi-
nista government.
CN*NW
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A blend o/'art and ptr)/a aneki, murcds
extolling (he.~iuu/ntislci rernlutinu adorn
a tam ucdls in tlatu~Wtut.
vert actions or to reinforce administration
police.
Instead of simply "gathering genuine
intelligence that could serve as the basis
for reasonable policies, the CIA often
ends up distorting reality, creating out of
whole cloth 'intelligence' to justify poli-
cies that have already been decided
upon," McGehee wrote in his book Dead-
IN Decei s-.~iy 25 bars in the CIA.
"What this means is that the 'Ministrv
of Truth'-the propaganda ministry in
Geor_,,e Orwell', i964-has become a re-
alin-," he said in a recent interview at his
home in Herndon, Va.
CIA spokesperson Kathy Pherson said
the CIA's function is to gather intelli-
gence, not to influence opinion or policy,
and that the agency abides by congres-
sional restrictions on its role.
McGehee, who plans another book
about the agency, said the controversy
over the contras' goals is an excellent ex-
ample of how disinformation can affect
public policy. For example, Edgar Cha-
morro stated that when Congress devel-
oped misgivings about the contras' goals,
the agency told the rebels to lie and to say
their objective was not to overthrow the
Sandinistas, but to interdict arms being
smuggled from Nicaragua to leftist El Sal-
vadoran rebels. State Department and
Pentagon documents repeated the same
statements. As late as April 1984, CIA
Director Casey told U. S. News & World
Report in a copyrighted interview that the
contras "certainly have had an impact" on
the flow of supplies from Nicaragua to the
leftist rebels, "though it's hard to quanti-
fy.
Chamorro stated in his World Court
deposition that "It was never our objec-
rive to stop the supposed flow of arms, of
which we never saw any evidence in the
first place. . . . Our goal, and that of the
CIA as well (as we were repeatedly assured
in private), was to overthrow the govern-
menr of Nicaragua."
'
Chamorro
s statements about an arms
flow to El Salvador are reinforced by Da-
vid MacMichael, a former estimates offi-
cer with the CIA's National Intelligence
Council who dealt with Central Ameri-
can affairs. MacMichael left the agency in
1983. He testified before the World Court
that he could find no substantial evidence
of Nicaraguan complicity in arms ship-
ments to leftist El Salvadoran rebels ex-
cept for a brief period at the end of 1980
and very early in 1981.
"The administration and the CIA have
systematically misrepresented Nicaraguan
involvement in the supply of arms to the
Salvadoran guerrillas to justify its efforts to 11 1
overthrow the Nicaraguan government,
said MacMichael, who now works as a se-
nior research fellow for the Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, a policy institute in
Washington, D.C.
Some former CIA personnel and con-
gressional staff said they believe a great
deal of pressure to politicize intelligence
has come directly from Casey, who ran
Reagan's 1980 election campaign. They
said such actions distort the CIA's primary
mission: The gathering and analysis of ob-
jective data for policy makers.
MacMichael is only one of several
agency personnel who have resigned in re-
cent years because they believed the CIA
was distorting information. Another is
John Horton, former national intelligence
officer for Latin America and a highly re-
spected analyst.
Horton wrote in an op-ed piece in The
Washington Post after he resigned in 1984
that he left "because of the pressure put on
me by the director of Central Intelligence
to come up with a National Intelligence
Estimate on Mexico that would satisfy
him."
A National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) is a major document policy makers
rely on when making economic and na-
tional security policy.
".Attempts to squelch displeasing intel-
ligence reports or judgments that don't
back up an administration's policies" have
been a recurring problem, Horton wrote.
"William Casey, the current director,
most differs from previous directors of
Central Intelligence in that he is a part of
the policy-making group where Central
America is involved as much as he is the
president's chief intelligence officer."
The op-ed piece drew a strong response
from Casey, who replied, "Improving the
estimating process was my primary con-
cern when I assumed office in 1981..
..
There were disagreements between the
drafting analyst and Mr. Horton over de-
letions made by the latter."
Members of Congress have also criti-
cized the agency for the increasingly polit-
ical content of its analyses. A 1982 staff
report by the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Evaluation of the House Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence stated, "The con-
cern underlying this report is not simply
that an occasional inaccuracy or oversim-
plification appears in intelligence... .
They may signal that the environment in
which analytic thought and production
decisions occur is under pressure to rein-
force policy."
Harry Rosit:ke, who retired in 1970 at-
ter 25 years with the agency, said in a re-
cent interview he is concerned about
"whether or not the president really gets a
realistic assessment of what the contra ca-
pabilities are. . . . Casey would be in-
clined to encourage him [the president] on
a gambit that he's been working on for
four years. So it's sort of like the Vietnam
war. "
Other former CIA personnel also drew
parallels between Central America and
Vietnam.
Ralph McGehee, the former represent-
ative in the agency's International Com-
munism Branch who worked in Southeast
Asia, said the CIA's media operations
against the Sandinistas are similar to tech-
niques used in Vietnam, which he de-
scribes as "the agency's greatest and long-
est disinformation campaign."
Underlying the concerns of former
agency personnel and other administra-
tion critics is the feeling that Congress
will be unable to stop the drift toward war.
They believe that the House and Senate
simply cannot adequately oversee the ac-
tivities of the agency.
"Congress has neither the will nor the
means to control the CIA," former CIA
officer Stockwell said.
Some Members of Congress also have
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doubts about the oversight process. "The
intelligence oversight committees of the
Congress review covert actions, but they
have very restricted power, which does
not match the kind of full congressional
review and legislative power that is essen-
tial for developing a credible policy over
the long run," said Sen. Patrick Leahy
(D-Vt.), vice chairman of the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence.
The House and Senate oversight com-
mittees were set up a decade ago in the
wake of congressional reports about intel-
ligence community abuses at home and
abroad. The committees authorize the
CIA budget and oversee all agency opera-
tions.
By law, the president can initiate a co-
vert operation abroad. He is required only
to make a determination (a "finding")
that such an operation would be in the
I national interest, and to notify the House
and Senate intelligence committees of the Salvadoran rebels.
finding. House committee members also indi-
The committees review the finding in cated they believed that the agency had
secret, and send their recommendations circumvented restrictions Congress had
to the president. The committees approve placed on CIA funding for the contras.
most covert plans, but do not have legal The report stated that congressional
authority to stop a covert operation they
disagree with. The committees' only re-
course is to urge the president to reconsid-
er the project.
Congress can only block a covert opera-
tion by specifically restricting funds for
that operation.
Members of the intelligence commit-
tees say that another problem with over-
sight is that CIA briefings are vague, mis-
leading or after the fact.
For example, the agency did not brief
the House Intelligence Committee on the
contra operation until December 1981-
four months after Chamorro says the
group was formally organized and began
receiving funds, training and weapons
from the agency.
Intelligence committee members com-
plained bitterly that the CIA had not ade-
quately informed them of plans to mine
Nicaragua's harbors in January 1984. Sen.
Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), who was
chairman of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee at the time, characterized the min-
ing as "an act of war."
Agency personnel said information
about the operation was listed in a report
it gave the committees.
Nevertheless, in April 1984 the House
and Senate passed non-binding resolu-
tions opposing the use of U. S. funds for
mining Nicaraguan waters.
In addition, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moy-
nihan (D-N.Y.) resigned as vice chairman
of the Senate Intelligence Committee to
protest the CIA's handling of consulta-
tions with Congress regarding the mining.
He withdrew his resignation after Casey
apologized to the committee and agreed to
"The truth had
nothing to do with our
decisions to run these
operations, " says for-
mer CIA official John
Stockwell.
provided by the CIA, they would not brief
us, but would be willing to brief [Proxmire
at his) request. "
The Senate Intelligence Committee
said any briefing would have to be classi.
fied, according to a Proxmire aide. Prox-
mire declined the briefing, because he
would not have been able to use the infor-
mation in hearings, debates or speeches,
the aide continued.
The GAO incident illustrates two
problems with the oversight process.
One is that even though the GAO is
the investigative arm of Congress, it can-
not look into many types of controversies
involving the agency. By law, the presi-
dent can limit the GAO's access to finan-
cial transactions related to foreign intelli-
give prior notice of any significant antici-
pated intelligence activity.
However, some committee members
and congressional staff say the agency has
not lived up to the spirit of the agreement.
"People mistakenly believe the com-
mittees are fully informed," said one con-
gressional staffer familiar with intelligence
issues. "The agency gives a perfunctory
briefing when they know we're going to
read about it in the papers the next day, so
their asses are covered."
Members' frustrations surfaced in a May
1983 report by the House Intelligence
Committee, which recommended that
Congress prohibit additional funding for
military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua. Committee members made it
clear that they thought the CIA was not
being truthful when it said the only goal of
the contras was to interdict arms allegedly
being shipped from Nicaragua to leftist El
gence or counterintelligence activities. In
addition, the GAO has no authority to
audit the CIA's confidential, extraordi-
nary or emergency expenditures.
The second problem is that the agency
is supposed to brief the intelligence com-
mittees, but the briefings themselves in-
volve classified material that committee
members then cannot discuss publicly.
When the intelligence committees do
try to openly examine CIA policy, they
are excoriated by administration officials.
who accuse them of compromising the
U.S. intelligence system and the nation's
measures "which sought to limit insurgent
activity to arms interdiction . . . [and]
prohibited assistance for the purpose of
overthrowing the government of Nica-
ragua" had "proved ineffective as moder-
ate curbs on insurgent activity or U. S.
policy."
However, the report stated the princi-
pal reason it wanted Congress to cut fund-
ing for the contra program was that Mem-
bers believed it was a failure and "counter-
productive" to long-term U.S. interests in
Central America.
Despite this report and indications
that-as Edgar Chamorro later said-the
agency had consistently lied to Congress
about the goal of the contras and the ways
in which U.S. funds were spent, the com-
mittee's effort to halt the program ulti-
mately failed.
Another indication of Congress' diffi-
culties in overseeing CIA operations can
be seen in the way allegations that the
agency was illegally lobbying Congress
were handled.
According to Edgar Chamorro, these
activities continued for years before Sen.
William Proxmire (D-Wisc. ), who is not
a member of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, asked the GAO to look into
the allegations.
However, "The CIA would not meet
with us to discuss the lobbying activities
alleged by Mr. Chamorro," GAO investi-
gators said in their December 1985 report.
"They stated that they had briefed the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
about Mr. Chamorro's statements... .
The committee staff director stated that
because of the nature of the information
j security.
When Sen. David Durenberger
(R-Minn. ), chairman of the Senate Intel-
ligence Committee, criticized some as-
pects of Casey's policies last November,
the CIA director wrote a letter accusing
him of "the repeated compromise of sensi-
tive intelligence sources and methods. ?" Former CIA personnel pointed out why
this type of response may intimidate com-
mittee members.
"You have to get reelected," Stockwell
said. "You have to deal every day with
pressure from the public, and one little
leak about your past, your background,
your positions, your allies, your whatnot,
and you know, you're sweating blood."
Some Members of Congress believe
ConOnulQ
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Reagan, Casey and national security ad-
visers want to change the oversight proc-
ess because they believe the committees
are obstructing administration policies
program.
CIA spokesperson Kathy Pherson said,
"The CIA works closely with its congres-
swer any questions they might have about
CIA activities. This is a democracy. We
The oversight battle heated up in July,
when the administration announced that
it wanted the CIA to take over supervi-
Many Members of Congress were in-
censed. Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif. )
said the plan would remove agency activi-
ties even further from congressional con-
trol and could lead the country into an-
Nicaragua, he said, "could be a rerun of
Vietnam. First American. money, then
American advisers, then* American con-
Cranston wants the Foreign Relations
Committee to investigate the administra
-
CIA's role, but previous efforts to get a
f H ,
i CIA and contra activities-including al-
legations the rebels were involved in gun-
running, drug trafficking and assassina-
"A lot of people in Congress don't
want a full investigation of the contras
and the CIA," said one congressional
"
staffer.
It would be like opening Pando-
ra's box; they're afraid all kinds of things
Although there seems to be widespread
I sional oversight process is flawed, there is
little agreement on what should be done
about it. Suggestions range from combin-
ing the House and Senate intelligence
committees into one joint committee
with expanded powers to restricting the
CIA to intelligence-gathering and creat-
ing a new agency to handle covert opera-
tions.
But many agency critics believe that no
reforms will occur until the public de-
mands them and is willing to hold the
president responsible for the agency he di-
rectly controls.
"Establishing a truly effective intelli-
gence agency is no problem," noted for-
mer CIA official McGehee. "The only
problem is getting our leaders to want
one. 0
Kathleen McHugh and John Day conm-
buted to this article. Gary Hovatrer, E. B.
Boyd and Peter Schlossman provided research
assistance.
.I,n
0
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