COUPS AND KILLINGS IN KABUL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000100150002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 22, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/18 :CIA-RDP90-005528000100150002-4
STAT
b.Ri ~ C~i I i r::.~':i.=,7 TII'E. MAGAZI l\E
ON P~G~, -1 22 1\QVE"1BER 1982
~a~ps aid K~l~engs in Kabul
A KGB def,~ctor tells how Afghanistan became Brezhnev s iet Nam
1'ladimit' Kuzichkin. 35, a formerKGB major whose presence in Britain
Haas announced by the British government last month, has given an ex-
traordinary account of Soviet involvement in Afghat:istan-perhaps the
greatest blot on Brezhnev's career-as seen by the KGB. Kuzichkin, who
defected to the British last June, had served under cover in Iran for five
years. He was it7 the ultrasecret "Directorate S
"which co
l
"ill
l
"
,
ntro
s
ega
s,
Smie:-born agents abroad. In an exclusive intervier in London last week with TIME?s
Frank .lvlelville, Kuzichkin said: 11 Brezhnev himself overruled repeated advice from
y'uri Andropo~~'s KGB not to turn Afghanistan into a Soviet satellite, ?)Afghan President
Babrak Karmal is a KGB agent of Jong standing, 3) Karmal's predecessor was murdered
in his palace b~? a specially trained, KGB-led Soviet assault group. Kuzichkin 's account:
enior KGB oi~cers rarely let their
hair down about politics. But Af-
ghanistan has exasperated many.
As a former boss (a KGB general) put it
late one night: "Afghanistan is our Viet
Nam. Look at what has happened. We
"- ---- -- `...._ ." s ~ '~? Taraki because Mr. Brezhnev
first place." The general had ca;~ ~:t.-. _ ~ ,..
ghan Communise were in a desperate po-
sition. They consulted the Soviet embassy
in Kabul. Moscow quickly confirmed that
we would support their proposed coup
against Daoud. Just before it was too
late, the Communist leaders ordered the
not by us. Karmal, on the other
hand. we said, understood the need
for subtle policies. Moreover, he
had been a KGB agent for many
Years. He could be relied upon to
accept our advice.
began by simply backing a friendly
regime: slowly we got more deeply
involved; then we staved manipu-
lating the regime-sometimes us-
ing desperate measures-and now?
Now we are bogged down in a war
we cannot win and cannot aban-
don. lt's ridiculous. A mess. And
but for Brezhnev and com>7anv we
- -""~ . ~ ~ good job! Things staved going off
and outside-felt but would not the rails almost at once. Taraki
stick ow necks out to say.
what many of us involved with Af= ,' ~ , ~__~ta he knew Taraki personal-
'-~ `"""' - /~~,? ing Karmal`s supporters (many of
50 yea..*s ve had never had any serf-
kings. Then. in 1973. [Mohammedl ~ ~ Brezhnev would do nothing to stop
in the Soviet leadership was that tarn to ensure there would also be a
massive Mushm insurrection in Af-
this change was for the good. Brezhnev welcoming Babrak Karmal to Moscow in 1980 ghanistan. Taraki`s response was to
Our relations with Daoud were slaughter any opposition within his
never vet)? good. He was keen to keep coup-in fact, from their prison cells. reach. Moscow tried to persuade him that
open his links with the West. He did The coup succeeded, and Afghani- this was a recipe for disaster, he should not
not wish to become too closely involved start went Communist. But Mr. Brezh- repeat Stalin's errors. Taraki told Moscow
with us. Those of us who knew Afghani- nev and his colleagues brushed aside the to mind its own business.
Stan were convinced no harm would come vitally important warnings that the KGB One day things began to look
of that. The Afghans would slaughter was giving them-and disaster ensued. brighter. A man called (Hafizullah) Amin
each other for generations, regardless of At the outset the Politburo felt it now seemingly emerged from nowhere to be
whether they claimed to be Communists, had a chance to make some real head- Taraki`s deputy. He was a cultivated Ori-
It v,~as inconceivable to us that Af- way in Afghanistan. It would pour in ental charmer. Quietly, Amin began to
ghanistan could do any credit to the Sovi- money and advisers. Afghanistan's links take control away from Tasaki. More im-
et Union. ]et alone "Communism.'' The with the West would be gradually sev- ponant. he persuaded Moscow that he
Afghans. we told each other, should be ered..Afghanistan would be not only a would be able to defuse the Muslim
left to stew in their own juice. We could neighboring country with whom we had threat. We at the KGB. though, had doubu
never control them, but neither could ~ good relations. like Firiland. but a neW about Amin from the star. Our investiga-
aa~one else. ~1'e had our first taste of member of the "Communist family." bons showed him to be asmooth-talking
things to come in 197fi. Daoud turned The KGB tried to explain tactfulh? ;fascist who was secretly pro-~~1'estern (he
against the Communists who had helped that a Communist takeove.* in Afghani- !had been eriura~erl ;., Tt,< T,.,:.<
;~' ~ ` ' Sanitized Co A roved for Release 2010/06/18 :CIA-RDP90-005528000100150002-4 `d Sta`~se
pY pp
Daoud as a legitimate ruler. An openly
Communist regime would arouse hostil-
ity that would then be directed against
the Soviet Union.
It was clearly of the utmost impor-
tance that Afghanistan should have the
right leader. The choice was betwcen
Karmal, who headed the Parcham faction
in the Afghan Communist parry, and
[Noor Mohammed] Taraki, who headed
the Khalq faction. We knew a lot about
both men. In the papers we put to the
Politburo, we scrupulously assessed their
strengths and weaknesses. Our assess-
ment made it clear that Taraki would be a
disastrous choice. He was savage by tem-
perament, had little feel for handling
complex political issues, and would be
s?~~?*? easily influenced by his cronies. but