PROGRESS OF RECOVERABLE SATELLITE STUDY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP89B00708R000500140014-5
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 22, 2009
Sequence Number: 
14
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 10, 1957
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP89B00708R000500140014-5.pdf96.48 KB
Body: 
~"~'...1 TO : A. H. Katz ~~ ~ D R j JK +- ii I 1 i ?-.~ FROM M E Davies DA'1o 10 . -~~' ^"""" : Q- ...,_ $ MAR I i SUBJECT:,, PROGRESS OF RECOVERABLE SATELLITE STUDY : X.. 4~d COPIES TO: S. M. Greenfield, R. W. Buchheim, J. H. Huntiicker, H. A. Approved For Release 2009/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B00708R000500140014-5 ;" Lieske, C. Gazley, E. C. Heffern, F. T. Smith, E. J. Barlow W. B. Graham, R. H. Prick The current recoverable satellite study is :still in the formative stages. However, as a result of discussions about a new operational and design philosophy with people at RAND and BMD, certain requirements for the study have become clear: 1)- Since the Lockheed satellite is in-the Air Force R and D program, its overall and component performance should be regarded as the standard case in this study. 2) A point which must receive careful consideration is the 'suggested relationship between a recoverable satellite program and this existing program. In performing the necessary comparisons and describing possible; courses of action, three reconnaissance systems will have to be ti ated: A). The Lockheed visual recce system. B) The Lockheed satellite modified to contain a new payload, consisting of a'camera and film recovery technique. C). An entirely new satellite stage. Possible conclusions of the RAND study might-be a recommendation tlo cancel A and initiate B or C, or continue A and add B to the program as a backup. It is assumed that budgetary constraints would not permit the development of both A and C. Two criteria are suggested for the comparison of these systema. First is the quality and quantity of the pictures given to the interpreters. Second is the complexity of the development problems. The first criterion is fairly well understood, and methods exist for computing the pho'to'graphic performance and simulating pictures. The second criterion is poorly~under- stood and techniques for performing the necessary comparison are. vague. Reliability, development 'time, and cost must be discussed in terms, of system complexity. Finally, the reconnaissance task must be defined and the relative military suitability of each configuration established. M L M 0 R A? N D U M "w cnenged to AUTHQ,;; TY M. E. Davies AFFECTWG THE NATIONAL OEFENb UP THE UNITED ? ~~ STATES WITHIN THE MEANINC OF THE ESPIONAGE 789 AND 794. U4 LAWS. TITLE 18 U.S.C.. SECTIONS Downgrn.~. d RI 3 year i ~f? THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION Of WHICH IN nt.e.rvnls; F D``` ~` 8esic< Approved For Release 2009/10/22: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500140014.-5-.7HORIZED PERSON II