PROSPECTS FOR UNITA IN A PACKAGE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00423R000100110006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 5, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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J t G K t I
DDI- .06 % - 26 y
5 November 1984
25X1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of African and Latin American Analysis
Chief, Africa Division, DDO
Regional Issues Branch, ALA/AF
Prospects for UNITA in a Package Namibia Settlement
1.I Ipassed on to us in ALA your interest in some of the 25X1
details of where southern African negotiations stand and the prospects for
UNITA if there is a settlement.
2. As we understand it, the package the Angolans have offered South
Africa through Frank Wisner llows for a phased withdrawal 25X1
over three years of some 20,000 Cuban troops below the Benguela rail 'line in
exchange for a South African cut off of aid to Savimbi and implementation of
UN Resolution 435. We believe Pretoria will not find Anoola's package
acceptable because it does not pull out enough Cubans fast enough. The
package may nevertheless be used as the basis for further negotitaions.
3. While we do not foresee Luanda and Pretoria reaching an accord in the
near future, we believe that a settlement could eventually emerge with the
following features:
-- A withdrawal of the bulk of Cuban forces from Angola--mostly from
below the Benguela railline--over a period of nine months to a year
and the pullout of most of the balance over another six months to a
year .
-- Implementation of UN Resolution 435--but possibly modified to allow
South African forces to stay in Namibia longer than currently
allowed (435 now mandates a drawdown of South African forces to
1,500 in a six week period).
-- The issue of South African aid to Savimbi finessed with the
understanding on Luanda's part--perhaps reinforced by a vague
declaration by Pretoria--that South African withdrawal from Namibia
would end its aid to UNITA.
We believe that under these circumstances, UNITA has a good chance of
surviving as a major political and military force throughout large areas of
Angola and stands a fair chance of triumphing eventually over the MPLA.
S E C R E T
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J L 1 R L I
4. Current Military Balance Luanda's military situation continues to be
one of slow decline. Its August-September offensive failed to deal the
devastating blow to UNITA the regime had hoped for and UNITA, with ample
supplies from South Africa, continues to press farther north into once
uncontested territory. The overall strength of the Angolan military is on the
order of 100,000 men, of which 35,000 to 45,000 are regular army troops. We
estimate that UNITA's military strength includes some 15,000 regular troops
and 20,000 guerrillas. In addition, Savimbi may have 30,000 generally unarmed
and untrained supporters in UNITA-controlled territory.
5. MPLA Deteriorates. Any agreement to withdraw Cuban forces would have
potentially devastating political consequences for the MPLA. The regime is
riven with factions that cut across lines of tribe, race, politics, military
rank, and generation. Most of these groups are to some degree unhappy with
dos Santos' ruling circle. Outside the MPLA's Kimbundu base (25% of the
population) the general population is largely hostile to the regime. Cuban
forces (and Soviet advisors and hardware) have kept the factions from each
other's throats. Cuban and Soviet bloc troops and advisors have also given
the Angolan military a small measure of confidence that it can stand up to
UNITA and South Africa and have helped keep the provincial governors loyal to
Luanda.
6. We believe that most Angolans are acutely aware that Cuban troops put
the regime in power in 1975, saved it from a coup in 1977, and keep it in
power in 1984. When the Cubans begin to go, many elites and other Angolans
are likely to judge that the regime's ability to govern will be significantly
diminished. The potential for instability within the regime will thus grow,
with possible consequences ranging from the defection of large military units
in the field to a military coup.
7. UNITA Presses Ahead. Savimbi, in our view, will vigorously press any
military advantage resulting from a Cuban pullback. Although the MPLA may
attempt to diminish his drive through negotiations--resulting possibly in a
brief UNITA stand down--we doubt Savimbi will pause long before pressing his
military advantage. If the two sides do reach a modus vivendi, we expect it
to be brief. UNITA, like the MPLA, is likely to cheat and the civil war
probably will resume after a brief pause.
8. Despite any tacit understanding on Luanda's part, Pretoria probably
will give Savimbi a "golden handshake" and even then continue to provide him
with aid through such various supply routes as Namibia, Botswana, Zambia,
Zaire, and the sea. France, moreover, appears more committed than ever to
providing aid to UNITA, although on a smaller scale than South Africa.
9. One wild card that could alter the fortunes of UNITA would be
Savimbi's untimely death. We know Luanda has sent assassination teams to kill
him and will be likely to redouble its efforts as he moves about Angola during
a truce. Even with his death, however, we would expect UNITA to remain a
potent force--with continued South African backing--at least throughout
central and southern Angola. The organization has a well defined political
and military structure and a locally well known second echelon of leaders that
would provide a replacement for Savimbi.
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SECRET
10. Possible US Role. Following an agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal
and parallel implementation of UN resolution 435, we believe the Angolans will
have certain expectations of the US, including the establishment of diplomatic
recognition and the provision of economic assistance to resuscitate the
economy. There also may be an expectation that the US will use its influence
to compel Pretoria to cease aiding UNITA.
11. If the US were to open diplomatic relations with Luanda as well as
orant limited economic assistance, it would represent a setback to UNITA--
unless there is an already agreed upon political reconciliation between UNITA
and the MPLA. However, since South Africa--and Washington for that matter--
are unlikely to aqree to any settlement that does not take into consideration
the interests of UNITA, Savimbi probably will have received sufficient
assurances of continued international support that he would be willing to
trade a Cuban troop withdrawal for a temporary setback on the diplomatic
S E C R E T
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