UPDATED CIA REPORT ON FOOD SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00423R000100090001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FO:R: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Updated CIA Report on Food Situation in
Afghanistan ~
1. The attached is for your signature. 25X1
2. State Department has requested a CIA analysis of the
food situation in Afghanistan as a means of ascertaining the need
for emergency food relief. Press reporting has indicated a
serious food problem in Afghanistan although we have no evidence
to suggest an urgent need on the scale suggested by INR.
Personnel from NESA and OGI have met with State analysts seve-ral
times in recent weeks. We have reached agreement on the type of
analysis we can provide and the timing, given the scarcity of
data and constraints on personnel resources. While we can
adequately address the question of food production, we expect to
encounter some difficulty in assessing the question of food
availability given the sparse collateral information on food
distribution, stocks, pricing, and consumption levels.
3. For your information I have attached the two most recent 25X1
studies on Afghanistan done by NESA and OGI. You should also be 71,
aware that Ambassador Hinton and
the government of Pakistan do not support the State program 25X1
In our view, 25X1
there is little possibility of the food aid reaching Afghanistan
before the onset of winter. 25X1
Attachments:
As stated
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 Central Intelligence Agency
2S SEP 19
DDT- 0-,5W3_ t3T
MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank McNeil
Acting Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
SUBJECT: Updated CIA Report on Food Situation in
Afghanistan
In response to your request of 19 September 1984, we have
begun an analysis of the agriculture and food situation in
Afghanistan. We plan to deliver the first of.the two reports you
have requested on 15 October, focusing on agricultural production
in the non-irrigated farming regions of Afghanistan's northern
plains and the irrigated areas of the Panjshear Valley and around
Herat, the sites of the heaviest fighting. Crop failures in the
non-irrigated region have historically been the cause of most
famines. We plan to examine agricultural conditions in all
areas, including production and distribution, in the second
report which should be available around 1 December. F
25X1
Robert a es
Deputy Director Mr Intelligence
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Afghanistan: Tenuous
Food Situation
Food supplies over the past year probably have
been comparable to levels before the Soviet inva-
sion and adequate to meet current needs. Soviet
operations have caused some disruptions, but have
not significantly reduced overall food supply levels.
Localized shortages of food and high prices have
resulted from disruptions in the distribution system
and poor harvests in a few areas. The high level of
military operations last spring and this summer or
an effort by the Soviets to deny food to the
insurgents and their rural supporters could lead to
serious shortages as early as this winter, and unfa-
vorable weather could lead to widespread shortages
by early next year.
Agricultural Problems and Resiliency 25X1
Since the Soviet invasion, the agricultural sector
has faced numerous disruptions.
large numbers of landowners have
fled the country, taking valuable machinery as well
as financial assets. The flight of more than 3
million people to neighboring Pakistan and Iran
and migration to the cities have reduced the extent
of cultivation as well as demand. Routine mainte-
nance of vineyards, orchards, and irrigation net-
works is being neglected.
The press) (have reported that
military operations have resulted in burned crops,
damaged grainfields, and destroyed irrigation sys-
tems. In some cases the Soviets have deliberately
destroyed crops in retaliation for insurgent opera-
tions. land
along major transportation routes and around mili-
tary bases has fallen out of production either
because the Soviets want a security zone or the
farmers fear for their lives.
The Soviets, however, generally allow the agricul-
tural sector to operate as it did before the invasion.
Government-produced fertilizer, for example, is
sold freely throughout Afghanistan
The primitive nature of Afghanistan's agricultural
sector has softened the impact of the Soviet occupa-
tion. Most farmers operate at the subsistence level
and are not heavily dependent on outside sources of
modern equipment, fuel, chemical fertilizers, im-
proved seeds, or pesticides.
Manpower apparently has been sufficient to sow
and harvest crops, albeit on fewer acres. We believe
some of those who have left the country or migrat-
ed to the cities return to work in the fields during
periods of peak labor demand.
there were good food harvests in most regions
during 1983. The major exception was in the
Khowst Valley, where heavy fighting resulted in
abandoned fields. While we cannot measure pro-
duction of all food crops, we believe the wheat
Secret
DI /EE {V 84-032
10 August 1984
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Major Grain-Producing Regions in Afghanistan
Uandah
'a;~r' Nimruz / I Qandahar
Iran
Helmand
Boundary representation is
not necessarily aumwnatie.
Unclassified
harvest is a useful indicator of total food produc-
tion. We estimate the 1983 wheat crop at between
2.5 and 3.0 million metric tons.
Production of industrial crops, even by government
records, has dropped dramatically. Harvests of
cotton, the most important commercial crop, and
sugar beets have declined by two-thirds since the
mid-1970s. We believe some of the resources in
producing these crops-land and labor-may now
be used in producing basic foodstuffs.
Secret
10 August 1984
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Pakistan
Grain-producing area
Province boundary
Imports Fill Gap
We estimate that slightly more than 300,000 tons 25X1
of wheat were brought into Afghanistan from _the
USSR and Pakistan in 1983. According to
25X1
Soviet and Afghan press report-
ing, wheat imports from the Soviet Union in 1983
were 160,000 to 180,000 tons. Most of the Soviet
grain was sent to Kabul, where the population has
25X1
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Agriculture Before the Invasion
Agriculture is the most important sector of the
economy. In the mid-to-late 1970s, agriculture
provided about 60 percent of national income and
employed 80 percent of the population. Agricultur-
al output grew by 3 percent annually in the mid-
1970s, and the country was roughly self-sufficient
infoodgrain production in 1977.
Afghanistan's cultivated land is scattered through-
out the country, mostly in valleys along rivers and
other sources of water because rainfall is uncertain
and inconsistent. Only 8 million of Afghanistan's
63 million hectares are arable, and throughout the
mid-to-late 1970s Afghan farmers cultivated on
average only about half of the arable land. Total
irrigable area is about 5.3 million hectares, of
which about 2.6 million were irrigated annually,
with the balance remaining fallow. About 1.4
million hectares of irrigated land has adequate
water throughout the year to make double crop-
ping possible.
The production of"foodgrains utilizes 90 percent of
land under cultivation. The remaining 10 percent
has been devoted primarily to fruits, vegetables,
cotton, oil seeds, and fodder crops:
? Wheat, the primary grain crop and main food
staple, is grown on about 60 percent of the total
cultivated area--2.4 million hectares. It is grown
throughout the country and on half of the irrigat-
ed land. In 1976, wheat production reached a
record 2.9 million metric tons, and no imports
were required.
? Corn is the second most important cereal and is
used for human consumption and animal fodder. 25X1
It is planted on about 500,000 hectares, and
average production has been about 800,000 tons.
Corn is grown primarily in the eastern valleys
bordering Pakistan and in the Helmand Valley.
? Rice is grown principally in the north around
Baghlan and Konduz; other rice-growing areas
are Herat, Nangarhar, and Helmand. Rice is
planted on about 200,000 hectares, and peak
production reached about 450,000 tons in 1976.
? Barley is grown on about 300,000 hectares, pri-
marily in rain fed, highland areas with short
growing seasons. It is used for human consump- 25X1
tion and animal feed. Peak output was about
400,000 tons in 1976.
? Truck gardens, cultivated orchards, and vine-
yards, while utilizing less than 10 percent of the
arable land, yield an important harvest of vegeta-
bles, fruits, and nuts. Peak production was about
1.6 million tons in 1976.
increased to nearly 2 million from 750,000 before
the invasio indicate that the
movement of people from rural to urban areas,
disruption of transportation, and the government's
inability to collect grain and other agricultural
products in insurgent-controlled areas left urban
areas with serious shortfalls.
? Most of rural Afghanistan, which is controlled by
the insurgents or is only subject to limited govern-
ment control, apnears to he almnct celf-cnffirient in
food production
most of the insurgents get their food from the local
Secret
/0 August 1984
25X1
population and do not carry large supplies while i.- - - -
operations.F__~ 25X1
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Secret
Military operations and patrols, however, have
interfered with internal and external trading neces-
sary to balance food deficit and surplus areas and
have caused higher prices. Goods used in barter are
visible and subject to destruction or confiscation.
We believe there is now a greater use of and more
demand for money to buy basic commodities and
reduce the risks of transporting goods.
Food supplies in Afghanistan last year probably
were near the levels available before the Soviet
invasion. We believe there were 2.8 to 3.3 million
tons of wheat available from domestic production
and imports to feed roughly 14 million people.
Afghanistan was generally considered self-
sufficient in wheat supplies in 1976, when wheat
production reached 2.9 million tons and the popula-
tion was roughly 14.5 million.
Secret
10 August 1984
Our estimate of the range of food supplies in
Afghanistan leads us to conclude that even at the
lower end of the range there was sufficient food in
the country to feed the population at prewar levels 25X1
if distributed properly. If food supplies were at the
upper range of the estimate, they would have
exceeded minimum requirements by 400,000 tons.
Even when supplies are sufficient, however, prob-
lems in distribution and combat operations could
still lead to spot shortages. Recent reports indicate,
moreover, that supplies probably were greater than
the minimum. For the past year we have had little
reporting of severe food shortages. Extra food
would compensate for the additional inefficiencies
in the system, allow for private stockpiles and
hoarding, especially in the rural areas, and the
destruction of some food supplies from military 25X1
operations and sabotage.
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Preliminary information indicates that food sup-
plies in 1984 generally are still adequate, with the
possible exception of Farah province. Crops pro-
duced thus far this year-primarily winter wheat-
appeared to be of at least normal quantity.
Afghanistan's food supplies, agriculture produc-
tion, and food distribution networks, however, re-
main fragile. The advent of widespread combat
operations or a Soviet effort to deny food supplies
could easily upset the tenuous balance and could
quickly lead to localized shortages. We already
have reports that in the Panjsher Valley, for exam-
ple, the fighting from April to June left crops
rotting in the fields. If large areas of crops go
unharvested and unplanted, and the Soviets block
the main entrances to the valley, the inhabitants
are likely to face shortages this winter. The same
would hold true in other areas of concentrated
military activity.
31 Secret
10 August 1984
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